diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch b/SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b64bb1f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-Xi-fix-potential-use-after-free-in-DeepCopyPointerCl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 9ca7d3f61a88ae6cf47fdf139b6215d745db976b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 11:41:40 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: fix potential use-after-free in + DeepCopyPointerClasses + +CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec) +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index 217baa9561..dcd4efb3bc 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -619,8 +619,10 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, + sizeof(XkbAction)); + } +- else ++ else { + free(to->button->xkb_acts); ++ to->button->xkb_acts = NULL; ++ } + + memcpy(to->button->labels, from->button->labels, + from->button->numButtons * sizeof(Atom)); +-- +2.39.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch b/SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e671d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/7] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in + XTestSwapFakeInput + +XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are +sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments. +However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes, +so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be +misparsed. + +Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct +xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes, +swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast. + +Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent. +Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest +doesn't support GenericEvent. + +CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c +index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644 +--- a/Xext/xtest.c ++++ b/Xext/xtest.c +@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req) + + nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent); + for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) { ++ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177; + /* Swap event */ +- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177]; ++ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype]; + /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */ +- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) { ++ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) { + client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type; + return BadValue; + } +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-configure.ac-search-for-the-fontrootdir-ourselves.patch b/SOURCES/0001-configure.ac-search-for-the-fontrootdir-ourselves.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e29358 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-configure.ac-search-for-the-fontrootdir-ourselves.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From e67e988730346c63d2f0cdf2531ed36b0c7ad5a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 14:50:29 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] configure.ac: search for the fontrootdir ourselves + +This replaces the use of font-utils' .m4 macro set with a copy of the +only one we actually want: the bit for the fontrootpath. + +We don't need configure options for every single subfont directory, so +let's hardcode those in the default font path. Like meson does upstream +too. + +With this patch we no longer require the font-utils dependency. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + configure.ac | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 0909cc5b4d..2349320888 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ XORG_WITH_XSLTPROC + XORG_ENABLE_UNIT_TESTS + XORG_LD_WRAP([optional]) + +-m4_ifndef([XORG_FONT_MACROS_VERSION], [m4_fatal([must install font-util 1.1 or later before running autoconf/autogen])]) +-XORG_FONT_MACROS_VERSION(1.1) +- + dnl this gets generated by autoheader, and thus contains all the defines. we + dnl don't ever actually use it, internally. + AC_CONFIG_HEADERS(include/do-not-use-config.h) +@@ -450,18 +447,27 @@ AC_MSG_RESULT([$FALLBACK_INPUT_DRIVER]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FALLBACK_INPUT_DRIVER, ["$FALLBACK_INPUT_DRIVER"], [ Fallback input driver ]) + + dnl Determine font path +-XORG_FONTROOTDIR +-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTMISCDIR, fontmiscdir, misc) +-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTOTFDIR, fontotfdir, OTF) +-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTTTFDIR, fontttfdir, TTF) +-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONTTYPE1DIR, fonttype1dir, Type1) +-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONT75DPIDIR, font75dpidir, 75dpi) +-XORG_FONTSUBDIR(FONT100DPIDIR, font100dpidir, 100dpi) ++dnl This is a copy of XORG_FONTROOTDIR from font-utils so we can drop the dependency ++AC_MSG_CHECKING([for root directory for font files]) ++AC_ARG_WITH(fontrootdir, ++ AS_HELP_STRING([--with-fontrootdir=DIR], ++ [Path to root directory for font files]), ++ [FONTROOTDIR="$withval"]) ++# if --with-fontrootdir not specified... ++if test "x${FONTROOTDIR}" = "x"; then ++ FONTROOTDIR=`$PKG_CONFIG --variable=fontrootdir fontutil` ++fi ++# ...and if pkg-config didn't find fontdir in fontutil.pc... ++if test "x${FONTROOTDIR}" = "x"; then ++ FONTROOTDIR="${datadir}/fonts/X11" ++fi ++AC_SUBST(FONTROOTDIR) ++AC_MSG_RESULT([${FONTROOTDIR}]) + + dnl Uses --with-default-font-path if set, otherwise uses standard + dnl subdirectories of FONTROOTDIR. Some distros set the default font path to + dnl "catalogue:/etc/X11/fontpath.d,built-ins" +-DEFAULT_FONT_PATH="${FONTMISCDIR}/,${FONTTTFDIR}/,${FONTOTFDIR}/,${FONTTYPE1DIR}/,${FONT100DPIDIR}/,${FONT75DPIDIR}/" ++DEFAULT_FONT_PATH="${FONTROOTDIR}/misc,${FONTROOTDIR}/OTF,${FONTROOTDIR}/TTF,${FONTROOTDIR}/Type1,${FONTROOTDIR}/75dpi,${FONTROOTDIR}/100dpi" + case $host_os in + darwin*) DEFAULT_FONT_PATH="${DEFAULT_FONT_PATH},/Library/Fonts,/System/Library/Fonts" ;; + esac +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e5ebb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName + +GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we +fail somewhere. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client) + xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc; + status = Success; + str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1]; +- if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status)) /* keymap, unsupported */ +- return BadMatch; ++ { ++ char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); /* keymap, unsupported */ ++ if (keymap) { ++ free(keymap); ++ return BadMatch; ++ } ++ } + names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); +- if (status != Success) ++ if (status == Success) { ++ len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff); ++ if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length) ++ status = BadLength; ++ } ++ ++ if (status != Success) { ++ free(names.keycodes); ++ free(names.types); ++ free(names.compat); ++ free(names.symbols); ++ free(names.geometry); + return status; +- len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff); +- if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length) +- return BadLength; ++ } + + CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask); + CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask); +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d358a32 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length + attacks + +GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the +request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length +field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a +swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str) + CARD16 len; + + wire = *wire_inout; ++ ++ if (client->req_len < ++ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer)) ++ return BadValue; ++ + len = *(CARD16 *) wire; + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&len); +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be7b84f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From c9b379ec5a1a34692af06056925bd0fc5f809713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:40:47 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/3] xkb: switch to array index loops to moving + pointers + +Most similar loops here use a pointer that advances with each loop +iteration, let's do the same here for consistency. + +No functional changes. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan +(cherry picked from commit f1070c01d616c5f21f939d5ebc533738779451ac) +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index d056c698c..684394d77 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -5372,16 +5372,16 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + row->left = rWire->left; + row->vertical = rWire->vertical; + kWire = (xkbKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1]; +- for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++) { ++ for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) { + XkbKeyPtr key; + + key = XkbAddGeomKey(row); + if (!key) + return BadAlloc; +- memcpy(key->name.name, kWire[k].name, XkbKeyNameLength); +- key->gap = kWire[k].gap; +- key->shape_ndx = kWire[k].shapeNdx; +- key->color_ndx = kWire[k].colorNdx; ++ memcpy(key->name.name, kWire->name, XkbKeyNameLength); ++ key->gap = kWire->gap; ++ key->shape_ndx = kWire->shapeNdx; ++ key->color_ndx = kWire->colorNdx; + if (key->shape_ndx >= geom->num_shapes) { + client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode3(0x10, key->shape_ndx, + geom->num_shapes); +@@ -5393,7 +5393,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + return BadMatch; + } + } +- rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *) &kWire[rWire->nKeys]; ++ rWire = (xkbRowWireDesc *)kWire; + } + wire = (char *) rWire; + if (sWire->nDoodads > 0) { +@@ -5458,16 +5458,16 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + return BadAlloc; + ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius; + ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1]; +- for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++) { +- pt->x = ptWire[p].x; +- pt->y = ptWire[p].y; ++ for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) { ++ pt->x = ptWire->x; ++ pt->y = ptWire->y; + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&pt->x); + swaps(&pt->y); + } + } + ol->num_points = olWire->nPoints; +- olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *) (&ptWire[olWire->nPoints]); ++ olWire = (xkbOutlineWireDesc *)ptWire; + } + if (shapeWire->primaryNdx != XkbNoShape) + shape->primary = &shape->outlines[shapeWire->primaryNdx]; +-- +2.36.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch b/SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33bcb88 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From cb260ba95d2bb1ae98b05e289d1b7947ac409230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/7] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if + verification failed + +Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the +property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) + + rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type, + stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits); ++ if (rc != Success) ++ return rc; + + len = stuff->nUnits; + if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq)))) +@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) + + rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type, + stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items); ++ if (rc != Success) ++ return rc; ++ + len = stuff->num_items; + if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq))) + return BadLength; +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch b/SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26cf147 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +From 45a0af83129eb7dc244c5118360afc1972a686c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 09:50:41 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/3] xkb: swap XkbSetDeviceInfo and + XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck + +XKB often uses a FooCheck and Foo function pair, the former is supposed +to check all values in the request and error out on BadLength, +BadValue, etc. The latter is then called once we're confident the values +are good (they may still fail on an individual device, but that's a +different topic). + +In the case of XkbSetDeviceInfo, those functions were incorrectly +named, with XkbSetDeviceInfo ending up as the checker function and +XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck as the setter function. As a result, the setter +function was called before the checker function, accessing request +data and modifying device state before we ensured that the data is +valid. + +In particular, the setter function relied on values being already +byte-swapped. This in turn could lead to potential OOB memory access. + +Fix this by correctly naming the functions and moving the length checks +over to the checker function. These were added in 87c64fc5b0 to the +wrong function, probably due to the incorrect naming. + +Fixes ZDI-CAN 16070, CVE-2022-2320. + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Introduced in c06e27b2f6fd9f7b9f827623a48876a225264132 + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +(cherry picked from commit dd8caf39e9e15d8f302e54045dd08d8ebf1025dc) +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- + 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 684394d77..36464a770 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -6554,7 +6554,8 @@ ProcXkbGetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client) + static char * + CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + DeviceIntPtr dev, +- int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client) ++ int num, int *status_rtrn, ClientPtr client, ++ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) + { + xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *ledWire; + int i; +@@ -6562,6 +6563,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + + ledWire = (xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *) wire; + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) { ++ *status_rtrn = BadLength; ++ return (char *) ledWire; ++ } ++ + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&ledWire->ledClass); + swaps(&ledWire->ledID); +@@ -6589,6 +6595,11 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + atomWire = (CARD32 *) &ledWire[1]; + if (nNames > 0) { + for (n = 0; n < nNames; n++) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) { ++ *status_rtrn = BadLength; ++ return (char *) atomWire; ++ } ++ + if (client->swapped) { + swapl(atomWire); + } +@@ -6600,6 +6611,10 @@ CheckSetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + mapWire = (xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *) atomWire; + if (nMaps > 0) { + for (n = 0; n < nMaps; n++) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) { ++ *status_rtrn = BadLength; ++ return (char *) mapWire; ++ } + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&mapWire->virtualMods); + swapl(&mapWire->ctrls); +@@ -6651,11 +6666,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *mapWire; + XkbSrvLedInfoPtr sli; + +- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) { +- *status_rtrn = BadLength; +- return (char *) ledWire; +- } +- + namec = mapc = statec = 0; + sli = XkbFindSrvLedInfo(dev, ledWire->ledClass, ledWire->ledID, + XkbXI_IndicatorMapsMask); +@@ -6674,10 +6684,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + memset((char *) sli->names, 0, XkbNumIndicators * sizeof(Atom)); + for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { + if (ledWire->namesPresent & bit) { +- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) { +- *status_rtrn = BadLength; +- return (char *) atomWire; +- } + sli->names[n] = (Atom) *atomWire; + if (sli->names[n] == None) + ledWire->namesPresent &= ~bit; +@@ -6695,10 +6701,6 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + if (ledWire->mapsPresent) { + for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { + if (ledWire->mapsPresent & bit) { +- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) { +- *status_rtrn = BadLength; +- return (char *) mapWire; +- } + sli->maps[n].flags = mapWire->flags; + sli->maps[n].which_groups = mapWire->whichGroups; + sli->maps[n].groups = mapWire->groups; +@@ -6734,13 +6736,17 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + } + + static int +-_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, ++_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, + xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) + { + char *wire; + + wire = (char *) &stuff[1]; + if (stuff->change & XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask) { ++ int sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc); ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (!dev->button) { + client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(XkbErr_BadClass, ButtonClass); + return XkbKeyboardErrorCode; +@@ -6751,13 +6757,13 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, + dev->button->numButtons); + return BadMatch; + } +- wire += (stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc)); ++ wire += sz; + } + if (stuff->change & XkbXI_IndicatorsMask) { + int status = Success; + + wire = CheckSetDeviceIndicators(wire, dev, stuff->nDeviceLedFBs, +- &status, client); ++ &status, client, stuff); + if (status != Success) + return status; + } +@@ -6768,8 +6774,8 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, + } + + static int +-_XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, +- xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) ++_XkbSetDeviceInfo(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, ++ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) + { + char *wire; + xkbExtensionDeviceNotify ed; +@@ -6793,8 +6799,6 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, + if (stuff->firstBtn + stuff->nBtns > nBtns) + return BadValue; + sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc); +- if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz)) +- return BadLength; + memcpy((char *) &acts[stuff->firstBtn], (char *) wire, sz); + wire += sz; + ed.reason |= XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask; +-- +2.36.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch b/SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d9f505 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From a16f2b9693d248b81703821fd22fba8b5ba83e1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/7] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcXIChangeProperty + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty, +so let's fix that too. + +CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + dix/property.c | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) + REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); + DeviceIntPtr dev; + unsigned long len; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int rc; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); +@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) + { + int rc; + DeviceIntPtr dev; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + unsigned long len; + + REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq); +diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c +index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644 +--- a/dix/property.c ++++ b/dix/property.c +@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) + WindowPtr pWin; + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; +- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err; ++ int sizeInBytes, err; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + + REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq); + +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch b/SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4200896 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +From bd134231e282d9eb126b6fdaa40bb383180fa72b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 11:11:06 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/3] xkb: add request length validation for + XkbSetGeometry + +No validation of the various fields on that report were done, so a +malicious client could send a short request that claims it had N +sections, or rows, or keys, and the server would process the request for +N sections, running out of bounds of the actual request data. + +Fix this by adding size checks to ensure our data is valid. + +ZDI-CAN 16062, CVE-2022-2319. + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +(cherry picked from commit 6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42) +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 36464a770..27d19793e 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -5160,7 +5160,7 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str) + } + + static Status +-_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, ++_CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req, + XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client) + { + char *wire; +@@ -5171,6 +5171,9 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, + Status status; + + dWire = (xkbDoodadWireDesc *) (*wire_inout); ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, dWire, dWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + any = dWire->any; + wire = (char *) &dWire[1]; + if (client->swapped) { +@@ -5273,7 +5276,7 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, + } + + static Status +-_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, ++_CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, xkbSetGeometryReq *req, + XkbGeometryPtr geom, XkbSectionPtr section, ClientPtr client) + { + register int r; +@@ -5284,6 +5287,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, + + wire = *wire_inout; + olWire = (xkbOverlayWireDesc *) wire; ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (client->swapped) { + swapl(&olWire->name); + } +@@ -5295,6 +5301,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, + xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *kWire; + XkbOverlayRowPtr row; + ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (rWire->rowUnder > section->num_rows) { + client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode4(0x20, r, section->num_rows, + rWire->rowUnder); +@@ -5303,6 +5312,9 @@ _CheckSetOverlay(char **wire_inout, + row = XkbAddGeomOverlayRow(ol, rWire->rowUnder, rWire->nKeys); + kWire = (xkbOverlayKeyWireDesc *) &rWire[1]; + for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (XkbAddGeomOverlayKey(ol, row, + (char *) kWire->over, + (char *) kWire->under) == NULL) { +@@ -5336,6 +5348,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + register int r; + xkbRowWireDesc *rWire; + ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, sWire, sWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (client->swapped) { + swapl(&sWire->name); + swaps(&sWire->top); +@@ -5361,6 +5376,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + XkbRowPtr row; + xkbKeyWireDesc *kWire; + ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, rWire, rWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&rWire->top); + swaps(&rWire->left); +@@ -5375,6 +5393,9 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + for (k = 0; k < rWire->nKeys; k++, kWire++) { + XkbKeyPtr key; + ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, kWire, kWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + key = XkbAddGeomKey(row); + if (!key) + return BadAlloc; +@@ -5400,7 +5421,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + register int d; + + for (d = 0; d < sWire->nDoodads; d++) { +- status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, section, client); ++ status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, section, client); + if (status != Success) + return status; + } +@@ -5409,7 +5430,7 @@ _CheckSetSections(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + register int o; + + for (o = 0; o < sWire->nOverlays; o++) { +- status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, geom, section, client); ++ status = _CheckSetOverlay(&wire, req, geom, section, client); + if (status != Success) + return status; + } +@@ -5443,6 +5464,9 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + xkbOutlineWireDesc *olWire; + XkbOutlinePtr ol; + ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, shapeWire, shapeWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + shape = + XkbAddGeomShape(geom, shapeWire->name, shapeWire->nOutlines); + if (!shape) +@@ -5453,12 +5477,18 @@ _CheckSetShapes(XkbGeometryPtr geom, + XkbPointPtr pt; + xkbPointWireDesc *ptWire; + ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, olWire, olWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + ol = XkbAddGeomOutline(shape, olWire->nPoints); + if (!ol) + return BadAlloc; + ol->corner_radius = olWire->cornerRadius; + ptWire = (xkbPointWireDesc *) &olWire[1]; + for (p = 0, pt = ol->points; p < olWire->nPoints; p++, pt++, ptWire++) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, ptWire, ptWire + 1)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + pt->x = ptWire->x; + pt->y = ptWire->y; + if (client->swapped) { +@@ -5564,12 +5594,15 @@ _CheckSetGeom(XkbGeometryPtr geom, xkbSetGeometryReq * req, ClientPtr client) + return status; + + for (i = 0; i < req->nDoodads; i++) { +- status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, geom, NULL, client); ++ status = _CheckSetDoodad(&wire, req, geom, NULL, client); + if (status != Success) + return status; + } + + for (i = 0; i < req->nKeyAliases; i++) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, wire, wire + XkbKeyNameLength)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (XkbAddGeomKeyAlias(geom, &wire[XkbKeyNameLength], wire) == NULL) + return BadAlloc; + wire += 2 * XkbKeyNameLength; +-- +2.36.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch b/SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c34054b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From be6bcbfa3f388ca0705db8baf10fa5c2d29b7d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/7] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255 + +The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above +255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche +to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero +anyway. + +This fixes an OOB write: + +ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a +temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail. +For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the +stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit +representing stuff->detail cleared. + +However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits, +thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write. + +CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +index 2769fb7c94..c9ac2f8553 100644 +--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c ++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + return BadValue; + } + ++ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never ++ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that ++ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */ ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) ++ return XIAlreadyGrabbed; ++ + if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1], + stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success) + return BadValue; +@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + ¶m, XI2, &mask); + break; + case XIGrabtypeKeycode: +- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never +- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that +- * cannot work anyway */ +- if (stuff->detail > 255) +- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed; +- else +- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, +- ¶m, XI2, &mask); ++ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, ++ ¶m, XI2, &mask); + break; + case XIGrabtypeEnter: + case XIGrabtypeFocusIn: +@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + return BadValue; + } + ++ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */ ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) { ++ client->errorValue = stuff->detail; ++ return BadValue; ++ } ++ + rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess); + if (rc != Success) + return rc; +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch b/SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92bb46f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 6b59bdddf30dde413c4e0391cf84f3b94d4b4e31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/7] Xext: free the screen saver resource when + replacing it + +This fixes a use-after-free bug: + +When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct +ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's +resources. + +When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new +struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The +old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources. + +Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes +ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct. + +Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead. + +CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + Xext/saver.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c +index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644 +--- a/Xext/saver.c ++++ b/Xext/saver.c +@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client) + pVlist++; + } + if (pPriv->attr) +- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr); ++ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType); + pPriv->attr = pAttr; + pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index); + if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr)) +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch b/SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9164d95 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From 40f06ae1bd12f4416df59382324a0d31ab2ba704 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/7] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off + from the same client + +This fixes a use-after-free bug: + +When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a +TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct +is added twice to the resources: + - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per + drawable, subsequent calls append to this list. + - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client. + +The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a +client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove +all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting +the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove +and free the whole list. + +However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the +same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the +existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the +client's resources. + +If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes +XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable +- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource +for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL. + +Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On +a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon. + +Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely +setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client +resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed +again when the client quits. + +Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for +clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify. + +CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c +index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644 +--- a/Xext/xvmain.c ++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c +@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff) + tpn = pn; + while (tpn) { + if (tpn->client == client) { +- if (!onoff) ++ if (!onoff) { + tpn->client = NULL; ++ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify); ++ } + return Success; + } + if (!tpn->client) +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch b/SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44b78dd --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 9c70f90b24ba5de5eeb8a854c25f72a38d497fb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 7/7] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after + freeing it + +Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not +reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access +already freed memory. + +CVE-2022-46283, ZDI-CAN-19530 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c +index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c ++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c +@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst) + } + else { + free(dst->names->radio_groups); ++ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL; + } + dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg; + +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch b/SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c84d387 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0008-Xext-fix-invalid-event-type-mask-in-XTestSwapFakeInp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:06:45 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xext: fix invalid event type mask in + XTestSwapFakeInput + +In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to +hexadecimal 0x177. + +Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 + Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput + +Found by Stuart Cassoff + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xext/xtest.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c +index 2985a4ce6e..dde5c4cf9d 100644 +--- a/Xext/xtest.c ++++ b/Xext/xtest.c +@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req) + + nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent); + for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) { +- int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177; ++ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0177; + /* Swap event */ + proc = EventSwapVector[evtype]; + /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */ +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xvfb-run.sh b/SOURCES/xvfb-run.sh index 9d088c1..5d4447b 100644 --- a/SOURCES/xvfb-run.sh +++ b/SOURCES/xvfb-run.sh @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ while :; do -f|--auth-file) AUTHFILE="$2"; shift ;; -h|--help) SHOWHELP="yes" ;; -n|--server-num) SERVERNUM="$2"; shift ;; - -l|--listen-tcp) LISTENTCP="" ;; + -l|--listen-tcp) LISTENTCP="-listen tcp" ;; -p|--xauth-protocol) XAUTHPROTO="$2"; shift ;; -s|--server-args) XVFBARGS="$2"; shift ;; -w|--wait) STARTWAIT="$2"; shift ;;