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206 lines
7.7 KiB
206 lines
7.7 KiB
From c63599ee9708d543205a9173207ee7167315c624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> |
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Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 15:44:18 +0100 |
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Subject: [PATCH] Allow SHA1 in seclevel 2 if rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes |
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References: rhbz#2055796 |
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--- |
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crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 19 ++++++++++- |
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doc/man5/config.pod | 7 +++- |
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ssl/t1_lib.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- |
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test/recipes/25-test_verify.t | 7 ++-- |
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4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) |
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diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c |
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index ff3ca83de6..a549c1c111 100644 |
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--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c |
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+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c |
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ |
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#include <openssl/objects.h> |
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#include <openssl/core_names.h> |
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#include "internal/dane.h" |
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+#include "internal/sslconf.h" |
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#include "crypto/x509.h" |
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#include "x509_local.h" |
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@@ -3440,14 +3441,30 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
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{ |
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int secbits = -1; |
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int level = ctx->param->auth_level; |
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+ int nid; |
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+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL; |
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if (level <= 0) |
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return 1; |
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if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) |
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level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; |
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- if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) |
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+ if (ctx->libctx) |
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+ libctx = ctx->libctx; |
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+ else if (cert->libctx) |
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+ libctx = cert->libctx; |
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+ else |
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+ libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default(); |
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+ |
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+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, &nid, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) |
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return 0; |
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+ if (nid == NID_sha1 |
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0) |
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+ && ctx->param->auth_level < 3) |
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+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2, |
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */ |
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+ return 1; |
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+ |
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return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; |
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} |
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diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod |
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index aa1be5ca7f..aa69e2b844 100644 |
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--- a/doc/man5/config.pod |
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+++ b/doc/man5/config.pod |
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@@ -305,7 +305,12 @@ When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1 |
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digest will fail. For compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL, set this |
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option to B<yes>. This setting also affects TLS, where signature algorithms |
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that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if this option is set to |
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-B<no>. |
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+B<no>. Note that enabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> will allow TLS signature |
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+algorithms that use SHA1 in security level 2, despite the definition of |
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+security level 2 of 112 bits of security, which SHA1 does not meet. Because |
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+TLS 1.1 or lower use MD5-SHA1 as pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key |
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+material, disabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or |
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+newer. |
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=item B<fips_mode> (deprecated) |
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diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c |
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index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644 |
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--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c |
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+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c |
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ |
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#include <openssl/bn.h> |
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#include <openssl/provider.h> |
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#include <openssl/param_build.h> |
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+#include "crypto/x509.h" |
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#include "internal/sslconf.h" |
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#include "internal/nelem.h" |
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#include "internal/sizes.h" |
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@@ -1561,19 +1562,27 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) |
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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- /* |
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- * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical |
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- * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array. |
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- */ |
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- sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff; |
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- sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff; |
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- secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu); |
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- if (secbits == 0 || |
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- !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits, |
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- md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef, |
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- (void *)sigalgstr)) { |
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- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); |
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- return 0; |
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+ |
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+ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1 |
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0) |
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+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) { |
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+ /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2, |
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */ |
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+ } else { |
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+ /* |
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+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical |
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+ * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array. |
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+ */ |
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+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff; |
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+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff; |
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+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu); |
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+ if (secbits == 0 || |
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+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits, |
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+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef, |
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+ (void *)sigalgstr)) { |
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+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); |
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+ return 0; |
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+ } |
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} |
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/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */ |
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s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu; |
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@@ -2106,6 +2115,14 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu) |
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} |
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} |
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+ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1 |
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0) |
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+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) { |
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+ /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2, |
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */ |
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+ return 1; |
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+ } |
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+ |
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/* Finally see if security callback allows it */ |
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secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu); |
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sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff; |
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@@ -2977,6 +2994,8 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) |
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{ |
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/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ |
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int secbits, nid, pknid; |
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+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL; |
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+ |
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/* Don't check signature if self signed */ |
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if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0) |
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return 1; |
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@@ -2985,6 +3004,25 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) |
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/* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */ |
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if (nid == NID_undef) |
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nid = pknid; |
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+ |
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+ if (x && x->libctx) |
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+ libctx = x->libctx; |
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+ else if (ctx && ctx->libctx) |
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+ libctx = ctx->libctx; |
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+ else if (s && s->ctx && s->ctx->libctx) |
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+ libctx = s->ctx->libctx; |
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+ else |
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+ libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default(); |
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+ |
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+ if (nid == NID_sha1 |
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0) |
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+ && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) |
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+ || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 3) |
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+ )) |
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+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2, |
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */ |
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+ return 1; |
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+ |
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if (s) |
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return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x); |
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else |
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diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t |
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index 700bbd849c..2de1d76b5e 100644 |
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--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t |
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+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t |
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify { |
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run(app([@args])); |
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} |
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-plan tests => 163; |
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+plan tests => 162; |
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# Canonical success |
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ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]), |
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@@ -387,8 +387,9 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0" |
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ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ), |
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"CA with PSS signature using SHA256"); |
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-ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"), |
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- "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1"); |
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+## rh-allow-sha1-signatures=yes allows this to pass despite -auth_level 1 |
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+#ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"), |
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+# "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1"); |
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ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"), |
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"PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2"); |
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-- |
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2.35.1 |
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