This addresses CVE-2025-46334, Git GUI malicious command injection on
Windows.
A malicious repository can ship versions of sh.exe or typical textconv
filter programs such as astextplain. Due to the unfortunate design of
Tcl on Windows, the search path when looking for an executable always
includes the current directory. The mentioned programs are invoked when
the user selects "Git Bash" or "Browse Files" from the menu.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
This addresses CVE-2025-27613, Gitk can create and truncate a user's
files:
When a user clones an untrusted repository and runs gitk without
additional command arguments, files for which the user has write
permission can be created and truncated. The option "Support per-file
encoding" must have been enabled before in Gitk's Preferences. This
option is disabled by default.
The same happens when "Show origin of this line" is used in the main
window (regardless of whether "Support per-file encoding" is enabled or
not).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
This addresses CVE-2025-27614, Arbitrary command execution with Gitk:
A Git repository can be crafted in such a way that with some social
engineering a user who has cloned the repository can be tricked into
running any script (e.g., Bourne shell, Perl, Python, ...) supplied by
the attacker by invoking `gitk filename`, where `filename` has a
particular structure. The script is run with the privileges of the user.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Since aae9560a35 (Work around Tcl's default `PATH` lookup,
2022-11-23), git-gui overrides exec and open on all platforms. But,
this was done in response to Tcl adding elements to $PATH on Windows,
while exec, open, and auto_execok honor $PATH as given on all other
platforms.
Let's do the override only on Windows, restoring others to using their
native exec and open. These honor the sanitized $PATH as that is written
out to env(PATH) in a previous commit. auto_execok is also safe on these
platforms, so can be used for _which.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
The previous commits bb5cb23daf (gitk: prevent overly long command
lines, 2023-01-24) rewrote a set of the 'open' calls substantially.
These were then later updated by 7dd272eca1 (gitk: escape file paths
before piping to git log, 2023-01-24) and d5d1b91e5327 (gitk: encode
arguments correctly with "open", 2025-03-07). In the preceding merge,
the conversions to a safe_open variant were undone to ensure that the
principal operation of the new 'open' calls is not modified by accident.
Since the 'open' calls now pass a redirection from a Tcl string as
stdin, convert the calls to 'safe_open_command_redirect'.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Since 8f23432b38 (windows: ignore empty `PATH` elements, 2022-11-23),
git-gui removes empty elements from $PATH, and a prior commit made this
remove all non-absolute elements from $PATH. But, this happens only on
Windows. Unsafe $PATH elements in $PATH are possible on all platforms.
Let's sanitize $PATH on all platforms to have consistent behavior. If a
user really wants the current repository on $PATH, they can add its
absolute name to $PATH.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Since 8f23432b38 (windows: ignore empty `PATH` elements, 2022-11-23),
git-gui excises all empty paths from $PATH, but still allows '.' or
other relative paths, which can also allow executing code from the
repository. Let's remove anything except absolute elements. While here,
let's remove duplicated elements, which are very common on Windows:
only the first such item can do anything except waste time repeating a
search.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
git-gui on Git for Windows creates a menu item to start a git-bash
session for the current repository. This menu-item works as desired when
git-gui is installed in the Git for Windows (g4w) distribution, but
not when run from a different location such as normally done in
development. The reason is that git-bash's location is known to be
'/git-bash' in the Unix pathname space known to MSYS, but this is not
known in the Windows pathname space. Instead, git-gui derives a pathname
for git-bash assuming it is at a known relative location.
If git-gui is run from a different directory than assumed in g4w, the
relative location changes, and git-gui resorts to running a generic bash
login session in a Windows console.
But, the MSYS system underlying Git for Windows includes the 'cygpath'
utility to convert between Unix and Windows pathnames. Let's use this so
git-bash's Windows pathname is determined directly from /git-bash.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
git-gui on Windows uses auto_execok to locate git-gui.exe,
which performs the same flawed search as does the builtin exec.
Use _which instead, performing a safe PATH lookup.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
On Windows, git-gui offers to open a git-bash session for the current
repository from the menu, but uses [auto_execok start] to get the
command to actually run that shell.
The code for auto_execok, in /usr/share/tcl8.6/tcl.init, has 'start' in
the 'shellBuiltins' list for cmd.exe on Windows: as a result,
auto_execok does not actually search for start, meaning this usage is
technically ok with auto_execok now. However, leaving this use of
auto_execok in place will just induce confusion about why a known unsafe
function is being used on Windows. Instead, let's switch to using our
known safe _which function that looks only in $PATH, excluding the
current working directory.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Commit 7d076d5675 (git-gui: handle shell script text filters when
loading for blame, 2011-12-09) added is_shellscript to test if a file
is executable by the shell, used only when searching for textconv
filters. The previous commit rearranged the tests for finding such
filters, and removed the only user of is_shellscript. Remove this
function.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Commit 7d076d5675 (git-gui: handle shell script text filters when
loading for blame, 2011-12-09) added open_cmd_pipe to run text
conversion in support of blame, with special handling for shell
scripts on Windows. To determine whether the command is a shell
script, 'lindex' is used to pick off the first token from the command.
However, cmd is actually a command string taken from .gitconfig
literally and is not necessarily a syntactically correct Tcl list.
Hence, it cannot be processed by 'lindex' and 'lrange' reliably.
Pass the command string to the shell just like on non-Windows
platforms to avoid the potentially incorrect treatment.
A use of 'auto_execok' is removed by this change. This function is
dangerous on Windows, because it searches programs in the current
directory. Delegating the path lookup to the shell is safe, because
/bin/sh and /bin/bash follow POSIX on all platforms, including the
Git for Windows port.
A possible regression is that the old code, given filter command of
'foo', could find 'foo.bat' as a script, and not just bare 'foo', or
'foo.exe'. This rewrite requires explicitly giving the suffix if it is
not .exe.
This part of Git GUI can be exercised using
git gui blame -- some.file
while some.file has a textconv filter configured and has unstaged
modifications.
Helped-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
git-gui has a few places where a bare "sh" is passed to exec, meaning
that the first instance of "sh" on $PATH will be used rather than the
shell configured. This violates expectations that the configured shell
is being used. Let's use [shellpath] everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Since commit d5257fb3c1 (git-gui: handle textconv filter on
Windows and in development, 2010-08-07), git-gui will search for a
usable shell if _shellpath is not configured, and on Windows may
resort to using auto_execok to find 'sh'. While this was intended for
development use, checks are insufficient to assure a proper
configuration when deployed where _shellpath is always set, but might
not give a usable shell.
Let's make this more robust by only searching if _shellpath was not
defined, and then using only our restricted search functions.
Furthermore, we should convert to a Windows path on Windows. Always
check for a valid shell on startup, meaning an absolute path to an
executable, aborting if these conditions are not met.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Commit 7d076d5675 (git-gui: handle shell script text filters when
loading for blame, 2011-12-09) added open_cmd_pipe, with special
handling for Windows detected by seeing that _shellpath does not
point to an executable shell. That is bad practice, and is broken by
the next commit that assures _shellpath is valid on all platforms.
Fix this by using [is_Windows] as done for all Windows specific code.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
The _which function finds executables on $PATH, and adds .exe on Windows
unless -script was given. However, win32.tcl executes "wscript.exe"
and "cscript.exe", both of which fail as _which adds .exe to both. This
is already fixed in git-gui released by Git for Windows. Do so here.
Signed-off-by: Mark Levedahl <mlevedahl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Branch js/fix-open-exec-2.40.0 converts `open` and `exec` calls to call
wrappers that sanitze the command arguments. This side branch updates
three `open` calls that are in conflict with the fix in the preceding
commit. To keep the intended operation of the 'open' calls, this merge
does not try to merge and resolve the conflicts, but ignores the
conversions that are brought in by the side branch, taking "ours" side
of the code in these three cases.
New fixes are the topic of the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
While "exec" uses a normal arguments list which is applied as
command + arguments (and redirections, etc), "open" uses a single
argument which is this command+arguments, where the command and
arguments are a list inside this one argument to "open".
Commit bb5cb23 (gitk: prevent overly long command lines 2023-05-08)
changed several values from individual arguments in that list (hashes
and file names), to a single value which is fed to git via redirection
to its stdin using "open" [1].
However, it didn't ensure correctly that this aggregate value in this
string is interpreted as a single element in this command+args list.
It did just enough so that newlines (which is how these elements are
concatenated) don't split this single list element.
A followup commit at the same patchset: 7dd272e (gitk: escape file
paths before piping to git log 2023-05-08) added a bit more, by
escaping backslahes and spaces at the file names, so that at least
it doesn't break when such file names get used there.
But these are not enough. At the very least tab is missing, and more,
and trying to manually escape every possible thing which can affect
how this string is interpreted in a list is a sub-par approach.
The solution is simply to tell tcl "this is a single list element".
which we can do by aggregating this value completely normally (hashes
and files separated by newlines), and then do [list $value].
So this is what this commit does, for all 3 places where bb5cb23
changed individual elements into an aggregate value.
[1]
That was not a fully accurate description. The accurate version
is that this string originally included two lists: hashes and files.
When used with "open" these lists correctly become the individual
elements of these lists, even if they contain spaces etc, so the
arguments which were used at this "git" commands were correct.
Commit bb5cb23 couldn't use these two lists as-is, because it needed
to process the individual elements in them (one element per line of
the aggregate value), and the issue is that ensuring this aggregate
is indeed interpreted as a single list element was sub-par.
Note: all the (double) quotes before/after the modification are not
required and with zero effect, even for \n. But this commit preserves
the original quoting form intentionally. It can be cleaned up later.
Signed-off-by: Avi Halachmi (:avih) <avihpit@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
As in the earlier commits, introduce a function that constructs a
pipeline of commands after sanitizing the arguments.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
The command line to invoke 'git blame' for a single line is constructed
using several if-conditionals, each with the same condition
{$from_index new {}}. Merge all of them into a single conditional.
This requires to duplicate significant parts of the command, but it
helps the next change, where we will have to deal with a nested list
structure.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
As in the previous commits, introduce a function that sanitizes
arguments and also keeps the returned file handle writable to pass
data to stdin.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
As in the previous commits, introduce a function that sanitizes
arguments intended for the process and in addition allows to pass
redirections, which are passed to Tcl's 'open' verbatim.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Tcl 'open' treats the second argument as a command when it begins
with |. The remainder of the argument is a list comprising the command
and its arguments. It assigns special meaning to these arguments when
they begin with a redirection, pipe or background operator. There are a
number of invocations of 'open' which construct arguments that are
taken from the Git repository or a user input. However, when file names
or ref names are taken from the repository, it is possible to find
names which have these special forms. They must not be interpreted by
'open' lest it redirects input or output, or attempts to build a
pipeline using a command name controlled by the repository.
Introduce a helper function that identifies such arguments and prepends
"./" to force such a name to be regarded as a relative file name.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Convert one 'exec' call that sends output to a process (pipeline).
Fortunately, the command does not contain any variables. For this
reason, just treat it as a "redirection".
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Convert 'exec' calls that both redirect output to a file and run the
process in the background. 'safe_exec_redirect' can take both these
"redirections" in the second argument simultaneously.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
As in the previous commits, introduce a function that sanitizes
arguments intended for the process and in addition allows to pass
redirections verbatim, which are interpreted by Tcl's 'exec'.
Redirections can include the background operator '&'.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Convert calls of 'exec' where the arguments are already available in
a list and 'eval' is used to unpack the list. Use 'concat' to unite
the arguments into a single list before passing them to 'safe_exec'.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Tcl 'exec' assigns special meaning to its argument when they begin with
redirection, pipe or background operator. There are a number of
invocations of 'exec' which construct arguments that are taken from the
Git repository or a user input. However, when file names or ref names
are taken from the repository, it is possible to find names with have
these special forms. They must not be interpreted by 'exec' lest it
redirects input or output, or attempts to build a pipeline using a
command name controlled by the repository.
Introduce a helper function that identifies such arguments and prepends
"./" to force such a name to be regarded as a relative file name.
Convert those 'exec' calls where the arguments can simply be packed
into a list.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Function 'diffcmd' derives which of git diff-files, git diff-index, or
git diff-tree must be invoked depending on the ids provided. It puts
the pipe symbol as the first element of the returned command list.
Note though that of the four callers only two use the command with
Tcl 'open' and need the pipe symbol. The other two callers pass the
command to Tcl 'exec' and must remove the pipe symbol.
Do not include the pipe symbol in the constructed command list, but let
the call sites decide whether to add it or not. Note that Tcl 'open'
inspects only the first character of the command list, which is also
the first character of the first element in the list. For this reason,
it is valid to just tack on the pipe symbol with |$cmd and it is not
necessary to use [concat | $cmd].
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
The Tcl 'open' function has a vary wide interface. It can open files as
well as pipes to external processes. The difference is made only by the
first character of the file name: if it is "|", an process is spawned.
We have a number of calls of Tcl 'open' that take a file name from the
environment in which Gitk is running. Be prepared that insane values are
injected. In particular, when we intend to open a file, do not mistake
a file name that happens to begin with "|" as a request to run a process.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
* maint-2.42:
Git 2.42.4
Git 2.41.3
Git 2.40.4
credential: disallow Carriage Returns in the protocol by default
credential: sanitize the user prompt
credential_format(): also encode <host>[:<port>]
t7300: work around platform-specific behaviour with long paths on MinGW
compat/regex: fix argument order to calloc(3)
mingw: drop bogus (and unneeded) declaration of `_pgmptr`
ci: remove 'Upload failed tests' directories' step from linux32 jobs
* maint-2.41:
Git 2.41.3
Git 2.40.4
credential: disallow Carriage Returns in the protocol by default
credential: sanitize the user prompt
credential_format(): also encode <host>[:<port>]
t7300: work around platform-specific behaviour with long paths on MinGW
compat/regex: fix argument order to calloc(3)
mingw: drop bogus (and unneeded) declaration of `_pgmptr`
ci: remove 'Upload failed tests' directories' step from linux32 jobs
* maint-2.40:
Git 2.40.4
credential: disallow Carriage Returns in the protocol by default
credential: sanitize the user prompt
credential_format(): also encode <host>[:<port>]
t7300: work around platform-specific behaviour with long paths on MinGW
compat/regex: fix argument order to calloc(3)
mingw: drop bogus (and unneeded) declaration of `_pgmptr`
ci: remove 'Upload failed tests' directories' step from linux32 jobs
This addresses two vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2024-50349:
Printing unsanitized URLs when asking for credentials made the
user susceptible to crafted URLs (e.g. in recursive clones) that
mislead the user into typing in passwords for trusted sites that
would then be sent to untrusted sites instead.
- CVE-2024-52006
Git may pass on Carriage Returns via the credential protocol to
credential helpers which use line-reading functions that
interpret said Carriage Returns as line endings, even though Git
did not intend that.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
While Git has documented that the credential protocol is line-based,
with newlines as terminators, the exact shape of a newline has not been
documented.
From Git's perspective, which is firmly rooted in the Linux ecosystem,
it is clear that "a newline" means a Line Feed character.
However, even Git's credential protocol respects Windows line endings
(a Carriage Return character followed by a Line Feed character, "CR/LF")
by virtue of using `strbuf_getline()`.
There is a third category of line endings that has been used originally
by MacOS, and that is respected by the default line readers of .NET and
node.js: bare Carriage Returns.
Git cannot handle those, and what is worse: Git's remedy against
CVE-2020-5260 does not catch when credential helpers are used that
interpret bare Carriage Returns as newlines.
Git Credential Manager addressed this as CVE-2024-50338, but other
credential helpers may still be vulnerable. So let's not only disallow
Line Feed characters as part of the values in the credential protocol,
but also disallow Carriage Return characters.
In the unlikely event that a credential helper relies on Carriage
Returns in the protocol, introduce an escape hatch via the
`credential.protectProtocol` config setting.
This addresses CVE-2024-52006.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When asking the user interactively for credentials, we want to avoid
misleading them e.g. via control sequences that pretend that the URL
targets a trusted host when it does not.
While Git learned, over the course of the preceding commits, to disallow
URLs containing URL-encoded control characters by default, credential
helpers are still allowed to specify values very freely (apart from Line
Feed and NUL characters, anything is allowed), and this would allow,
say, a username containing control characters to be specified that would
then be displayed in the interactive terminal prompt asking the user for
the password, potentially sending those control characters directly to
the terminal. This is undesirable because control characters can be used
to mislead users to divulge secret information to untrusted sites.
To prevent such an attack vector, let's add a `git_prompt()` that forces
the displayed text to be sanitized, i.e. displaying question marks
instead of control characters.
Note: While this commit's diff changes a lot of `user@host` strings to
`user%40host`, which may look suspicious on the surface, there is a good
reason for that: this string specifies a user name, not a
<username>@<hostname> combination! In the context of t5541, the actual
combination looks like this: `user%40@127.0.0.1:5541`. Therefore, these
string replacements document a net improvement introduced by this
commit, as `user@host@127.0.0.1` could have left readers wondering where
the user name ends and where the host name begins.
Hinted-at-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
An upcoming change wants to sanitize the credential password prompt
where a URL is displayed that may potentially come from a `.gitmodules`
file. To this end, the `credential_format()` function is employed.
To sanitize the host name (and optional port) part of the URL, we need a
new mode of the `strbuf_add_percentencode()` function because the
current mode is both too strict and too lenient: too strict because it
encodes `:`, `[` and `]` (which should be left unencoded in
`<host>:<port>` and in IPv6 addresses), and too lenient because it does
not encode invalid host name characters `/`, `_` and `~`.
So let's introduce and use a new mode specifically to encode the host
name and optional port part of a URI, leaving alpha-numerical
characters, periods, colons and brackets alone and encoding all others.
This only leads to a change of behavior for URLs that contain invalid
host names.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The planet keeps revolving, and CI definitions (even old ones) need to
be kept up to date, even if they worked unchanged before (because now
they don't).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Windows by default has a restriction in place to only allow paths up to
260 characters. This restriction can nowadays be lifted by setting a
registry key, but is still active by default.
In t7300 we have one test that exercises the behaviour of git-clean(1)
with such long paths. Interestingly enough, this test fails on my system
that uses Windows 10 with mingw-w64 installed via MSYS2: instead of
observing ENAMETOOLONG, we observe ENOENT. This behaviour is consistent
across multiple different environments I have tried.
I cannot say why exactly we observe a different error here, but I would
not be surprised if this was either dependent on the Windows version,
the version of MinGW, the current working directory of Git or any kind
of combination of these.
Work around the issue by handling both errors.
[Backported from 106834e34a (t7300: work around platform-specific
behaviour with long paths on MinGW, 2024-10-09).]
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Windows compiler suddenly started complaining that calloc(3) takes
its arguments in <nmemb, size> order. Indeed, there are many calls
that has their arguments in a _wrong_ order.
Fix them all.
A sample breakage can be seen at
https://github.com/git/git/actions/runs/9046793153/job/24857988702#step:4:272
[Backported from f01301aabe (compat/regex: fix argument order to
calloc(3), 2024-05-11).]
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
In 08809c09aa (mingw: add a helper function to attach GDB to the
current process, 2020-02-13), I added a declaration that was not needed.
Back then, that did not matter, but now that the declaration of that
symbol was changed in mingw-w64's headers, it causes the following
compile error:
CC compat/mingw.o
compat/mingw.c: In function 'open_in_gdb':
compat/mingw.c:35:9: error: function declaration isn't a prototype [-Werror=strict-prototypes]
35 | extern char *_pgmptr;
| ^~~~~~
In file included from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/lib/gcc/x86_64-w64-mingw32/14.1.0/include/mm_malloc.h:27,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/lib/gcc/x86_64-w64-mingw32/14.1.0/include/xmmintrin.h:34,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/lib/gcc/x86_64-w64-mingw32/14.1.0/include/immintrin.h:31,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/lib/gcc/x86_64-w64-mingw32/14.1.0/include/x86intrin.h:32,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/include/winnt.h:1658,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/include/minwindef.h:163,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/include/windef.h:9,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/include/windows.h:69,
from C:/git-sdk-64/usr/src/git/build-installers/mingw64/include/winsock2.h:23,
from compat/../git-compat-util.h:215,
from compat/mingw.c:1:
compat/mingw.c:35:22: error: '__p__pgmptr' redeclared without dllimport attribute: previous dllimport ignored [-Werror=attributes]
35 | extern char *_pgmptr;
| ^~~~~~~
Let's just drop the declaration and get rid of this compile error.
[Backported from 3c295c87c2 (mingw: drop bogus (and unneeded)
declaration of `_pgmptr`, 2024-06-19).]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Linux32 jobs seem to be getting:
Error: This request has been automatically failed because it uses a
deprecated version of `actions/upload-artifact: v1`. Learn more:
https://github.blog/changelog/2024-02-13-deprecation-notice-v1-and-v2-of-the-artifact-actions/
before doing anything useful. For now, disable the step.
Ever since actions/upload-artifact@v1 got disabled, mentioning the
offending version of it seems to stop anything from happening. At
least this should run the same build and test.
See
https://github.com/git/git/actions/runs/10780030750/job/29894867249
for example.
[Backported from 90f2c7240c (ci: remove 'Upload failed tests'
directories' step from linux32 jobs, 2024-09-09).]
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
* fixes/2.45.1/2.43:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
Johannes Sixt