powerel9
/
xorg-x11-server
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Projects Releases Wiki Activity
Browse Source

add new patches and update tcp listener 

Signed-off-by: Toshaan Bharvani <toshaan@powerel.org>
master
Toshaan Bharvani 4 months ago
parent
3900071377
commit
1397e77c3b
16 changed files with 1082 additions and 1 deletions
Whitespace
Show all changes Ignore whitespace when comparing lines Ignore changes in amount of whitespace Ignore changes in whitespace at EOL
Split View
Diff Options
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File
  1. 36
      SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch
  2. 52
      SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
  3. 72
      SOURCES/0001-configure.ac-search-for-the-fontrootdir-ourselves.patch
  4. 59
      SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
  5. 35
      SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
  6. 77
      SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch
  7. 41
      SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
  8. 180
      SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch
  9. 71
      SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
  10. 183
      SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch
  11. 82
      SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
  12. 48
      SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
  13. 74
      SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
  14. 36
      SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
  15. 35
      SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch
  16. 2
      SOURCES/xvfb-run.sh

36
SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 9ca7d3f61a88ae6cf47fdf139b6215d745db976b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 11:41:40 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: fix potential use-after-free in
DeepCopyPointerClasses

CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec)
---
Xi/exevents.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
index 217baa9561..dcd4efb3bc 100644
--- a/Xi/exevents.c
+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
@@ -619,8 +619,10 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
sizeof(XkbAction));
}
- else
+ else {
free(to->button->xkb_acts);
+ to->button->xkb_acts = NULL;
+ }
memcpy(to->button->labels, from->button->labels,
from->button->numButtons * sizeof(Atom));
--
2.39.0

52
SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/7] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
XTestSwapFakeInput

XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
misparsed.

Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.

Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
doesn't support GenericEvent.

CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
--- a/Xext/xtest.c
+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
/* Swap event */
- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
+ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
/* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
+ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
--
2.38.1

72
SOURCES/0001-configure.ac-search-for-the-fontrootdir-ourselves.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From e67e988730346c63d2f0cdf2531ed36b0c7ad5a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 14:50:29 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] configure.ac: search for the fontrootdir ourselves

This replaces the use of font-utils' .m4 macro set with a copy of the
only one we actually want: the bit for the fontrootpath.

We don't need configure options for every single subfont directory, so
let's hardcode those in the default font path. Like meson does upstream
too.

With this patch we no longer require the font-utils dependency.

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
configure.ac | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0909cc5b4d..2349320888 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ XORG_WITH_XSLTPROC
XORG_ENABLE_UNIT_TESTS
XORG_LD_WRAP([optional])
-m4_ifndef([XORG_FONT_MACROS_VERSION], [m4_fatal([must install font-util 1.1 or later before running autoconf/autogen])])
-XORG_FONT_MACROS_VERSION(1.1)
-
dnl this gets generated by autoheader, and thus contains all the defines. we
dnl don't ever actually use it, internally.
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS(include/do-not-use-config.h)
@@ -450,18 +447,27 @@ AC_MSG_RESULT([$FALLBACK_INPUT_DRIVER])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FALLBACK_INPUT_DRIVER, ["$FALLBACK_INPUT_DRIVER"], [ Fallback input driver ])
dnl Determine font path
-XORG_FONTROOTDIR
-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTMISCDIR, fontmiscdir, misc)
-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTOTFDIR, fontotfdir, OTF)
-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTTTFDIR, fontttfdir, TTF)
-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTTYPE1DIR, fonttype1dir, Type1)
-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONT75DPIDIR, font75dpidir, 75dpi)
-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONT100DPIDIR, font100dpidir, 100dpi)
+dnl This is a copy of XORG_FONTROOTDIR from font-utils so we can drop the dependency
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for root directory for font files])
+AC_ARG_WITH(fontrootdir,
+ AS_HELP_STRING([--with-fontrootdir=DIR],
+ [Path to root directory for font files]),
+ [FONTROOTDIR="$withval"])
+# if --with-fontrootdir not specified...
+if test "x${FONTROOTDIR}" = "x"; then
+ FONTROOTDIR=`$PKG_CONFIG --variable=fontrootdir fontutil`
+fi
+# ...and if pkg-config didn't find fontdir in fontutil.pc...
+if test "x${FONTROOTDIR}" = "x"; then
+ FONTROOTDIR="${datadir}/fonts/X11"
+fi
+AC_SUBST(FONTROOTDIR)
+AC_MSG_RESULT([${FONTROOTDIR}])
dnl Uses --with-default-font-path if set, otherwise uses standard
dnl subdirectories of FONTROOTDIR. Some distros set the default font path to
dnl "catalogue:/etc/X11/fontpath.d,built-ins"
-DEFAULT_FONT_PATH="${FONTMISCDIR}/,${FONTTTFDIR}/,${FONTOTFDIR}/,${FONTTYPE1DIR}/,${FONT100DPIDIR}/,${FONT75DPIDIR}/"
+DEFAULT_FONT_PATH="${FONTROOTDIR}/misc,${FONTROOTDIR}/OTF,${FONTROOTDIR}/TTF,${FONTROOTDIR}/Type1,${FONTROOTDIR}/75dpi,${FONTROOTDIR}/100dpi"
case $host_os in
darwin*) DEFAULT_FONT_PATH="${DEFAULT_FONT_PATH},/Library/Fonts,/System/Library/Fonts" ;;
esac
--
2.38.1

59
SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName

GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
fail somewhere.

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
status = Success;
str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
- if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status)) /* keymap, unsupported */
- return BadMatch;
+ {
+ char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); /* keymap, unsupported */
+ if (keymap) {
+ free(keymap);
+ return BadMatch;
+ }
+ }
names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
- if (status != Success)
+ if (status == Success) {
+ len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
+ if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
+ status = BadLength;
+ }
+
+ if (status != Success) {
+ free(names.keycodes);
+ free(names.types);
+ free(names.compat);
+ free(names.symbols);
+ free(names.geometry);
return status;
- len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
- if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
- return BadLength;
+ }
CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
--
2.38.1

35
SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length
attacks

GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
CARD16 len;
wire = *wire_inout;
+
+ if (client->req_len <
+ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
+ return BadValue;
+
len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&len);
--
2.38.1

77
SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
From c9b379ec5a1a34692af06056925bd0fc5f809713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:40:47 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/3] xkb: switch to array index loops to moving
pointers

Most similar loops here use a pointer that advances with each loop
iteration, let's do the same here for consistency.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f1070c01d616c5f21f939d5ebc533738779451ac)
---
xkb/xkb.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index d056c698c..684394d77 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -5372,16 +5372,16 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
row->left = rWire->left;
row->vertical = rWire->vertical;
kWire = (xkbKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1];
- for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++) {
+ for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
XkbKeyPtr key;
key = XkbAddGeomKey(row);
if (!key)
return BadAlloc;
- memcpy(key->name.name, kWire[k].name, XkbKeyNameLength);
- key->gap = kWire[k].gap;
- key->shape_ndx = kWire[k].shapeNdx;
- key->color_ndx = kWire[k].colorNdx;
+ memcpy(key->name.name, kWire->name, XkbKeyNameLength);
+ key->gap = kWire->gap;
+ key->shape_ndx = kWire->shapeNdx;
+ key->color_ndx = kWire->colorNdx;
if (key->shape_ndx >= geom->num_shapes) {
client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode3(0x10, key->shape_ndx,
geom->num_shapes);
@@ -5393,7 +5393,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
return BadMatch;
}
}
- rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *) &kWire[rWire->nKeys];
+ rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *)kWire;
}
wire = (char *) rWire;
if (sWire->nDoodads > 0) {
@@ -5458,16 +5458,16 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
return BadAlloc;
ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius;
ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1];
- for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++) {
- pt->x = ptWire[p].x;
- pt->y = ptWire[p].y;
+ for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) {
+ pt->x = ptWire->x;
+ pt->y = ptWire->y;
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&pt->x);
swaps(&pt->y);
}
}
ol->num_points = olWire->nPoints;
- olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *) (&ptWire[olWire->nPoints]);
+ olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *)ptWire;
}
if (shapeWire->primaryNdx != XkbNoShape)
shape->primary = &shape->outlines[shapeWire->primaryNdx];
--
2.36.1

41
SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From cb260ba95d2bb1ae98b05e289d1b7947ac409230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
verification failed

Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
+ if (rc != Success)
+ return rc;
len = stuff->nUnits;
if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
+ if (rc != Success)
+ return rc;
+
len = stuff->num_items;
if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
return BadLength;
--
2.38.1

180
SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
From 45a0af83129eb7dc244c5118360afc1972a686c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 09:50:41 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/3] xkb: swap XkbSetDeviceInfo and
XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck

XKB often uses a FooCheck and Foo function pair, the former is supposed
to check all values in the request and error out on BadLength,
BadValue, etc. The latter is then called once we're confident the values
are good (they may still fail on an individual device, but that's a
different topic).

In the case of XkbSetDeviceInfo, those functions were incorrectly
named, with XkbSetDeviceInfo ending up as the checker function and
XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck as the setter function. As a result, the setter
function was called before the checker function, accessing request
data and modifying device state before we ensured that the data is
valid.

In particular, the setter function relied on values being already
byte-swapped. This in turn could lead to potential OOB memory access.

Fix this by correctly naming the functions and moving the length checks
over to the checker function. These were added in 87c64fc5b0 to the
wrong function, probably due to the incorrect naming.

Fixes ZDI-CAN 16070, CVE-2022-2320.

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Introduced in c06e27b2f6fd9f7b9f827623a48876a225264132

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit dd8caf39e9e15d8f302e54045dd08d8ebf1025dc)
---
xkb/xkb.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 684394d77..36464a770 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -6554,7 +6554,8 @@ ProcXkbGetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client)
static char *
CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
DeviceIntPtr dev,
- int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client)
+ int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client,
+ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
{
xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *ledWire;
int i;
@@ -6562,6 +6563,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
ledWire = (xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *) wire;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) {
+ *status_rtrn = BadLength;
+ return (char *) ledWire;
+ }
+
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&ledWire->ledClass);
swaps(&ledWire->ledID);
@@ -6589,6 +6595,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
atomWire = (CARD32 *) &ledWire[1];
if (nNames > 0) {
for (n = 0; n < nNames; n++) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) {
+ *status_rtrn = BadLength;
+ return (char *) atomWire;
+ }
+
if (client->swapped) {
swapl(atomWire);
}
@@ -6600,6 +6611,10 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
mapWire = (xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *) atomWire;
if (nMaps > 0) {
for (n = 0; n < nMaps; n++) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) {
+ *status_rtrn = BadLength;
+ return (char *) mapWire;
+ }
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&mapWire->virtualMods);
swapl(&mapWire->ctrls);
@@ -6651,11 +6666,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *mapWire;
XkbSrvLedInfoPtr sli;
- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) {
- *status_rtrn = BadLength;
- return (char *) ledWire;
- }
-
namec = mapc = statec = 0;
sli = XkbFindSrvLedInfo(dev, ledWire->ledClass, ledWire->ledID,
XkbXI_IndicatorMapsMask);
@@ -6674,10 +6684,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
memset((char *) sli->names, 0, XkbNumIndicators * sizeof(Atom));
for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) {
if (ledWire->namesPresent & bit) {
- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) {
- *status_rtrn = BadLength;
- return (char *) atomWire;
- }
sli->names[n] = (Atom) *atomWire;
if (sli->names[n] == None)
ledWire->namesPresent &= ~bit;
@@ -6695,10 +6701,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
if (ledWire->mapsPresent) {
for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) {
if (ledWire->mapsPresent & bit) {
- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) {
- *status_rtrn = BadLength;
- return (char *) mapWire;
- }
sli->maps[n].flags = mapWire->flags;
sli->maps[n].which_groups = mapWire->whichGroups;
sli->maps[n].groups = mapWire->groups;
@@ -6734,13 +6736,17 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire,
}
static int
-_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
+_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
{
char *wire;
wire = (char *) &stuff[1];
if (stuff->change & XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask) {
+ int sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc);
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (!dev->button) {
client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(XkbErr_BadClass, ButtonClass);
return XkbKeyboardErrorCode;
@@ -6751,13 +6757,13 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
dev->button->numButtons);
return BadMatch;
}
- wire += (stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc));
+ wire += sz;
}
if (stuff->change & XkbXI_IndicatorsMask) {
int status = Success;
wire = CheckSetDeviceIndicators(wire, dev, stuff->nDeviceLedFBs,
- &status, client);
+ &status, client, stuff);
if (status != Success)
return status;
}
@@ -6768,8 +6774,8 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
}
static int
-_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
- xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
+_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
+ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff)
{
char *wire;
xkbExtensionDeviceNotify ed;
@@ -6793,8 +6799,6 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
if (stuff->firstBtn + stuff->nBtns > nBtns)
return BadValue;
sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc);
- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz))
- return BadLength;
memcpy((char *) &acts[stuff->firstBtn], (char *) wire, sz);
wire += sz;
ed.reason |= XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask;
--
2.36.1

71
SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
From a16f2b9693d248b81703821fd22fba8b5ba83e1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/7] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
ProcXIChangeProperty

This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.

Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.

The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.

The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
so let's fix that too.

CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
dix/property.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
DeviceIntPtr dev;
unsigned long len;
- int totalSize;
+ uint64_t totalSize;
int rc;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
{
int rc;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
- int totalSize;
+ uint64_t totalSize;
unsigned long len;
REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
--- a/dix/property.c
+++ b/dix/property.c
@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
WindowPtr pWin;
char format, mode;
unsigned long len;
- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
+ int sizeInBytes, err;
+ uint64_t totalSize;
REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
--
2.38.1

183
SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
From bd134231e282d9eb126b6fdaa40bb383180fa72b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 11:11:06 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/3] xkb: add request length validation for
XkbSetGeometry

No validation of the various fields on that report were done, so a
malicious client could send a short request that claims it had N
sections, or rows, or keys, and the server would process the request for
N sections, running out of bounds of the actual request data.

Fix this by adding size checks to ensure our data is valid.

ZDI-CAN 16062, CVE-2022-2319.

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42)
---
xkb/xkb.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 36464a770..27d19793e 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -5160,7 +5160,7 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
}
static Status
-_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
+_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req,
XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client)
{
char *wire;
@@ -5171,6 +5171,9 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
Status status;
dWire = (xkbDoodadWireDesc *) (*wire_inout);
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, dWire, dWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
any = dWire->any;
wire = (char *) &dWire[1];
if (client->swapped) {
@@ -5273,7 +5276,7 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout,
}
static Status
-_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
+_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req,
XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client)
{
register int r;
@@ -5284,6 +5287,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
wire = *wire_inout;
olWire = (xkbOverlayWireDesc *) wire;
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (client->swapped) {
swapl(&olWire->name);
}
@@ -5295,6 +5301,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *kWire;
XkbOverlayRowPtr row;
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (rWire->rowUnder > section->num_rows) {
client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode4(0x20, r, section->num_rows,
rWire->rowUnder);
@@ -5303,6 +5312,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout,
row = XkbAddGeomOverlayRow(ol, rWire->rowUnder, rWire->nKeys);
kWire = (xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1];
for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (XkbAddGeomOverlayKey(ol, row,
(char *) kWire->over,
(char *) kWire->under) == NULL) {
@@ -5336,6 +5348,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
register int r;
xkbRowWireDesc *rWire;
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, sWire, sWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (client->swapped) {
swapl(&sWire->name);
swaps(&sWire->top);
@@ -5361,6 +5376,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
XkbRowPtr row;
xkbKeyWireDesc *kWire;
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rWire->top);
swaps(&rWire->left);
@@ -5375,6 +5393,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) {
XkbKeyPtr key;
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
key = XkbAddGeomKey(row);
if (!key)
return BadAlloc;
@@ -5400,7 +5421,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
register int d;
for (d = 0; d < sWire->nDoodads; d++) {
- status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, section, client);
+ status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, section, client);
if (status != Success)
return status;
}
@@ -5409,7 +5430,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
register int o;
for (o = 0; o < sWire->nOverlays; o++) {
- status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, geom, section, client);
+ status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, req, geom, section, client);
if (status != Success)
return status;
}
@@ -5443,6 +5464,9 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
xkbOutlineWireDesc *olWire;
XkbOutlinePtr ol;
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, shapeWire, shapeWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
shape =
XkbAddGeomShape(geom, shapeWire->name, shapeWire->nOutlines);
if (!shape)
@@ -5453,12 +5477,18 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom,
XkbPointPtr pt;
xkbPointWireDesc *ptWire;
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
ol = XkbAddGeomOutline(shape, olWire->nPoints);
if (!ol)
return BadAlloc;
ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius;
ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1];
for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, ptWire, ptWire + 1))
+ return BadLength;
+
pt->x = ptWire->x;
pt->y = ptWire->y;
if (client->swapped) {
@@ -5564,12 +5594,15 @@ _CheckSetGeom(XkbGeometryPtr geom, xkbSetGeometryReq * req, ClientPtr client)
return status;
for (i = 0; i < req->nDoodads; i++) {
- status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, NULL, client);
+ status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, NULL, client);
if (status != Success)
return status;
}
for (i = 0; i < req->nKeyAliases; i++) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, wire, wire + XkbKeyNameLength))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (XkbAddGeomKeyAlias(geom, &wire[XkbKeyNameLength], wire) == NULL)
return BadAlloc;
wire += 2 * XkbKeyNameLength;
--
2.36.1

82
SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From be6bcbfa3f388ca0705db8baf10fa5c2d29b7d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/7] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255

The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
anyway.

This fixes an OOB write:

ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
representing stuff->detail cleared.

However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.

CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
index 2769fb7c94..c9ac2f8553 100644
--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
return BadValue;
}
+ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
+ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
+ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
+ if (stuff->detail > 255)
+ return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
+
if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
return BadValue;
@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
&param, XI2, &mask);
break;
case XIGrabtypeKeycode:
- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
- * cannot work anyway */
- if (stuff->detail > 255)
- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed;
- else
- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
- &param, XI2, &mask);
+ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
+ &param, XI2, &mask);
break;
case XIGrabtypeEnter:
case XIGrabtypeFocusIn:
@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
return BadValue;
}
+ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
+ if (stuff->detail > 255) {
+ client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
+ return BadValue;
+ }
+
rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
--
2.38.1

48
SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 6b59bdddf30dde413c4e0391cf84f3b94d4b4e31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/7] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
replacing it

This fixes a use-after-free bug:

When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
resources.

When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.

Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.

Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.

CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
--- a/Xext/saver.c
+++ b/Xext/saver.c
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
pVlist++;
}
if (pPriv->attr)
- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
+ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
pPriv->attr = pAttr;
pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
--
2.38.1

74
SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
From 40f06ae1bd12f4416df59382324a0d31ab2ba704 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
from the same client

This fixes a use-after-free bug:

When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
is added twice to the resources:
- as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
- as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.

The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
and free the whole list.

However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
client's resources.

If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.

Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.

Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
again when the client quits.

Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.

CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
tpn = pn;
while (tpn) {
if (tpn->client == client) {
- if (!onoff)
+ if (!onoff) {
tpn->client = NULL;
+ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
+ }
return Success;
}
if (!tpn->client)
--
2.38.1

36
SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 9c70f90b24ba5de5eeb8a854c25f72a38d497fb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/7] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
freeing it

Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
already freed memory.

CVE-2022-46283, ZDI-CAN-19530

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
}
else {
free(dst->names->radio_groups);
+ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
}
dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
--
2.38.1

35
SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:06:45 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xext: fix invalid event type mask in
XTestSwapFakeInput

In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to
hexadecimal 0x177.

Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63
Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput

Found by Stuart Cassoff

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/xtest.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
index 2985a4ce6e..dde5c4cf9d 100644
--- a/Xext/xtest.c
+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
- int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0177;
/* Swap event */
proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
/* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
--
2.38.1

2
SOURCES/xvfb-run.sh
Unescape View File

@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ while :; do @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ while :; do
-f|--auth-file) AUTHFILE="$2"; shift ;;
-h|--help) SHOWHELP="yes" ;;
-n|--server-num) SERVERNUM="$2"; shift ;;
-l|--listen-tcp) LISTENTCP="" ;;
-l|--listen-tcp) LISTENTCP="-listen tcp" ;;
-p|--xauth-protocol) XAUTHPROTO="$2"; shift ;;
-s|--server-args) XVFBARGS="$2"; shift ;;
-w|--wait) STARTWAIT="$2"; shift ;;

Write Preview
Loading…
Cancel
Save