Sync with Git 2.31.6

Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Git v2.30.7 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-41903 and
+CVE-2022-23521.
+
+
+Fixes since v2.30.6
+-------------------
+
+ * CVE-2022-41903:
+
+   git log has the ability to display commits using an arbitrary
+   format with its --format specifiers. This functionality is also
+   exposed to git archive via the export-subst gitattribute.
+
+   When processing the padding operators (e.g., %<(, %<|(, %>(,
+   %>>(, or %><( ), an integer overflow can occur in
+   pretty.c::format_and_pad_commit() where a size_t is improperly
+   stored as an int, and then added as an offset to a subsequent
+   memcpy() call.
+
+   This overflow can be triggered directly by a user running a
+   command which invokes the commit formatting machinery (e.g., git
+   log --format=...). It may also be triggered indirectly through
+   git archive via the export-subst mechanism, which expands format
+   specifiers inside of files within the repository during a git
+   archive.
+
+   This integer overflow can result in arbitrary heap writes, which
+   may result in remote code execution.
+
+* CVE-2022-23521:
+
+    gitattributes are a mechanism to allow defining attributes for
+    paths. These attributes can be defined by adding a `.gitattributes`
+    file to the repository, which contains a set of file patterns and
+    the attributes that should be set for paths matching this pattern.
+
+    When parsing gitattributes, multiple integer overflows can occur
+    when there is a huge number of path patterns, a huge number of
+    attributes for a single pattern, or when the declared attribute
+    names are huge.
+
+    These overflows can be triggered via a crafted `.gitattributes` file
+    that may be part of the commit history. Git silently splits lines
+    longer than 2KB when parsing gitattributes from a file, but not when
+    parsing them from the index. Consequentially, the failure mode
+    depends on whether the file exists in the working tree, the index or
+    both.
+
+    This integer overflow can result in arbitrary heap reads and writes,
+    which may result in remote code execution.
+
+Credit for finding CVE-2022-41903 goes to Joern Schneeweisz of GitLab.
+An initial fix was authored by Markus Vervier of X41 D-Sec. Credit for
+finding CVE-2022-23521 goes to Markus Vervier and Eric Sesterhenn of X41
+D-Sec. This work was sponsored by OSTIF.
+
+The proposed fixes have been polished and extended to cover additional
+findings by Patrick Steinhardt of GitLab, with help from others on the
+Git security mailing list.
+
+Patrick Steinhardt (21):
+      attr: fix overflow when upserting attribute with overly long name
+      attr: fix out-of-bounds read with huge attribute names
+      attr: fix integer overflow when parsing huge attribute names
+      attr: fix out-of-bounds write when parsing huge number of attributes
+      attr: fix out-of-bounds read with unreasonable amount of patterns
+      attr: fix integer overflow with more than INT_MAX macros
+      attr: harden allocation against integer overflows
+      attr: fix silently splitting up lines longer than 2048 bytes
+      attr: ignore attribute lines exceeding 2048 bytes
+      attr: ignore overly large gitattributes files
+      pretty: fix out-of-bounds write caused by integer overflow
+      pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when left-flushing with stealing
+      pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid padding format
+      pretty: fix adding linefeed when placeholder is not expanded
+      pretty: fix integer overflow in wrapping format
+      utf8: fix truncated string lengths in `utf8_strnwidth()`
+      utf8: fix returning negative string width
+      utf8: fix overflow when returning string width
+      utf8: fix checking for glyph width in `strbuf_utf8_replace()`
+      utf8: refactor `strbuf_utf8_replace` to not rely on preallocated buffer
+      pretty: restrict input lengths for padding and wrapping formats
+

Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Git v2.31.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.30.7; see
+the release notes for that version for details.

attr.c

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static const char git_attr__unknown[] = "(builtin)unknown";
 #endif
 
 struct git_attr {
-	int attr_nr; /* unique attribute number */
+	unsigned int attr_nr; /* unique attribute number */
 	char name[FLEX_ARRAY]; /* attribute name */
 };
 
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static void report_invalid_attr(const char *name, size_t len,
  * dictionary.  If no entry is found, create a new attribute and store it in
  * the dictionary.
  */
-static const struct git_attr *git_attr_internal(const char *name, int namelen)
+static const struct git_attr *git_attr_internal(const char *name, size_t namelen)
 {
 	struct git_attr *a;
 
@@ -226,8 +226,8 @@ static const struct git_attr *git_attr_internal(const char *name, int namelen)
 		a->attr_nr = hashmap_get_size(&g_attr_hashmap.map);
 
 		attr_hashmap_add(&g_attr_hashmap, a->name, namelen, a);
-		assert(a->attr_nr ==
-		       (hashmap_get_size(&g_attr_hashmap.map) - 1));
+		if (a->attr_nr != hashmap_get_size(&g_attr_hashmap.map) - 1)
+			die(_("unable to add additional attribute"));
 	}
 
 	hashmap_unlock(&g_attr_hashmap);
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ struct match_attr {
 		const struct git_attr *attr;
 	} u;
 	char is_macro;
-	unsigned num_attr;
+	size_t num_attr;
 	struct attr_state state[FLEX_ARRAY];
 };
 
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static const char *parse_attr(const char *src, int lineno, const char *cp,
 			      struct attr_state *e)
 {
 	const char *ep, *equals;
-	int len;
+	size_t len;
 
 	ep = cp + strcspn(cp, blank);
 	equals = strchr(cp, '=');
@@ -337,8 +337,7 @@ static const char *parse_attr(const char *src, int lineno, const char *cp,
 static struct match_attr *parse_attr_line(const char *line, const char *src,
 					  int lineno, unsigned flags)
 {
-	int namelen;
-	int num_attr, i;
+	size_t namelen, num_attr, i;
 	const char *cp, *name, *states;
 	struct match_attr *res = NULL;
 	int is_macro;
@@ -349,6 +348,11 @@ static struct match_attr *parse_attr_line(const char *line, const char *src,
 		return NULL;
 	name = cp;
 
+	if (strlen(line) >= ATTR_MAX_LINE_LENGTH) {
+		warning(_("ignoring overly long attributes line %d"), lineno);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	if (*cp == '"' && !unquote_c_style(&pattern, name, &states)) {
 		name = pattern.buf;
 		namelen = pattern.len;
@@ -385,10 +389,9 @@ static struct match_attr *parse_attr_line(const char *line, const char *src,
 			goto fail_return;
 	}
 
-	res = xcalloc(1,
-		      sizeof(*res) +
-		      sizeof(struct attr_state) * num_attr +
-		      (is_macro ? 0 : namelen + 1));
+	res = xcalloc(1, st_add3(sizeof(*res),
+				 st_mult(sizeof(struct attr_state), num_attr),
+				 is_macro ? 0 : namelen + 1));
 	if (is_macro) {
 		res->u.attr = git_attr_internal(name, namelen);
 	} else {
@@ -451,11 +454,12 @@ struct attr_stack {
 
 static void attr_stack_free(struct attr_stack *e)
 {
-	int i;
+	unsigned i;
 	free(e->origin);
 	for (i = 0; i < e->num_matches; i++) {
 		struct match_attr *a = e->attrs[i];
-		int j;
+		size_t j;
+
 		for (j = 0; j < a->num_attr; j++) {
 			const char *setto = a->state[j].setto;
 			if (setto == ATTR__TRUE ||
@@ -664,8 +668,8 @@ static void handle_attr_line(struct attr_stack *res,
 	a = parse_attr_line(line, src, lineno, flags);
 	if (!a)
 		return;
-	ALLOC_GROW(res->attrs, res->num_matches + 1, res->alloc);
-	res->attrs[res->num_matches++] = a;
+	ALLOC_GROW_BY(res->attrs, res->num_matches, 1, res->alloc);
+	res->attrs[res->num_matches - 1] = a;
 }
 
 static struct attr_stack *read_attr_from_array(const char **list)
@@ -705,11 +709,12 @@ void git_attr_set_direction(enum git_attr_direction new_direction)
 
 static struct attr_stack *read_attr_from_file(const char *path, unsigned flags)
 {
+	struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
 	int fd;
 	FILE *fp;
 	struct attr_stack *res;
-	char buf[2048];
 	int lineno = 0;
+	struct stat st;
 
 	if (flags & READ_ATTR_NOFOLLOW)
 		fd = open_nofollow(path, O_RDONLY);
@@ -721,15 +726,26 @@ static struct attr_stack *read_attr_from_file(const char *path, unsigned flags)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	fp = xfdopen(fd, "r");
+	if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
+		warning_errno(_("cannot fstat gitattributes file '%s'"), path);
+		fclose(fp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (st.st_size >= ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
+		warning(_("ignoring overly large gitattributes file '%s'"), path);
+		fclose(fp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	CALLOC_ARRAY(res, 1);
-	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
-		char *bufp = buf;
-		if (!lineno)
-			skip_utf8_bom(&bufp, strlen(bufp));
-		handle_attr_line(res, bufp, path, ++lineno, flags);
+	while (strbuf_getline(&buf, fp) != EOF) {
+		if (!lineno && starts_with(buf.buf, utf8_bom))
+			strbuf_remove(&buf, 0, strlen(utf8_bom));
+		handle_attr_line(res, buf.buf, path, ++lineno, flags);
 	}
+
 	fclose(fp);
+	strbuf_release(&buf);
 	return res;
 }
 
@@ -740,13 +756,18 @@ static struct attr_stack *read_attr_from_index(struct index_state *istate,
 	struct attr_stack *res;
 	char *buf, *sp;
 	int lineno = 0;
+	size_t size;
 
 	if (!istate)
 		return NULL;
 
-	buf = read_blob_data_from_index(istate, path, NULL);
+	buf = read_blob_data_from_index(istate, path, &size);
 	if (!buf)
 		return NULL;
+	if (size >= ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
+		warning(_("ignoring overly large gitattributes blob '%s'"), path);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	CALLOC_ARRAY(res, 1);
 	for (sp = buf; *sp; ) {
@@ -1017,12 +1038,12 @@ static int macroexpand_one(struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs, int nr, int rem);
 static int fill_one(const char *what, struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs,
 		    const struct match_attr *a, int rem)
 {
-	int i;
+	size_t i;
 
-	for (i = a->num_attr - 1; rem > 0 && i >= 0; i--) {
-		const struct git_attr *attr = a->state[i].attr;
+	for (i = a->num_attr; rem > 0 && i > 0; i--) {
+		const struct git_attr *attr = a->state[i - 1].attr;
 		const char **n = &(all_attrs[attr->attr_nr].value);
-		const char *v = a->state[i].setto;
+		const char *v = a->state[i - 1].setto;
 
 		if (*n == ATTR__UNKNOWN) {
 			debug_set(what,
@@ -1041,11 +1062,11 @@ static int fill(const char *path, int pathlen, int basename_offset,
 		struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs, int rem)
 {
 	for (; rem > 0 && stack; stack = stack->prev) {
-		int i;
+		unsigned i;
 		const char *base = stack->origin ? stack->origin : "";
 
-		for (i = stack->num_matches - 1; 0 < rem && 0 <= i; i--) {
-			const struct match_attr *a = stack->attrs[i];
+		for (i = stack->num_matches; 0 < rem && 0 < i; i--) {
+			const struct match_attr *a = stack->attrs[i - 1];
 			if (a->is_macro)
 				continue;
 			if (path_matches(path, pathlen, basename_offset,
@@ -1076,11 +1097,11 @@ static void determine_macros(struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs,
 			     const struct attr_stack *stack)
 {
 	for (; stack; stack = stack->prev) {
-		int i;
-		for (i = stack->num_matches - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-			const struct match_attr *ma = stack->attrs[i];
+		unsigned i;
+		for (i = stack->num_matches; i > 0; i--) {
+			const struct match_attr *ma = stack->attrs[i - 1];
 			if (ma->is_macro) {
-				int n = ma->u.attr->attr_nr;
+				unsigned int n = ma->u.attr->attr_nr;
 				if (!all_attrs[n].macro) {
 					all_attrs[n].macro = ma;
 				}
@@ -1132,7 +1153,7 @@ void git_check_attr(struct index_state *istate,
 	collect_some_attrs(istate, path, check);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < check->nr; i++) {
-		size_t n = check->items[i].attr->attr_nr;
+		unsigned int n = check->items[i].attr->attr_nr;
 		const char *value = check->all_attrs[n].value;
 		if (value == ATTR__UNKNOWN)
 			value = ATTR__UNSET;

attr.h

@@ -107,6 +107,18 @@
  * - Free the `attr_check` struct by calling `attr_check_free()`.
  */
 
+/**
+ * The maximum line length for a gitattributes file. If the line exceeds this
+ * length we will ignore it.
+ */
+#define ATTR_MAX_LINE_LENGTH 2048
+
+ /**
+  * The maximum size of the giattributes file. If the file exceeds this size we
+  * will ignore it.
+  */
+#define ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE (100 * 1024 * 1024)
+
 struct index_state;
 
 /**

column.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ struct column_data {
 /* return length of 's' in letters, ANSI escapes stripped */
 static int item_length(const char *s)
 {
-	return utf8_strnwidth(s, -1, 1);
+	return utf8_strnwidth(s, strlen(s), 1);
 }
 
 /*

git-compat-util.h

@@ -929,6 +929,14 @@ static inline size_t st_sub(size_t a, size_t b)
 	return a - b;
 }
 
+static inline int cast_size_t_to_int(size_t a)
+{
+	if (a > INT_MAX)
+		die("number too large to represent as int on this platform: %"PRIuMAX,
+		    (uintmax_t)a);
+	return (int)a;
+}
+
 #ifdef HAVE_ALLOCA_H
 # include <alloca.h>
 # define xalloca(size)      (alloca(size))

pretty.c

@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
 #include "trailer.h"
 #include "run-command.h"
 
+/*
+ * The limit for formatting directives, which enable the caller to append
+ * arbitrarily many bytes to the formatted buffer. This includes padding
+ * and wrapping formatters.
+ */
+#define FORMATTING_LIMIT (16 * 1024)
+
 static char *user_format;
 static struct cmt_fmt_map {
 	const char *name;
@@ -920,7 +927,9 @@ static void strbuf_wrap(struct strbuf *sb, size_t pos,
 	if (pos)
 		strbuf_add(&tmp, sb->buf, pos);
 	strbuf_add_wrapped_text(&tmp, sb->buf + pos,
-				(int) indent1, (int) indent2, (int) width);
+				cast_size_t_to_int(indent1),
+				cast_size_t_to_int(indent2),
+				cast_size_t_to_int(width));
 	strbuf_swap(&tmp, sb);
 	strbuf_release(&tmp);
 }
@@ -1046,9 +1055,18 @@ static size_t parse_padding_placeholder(const char *placeholder,
 		const char *end = start + strcspn(start, ",)");
 		char *next;
 		int width;
-		if (!end || end == start)
+		if (!*end || end == start)
 			return 0;
 		width = strtol(start, &next, 10);
+
+		/*
+		 * We need to limit the amount of padding, or otherwise this
+		 * would allow the user to pad the buffer by arbitrarily many
+		 * bytes and thus cause resource exhaustion.
+		 */
+		if (width < -FORMATTING_LIMIT || width > FORMATTING_LIMIT)
+			return 0;
+
 		if (next == start || width == 0)
 			return 0;
 		if (width < 0) {
@@ -1293,6 +1311,16 @@ static size_t format_commit_one(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 				if (*next != ')')
 					return 0;
 			}
+
+			/*
+			 * We need to limit the format here as it allows the
+			 * user to prepend arbitrarily many bytes to the buffer
+			 * when rewrapping.
+			 */
+			if (width > FORMATTING_LIMIT ||
+			    indent1 > FORMATTING_LIMIT ||
+			    indent2 > FORMATTING_LIMIT)
+				return 0;
 			rewrap_message_tail(sb, c, width, indent1, indent2);
 			return end - placeholder + 1;
 		} else
@@ -1574,19 +1602,21 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 				    struct format_commit_context *c)
 {
 	struct strbuf local_sb = STRBUF_INIT;
-	int total_consumed = 0, len, padding = c->padding;
+	size_t total_consumed = 0;
+	int len, padding = c->padding;
+
 	if (padding < 0) {
 		const char *start = strrchr(sb->buf, '\n');
 		int occupied;
 		if (!start)
 			start = sb->buf;
-		occupied = utf8_strnwidth(start, -1, 1);
+		occupied = utf8_strnwidth(start, strlen(start), 1);
 		occupied += c->pretty_ctx->graph_width;
 		padding = (-padding) - occupied;
 	}
 	while (1) {
 		int modifier = *placeholder == 'C';
-		int consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
+		size_t consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
 		total_consumed += consumed;
 
 		if (!modifier)
@@ -1598,7 +1628,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 		placeholder++;
 		total_consumed++;
 	}
-	len = utf8_strnwidth(local_sb.buf, -1, 1);
+	len = utf8_strnwidth(local_sb.buf, local_sb.len, 1);
 
 	if (c->flush_type == flush_left_and_steal) {
 		const char *ch = sb->buf + sb->len - 1;
@@ -1613,7 +1643,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 			if (*ch != 'm')
 				break;
 			p = ch - 1;
-			while (ch - p < 10 && *p != '\033')
+			while (p > sb->buf && ch - p < 10 && *p != '\033')
 				p--;
 			if (*p != '\033' ||
 			    ch + 1 - p != display_mode_esc_sequence_len(p))
@@ -1652,7 +1682,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 		}
 		strbuf_addbuf(sb, &local_sb);
 	} else {
-		int sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
+		size_t sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
 		if (c->flush_type == flush_left)
 			offset = padding - len;
 		else if (c->flush_type == flush_both)
@@ -1675,8 +1705,7 @@ static size_t format_commit_item(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 				 const char *placeholder,
 				 void *context)
 {
-	int consumed;
-	size_t orig_len;
+	size_t consumed, orig_len;
 	enum {
 		NO_MAGIC,
 		ADD_LF_BEFORE_NON_EMPTY,
@@ -1697,9 +1726,21 @@ static size_t format_commit_item(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
-	if (magic != NO_MAGIC)
+	if (magic != NO_MAGIC) {
 		placeholder++;
 
+		switch (placeholder[0]) {
+		case 'w':
+			/*
+			 * `%+w()` cannot ever expand to a non-empty string,
+			 * and it potentially changes the layout of preceding
+			 * contents. We're thus not able to handle the magic in
+			 * this combination and refuse the pattern.
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		};
+	}
+
 	orig_len = sb->len;
 	if (((struct format_commit_context *)context)->flush_type != no_flush)
 		consumed = format_and_pad_commit(sb, placeholder, context);

t/t0003-attributes.sh

@@ -369,4 +369,63 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlinks not respected in-tree' '
 	test_i18ngrep "unable to access.*gitattributes" err
 '
 
+test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignored in tree' '
+	test_when_finished "rm .gitattributes" &&
+	printf "path %02043d" 1 >.gitattributes &&
+	git check-attr --all path >actual 2>err &&
+	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
+	test_cmp expect err &&
+	test_must_be_empty actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignores trailing content in tree' '
+	test_when_finished "rm .gitattributes" &&
+	# older versions of Git broke lines at 2048 bytes; the 2045 bytes
+	# of 0-padding here is accounting for the three bytes of "a 1", which
+	# would knock "trailing" to the "next" line, where it would be
+	# erroneously parsed.
+	printf "a %02045dtrailing attribute\n" 1 >.gitattributes &&
+	git check-attr --all trailing >actual 2>err &&
+	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
+	test_cmp expect err &&
+	test_must_be_empty actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE 'large attributes file ignored in tree' '
+	test_when_finished "rm .gitattributes" &&
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=.gitattributes bs=101M count=1 2>/dev/null &&
+	git check-attr --all path >/dev/null 2>err &&
+	echo "warning: ignoring overly large gitattributes file ${SQ}.gitattributes${SQ}" >expect &&
+	test_cmp expect err
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignored in index' '
+	test_when_finished "git update-index --remove .gitattributes" &&
+	blob=$(printf "path %02043d" 1 | git hash-object -w --stdin) &&
+	git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes &&
+	git check-attr --cached --all path >actual 2>err &&
+	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
+	test_cmp expect err &&
+	test_must_be_empty actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignores trailing content in index' '
+	test_when_finished "git update-index --remove .gitattributes" &&
+	blob=$(printf "a %02045dtrailing attribute\n" 1 | git hash-object -w --stdin) &&
+	git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes &&
+	git check-attr --cached --all trailing >actual 2>err &&
+	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
+	test_cmp expect err &&
+	test_must_be_empty actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE 'large attributes file ignored in index' '
+	test_when_finished "git update-index --remove .gitattributes" &&
+	blob=$(dd if=/dev/zero bs=101M count=1 2>/dev/null | git hash-object -w --stdin) &&
+	git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes &&
+	git check-attr --cached --all path >/dev/null 2>err &&
+	echo "warning: ignoring overly large gitattributes blob ${SQ}.gitattributes${SQ}" >expect &&
+	test_cmp expect err
+'
+
 test_done

t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh

@@ -1002,4 +1002,80 @@ test_expect_success '%(describe:exclude=...) vs git describe --exclude ...' '
 	test_cmp expect actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with space stealing' '
+	printf mm0 >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:mm%>>|(1)%x30" >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with invalid padding format' '
+	printf "%s%%<(20" "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%H%<(20" >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with magical wrapping directives' '
+	commit_id=$(git commit-tree HEAD^{tree} -m "describe me") &&
+	git tag describe-me $commit_id &&
+	printf "\n(tag:\ndescribe-me)%%+w(2)" >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1)%+d%+w(2)" $commit_id >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing wrapping directive' '
+	printf "%%w(2147483649,1,1)0" >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(2147483649,1,1)%x30" >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual &&
+	printf "%%w(1,2147483649,1)0" >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,2147483649,1)%x30" >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual &&
+	printf "%%w(1,1,2147483649)0" >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,1,2147483649)%x30" >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing padding directive' '
+	printf "%%<(2147483649)0" >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%<(2147483649)%x30" >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
+	printf "\20\20   0" >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%x10%x10%>|(4)%x30" >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'log --pretty truncation with control chars' '
+	test_commit "$(printf "\20\20\20\20xxxx")" file contents commit-with-control-chars &&
+	printf "\20\20\20\20x.." >expect &&
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%<(3,trunc)%s" commit-with-control-chars >actual &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
+	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
+	git log -1 --pretty="format:%>(2147483646)%x41%41%>(2147483646)%x41" >/dev/null
+'
+
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'set up huge commit' '
+	test-tool genzeros 2147483649 | tr "\000" "1" >expect &&
+	huge_commit=$(git commit-tree -F expect HEAD^{tree})
+'
+
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+	git log -1 --format="%B%<(1)%x30" $huge_commit >actual &&
+	echo 0 >>expect &&
+	test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message does not cause allocation failure' '
+	test_must_fail git log -1 --format="%<(1)%B" $huge_commit 2>error &&
+	cat >expect <<-EOF &&
+	fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
+	EOF
+	test_cmp expect error
+'
+
 test_done

t/test-lib.sh

@@ -1642,6 +1642,10 @@ build_option () {
 	sed -ne "s/^$1: //p"
 }
 
+test_lazy_prereq SIZE_T_IS_64BIT '
+	test 8 -eq "$(build_option sizeof-size_t)"
+'
+
 test_lazy_prereq LONG_IS_64BIT '
 	test 8 -le "$(build_option sizeof-long)"
 '

utf8.c

@@ -206,26 +206,34 @@ int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p)
  * string, assuming that the string is utf8.  Returns strlen() instead
  * if the string does not look like a valid utf8 string.
  */
-int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi)
+int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
 {
-	int width = 0;
 	const char *orig = string;
+	size_t width = 0;
 
-	if (len == -1)
-		len = strlen(string);
 	while (string && string < orig + len) {
-		int skip;
+		int glyph_width;
+		size_t skip;
+
 		while (skip_ansi &&
 		       (skip = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(string)) != 0)
 			string += skip;
-		width += utf8_width(&string, NULL);
+
+		glyph_width = utf8_width(&string, NULL);
+		if (glyph_width > 0)
+			width += glyph_width;
 	}
-	return string ? width : len;
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: fix the interface of this function and `utf8_strwidth()` to
+	 * return `size_t` instead of `int`.
+	 */
+	return cast_size_t_to_int(string ? width : len);
 }
 
 int utf8_strwidth(const char *string)
 {
-	return utf8_strnwidth(string, -1, 0);
+	return utf8_strnwidth(string, strlen(string), 0);
 }
 
 int is_utf8(const char *text)
@@ -357,51 +365,52 @@ void strbuf_add_wrapped_bytes(struct strbuf *buf, const char *data, int len,
 void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
 			 const char *subst)
 {
-	struct strbuf sb_dst = STRBUF_INIT;
-	char *src = sb_src->buf;
-	char *end = src + sb_src->len;
-	char *dst;
-	int w = 0, subst_len = 0;
+	const char *src = sb_src->buf, *end = sb_src->buf + sb_src->len;
+	struct strbuf dst;
+	int w = 0;
 
-	if (subst)
-		subst_len = strlen(subst);
-	strbuf_grow(&sb_dst, sb_src->len + subst_len);
-	dst = sb_dst.buf;
+	strbuf_init(&dst, sb_src->len);
 
 	while (src < end) {
-		char *old;
+		const char *old;
+		int glyph_width;
 		size_t n;
 
 		while ((n = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(src))) {
-			memcpy(dst, src, n);
+			strbuf_add(&dst, src, n);
 			src += n;
-			dst += n;
 		}
 
 		if (src >= end)
 			break;
 
 		old = src;
-		n = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
-		if (!src) 	/* broken utf-8, do nothing */
+		glyph_width = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
+		if (!src) /* broken utf-8, do nothing */
 			goto out;
-		if (n && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
+
+		/*
+		 * In case we see a control character we copy it into the
+		 * buffer, but don't add it to the width.
+		 */
+		if (glyph_width < 0)
+			glyph_width = 0;
+
+		if (glyph_width && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
 			if (subst) {
-				memcpy(dst, subst, subst_len);
-				dst += subst_len;
+				strbuf_addstr(&dst, subst);
 				subst = NULL;
 			}
-			w += n;
-			continue;
+		} else {
+			strbuf_add(&dst, old, src - old);
 		}
-		memcpy(dst, old, src - old);
-		dst += src - old;
-		w += n;
+
+		w += glyph_width;
 	}
-	strbuf_setlen(&sb_dst, dst - sb_dst.buf);
-	strbuf_swap(sb_src, &sb_dst);
+
+	strbuf_swap(sb_src, &dst);
 out:
-	strbuf_release(&sb_dst);
+	strbuf_release(&dst);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -796,7 +805,7 @@ int skip_utf8_bom(char **text, size_t len)
 void strbuf_utf8_align(struct strbuf *buf, align_type position, unsigned int width,
 		       const char *s)
 {
-	int slen = strlen(s);
+	size_t slen = strlen(s);
 	int display_len = utf8_strnwidth(s, slen, 0);
 	int utf8_compensation = slen - display_len;
 

utf8.h

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ typedef unsigned int ucs_char_t;  /* assuming 32bit int */
 
 size_t display_mode_esc_sequence_len(const char *s);
 int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p);
-int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi);
+int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi);
 int utf8_strwidth(const char *string);
 int is_utf8(const char *text);
 int is_encoding_utf8(const char *name);