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systemd/SOURCES/0224-tpm2-support-policies-...

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From 98997b288819f4dac7b2ca19c199d71e733bfa92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Grigori Goronzy <greg@chown.ath.cx>
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 22:13:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tpm2: support policies with PIN
Modify TPM2 authentication policy to optionally include an authValue, i.e.
a password/PIN. We use the "PIN" terminology since it's used by other
systems such as Windows, even though the PIN is not necessarily numeric.
The pin is hashed via SHA256 to allow for arbitrary length PINs.
v2: fix tpm2_seal in sd-repart
v3: applied review feedback
(cherry picked from commit 2f5a892aa0d70aa4f1f10c8dba495ad52bc02bc3)
Related: #2087652
---
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c | 4 +-
src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tokens/luks2-tpm2.c | 2 +-
src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c | 2 +-
src/partition/repart.c | 2 +-
src/shared/creds-util.c | 2 +
src/shared/tpm2-util.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++-
src/shared/tpm2-util.h | 8 +-
7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
index 801014af11..f5f6b87d0f 100644
--- a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
+++ b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
assert_se(node = crypt_get_device_name(cd));
- r = tpm2_seal(device, pcr_mask, &secret, &secret_size, &blob, &blob_size, &hash, &hash_size, &pcr_bank, &primary_alg);
+ r = tpm2_seal(device, pcr_mask, NULL, &secret, &secret_size, &blob, &blob_size, &hash, &hash_size, &pcr_bank, &primary_alg);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
/* Quick verification that everything is in order, we are not in a hurry after all. */
log_debug("Unsealing for verification...");
- r = tpm2_unseal(device, pcr_mask, pcr_bank, primary_alg, blob, blob_size, hash, hash_size, &secret2, &secret2_size);
+ r = tpm2_unseal(device, pcr_mask, pcr_bank, primary_alg, blob, blob_size, hash, hash_size, NULL, &secret2, &secret2_size);
if (r < 0)
return r;
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tokens/luks2-tpm2.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tokens/luks2-tpm2.c
index 3d39dfa884..de189c7bed 100644
--- a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tokens/luks2-tpm2.c
+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tokens/luks2-tpm2.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int acquire_luks2_key(
pcr_mask, pcr_bank,
primary_alg,
key_data, key_data_size,
- policy_hash, policy_hash_size,
+ policy_hash, policy_hash_size, NULL,
ret_decrypted_key, ret_decrypted_key_size);
}
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c
index cb139518a7..05d76a684d 100644
--- a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c
+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int acquire_tpm2_key(
blob = loaded_blob;
}
- return tpm2_unseal(device, pcr_mask, pcr_bank, primary_alg, blob, blob_size, policy_hash, policy_hash_size, ret_decrypted_key, ret_decrypted_key_size);
+ return tpm2_unseal(device, pcr_mask, pcr_bank, primary_alg, blob, blob_size, policy_hash, policy_hash_size, NULL, ret_decrypted_key, ret_decrypted_key_size);
}
int find_tpm2_auto_data(
diff --git a/src/partition/repart.c b/src/partition/repart.c
index 2f70796e58..adfec0b9f3 100644
--- a/src/partition/repart.c
+++ b/src/partition/repart.c
@@ -2655,7 +2655,7 @@ static int partition_encrypt(
uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
int keyslot;
- r = tpm2_seal(arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, &secret, &secret_size, &blob, &blob_size, &hash, &hash_size, &pcr_bank, &primary_alg);
+ r = tpm2_seal(arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, NULL, &secret, &secret_size, &blob, &blob_size, &hash, &hash_size, &pcr_bank, &primary_alg);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to seal to TPM2: %m");
diff --git a/src/shared/creds-util.c b/src/shared/creds-util.c
index 4d0681bc10..c4dcc396ac 100644
--- a/src/shared/creds-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/creds-util.c
@@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ int encrypt_credential_and_warn(
r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_device,
tpm2_pcr_mask,
+ NULL,
&tpm2_key,
&tpm2_key_size,
&tpm2_blob,
@@ -803,6 +804,7 @@ int decrypt_credential_and_warn(
le32toh(t->blob_size),
t->policy_hash_and_blob + le32toh(t->blob_size),
le32toh(t->policy_hash_size),
+ NULL,
&tpm2_key,
&tpm2_key_size);
if (r < 0)
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
index 70a2929432..aca7b69ab5 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
+#include "sha256.h"
#include "time-util.h"
static void *libtss2_esys_dl = NULL;
@@ -30,10 +31,12 @@ TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_GetRandom)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Initialize)(ESYS_CONTEXT **esys_context, TSS2_TCTI_CONTEXT *tcti, TSS2_ABI_VERSION *abiVersion) = NULL;
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Load)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR parentHandle, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPM2B_PRIVATE *inPrivate, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *inPublic, ESYS_TR *objectHandle) = NULL;
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PCR_Read)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR shandle1,ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrSelectionIn, UINT32 *pcrUpdateCounter, TPML_PCR_SELECTION **pcrSelectionOut, TPML_DIGEST **pcrValues);
+TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PolicyAuthValue)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR policySession, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3) = NULL;
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PolicyGetDigest)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR policySession, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, TPM2B_DIGEST **policyDigest) = NULL;
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PolicyPCR)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR policySession, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPM2B_DIGEST *pcrDigest, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs) = NULL;
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_StartAuthSession)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR tpmKey, ESYS_TR bind, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPM2B_NONCE *nonceCaller, TPM2_SE sessionType, const TPMT_SYM_DEF *symmetric, TPMI_ALG_HASH authHash, ESYS_TR *sessionHandle) = NULL;
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Startup)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, TPM2_SU startupType) = NULL;
+TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_TR_SetAuth)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR handle, TPM2B_AUTH const *authValue) = NULL;
TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Unseal)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR itemHandle, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA **outData) = NULL;
const char* (*sym_Tss2_RC_Decode)(TSS2_RC rc) = NULL;
@@ -58,10 +61,12 @@ int dlopen_tpm2(void) {
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_Initialize),
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_Load),
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_PCR_Read),
+ DLSYM_ARG(Esys_PolicyAuthValue),
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_PolicyGetDigest),
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_PolicyPCR),
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_StartAuthSession),
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_Startup),
+ DLSYM_ARG(Esys_TR_SetAuth),
DLSYM_ARG(Esys_Unseal));
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -594,6 +599,7 @@ static int tpm2_make_pcr_session(
ESYS_CONTEXT *c,
uint32_t pcr_mask,
uint16_t pcr_bank, /* If UINT16_MAX, pick best bank automatically, otherwise specify bank explicitly. */
+ bool use_pin,
ESYS_TR *ret_session,
TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest,
TPMI_ALG_HASH *ret_pcr_bank) {
@@ -669,6 +675,21 @@ static int tpm2_make_pcr_session(
goto finish;
}
+ if (use_pin) {
+ rc = sym_Esys_PolicyAuthValue(
+ c,
+ session,
+ ESYS_TR_NONE,
+ ESYS_TR_NONE,
+ ESYS_TR_NONE);
+ if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+ r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
+ "Failed to add authValue policy to TPM: %s",
+ sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+
if (DEBUG_LOGGING || ret_policy_digest) {
log_debug("Acquiring policy digest.");
@@ -717,9 +738,22 @@ finish:
return r;
}
+static void hash_pin(const char *pin, size_t len, uint8_t ret_digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]) {
+ struct sha256_ctx hash;
+
+ assert(pin);
+
+ sha256_init_ctx(&hash);
+ sha256_process_bytes(pin, len, &hash);
+ sha256_finish_ctx(&hash, ret_digest);
+
+ explicit_bzero_safe(&hash, sizeof(hash));
+}
+
int tpm2_seal(
const char *device,
uint32_t pcr_mask,
+ const char *pin,
void **ret_secret,
size_t *ret_secret_size,
void **ret_blob,
@@ -782,7 +816,8 @@ int tpm2_seal(
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = tpm2_make_pcr_session(c.esys_context, pcr_mask, UINT16_MAX, NULL, &policy_digest, &pcr_bank);
+ r = tpm2_make_pcr_session(c.esys_context, pcr_mask, UINT16_MAX, !!pin, NULL, &policy_digest,
+ &pcr_bank);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
@@ -813,6 +848,10 @@ int tpm2_seal(
.size = sizeof(hmac_sensitive.sensitive),
.sensitive.data.size = 32,
};
+ if (pin) {
+ hash_pin(pin, strlen(pin), hmac_sensitive.sensitive.userAuth.buffer);
+ hmac_sensitive.sensitive.userAuth.size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ }
assert(sizeof(hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.buffer) >= hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.size);
(void) tpm2_credit_random(c.esys_context);
@@ -910,6 +949,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(
r = 0;
finish:
+ explicit_bzero_safe(&hmac_sensitive, sizeof(hmac_sensitive));
primary = flush_context_verbose(c.esys_context, primary);
return r;
}
@@ -923,6 +963,7 @@ int tpm2_unseal(
size_t blob_size,
const void *known_policy_hash,
size_t known_policy_hash_size,
+ const char *pin,
void **ret_secret,
size_t *ret_secret_size) {
@@ -978,7 +1019,7 @@ int tpm2_unseal(
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = tpm2_make_pcr_session(c.esys_context, pcr_mask, pcr_bank, &session, &policy_digest, NULL);
+ r = tpm2_make_pcr_session(c.esys_context, pcr_mask, pcr_bank, !!pin, &session, &policy_digest, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
@@ -1005,11 +1046,38 @@ int tpm2_unseal(
&public,
&hmac_key);
if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
- r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
- "Failed to load HMAC key in TPM: %s", sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
+ /* If we're in dictionary attack lockout mode, we should see a lockout error here, which we
+ * need to translate for the caller. */
+ if (rc == TPM2_RC_LOCKOUT)
+ r = log_error_errno(
+ SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOLCK),
+ "TPM2 device is in dictionary attack lockout mode.");
+ else
+ r = log_error_errno(
+ SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
+ "Failed to load HMAC key in TPM: %s",
+ sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
goto finish;
}
+ if (pin) {
+ TPM2B_AUTH auth = {
+ .size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+ };
+
+ hash_pin(pin, strlen(pin), auth.buffer);
+
+ rc = sym_Esys_TR_SetAuth(c.esys_context, hmac_key, &auth);
+ explicit_bzero_safe(&auth, sizeof(auth));
+ if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+ r = log_error_errno(
+ SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
+ "Failed to load PIN in TPM: %s",
+ sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+
log_debug("Unsealing HMAC key.");
rc = sym_Esys_Unseal(
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.h b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
index cb57a847e2..784e9fd11e 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#pragma once
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
#include "json.h"
#include "macro.h"
@@ -20,10 +22,12 @@ extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_GetRandom)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR shandle1
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Initialize)(ESYS_CONTEXT **esys_context, TSS2_TCTI_CONTEXT *tcti, TSS2_ABI_VERSION *abiVersion);
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Load)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR parentHandle, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPM2B_PRIVATE *inPrivate, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *inPublic, ESYS_TR *objectHandle);
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PCR_Read)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR shandle1,ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrSelectionIn, UINT32 *pcrUpdateCounter, TPML_PCR_SELECTION **pcrSelectionOut, TPML_DIGEST **pcrValues);
+extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PolicyAuthValue)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR policySession, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3);
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PolicyGetDigest)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR policySession, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, TPM2B_DIGEST **policyDigest);
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_PolicyPCR)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR policySession, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPM2B_DIGEST *pcrDigest, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs);
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_StartAuthSession)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR tpmKey, ESYS_TR bind, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, const TPM2B_NONCE *nonceCaller, TPM2_SE sessionType, const TPMT_SYM_DEF *symmetric, TPMI_ALG_HASH authHash, ESYS_TR *sessionHandle);
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Startup)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, TPM2_SU startupType);
+extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_TR_SetAuth)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR handle, TPM2B_AUTH const *authValue);
extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Esys_Unseal)(ESYS_CONTEXT *esysContext, ESYS_TR itemHandle, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2, ESYS_TR shandle3, TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA **outData);
extern const char* (*sym_Tss2_RC_Decode)(TSS2_RC rc);
@@ -35,8 +39,8 @@ extern TSS2_RC (*sym_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Unmarshal)(uint8_t const buffer[], siz
int dlopen_tpm2(void);
-int tpm2_seal(const char *device, uint32_t pcr_mask, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, void **ret_pcr_hash, size_t *ret_pcr_hash_size, uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg);
-int tpm2_unseal(const char *device, uint32_t pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *pcr_hash, size_t pcr_hash_size, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size);
+int tpm2_seal(const char *device, uint32_t pcr_mask, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, void **ret_pcr_hash, size_t *ret_pcr_hash_size, uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg);
+int tpm2_unseal(const char *device, uint32_t pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *pcr_hash, size_t pcr_hash_size, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size);
#endif