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3030 lines
102 KiB
3030 lines
102 KiB
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/err/openssl.txt.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/err/openssl.txt |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/err/openssl.txt.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.320094521 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/err/openssl.txt 2019-11-14 15:07:05.342094129 +0100 |
|
@@ -821,6 +821,11 @@ EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL:201:s390x_aes_g |
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EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG:228:scrypt_alg |
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EVP_F_UPDATE:173:update |
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KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT:112:HKDF_Extract |
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+KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL:134:kbkdf_ctrl |
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+KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL_STR:135:kbkdf_ctrl_str |
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+KDF_F_KBKDF_DERIVE:136:kbkdf_derive |
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+KDF_F_KBKDF_NEW:137:kbkdf_new |
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+KDF_F_KDF_CIPHER2CTRL:138:kdf_cipher2ctrl |
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KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE:113:kdf_hkdf_derive |
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KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW:114:kdf_hkdf_new |
|
KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE:115:kdf_hkdf_size |
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@@ -840,6 +845,8 @@ KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_NEW:133:kdf_sshkdf_new |
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KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR:125:kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str |
|
KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE:126:kdf_tls1_prf_derive |
|
KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW:127:kdf_tls1_prf_new |
|
+KDF_F_KRB5KDF:139:KRB5KDF |
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+KDF_F_KRB5KDF_DERIVE:140:krb5kdf_derive |
|
KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF:128:pbkdf2_set_membuf |
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KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR:103:pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str |
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KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE:102:pkey_hkdf_derive |
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@@ -853,6 +860,9 @@ KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR:100:pkey_tl |
|
KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE:101:pkey_tls1_prf_derive |
|
KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_INIT:110:pkey_tls1_prf_init |
|
KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF:129:scrypt_set_membuf |
|
+KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE:141:sskdf_derive |
|
+KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW:142:sskdf_new |
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+KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE:143:sskdf_size |
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KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG:111:tls1_prf_alg |
|
OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT:105:OBJ_add_object |
|
OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_SIGID:107:OBJ_add_sigid |
|
@@ -2325,7 +2335,13 @@ EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE:126:unsuppor |
|
EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED:170:wrap mode not allowed |
|
EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH:109:wrong final block length |
|
EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS:183:xts duplicated keys |
|
+KDF_R_FAILED_TO_GENERATE_KEY:118:failed to generate key |
|
+KDF_R_INVALID_CIPHER:116:invalid cipher |
|
+KDF_R_INVALID_CONSTANT_LENGTH:119:invalid constant length |
|
KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST:100:invalid digest |
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+KDF_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH:117:invalid seed length |
|
+KDF_R_MISSING_CIPHER:120:missing cipher |
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+KDF_R_MISSING_CONSTANT:121:missing constant |
|
KDF_R_MISSING_ITERATION_COUNT:109:missing iteration count |
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KDF_R_MISSING_KEY:104:missing key |
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KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST:105:missing message digest |
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@@ -2340,6 +2356,7 @@ KDF_R_MISSING_XCGHASH:115:missing xcghas |
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KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE:103:unknown parameter type |
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KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR:108:value error |
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KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING:102:value missing |
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+KDF_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH:120:wrong final block length |
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KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE:112:wrong output buffer size |
|
OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS:102:oid exists |
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OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID:101:unknown nid |
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diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.320094521 +0100 |
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+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c 2019-11-14 15:07:05.342094129 +0100 |
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@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ static const EVP_KDF_METHOD *standard_me |
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&tls1_prf_kdf_meth, |
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&hkdf_kdf_meth, |
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&sshkdf_kdf_meth, |
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+ &kb_kdf_meth, |
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+ &krb5kdf_kdf_meth, |
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+ &ss_kdf_meth |
|
}; |
|
|
|
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_KDF_METHOD *, const EVP_KDF_METHOD *, |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/include/crypto/evp.h.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/include/crypto/evp.h |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/include/crypto/evp.h.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.320094521 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/include/crypto/evp.h 2019-11-14 15:07:05.342094129 +0100 |
|
@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ extern const EVP_KDF_METHOD scrypt_kdf_m |
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extern const EVP_KDF_METHOD tls1_prf_kdf_meth; |
|
extern const EVP_KDF_METHOD hkdf_kdf_meth; |
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extern const EVP_KDF_METHOD sshkdf_kdf_meth; |
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+extern const EVP_KDF_METHOD kb_kdf_meth; |
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+extern const EVP_KDF_METHOD krb5kdf_kdf_meth; |
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+extern const EVP_KDF_METHOD ss_kdf_meth; |
|
|
|
struct evp_md_st { |
|
int type; |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/build.info.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/build.info |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/build.info.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.320094521 +0100 |
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+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/build.info 2019-11-14 15:07:05.342094129 +0100 |
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@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ |
|
LIBS=../../libcrypto |
|
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ |
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- tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c kdf_util.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c sshkdf.c |
|
+ tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c kdf_util.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c sshkdf.c kbkdf.c krb5kdf.c sskdf.c |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c |
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--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.343094112 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c 2019-11-18 17:21:58.326635901 +0100 |
|
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@ |
|
+/* |
|
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
|
+ * Copyright 2019 Red Hat, Inc. |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
|
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
|
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
|
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
|
+ */ |
|
+ |
|
+/* |
|
+ * This implements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-108/final |
|
+ * section 5.1 ("counter mode") and section 5.2 ("feedback mode") in both HMAC |
|
+ * and CMAC. That document does not name the KDFs it defines; the name is |
|
+ * derived from |
|
+ * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/Key-Derivation |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Note that section 5.3 ("double-pipeline mode") is not implemented, though |
|
+ * it would be possible to do so in the future. |
|
+ * |
|
+ * These versions all assume the counter is used. It would be relatively |
|
+ * straightforward to expose a configuration handle should the need arise. |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Variable names attempt to match those of SP800-108. |
|
+ */ |
|
+ |
|
+#include <stdarg.h> |
|
+#include <stdlib.h> |
|
+#include <string.h> |
|
+ |
|
+#include <openssl/evp.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/hmac.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/cmac.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/kdf.h> |
|
+ |
|
+#include "internal/numbers.h" |
|
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
|
+#include "crypto/evp.h" |
|
+#include "kdf_local.h" |
|
+ |
|
+#include "e_os.h" |
|
+ |
|
+#ifdef MIN |
|
+# undef MIN |
|
+#endif |
|
+#define MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b) |
|
+ |
|
+typedef struct { |
|
+ int mac_type; |
|
+ union { |
|
+ HMAC_CTX *hmac; |
|
+ CMAC_CTX *cmac; |
|
+ } m; |
|
+} MAC_CTX; |
|
+ |
|
+/* Our context structure. */ |
|
+struct evp_kdf_impl_st { |
|
+ int mode; |
|
+ |
|
+ MAC_CTX *ctx_init; |
|
+ |
|
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; |
|
+ const EVP_MD *md; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */ |
|
+ unsigned char *ki; |
|
+ size_t ki_len; |
|
+ unsigned char *label; |
|
+ size_t label_len; |
|
+ unsigned char *context; |
|
+ size_t context_len; |
|
+ unsigned char *iv; |
|
+ size_t iv_len; |
|
+}; |
|
+ |
|
+static MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_new(int mac_type) |
|
+{ |
|
+ MAC_CTX *ctx; |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
|
+ if (ctx == NULL) |
|
+ return NULL; |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx->mac_type = mac_type; |
|
+ if (mac_type == EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) { |
|
+ if ((ctx->m.hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ if ((ctx->m.cmac = CMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return ctx; |
|
+ |
|
+err: |
|
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
|
+ return NULL; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void EVP_MAC_CTX_free(MAC_CTX *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (ctx == NULL) |
|
+ return; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (ctx->mac_type == EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) |
|
+ HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->m.hmac); |
|
+ else |
|
+ CMAC_CTX_free(ctx->m.cmac); |
|
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(MAC_CTX *sctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ MAC_CTX *ctx; |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sctx)); |
|
+ if (ctx == NULL) |
|
+ return NULL; |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx->mac_type = sctx->mac_type; |
|
+ if (sctx->mac_type == EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) { |
|
+ if ((ctx->m.hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL |
|
+ || HMAC_CTX_copy(ctx->m.hmac, sctx->m.hmac) <= 0) |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ if ((ctx->m.cmac = CMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL |
|
+ || CMAC_CTX_copy(ctx->m.cmac, sctx->m.cmac) <= 0) |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return ctx; |
|
+ |
|
+err: |
|
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); |
|
+ return NULL; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static size_t EVP_MAC_size(MAC_CTX *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (ctx->mac_type == EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) { |
|
+ const EVP_MD *md; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (ctx->m.hmac == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ if ((md = HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx->m.hmac)) == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ return (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md); |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (ctx->m.cmac == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ if ((cctx = CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(ctx->m.cmac)) == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(cctx); |
|
+ } |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int EVP_MAC_update(MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, |
|
+ size_t datalen) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (ctx->mac_type == EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) |
|
+ return HMAC_Update(ctx->m.hmac, data, datalen); |
|
+ else |
|
+ return CMAC_Update(ctx->m.cmac, data, datalen); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int EVP_MAC_final(MAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
|
+ size_t *outl, size_t outsize) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (outsize != EVP_MAC_size(ctx)) |
|
+ /* we do not cope with anything else */ |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (ctx->mac_type == EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) { |
|
+ unsigned int intsize = (unsigned int)outsize; |
|
+ int ret; |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = HMAC_Final(ctx->m.hmac, out, &intsize); |
|
+ if (outl != NULL) |
|
+ *outl = intsize; |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ size_t size = outsize; |
|
+ int ret; |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = CMAC_Final(ctx->m.cmac, out, &size); |
|
+ if (outl != NULL) |
|
+ *outl = size; |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+ } |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int evp_mac_init(MAC_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, |
|
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (ctx->mac_type == EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) { |
|
+ if (md == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->m.hmac, key, (int)keylen, md, NULL); |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ if (cipher == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ return CMAC_Init(ctx->m.cmac, key, keylen, cipher, NULL); |
|
+ } |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void kbkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx); |
|
+ |
|
+/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */ |
|
+static uint32_t be32(uint32_t host) |
|
+{ |
|
+ uint32_t big = 0; |
|
+ const union { |
|
+ long one; |
|
+ char little; |
|
+ } is_endian = { 1 }; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (!is_endian.little) |
|
+ return host; |
|
+ |
|
+ big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24; |
|
+ big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8; |
|
+ big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8; |
|
+ big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24; |
|
+ return big; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kbkdf_new(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx; |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
|
+ if (ctx == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
+ return NULL; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ return ctx; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void kbkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ kbkdf_reset(ctx); |
|
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void kbkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len); |
|
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+/* SP800-108 section 5.1 or section 5.2 depending on mode. */ |
|
+static int derive(MAC_CTX *ctx_init, int mode, unsigned char *iv, |
|
+ size_t iv_len, unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, |
|
+ unsigned char *context, size_t context_len, |
|
+ unsigned char *k_i, size_t h, uint32_t l, unsigned char *ko, |
|
+ size_t ko_len) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0; |
|
+ MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
|
+ size_t written = 0, to_write, k_i_len = iv_len; |
|
+ const unsigned char zero = 0; |
|
+ uint32_t counter, i; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* Setup K(0) for feedback mode. */ |
|
+ if (iv_len > 0) |
|
+ memcpy(k_i, iv, iv_len); |
|
+ |
|
+ for (counter = 1; written < ko_len; counter++) { |
|
+ i = be32(counter); |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init); |
|
+ if (ctx == NULL) |
|
+ goto done; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* Perform feedback, if appropriate. */ |
|
+ if (mode == EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, k_i, k_i_len)) |
|
+ goto done; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&i, 4) |
|
+ || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, label, label_len) |
|
+ || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &zero, 1) |
|
+ || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, context, context_len) |
|
+ || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&l, 4) |
|
+ || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, k_i, NULL, h)) |
|
+ goto done; |
|
+ |
|
+ to_write = ko_len - written; |
|
+ memcpy(ko + written, k_i, MIN(to_write, h)); |
|
+ written += h; |
|
+ |
|
+ k_i_len = h; |
|
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); |
|
+ ctx = NULL; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = 1; |
|
+done: |
|
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int kbkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0; |
|
+ unsigned char *k_i = NULL; |
|
+ uint32_t l = be32(keylen * 8); |
|
+ size_t h = 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* label, context, and iv are permitted to be empty. Check everything |
|
+ * else. */ |
|
+ if (ctx->ctx_init == NULL |
|
+ || evp_mac_init(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->md, ctx->cipher, ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len) <= 0) { |
|
+ if (ctx->ki_len == 0 || ctx->ki == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ /* Could either be missing MAC or missing message digest or missing |
|
+ * cipher - arbitrarily, I pick this one. */ |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ h = EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx_init); |
|
+ if (h == 0) |
|
+ goto done; |
|
+ if (ctx->iv_len != 0 && ctx->iv_len != h) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH); |
|
+ goto done; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ k_i = OPENSSL_zalloc(h); |
|
+ if (k_i == NULL) |
|
+ goto done; |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = derive(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->mode, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len, ctx->label, |
|
+ ctx->label_len, ctx->context, ctx->context_len, k_i, h, l, |
|
+ key, keylen); |
|
+done: |
|
+ if (ret != 1) |
|
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(k_i, h); |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static size_t kbkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ return UINT32_MAX/8; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int kbkdf_parse_buffer_arg(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len, |
|
+ va_list args) |
|
+{ |
|
+ const unsigned char *p; |
|
+ size_t len; |
|
+ |
|
+ p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *); |
|
+ len = va_arg(args, size_t); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len); |
|
+ if (len == 0) { |
|
+ *dst = NULL; |
|
+ *dst_len = 0; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ *dst = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len); |
|
+ if (*dst == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ *dst_len = len; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int kbkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx, int cmd, va_list args) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int t; |
|
+ |
|
+ switch (cmd) { |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD: |
|
+ ctx->md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *); |
|
+ if (ctx->md == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER: |
|
+ ctx->cipher = va_arg(args, const EVP_CIPHER *); |
|
+ if (ctx->cipher == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY: |
|
+ return kbkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&ctx->ki, |
|
+ &ctx->ki_len, args); |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT: |
|
+ return kbkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&ctx->label, |
|
+ &ctx->label_len, args); |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO: |
|
+ return kbkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&ctx->context, |
|
+ &ctx->context_len, args); |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED: |
|
+ return kbkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&ctx->iv, |
|
+ &ctx->iv_len, args); |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE: |
|
+ t = va_arg(args, int); |
|
+ if (t != EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_COUNTER && t != EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK ) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ ctx->mode = t; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE: |
|
+ t = va_arg(args, int); |
|
+ if (t != EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC && t != EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC ) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL) { |
|
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init); |
|
+ } |
|
+ ctx->ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(t); |
|
+ if (ctx->ctx_init == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ |
|
+ default: |
|
+ return -2; |
|
+ |
|
+ } |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int kbkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx, const char *type, |
|
+ const char *value) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (value == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_md2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value); |
|
+ /* alias, for historical reasons */ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_md2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "cipher") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_cipher2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(ctx, kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "mode") == 0) { |
|
+ int mode; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcasecmp(value, "counter") == 0) { |
|
+ mode = EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_COUNTER; |
|
+ } else if (strcasecmp(value, "feedback") == 0) { |
|
+ mode = EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ return call_ctrl(kbkdf_ctrl, ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE, |
|
+ mode); |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "mac_type") == 0) { |
|
+ int mac_type; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcasecmp(value, "hmac") == 0) { |
|
+ mac_type = EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC; |
|
+ } else if (strcasecmp(value, "cmac") == 0) { |
|
+ mac_type = EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ return call_ctrl(kbkdf_ctrl, ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE, |
|
+ mac_type); |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE); |
|
+ return -2; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+const EVP_KDF_METHOD kb_kdf_meth = { |
|
+ EVP_KDF_KB, |
|
+ kbkdf_new, |
|
+ kbkdf_free, |
|
+ kbkdf_reset, |
|
+ kbkdf_ctrl, |
|
+ kbkdf_ctrl_str, |
|
+ kbkdf_size, |
|
+ kbkdf_derive, |
|
+}; |
|
+ |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.320094521 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c 2019-11-14 15:07:05.343094112 +0100 |
|
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ |
|
|
|
static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = { |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, 0), "HKDF_Extract"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL, 0), "kbkdf_ctrl"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL_STR, 0), "kbkdf_ctrl_str"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KBKDF_DERIVE, 0), "kbkdf_derive"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KBKDF_NEW, 0), "kbkdf_new"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_CIPHER2CTRL, 0), "kdf_cipher2ctrl"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, 0), "kdf_hkdf_derive"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, 0), "kdf_hkdf_new"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, 0), "kdf_hkdf_size"}, |
|
@@ -41,6 +46,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_fun |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, 0), |
|
"kdf_tls1_prf_derive"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW, 0), "kdf_tls1_prf_new"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KRB5KDF, 0), "KRB5KDF"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KRB5KDF_DERIVE, 0), "krb5kdf_derive"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, 0), "pbkdf2_set_membuf"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE, 0), "pkey_hkdf_derive"}, |
|
@@ -59,12 +66,22 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_fun |
|
"pkey_tls1_prf_derive"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_INIT, 0), "pkey_tls1_prf_init"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, 0), "scrypt_set_membuf"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, 0), "sskdf_derive"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, 0), "sskdf_new"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, 0), "sskdf_size"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, 0), "tls1_prf_alg"}, |
|
{0, NULL} |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = { |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_FAILED_TO_GENERATE_KEY), |
|
+ "failed to generate key"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_CIPHER), "invalid cipher"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_CONSTANT_LENGTH), "invalid constant length"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH), "invalid seed length"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_CIPHER), "missing cipher"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_CONSTANT), "missing constant"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_ITERATION_COUNT), |
|
"missing iteration count"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY), "missing key"}, |
|
@@ -82,6 +99,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_rea |
|
"unknown parameter type"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR), "value error"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"}, |
|
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH), |
|
+ "wrong final block length"}, |
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE), |
|
"wrong output buffer size"}, |
|
{0, NULL} |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.313094646 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h 2019-11-14 15:07:05.344094093 +0100 |
|
@@ -19,4 +19,6 @@ int kdf_hex2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, |
|
int kdf_md2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, |
|
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args), |
|
int cmd, const char *md_name); |
|
- |
|
+int kdf_cipher2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, |
|
+ int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args), |
|
+ int cmd, const char *cipher_name); |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.313094646 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c 2019-11-14 15:07:05.344094093 +0100 |
|
@@ -71,3 +71,16 @@ int kdf_md2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, |
|
return call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, md); |
|
} |
|
|
|
+/* Pass a cipher to a ctrl */ |
|
+int kdf_cipher2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, |
|
+ int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args), |
|
+ int cmd, const char *cipher_name) |
|
+{ |
|
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (cipher_name == NULL || (cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(cipher_name)) == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_CIPHER2CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_CIPHER); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, cipher); |
|
+} |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.344094093 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c 2019-11-18 17:18:13.056604404 +0100 |
|
@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@ |
|
+/* |
|
+ * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
|
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
|
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
|
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
|
+ */ |
|
+ |
|
+#include <stdlib.h> |
|
+#include <stdarg.h> |
|
+#include <string.h> |
|
+ |
|
+#include <openssl/des.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/evp.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/kdf.h> |
|
+ |
|
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
|
+#include "crypto/evp.h" |
|
+#include "kdf_local.h" |
|
+ |
|
+/* KRB5 KDF defined in RFC 3961, Section 5.1 */ |
|
+ |
|
+static int KRB5KDF(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, |
|
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, |
|
+ const unsigned char *constant, size_t constant_len, |
|
+ unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len); |
|
+ |
|
+struct evp_kdf_impl_st { |
|
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; |
|
+ unsigned char *key; |
|
+ size_t key_len; |
|
+ unsigned char *constant; |
|
+ size_t constant_len; |
|
+}; |
|
+ |
|
+static void krb5kdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx); |
|
+ |
|
+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *krb5kdf_new(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx; |
|
+ |
|
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL) |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
+ return ctx; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void krb5kdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ krb5kdf_reset(ctx); |
|
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void krb5kdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->constant, ctx->constant_len); |
|
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int krb5kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx, unsigned char *key, |
|
+ size_t keylen) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (ctx->cipher == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KRB5KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CIPHER); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (ctx->key == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KRB5KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (ctx->constant == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KRB5KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CONSTANT); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return KRB5KDF(ctx->cipher, ctx->key, ctx->key_len, |
|
+ ctx->constant, ctx->constant_len, |
|
+ key, keylen); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static size_t krb5kdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (ctx->cipher != NULL) |
|
+ return EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ctx->cipher); |
|
+ else |
|
+ return EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+ |
|
+static int krb5kdf_parse_buffer_arg(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len, |
|
+ va_list args) |
|
+{ |
|
+ const unsigned char *p; |
|
+ size_t len; |
|
+ |
|
+ p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *); |
|
+ len = va_arg(args, size_t); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len); |
|
+ if (len == 0) { |
|
+ *dst = NULL; |
|
+ *dst_len = 0; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ *dst = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len); |
|
+ if (*dst == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ *dst_len = len; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int krb5kdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx, int cmd, va_list args) |
|
+{ |
|
+ switch (cmd) { |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER: |
|
+ ctx->cipher = va_arg(args, const EVP_CIPHER *); |
|
+ if (ctx->cipher == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY: |
|
+ return krb5kdf_parse_buffer_arg(&ctx->key, |
|
+ &ctx->key_len, args); |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT: |
|
+ return krb5kdf_parse_buffer_arg(&ctx->constant, |
|
+ &ctx->constant_len, args); |
|
+ default: |
|
+ return -2; |
|
+ |
|
+ } |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int krb5kdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *ctx, const char *type, |
|
+ const char *value) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (value == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "cipher") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_cipher2ctrl(ctx, krb5kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(ctx, krb5kdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(ctx, krb5kdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "constant") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(ctx, krb5kdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexconstant") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(ctx, krb5kdf_ctrl, |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE); |
|
+ return -2; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+ |
|
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES |
|
+/* |
|
+ * DES3 is a special case, it requires a random-to-key function and its |
|
+ * input truncated to 21 bytes of the 24 produced by the cipher. |
|
+ * See RFC3961 6.3.1 |
|
+ */ |
|
+static int fixup_des3_key(unsigned char *key) |
|
+{ |
|
+ unsigned char *cblock; |
|
+ int i, j; |
|
+ |
|
+ for (i = 2; i >= 0; i--) { |
|
+ cblock = &key[i * 8]; |
|
+ memmove(cblock, &key[i * 7], 7); |
|
+ cblock[7] = 0; |
|
+ for (j = 0; j < 7; j++) |
|
+ cblock[7] |= (cblock[j] & 1) << (j + 1); |
|
+ DES_set_odd_parity((DES_cblock *)cblock); |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ /* fail if keys are such that triple des degrades to single des */ |
|
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(&key[0], &key[8], 8) == 0 || |
|
+ CRYPTO_memcmp(&key[8], &key[16], 8) == 0) { |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+} |
|
+#endif |
|
+ |
|
+/* |
|
+ * N-fold(K) where blocksize is N, and constant_len is K |
|
+ * Note: Here |= denotes concatenation |
|
+ * |
|
+ * L = lcm(N,K) |
|
+ * R = L/K |
|
+ * |
|
+ * for r: 1 -> R |
|
+ * s |= constant rot 13*(r-1)) |
|
+ * |
|
+ * block = 0 |
|
+ * for k: 1 -> K |
|
+ * block += s[N(k-1)..(N-1)k] (one's complement addition) |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Optimizing for space we compute: |
|
+ * for each l in L-1 -> 0: |
|
+ * s[l] = (constant rot 13*(l/K))[l%k] |
|
+ * block[l % N] += s[l] (with carry) |
|
+ * finally add carry if any |
|
+ */ |
|
+static void n_fold(unsigned char *block, unsigned int blocksize, |
|
+ const unsigned char *constant, size_t constant_len) |
|
+{ |
|
+ unsigned int tmp, gcd, remainder, lcm, carry; |
|
+ int b, l; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (constant_len == blocksize) { |
|
+ memcpy(block, constant, constant_len); |
|
+ return; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ /* Least Common Multiple of lengths: LCM(a,b)*/ |
|
+ gcd = blocksize; |
|
+ remainder = constant_len; |
|
+ /* Calculate Great Common Divisor first GCD(a,b) */ |
|
+ while (remainder != 0) { |
|
+ tmp = gcd % remainder; |
|
+ gcd = remainder; |
|
+ remainder = tmp; |
|
+ } |
|
+ /* resulting a is the GCD, LCM(a,b) = |a*b|/GCD(a,b) */ |
|
+ lcm = blocksize * constant_len / gcd; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* now spread out the bits */ |
|
+ memset(block, 0, blocksize); |
|
+ |
|
+ /* last to first to be able to bring carry forward */ |
|
+ carry = 0; |
|
+ for (l = lcm - 1; l >= 0; l--) { |
|
+ unsigned int rotbits, rshift, rbyte; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* destination byte in block is l % N */ |
|
+ b = l % blocksize; |
|
+ /* Our virtual s buffer is R = L/K long (K = constant_len) */ |
|
+ /* So we rotate backwards from R-1 to 0 (none) rotations */ |
|
+ rotbits = 13 * (l / constant_len); |
|
+ /* find the byte on s where rotbits falls onto */ |
|
+ rbyte = l - (rotbits / 8); |
|
+ /* calculate how much shift on that byte */ |
|
+ rshift = rotbits & 0x07; |
|
+ /* rbyte % constant_len gives us the unrotated byte in the |
|
+ * constant buffer, get also the previous byte then |
|
+ * appropriately shift them to get the rotated byte we need */ |
|
+ tmp = (constant[(rbyte-1) % constant_len] << (8 - rshift) |
|
+ | constant[rbyte % constant_len] >> rshift) |
|
+ & 0xff; |
|
+ /* add with carry to any value placed by previous passes */ |
|
+ tmp += carry + block[b]; |
|
+ block[b] = tmp & 0xff; |
|
+ /* save any carry that may be left */ |
|
+ carry = tmp >> 8; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ /* if any carry is left at the end, add it through the number */ |
|
+ for (b = blocksize - 1; b >= 0 && carry != 0; b--) { |
|
+ carry += block[b]; |
|
+ block[b] = carry & 0xff; |
|
+ carry >>= 8; |
|
+ } |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
|
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, |
|
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int klen, ret; |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ /* set the key len for the odd variable key len cipher */ |
|
+ klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); |
|
+ if (key_len != (size_t)klen) { |
|
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key_len); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ } |
|
+ /* we never want padding, either the length requested is a multiple of |
|
+ * the cipher block size or we are passed a cipher that can cope with |
|
+ * partial blocks via techniques like cipher text stealing */ |
|
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ |
|
+out: |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int KRB5KDF(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, |
|
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, |
|
+ const unsigned char *constant, size_t constant_len, |
|
+ unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len) |
|
+{ |
|
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
|
+ unsigned char block[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; |
|
+ unsigned char *plainblock, *cipherblock; |
|
+ size_t blocksize; |
|
+ size_t cipherlen; |
|
+ size_t osize; |
|
+ int des3_no_fixup = 0; |
|
+ int ret; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (key_len != okey_len) { |
|
+ /* special case for 3des, where the caller may be requesting |
|
+ * the random raw key, instead of the fixed up key */ |
|
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc && |
|
+ key_len == 24 && okey_len == 21) { |
|
+ des3_no_fixup = 1; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KRB5KDF, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
|
+ if (ctx == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = cipher_init(ctx, cipher, key, key_len); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* Initialize input block */ |
|
+ blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (constant_len == 0 || constant_len > blocksize) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KRB5KDF, KDF_R_INVALID_CONSTANT_LENGTH); |
|
+ ret = 0; |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ n_fold(block, blocksize, constant, constant_len); |
|
+ plainblock = block; |
|
+ cipherblock = block + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; |
|
+ |
|
+ for (osize = 0; osize < okey_len; osize += cipherlen) { |
|
+ int olen; |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, cipherblock, &olen, |
|
+ plainblock, blocksize); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ cipherlen = olen; |
|
+ ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherblock, &olen); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ if (olen != 0) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KRB5KDF, KDF_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH); |
|
+ ret = 0; |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ /* write cipherblock out */ |
|
+ if (cipherlen > okey_len - osize) |
|
+ cipherlen = okey_len - osize; |
|
+ memcpy(okey + osize, cipherblock, cipherlen); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (okey_len > osize + cipherlen) { |
|
+ /* we need to reinitialize cipher context per spec */ |
|
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ ret = cipher_init(ctx, cipher, key, key_len); |
|
+ if (!ret) |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ |
|
+ /* also swap block offsets so last ciphertext becomes new |
|
+ * plaintext */ |
|
+ plainblock = cipherblock; |
|
+ if (cipherblock == block) { |
|
+ cipherblock += EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ cipherblock = block; |
|
+ } |
|
+ } |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES |
|
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc && !des3_no_fixup) { |
|
+ ret = fixup_des3_key(okey); |
|
+ if (!ret) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KRB5KDF, KDF_R_FAILED_TO_GENERATE_KEY); |
|
+ goto out; |
|
+ } |
|
+ } |
|
+#endif |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = 1; |
|
+ |
|
+out: |
|
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
|
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(block, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH * 2); |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+const EVP_KDF_METHOD krb5kdf_kdf_meth = { |
|
+ EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF, |
|
+ krb5kdf_new, |
|
+ krb5kdf_free, |
|
+ krb5kdf_reset, |
|
+ krb5kdf_ctrl, |
|
+ krb5kdf_ctrl_str, |
|
+ krb5kdf_size, |
|
+ krb5kdf_derive, |
|
+}; |
|
+ |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.327094396 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c 2019-11-18 17:18:25.343388314 +0100 |
|
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ |
|
#include <string.h> |
|
#include <openssl/evp.h> |
|
#include <openssl/kdf.h> |
|
+#include "internal/numbers.h" |
|
#include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
|
#include "crypto/evp.h" |
|
#include "kdf_local.h" |
|
@@ -68,6 +69,12 @@ static int kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(u |
|
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *); |
|
len = va_arg(args, size_t); |
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len); |
|
+ if (len == 0) { |
|
+ *dst = NULL; |
|
+ *dst_len = 0; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
*dst = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len); |
|
if (*dst == NULL) |
|
return 0; |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.344094093 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c 2019-11-18 17:21:40.349952802 +0100 |
|
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ |
|
+/* |
|
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
|
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
|
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
|
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
|
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
|
+ */ |
|
+ |
|
+/* |
|
+ * Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final |
|
+ * Section 4.1. |
|
+ * |
|
+ * The Single Step KDF algorithm is given by: |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Result(0) = empty bit string (i.e., the null string). |
|
+ * For i = 1 to reps, do the following: |
|
+ * Increment counter by 1. |
|
+ * Result(i) = Result(i – 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo). |
|
+ * DKM = LeftmostBits(Result(reps), L)) |
|
+ * |
|
+ * NOTES: |
|
+ * Z is a shared secret required to produce the derived key material. |
|
+ * counter is a 4 byte buffer. |
|
+ * FixedInfo is a bit string containing context specific data. |
|
+ * DKM is the output derived key material. |
|
+ * L is the required size of the DKM. |
|
+ * reps = [L / H_outputBits] |
|
+ * H(x) is the auxiliary function that can be either a hash, HMAC or KMAC. |
|
+ * This backported version supports only a hash. |
|
+ * H_outputBits is the length of the output of the auxiliary function H(x). |
|
+ * |
|
+ * Currently there is not a comprehensive list of test vectors for this |
|
+ * algorithm, especially for H(x) = HMAC and H(x) = KMAC. |
|
+ * Test vectors for H(x) = Hash are indirectly used by CAVS KAS tests. |
|
+ */ |
|
+#include <stdlib.h> |
|
+#include <stdarg.h> |
|
+#include <string.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/hmac.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/evp.h> |
|
+#include <openssl/kdf.h> |
|
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
|
+#include "crypto/evp.h" |
|
+#include "kdf_local.h" |
|
+ |
|
+struct evp_kdf_impl_st { |
|
+ const EVP_MD *md; /* H(x) = hash */ |
|
+ unsigned char *secret; |
|
+ size_t secret_len; |
|
+ unsigned char *info; |
|
+ size_t info_len; |
|
+}; |
|
+ |
|
+#define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30) |
|
+ |
|
+/* |
|
+ * Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final |
|
+ * Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x) |
|
+ */ |
|
+static int SSKDF_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md, |
|
+ const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len, |
|
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, |
|
+ unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0, hlen; |
|
+ size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len; |
|
+ unsigned char c[4]; |
|
+ unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
|
+ unsigned char *out = derived_key; |
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN |
|
+ || derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN |
|
+ || derived_key_len == 0) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md); |
|
+ if (hlen <= 0) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ out_len = (size_t)hlen; |
|
+ |
|
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); |
|
+ ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); |
|
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL) |
|
+ goto end; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md)) |
|
+ goto end; |
|
+ |
|
+ for (counter = 1;; counter++) { |
|
+ c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff); |
|
+ c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff); |
|
+ c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff); |
|
+ c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (!(EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init) |
|
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)) |
|
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len) |
|
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, info, info_len))) |
|
+ goto end; |
|
+ if (len >= out_len) { |
|
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL)) |
|
+ goto end; |
|
+ out += out_len; |
|
+ len -= out_len; |
|
+ if (len == 0) |
|
+ break; |
|
+ } else { |
|
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL)) |
|
+ goto end; |
|
+ memcpy(out, mac, len); |
|
+ break; |
|
+ } |
|
+ } |
|
+ ret = 1; |
|
+end: |
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); |
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx_init); |
|
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac)); |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *sskdf_new(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl; |
|
+ |
|
+ if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL) |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
|
+ return impl; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void sskdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl) |
|
+{ |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->info, impl->info_len); |
|
+ memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl)); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static void sskdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl) |
|
+{ |
|
+ sskdf_reset(impl); |
|
+ OPENSSL_free(impl); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int sskdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len) |
|
+{ |
|
+ const unsigned char *p; |
|
+ size_t len; |
|
+ |
|
+ p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *); |
|
+ len = va_arg(args, size_t); |
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*out, *out_len); |
|
+ if (len == 0) { |
|
+ *out = NULL; |
|
+ *out_len = 0; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ *out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len); |
|
+ if (*out == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ *out_len = len; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int sskdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args) |
|
+{ |
|
+ const EVP_MD *md; |
|
+ |
|
+ switch (cmd) { |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY: |
|
+ return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len); |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO: |
|
+ return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->info, &impl->info_len); |
|
+ |
|
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD: |
|
+ md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *); |
|
+ if (md == NULL) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ impl->md = md; |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+ |
|
+ default: |
|
+ return -2; |
|
+ } |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int sskdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type, |
|
+ const char *value) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, |
|
+ value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, |
|
+ value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO, |
|
+ value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO, |
|
+ value); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0) |
|
+ return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value); |
|
+ |
|
+ return -2; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static size_t sskdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int len; |
|
+ |
|
+ if (impl->md == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md); |
|
+ return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int sskdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) |
|
+{ |
|
+ if (impl->secret == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ /* H(x) = hash */ |
|
+ if (impl->md == NULL) { |
|
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len, |
|
+ impl->info, impl->info_len, key, keylen); |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+const EVP_KDF_METHOD ss_kdf_meth = { |
|
+ EVP_KDF_SS, |
|
+ sskdf_new, |
|
+ sskdf_free, |
|
+ sskdf_reset, |
|
+ sskdf_ctrl, |
|
+ sskdf_ctrl_str, |
|
+ sskdf_size, |
|
+ sskdf_derive |
|
+}; |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.322094485 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h 2019-11-14 15:07:05.345094076 +0100 |
|
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ static const unsigned char so[7762] = { |
|
0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0D, /* [ 7753] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_256 */ |
|
}; |
|
|
|
-#define NUM_NID 1196 |
|
+#define NUM_NID 1199 |
|
static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = { |
|
{"UNDEF", "undefined", NID_undef}, |
|
{"rsadsi", "RSA Data Security, Inc.", NID_rsadsi, 6, &so[0]}, |
|
@@ -2276,9 +2276,12 @@ static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NI |
|
{"hmacWithSHA512-224", "hmacWithSHA512-224", NID_hmacWithSHA512_224, 8, &so[7745]}, |
|
{"hmacWithSHA512-256", "hmacWithSHA512-256", NID_hmacWithSHA512_256, 8, &so[7753]}, |
|
{"SSHKDF", "sshkdf", NID_sshkdf}, |
|
+ {"KBKDF", "kbkdf", NID_kbkdf}, |
|
+ {"KRB5KDF", "krb5kdf", NID_krb5kdf}, |
|
+ {"SSKDF", "sskdf", NID_sskdf}, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
-#define NUM_SN 1187 |
|
+#define NUM_SN 1190 |
|
static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = { |
|
364, /* "AD_DVCS" */ |
|
419, /* "AES-128-CBC" */ |
|
@@ -2442,7 +2445,9 @@ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN |
|
183, /* "ISO-US" */ |
|
645, /* "ITU-T" */ |
|
646, /* "JOINT-ISO-ITU-T" */ |
|
+ 1196, /* "KBKDF" */ |
|
773, /* "KISA" */ |
|
+ 1197, /* "KRB5KDF" */ |
|
1063, /* "KxANY" */ |
|
1039, /* "KxDHE" */ |
|
1041, /* "KxDHE-PSK" */ |
|
@@ -2557,6 +2562,7 @@ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN |
|
100, /* "SN" */ |
|
1006, /* "SNILS" */ |
|
1195, /* "SSHKDF" */ |
|
+ 1198, /* "SSKDF" */ |
|
16, /* "ST" */ |
|
143, /* "SXNetID" */ |
|
1062, /* "SipHash" */ |
|
@@ -3469,7 +3475,7 @@ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN |
|
1093, /* "x509ExtAdmission" */ |
|
}; |
|
|
|
-#define NUM_LN 1187 |
|
+#define NUM_LN 1190 |
|
static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = { |
|
363, /* "AD Time Stamping" */ |
|
405, /* "ANSI X9.62" */ |
|
@@ -4262,8 +4268,10 @@ static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN |
|
957, /* "jurisdictionCountryName" */ |
|
955, /* "jurisdictionLocalityName" */ |
|
956, /* "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName" */ |
|
+ 1196, /* "kbkdf" */ |
|
150, /* "keyBag" */ |
|
773, /* "kisa" */ |
|
+ 1197, /* "krb5kdf" */ |
|
1063, /* "kx-any" */ |
|
1039, /* "kx-dhe" */ |
|
1041, /* "kx-dhe-psk" */ |
|
@@ -4612,6 +4620,7 @@ static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN |
|
1133, /* "sm4-ecb" */ |
|
1135, /* "sm4-ofb" */ |
|
1195, /* "sshkdf" */ |
|
+ 1198, /* "sskdf" */ |
|
16, /* "stateOrProvinceName" */ |
|
660, /* "streetAddress" */ |
|
498, /* "subtreeMaximumQuality" */ |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/objects.txt.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/objects.txt |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/objects.txt.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.322094485 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/objects.txt 2019-11-14 15:07:05.345094076 +0100 |
|
@@ -1603,6 +1603,15 @@ secg-scheme 14 3 : dhSinglePass-cofactor |
|
# NID for SSHKDF |
|
: SSHKDF : sshkdf |
|
|
|
+# NID for KBKDF |
|
+ : KBKDF : kbkdf |
|
+ |
|
+# NID for KRB5KDF |
|
+ : KRB5KDF : krb5kdf |
|
+ |
|
+# NID for SSKDF |
|
+ : SSKDF : sskdf |
|
+ |
|
# RFC 4556 |
|
1 3 6 1 5 2 3 : id-pkinit |
|
id-pkinit 4 : pkInitClientAuth : PKINIT Client Auth |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.322094485 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
@@ -1193,3 +1193,6 @@ magma_mac 1192 |
|
hmacWithSHA512_224 1193 |
|
hmacWithSHA512_256 1194 |
|
sshkdf 1195 |
|
+kbkdf 1196 |
|
+krb5kdf 1197 |
|
+sskdf 1198 |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.314094628 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
@@ -140,7 +140,14 @@ The value string is expected to be a dec |
|
This control expects one argument: C<EVP_MD *md> |
|
|
|
For MAC implementations that use a message digest as an underlying computation |
|
-algorithm, this control set what the digest algorithm should be. |
|
+algorithm, this control sets what the digest algorithm should be. |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects one argument: C<EVP_CIPHER *cipher> |
|
+ |
|
+For MAC implementations that use a cipher as an underlying computation |
|
+algorithm, this control sets what the cipher algorithm should be. |
|
|
|
EVP_KDF_ctrl_str() type string: "md" |
|
|
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KB.pod.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KB.pod |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KB.pod.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KB.pod 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ |
|
+=pod |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 NAME |
|
+ |
|
+EVP_KDF_KB - The Key-Based EVP_KDF implementation |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 DESCRIPTION |
|
+ |
|
+The EVP_KDF_KB algorithm implements the Key-Based key derivation function |
|
+(KBKDF). KBKDF derives a key from repeated application of a keyed MAC to an |
|
+input secret (and other optional values). |
|
+ |
|
+=head2 Numeric identity |
|
+ |
|
+B<EVP_KDF_KB> is the numeric identity for this implementation; it can be used with the |
|
+EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id() function. |
|
+ |
|
+=head2 Supported controls |
|
+ |
|
+The supported controls are: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects one argument: C<int mode> |
|
+ |
|
+Sets the mode for the KBKDF operation. There are two supported modes: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_COUNTER> |
|
+ |
|
+The counter mode of KBKDF should be used. This is the default. |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK> |
|
+ |
|
+The feedback mode of KBKDF should be used. |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects one argument: C<int mac_type> |
|
+ |
|
+Sets the mac type for the KBKDF operation. There are two supported mac types: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC> |
|
+ |
|
+The HMAC with the digest set by B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD> should be used as the mac. |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC> |
|
+ |
|
+The CMAC with the cipher set by B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER> should be used as the mac. |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD> |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER> |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY> |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT> |
|
+ |
|
+These controls work as described in L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS>. |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects two arguments: C<unsigned char *info>, C<size_t infolen> |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects two arguments: C<unsigned char *seed>, C<size_t seedlen> |
|
+ |
|
+It is used only in the feedback mode and the length must be the same |
|
+as the block length of the cipher in CMAC or the size of the digest in HMAC. |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+The controls B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY>, B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT>, |
|
+B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO>, and B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED> |
|
+correspond to KI, Label, Context, and IV (respectively) in SP800-108. |
|
+As in that document, salt, info, and seed are optional and may be |
|
+omitted. |
|
+ |
|
+Depending on whether mac is CMAC or HMAC, either digest or cipher is |
|
+required (respectively) and the other is unused. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 NOTES |
|
+ |
|
+A context for KBKDF can be obtained by calling: |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB); |
|
+ |
|
+The output length of an KBKDF is specified via the C<keylen> |
|
+parameter to the L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)> function. |
|
+ |
|
+Note that currently OpenSSL only implements counter and feedback modes. Other |
|
+variants may be supported in the future. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 EXAMPLES |
|
+ |
|
+This example derives 10 bytes using COUNTER-HMAC-SHA256, with KI "secret", |
|
+Label "label", and Context "context". |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ unsigned char out[10]; |
|
+ |
|
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB); |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, EVP_sha256()); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE, EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, "secret", strlen("secret")); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, "label", strlen("label")); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO, "context", strlen("context")); |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, sizeof(out)) <= 0) |
|
+ error("EVP_KDF_derive"); |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ |
|
+This example derives 10 bytes using FEEDBACK-CMAC-AES256, with KI "secret", |
|
+Label "label", Context "context", and IV "sixteen bytes iv". |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ unsigned char out[10]; |
|
+ unsigned char *iv = "sixteen bytes iv"; |
|
+ |
|
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB); |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_cbc()); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE, EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE, EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, "secret", strlen("secret")); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, "label", strlen("label")); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO, "context", strlen("context")); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED, iv, strlen(iv)); |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, sizeof(out)) <= 0) |
|
+ error("EVP_KDF_derive"); |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 CONFORMING TO |
|
+ |
|
+NIST SP800-108, IETF RFC 6803, IETF RFC 8009. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 SEE ALSO |
|
+ |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX_free(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_ctrl(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_size(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS> |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 HISTORY |
|
+ |
|
+This functionality was added to OpenSSL 3.0. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 COPYRIGHT |
|
+ |
|
+Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
|
+Copyright 2019 Red Hat, Inc. |
|
+ |
|
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
|
+this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
|
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
|
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |
|
+ |
|
+=cut |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF.pod.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF.pod |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF.pod.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF.pod 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ |
|
+=pod |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 NAME |
|
+ |
|
+EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF - The RFC3961 Krb5 KDF EVP_KDF implementation |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 DESCRIPTION |
|
+ |
|
+Support for computing the B<KRB5KDF> KDF through the B<EVP_KDF> API. |
|
+ |
|
+The B<EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF> algorithm implements the key derivation function defined |
|
+in RFC 3961, section 5.1 and is used by Krb5 to derive session keys. |
|
+Three inputs are required to perform key derivation: a cipher, (for example |
|
+AES-128-CBC), the initial key, and a constant. |
|
+ |
|
+=head2 Numeric identity |
|
+ |
|
+B<EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF> is the numeric identity for this implementation; it can be used with the |
|
+EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id() function. |
|
+ |
|
+=head2 Supported controls |
|
+ |
|
+The supported controls are: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER> |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY> |
|
+ |
|
+These controls work as described in L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS>. |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects two arguments: C<unsigned char *constant>, C<size_t constantlen> |
|
+ |
|
+This control sets the I<constant> value for the KDF. |
|
+If a value is already set, the contents are replaced. |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 NOTES |
|
+ |
|
+A context for KRB5KDF can be obtained by calling: |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF); |
|
+ |
|
+The output length of the KRB5KDF derivation is specified via the I<keylen> |
|
+parameter to the L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)> function, and MUST match the key |
|
+length for the chosen cipher or an error is returned. Moreover the |
|
+I<constant>'s length must not exceed the block size of the cipher. |
|
+Since the KRB5KDF output length depends on the chosen cipher, calling |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_size()> to obtain the requisite length returns the correct length |
|
+only after the cipher is set. Prior to that B<EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH> is returned. |
|
+The caller must allocate a buffer of the correct length for the chosen |
|
+cipher, and pass that buffer to the L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)> function along |
|
+with that length. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 EXAMPLES |
|
+ |
|
+This example derives a key using the AES-128-CBC cipher: |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ unsigned char key[16] = "01234..."; |
|
+ unsigned char constant[] = "I'm a constant"; |
|
+ unsigned char out[16]; |
|
+ size_t outlen = sizeof(out); |
|
+ |
|
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF); |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_cbc()); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, key, (size_t)16); |
|
+ EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT, constant, strlen(constant)); |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen) <= 0) |
|
+ /* Error */ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 CONFORMING TO |
|
+ |
|
+RFC 3961 |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 SEE ALSO |
|
+ |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX_free(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_ctrl(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_size(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS> |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 HISTORY |
|
+ |
|
+This functionality was added to OpenSSL 3.0. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 COPYRIGHT |
|
+ |
|
+Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
|
+ |
|
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
|
+this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
|
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
|
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |
|
+ |
|
+=cut |
|
+ |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SS.pod.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SS.pod |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SS.pod.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SS.pod 2019-11-14 15:07:05.346094058 +0100 |
|
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ |
|
+=pod |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 NAME |
|
+ |
|
+EVP_KDF_SS - The Single Step / One Step EVP_KDF implementation |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 DESCRIPTION |
|
+ |
|
+The EVP_KDF_SS algorithm implements the Single Step key derivation function (SSKDF). |
|
+SSKDF derives a key using input such as a shared secret key (that was generated |
|
+during the execution of a key establishment scheme) and fixedinfo. |
|
+SSKDF is also informally referred to as 'Concat KDF'. |
|
+ |
|
+=head2 Auxilary function |
|
+ |
|
+The implementation uses a selectable auxiliary function H, which can be in the |
|
+backported version only a: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<H(x) = hash(x, digest=md)> |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+=head2 Numeric identity |
|
+ |
|
+B<EVP_KDF_SS> is the numeric identity for this implementation; it |
|
+can be used with the EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id() function. |
|
+ |
|
+=head2 Supported controls |
|
+ |
|
+The supported controls are: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD> |
|
+ |
|
+This control works as described in L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS>. |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects two arguments: C<unsigned char *secret>, C<size_t secretlen> |
|
+ |
|
+The shared secret used for key derivation. This control sets the secret. |
|
+ |
|
+EVP_KDF_ctrl_str() takes two type strings for this control: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item "secret" |
|
+ |
|
+The value string is used as is. |
|
+ |
|
+=item "hexsecret" |
|
+ |
|
+The value string is expected to be a hexadecimal number, which will be |
|
+decoded before being passed on as the control value. |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO> |
|
+ |
|
+This control expects two arguments: C<unsigned char *info>, C<size_t infolen> |
|
+ |
|
+An optional value for fixedinfo, also known as otherinfo. This control sets the fixedinfo. |
|
+ |
|
+EVP_KDF_ctrl_str() takes two type strings for this control: |
|
+ |
|
+=over 4 |
|
+ |
|
+=item "info" |
|
+ |
|
+The value string is used as is. |
|
+ |
|
+=item "hexinfo" |
|
+ |
|
+The value string is expected to be a hexadecimal number, which will be |
|
+decoded before being passed on as the control value. |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+=back |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 NOTES |
|
+ |
|
+A context for SSKDF can be obtained by calling: |
|
+ |
|
+EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SS); |
|
+ |
|
+The output length of an SSKDF is specified via the C<keylen> |
|
+parameter to the L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)> function. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 EXAMPLE |
|
+ |
|
+This example derives 10 bytes using H(x) = SHA-256, with the secret key "secret" |
|
+and fixedinfo value "label": |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ unsigned char out[10]; |
|
+ |
|
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SS); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, EVP_sha256()) <= 0) { |
|
+ error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD"); |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, "secret", (size_t)6) <= 0) { |
|
+ error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY"); |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO, "label", (size_t)5) <= 0) { |
|
+ error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO"); |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, sizeof(out)) <= 0) { |
|
+ error("EVP_KDF_derive"); |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 CONFORMING TO |
|
+ |
|
+NIST SP800-56Cr1. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 SEE ALSO |
|
+ |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX_free(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_ctrl(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_size(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)>, |
|
+L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS> |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 HISTORY |
|
+ |
|
+This functionality was added to OpenSSL 3.0.0. |
|
+ |
|
+=head1 COPYRIGHT |
|
+ |
|
+Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Copyright |
|
+(c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
|
+ |
|
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
|
+this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
|
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
|
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |
|
+ |
|
+=cut |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdferr.h.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdferr.h |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdferr.h.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.323094468 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdferr.h 2019-11-14 15:07:05.347094040 +0100 |
|
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void); |
|
* KDF function codes. |
|
*/ |
|
# define KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT 112 |
|
+# define KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL 134 |
|
+# define KDF_F_KBKDF_CTRL_STR 135 |
|
+# define KDF_F_KBKDF_DERIVE 136 |
|
+# define KDF_F_KBKDF_NEW 137 |
|
+# define KDF_F_KDF_CIPHER2CTRL 138 |
|
# define KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE 113 |
|
# define KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW 114 |
|
# define KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE 115 |
|
@@ -43,6 +48,8 @@ int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void); |
|
# define KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR 125 |
|
# define KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE 126 |
|
# define KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW 127 |
|
+# define KDF_F_KRB5KDF 139 |
|
+# define KDF_F_KRB5KDF_DERIVE 140 |
|
# define KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF 128 |
|
# define KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR 103 |
|
# define KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE 102 |
|
@@ -56,12 +63,21 @@ int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void); |
|
# define KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE 101 |
|
# define KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_INIT 110 |
|
# define KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF 129 |
|
+# define KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE 141 |
|
+# define KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW 142 |
|
+# define KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE 143 |
|
# define KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG 111 |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* KDF reason codes. |
|
*/ |
|
+# define KDF_R_FAILED_TO_GENERATE_KEY 118 |
|
+# define KDF_R_INVALID_CIPHER 116 |
|
+# define KDF_R_INVALID_CONSTANT_LENGTH 119 |
|
# define KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST 100 |
|
+# define KDF_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH 117 |
|
+# define KDF_R_MISSING_CIPHER 120 |
|
+# define KDF_R_MISSING_CONSTANT 121 |
|
# define KDF_R_MISSING_ITERATION_COUNT 109 |
|
# define KDF_R_MISSING_KEY 104 |
|
# define KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST 105 |
|
@@ -76,6 +92,7 @@ int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void); |
|
# define KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE 103 |
|
# define KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR 108 |
|
# define KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING 102 |
|
+# define KDF_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH 122 |
|
# define KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE 112 |
|
|
|
#endif |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdf.h.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdf.h |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdf.h.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.323094468 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/kdf.h 2019-11-14 15:07:05.347094040 +0100 |
|
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ extern "C" { |
|
# define EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF NID_tls1_prf |
|
# define EVP_KDF_HKDF NID_hkdf |
|
# define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF NID_sshkdf |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_KB NID_kbkdf |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF NID_krb5kdf |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_SS NID_sskdf |
|
|
|
EVP_KDF_CTX *EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(int id); |
|
void EVP_KDF_CTX_free(EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx); |
|
@@ -51,6 +54,13 @@ int EVP_KDF_derive(EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx, uns |
|
# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH 0x10 /* unsigned char *, size_t */ |
|
# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID 0x11 /* unsigned char *, size_t */ |
|
# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE 0x12 /* int */ |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE 0x13 /* int */ |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE 0x14 /* int */ |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER 0x15 /* EVP_CIPHER * */ |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO 0x16 /* unsigned char *, size_t */ |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED 0x17 /* unsigned char *, size_t */ |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT 0x18 /* unsigned char *, size_t */ |
|
+# define EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO 0x19 /* unsigned char *, size_t */ |
|
|
|
# define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND 0 |
|
# define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY 1 |
|
@@ -63,6 +73,12 @@ int EVP_KDF_derive(EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx, uns |
|
#define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INTEGRITY_KEY_CLI_TO_SRV 69 |
|
#define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INTEGRITY_KEY_SRV_TO_CLI 70 |
|
|
|
+#define EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_COUNTER 0 |
|
+#define EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK 1 |
|
+ |
|
+#define EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC 0 |
|
+#define EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC 1 |
|
+ |
|
/**** The legacy PKEY-based KDF API follows. ****/ |
|
|
|
# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL) |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/obj_mac.h.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/obj_mac.h |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/obj_mac.h.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.323094468 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/include/openssl/obj_mac.h 2019-11-14 15:07:05.347094040 +0100 |
|
@@ -4974,6 +4974,18 @@ |
|
#define LN_sshkdf "sshkdf" |
|
#define NID_sshkdf 1203 |
|
|
|
+#define SN_kbkdf "KBKDF" |
|
+#define LN_kbkdf "kbkdf" |
|
+#define NID_kbkdf 1204 |
|
+ |
|
+#define SN_krb5kdf "KRB5KDF" |
|
+#define LN_krb5kdf "krb5kdf" |
|
+#define NID_krb5kdf 1205 |
|
+ |
|
+#define SN_sskdf "SSKDF" |
|
+#define LN_sskdf "sskdf" |
|
+#define NID_sskdf 1206 |
|
+ |
|
#define SN_id_pkinit "id-pkinit" |
|
#define NID_id_pkinit 1031 |
|
#define OBJ_id_pkinit 1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,2L,3L |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/test/evp_kdf_test.c.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/test/evp_kdf_test.c |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/test/evp_kdf_test.c.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.315094610 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/test/evp_kdf_test.c 2019-11-14 15:07:05.348094022 +0100 |
|
@@ -225,13 +225,358 @@ err: |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
+/* |
|
+ * KBKDF test vectors from RFC 6803 (Camellia Encryption for Kerberos 5) |
|
+ * section 10. |
|
+ */ |
|
+static int test_kdf_kbkdf_6803_128(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0, i; |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ static unsigned char input_key[] = { |
|
+ 0x57, 0xD0, 0x29, 0x72, 0x98, 0xFF, 0xD9, 0xD3, |
|
+ 0x5D, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0xB4, 0xBD, 0xE2, 0x4B, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char constants[][5] = { |
|
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x99 }, |
|
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0xaa }, |
|
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x55 }, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char outputs[][16] = { |
|
+ {0xD1, 0x55, 0x77, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x05, 0xF0, |
|
+ 0x2B, 0x38, 0xD4, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x9E, 0x5A, 0x56}, |
|
+ {0x64, 0xDF, 0x83, 0xF8, 0x5A, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x17, |
|
+ 0x57, 0x7D, 0x8C, 0x37, 0x03, 0x57, 0x96, 0xAB}, |
|
+ {0x3E, 0x4F, 0xBD, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x9C, |
|
+ 0x42, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x46, 0x35} |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 }; |
|
+ unsigned char result[16] = { 0 }; |
|
+ |
|
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { |
|
+ ret = 0; |
|
+ if ((kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB)) == NULL) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_KB"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE, EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE, EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, EVP_camellia_128_cbc()) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, input_key, sizeof(input_key)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, constants[i], sizeof(constants[i])) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED, iv, sizeof(iv)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ ret = TEST_int_gt(EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, result, sizeof(result)), 0) |
|
+ && TEST_mem_eq(result, sizeof(result), outputs[i], |
|
+ sizeof(outputs[i])); |
|
+err: |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ if (ret != 1) |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int test_kdf_kbkdf_6803_256(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0, i; |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ static unsigned char input_key[] = { |
|
+ 0xB9, 0xD6, 0x82, 0x8B, 0x20, 0x56, 0xB7, 0xBE, |
|
+ 0x65, 0x6D, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x23, 0xB1, 0xFA, 0xC6, |
|
+ 0x82, 0x14, 0xAC, 0x2B, 0x72, 0x7E, 0xCF, 0x5F, |
|
+ 0x69, 0xAF, 0xE0, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x2C, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char constants[][5] = { |
|
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x99 }, |
|
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0xaa }, |
|
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x55 }, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char outputs[][32] = { |
|
+ {0xE4, 0x67, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x2B, 0xC7, 0xD3, |
|
+ 0x15, 0x5A, 0x62, 0x20, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0x19, 0x22, |
|
+ 0x0E, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0xFF, 0x78, 0xB0, 0xD1, 0xE6, |
|
+ 0xA1, 0x54, 0x49, 0x91, 0x46, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0x50, |
|
+ }, |
|
+ {0x41, 0x2A, 0xEF, 0xC3, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x28, 0x5F, |
|
+ 0xC3, 0x96, 0x6C, 0x6A, 0x51, 0x81, 0xE7, 0x60, |
|
+ 0x5A, 0xE6, 0x75, 0x23, 0x5B, 0x6D, 0x54, 0x9F, |
|
+ 0xBF, 0xC9, 0xAB, 0x66, 0x30, 0xA4, 0xC6, 0x04, |
|
+ }, |
|
+ {0xFA, 0x62, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0xE5, 0x23, 0x99, 0x3F, |
|
+ 0xA3, 0x88, 0xAE, 0xFD, 0xC6, 0x7E, 0x67, 0xEB, |
|
+ 0xCD, 0x8C, 0x08, 0xE8, 0xA0, 0x24, 0x6B, 0x1D, |
|
+ 0x73, 0xB0, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x9F, 0xC5, 0x82, 0xB0, |
|
+ }, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 }; |
|
+ unsigned char result[32] = { 0 }; |
|
+ |
|
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { |
|
+ ret = 0; |
|
+ if ((kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB)) == NULL) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_KB"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE, EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE, EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, EVP_camellia_256_cbc()) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, input_key, sizeof(input_key)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, constants[i], sizeof(constants[i])) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED, iv, sizeof(iv)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ ret = TEST_int_gt(EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, result, sizeof(result)), 0) |
|
+ && TEST_mem_eq(result, sizeof(result), outputs[i], |
|
+ sizeof(outputs[i])); |
|
+err: |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ if (ret != 1) |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+ } |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+/* Two test vectors from RFC 8009 (AES Encryption with HMAC-SHA2 for Kerberos |
|
+ * 5) appendix A. */ |
|
+static int test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf1(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0; |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ char *label = "prf", *prf_input = "test"; |
|
+ static unsigned char input_key[] = { |
|
+ 0x37, 0x05, 0xD9, 0x60, 0x80, 0xC1, 0x77, 0x28, |
|
+ 0xA0, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xB6, 0xE0, 0xD2, 0x3C, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char output[] = { |
|
+ 0x9D, 0x18, 0x86, 0x16, 0xF6, 0x38, 0x52, 0xFE, |
|
+ 0x86, 0x91, 0x5B, 0xB8, 0x40, 0xB4, 0xA8, 0x86, |
|
+ 0xFF, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x19, 0xB4, 0x9B, |
|
+ 0x89, 0x33, 0x93, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x85, 0x42, 0x95, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ unsigned char result[sizeof(output)] = { 0 }; |
|
+ |
|
+ if ((kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB)) == NULL) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_KB"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE, EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, EVP_sha256()) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, input_key, sizeof(input_key)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, label, strlen(label)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO, prf_input, strlen(prf_input)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ ret = TEST_int_gt(EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, result, sizeof(result)), 0) |
|
+ && TEST_mem_eq(result, sizeof(result), output, |
|
+ sizeof(output)); |
|
+err: |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf2(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0; |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ char *label = "prf", *prf_input = "test"; |
|
+ static unsigned char input_key[] = { |
|
+ 0x6D, 0x40, 0x4D, 0x37, 0xFA, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x9D, |
|
+ 0xF0, 0xD3, 0x35, 0x68, 0xD3, 0x20, 0x66, 0x98, |
|
+ 0x00, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x36, 0x47, 0x2E, 0xA8, 0xA0, |
|
+ 0x26, 0xD1, 0x6B, 0x71, 0x82, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x52, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char output[] = { |
|
+ 0x98, 0x01, 0xF6, 0x9A, 0x36, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0xF6, |
|
+ 0x75, 0xE5, 0x95, 0x21, 0xE1, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xA0, |
|
+ 0x7F, 0x67, 0xEF, 0xE1, 0xCF, 0xDE, 0x8D, 0x3C, |
|
+ 0x8D, 0x6F, 0x6A, 0x02, 0x56, 0xE3, 0xB1, 0x7D, |
|
+ 0xB3, 0xC1, 0xB6, 0x2A, 0xD1, 0xB8, 0x55, 0x33, |
|
+ 0x60, 0xD1, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEB, 0x15, 0x14, 0xD2, |
|
+ }; |
|
+ unsigned char result[sizeof(output)] = { 0 }; |
|
+ |
|
+ if ((kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB)) == NULL) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_KB"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE, EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, EVP_sha384()) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, input_key, sizeof(input_key)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, label, strlen(label)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO, prf_input, strlen(prf_input)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ ret = TEST_int_gt(EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, result, sizeof(result)), 0) |
|
+ && TEST_mem_eq(result, sizeof(result), output, |
|
+ sizeof(output)); |
|
+err: |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int test_kdf_krb5kdf(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ int ret = 0; |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ unsigned char out[16]; |
|
+ static unsigned char key[] = { |
|
+ 0x42, 0x26, 0x3C, 0x6E, 0x89, 0xF4, 0xFC, 0x28, |
|
+ 0xB8, 0xDF, 0x68, 0xEE, 0x09, 0x79, 0x9F, 0x15 |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static unsigned char constant[] = { |
|
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x99 |
|
+ }; |
|
+ static const unsigned char expected[sizeof(out)] = { |
|
+ 0x34, 0x28, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x2B, 0xC9, 0x27, 0x69, |
|
+ 0xB2, 0xDA, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0xF0, 0x66, 0x85, 0x4B |
|
+ }; |
|
+ |
|
+ if ((kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF)) == NULL) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_cbc()) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT, constant, sizeof(constant)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT"); |
|
+ goto err; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ ret = |
|
+ TEST_int_gt(EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, sizeof(out)), 0) |
|
+ && TEST_mem_eq(out, sizeof(out), expected, sizeof(expected)); |
|
+ |
|
+err: |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ return ret; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
+static int test_kdf_ss_hash(void) |
|
+{ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; |
|
+ const unsigned char z[] = { |
|
+ 0x6d,0xbd,0xc2,0x3f,0x04,0x54,0x88,0xe4,0x06,0x27,0x57,0xb0,0x6b,0x9e, |
|
+ 0xba,0xe1,0x83,0xfc,0x5a,0x59,0x46,0xd8,0x0d,0xb9,0x3f,0xec,0x6f,0x62, |
|
+ 0xec,0x07,0xe3,0x72,0x7f,0x01,0x26,0xae,0xd1,0x2c,0xe4,0xb2,0x62,0xf4, |
|
+ 0x7d,0x48,0xd5,0x42,0x87,0xf8,0x1d,0x47,0x4c,0x7c,0x3b,0x18,0x50,0xe9 |
|
+ }; |
|
+ const unsigned char other[] = { |
|
+ 0xa1,0xb2,0xc3,0xd4,0xe5,0x43,0x41,0x56,0x53,0x69,0x64,0x3c,0x83,0x2e, |
|
+ 0x98,0x49,0xdc,0xdb,0xa7,0x1e,0x9a,0x31,0x39,0xe6,0x06,0xe0,0x95,0xde, |
|
+ 0x3c,0x26,0x4a,0x66,0xe9,0x8a,0x16,0x58,0x54,0xcd,0x07,0x98,0x9b,0x1e, |
|
+ 0xe0,0xec,0x3f,0x8d,0xbe |
|
+ }; |
|
+ const unsigned char expected[] = { |
|
+ 0xa4,0x62,0xde,0x16,0xa8,0x9d,0xe8,0x46,0x6e,0xf5,0x46,0x0b,0x47,0xb8 |
|
+ }; |
|
+ unsigned char out[14]; |
|
+ |
|
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SS); |
|
+ |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, EVP_sha224()) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD"); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, z, sizeof(z)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY"); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO, other, |
|
+ sizeof(other)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO"); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, sizeof(out)) <= 0) { |
|
+ TEST_error("EVP_KDF_derive"); |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ } |
|
+ |
|
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, sizeof(out), expected, sizeof(expected))) |
|
+ return 0; |
|
+ |
|
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); |
|
+ return 1; |
|
+} |
|
+ |
|
int setup_tests(void) |
|
{ |
|
+ ADD_TEST(test_kdf_kbkdf_6803_128); |
|
+ ADD_TEST(test_kdf_kbkdf_6803_256); |
|
+ ADD_TEST(test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf1); |
|
+ ADD_TEST(test_kdf_kbkdf_8009_prf2); |
|
ADD_TEST(test_kdf_tls1_prf); |
|
ADD_TEST(test_kdf_hkdf); |
|
ADD_TEST(test_kdf_pbkdf2); |
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT |
|
ADD_TEST(test_kdf_scrypt); |
|
#endif |
|
+ ADD_TEST(test_kdf_krb5kdf); |
|
+ ADD_TEST(test_kdf_ss_hash); |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
diff -up openssl-1.1.1d/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt.krb5-kdf openssl-1.1.1d/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt |
|
--- openssl-1.1.1d/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt.krb5-kdf 2019-11-14 15:07:05.327094396 +0100 |
|
+++ openssl-1.1.1d/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt 2019-11-14 15:07:05.349094005 +0100 |
|
@@ -5286,3 +5286,559 @@ Ctrl.hexsession_id = hexsession_id:a4ebd |
|
Ctrl.type = type:A |
|
Output = FF |
|
Result = KDF_MISMATCH |
|
+ |
|
+Title = KRB5KDF tests (from RFC 3961 test vectors and krb5 sources) |
|
+ |
|
+#RFC3961 |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:dce06b1f64c857a11c3db57c51899b2cc1791008ce973b92 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000155 |
|
+Output = 925179d04591a79b5d3192c4a7e9c289b049c71f6ee604cd |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:5e13d31c70ef765746578531cb51c15bf11ca82c97cee9f2 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:00000001aa |
|
+Output = 9e58e5a146d9942a101c469845d67a20e3c4259ed913f207 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:98e6fd8a04a4b6859b75a176540b9752bad3ecd610a252bc |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000155 |
|
+Output = 13fef80d763e94ec6d13fd2ca1d085070249dad39808eabf |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:622aec25a2fe2cad7094680b7c64940280084c1a7cec92b5 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:00000001aa |
|
+Output = f8dfbf04b097e6d9dc0702686bcb3489d91fd9a4516b703e |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:d3f8298ccb166438dcb9b93ee5a7629286a491f838f802fb |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:6b65726265726f73 |
|
+Output = 2370da575d2a3da864cebfdc5204d56df779a7df43d9da43 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:c1081649ada74362e6a1459d01dfd30d67c2234c940704da |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000155 |
|
+Output = 348057ec98fdc48016161c2a4c7a943e92ae492c989175f7 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:5d154af238f46713155719d55e2f1f790dd661f279a7917c |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:00000001aa |
|
+Output = a8808ac267dada3dcbe9a7c84626fbc761c294b01315e5c1 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:798562e049852f57dc8c343ba17f2ca1d97394efc8adc443 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000155 |
|
+Output = c813f88a3be3b334f75425ce9175fbe3c8493b89c8703b49 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:26dce334b545292f2feab9a8701a89a4b99eb9942cecd016 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:00000001aa |
|
+Output = f48ffd6e83f83e7354e694fd252cf83bfe58f7d5ba37ec5d |
|
+ |
|
+#Krb5 sources |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:850BB51358548CD05E86768C313E3BFEF7511937DCF72C3E |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000299 |
|
+Output = F78C496D16E6C2DAE0E0B6C24057A84C0426AEEF26FD6DCE |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:850BB51358548CD05E86768C313E3BFEF7511937DCF72C3E |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:00000002AA |
|
+Output = 5B5723D0B634CB684C3EBA5264E9A70D52E683231AD3C4CE |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:850BB51358548CD05E86768C313E3BFEF7511937DCF72C3E |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000255 |
|
+Output = A77C94980E9B7345A81525C423A737CE67F4CD91B6B3DA45 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:AES-128-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:42263C6E89F4FC28B8DF68EE09799F15 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000299 |
|
+Output = 34280A382BC92769B2DA2F9EF066854B |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:AES-128-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:42263C6E89F4FC28B8DF68EE09799F15 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:00000002AA |
|
+Output = 5B14FC4E250E14DDF9DCCF1AF6674F53 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:AES-128-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:42263C6E89F4FC28B8DF68EE09799F15 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000255 |
|
+Output = 4ED31063621684F09AE8D89991AF3E8F |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:AES-256-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:FE697B52BC0D3CE14432BA036A92E65BBB52280990A2FA27883998D72AF30161 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000299 |
|
+Output = BFAB388BDCB238E9F9C98D6A878304F04D30C82556375AC507A7A852790F4674 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:AES-256-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:FE697B52BC0D3CE14432BA036A92E65BBB52280990A2FA27883998D72AF30161 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:00000002AA |
|
+Output = C7CFD9CD75FE793A586A542D87E0D1396F1134A104BB1A9190B8C90ADA3DDF37 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:AES-256-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:FE697B52BC0D3CE14432BA036A92E65BBB52280990A2FA27883998D72AF30161 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000255 |
|
+Output = 97151B4C76945063E2EB0529DC067D97D7BBA90776D8126D91F34F3101AEA8BA |
|
+ |
|
+#Same as the first but with no "fixup" |
|
+KDF = KRB5KDF |
|
+Ctrl.cipher = cipher:DES-EDE3-CBC |
|
+Ctrl.hexkey = hexkey:dce06b1f64c857a11c3db57c51899b2cc1791008ce973b92 |
|
+Ctrl.hexconstant = hexconstant:0000000155 |
|
+Output = 935079d14490a75c3093c4a6e8c3b049c71e6ee705 |
|
+ |
|
+#There are currently no official test vectors for Single Step KDF |
|
+#https://github.com/patrickfav/singlestep-kdf/wiki/NIST-SP-800-56C-Rev1:-Non-Official-Test-Vectors |
|
+Title = Single Step KDF tests |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:d09a6b1a472f930db4f5e6b967900744 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:b117255ab5f1b6b96fc434b0 |
|
+Output = b5a3c52e97ae6e8c5069954354eab3c7 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:343666c0dd34b756e70f759f14c304f5 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:722b28448d7eab85491bce09 |
|
+Output = 1003b650ddd3f0891a15166db5ec881d |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:b84acf03ab08652dd7f82fa956933261 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:3d8773ec068c86053a918565 |
|
+Output = 1635dcd1ce698f736831b4badb68ab2b |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:8cc24ca3f1d1a8b34783780b79890430 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:f08d4f2d9a8e6d7105c0bc16 |
|
+Output = b8e716fb84a420aed4812cd76d9700ee |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:b616905a6f7562cd2689142ce21e42a3 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:ead310159a909da87e7b4b40 |
|
+Output = 1b9201358c50fe5d5d42907c4a9fce78 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:3f57fd3fd56199b3eb33890f7ee28180 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:7a5056ba4fdb034c7cb6c4fe |
|
+Output = e51ebd30a8c4b8449b0fb29d9adc11af |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:fb9fb108d104e9f662d6593fc84cde69 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:5faf29211c1bdbf1b2696a7c |
|
+Output = 7a3a7e670656e48c390cdd7c51e167e0 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:237a39981794f4516dccffc3dda28396 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:62ed9528d104c241e0f66275 |
|
+Output = 0c26fc9e90e1c5c5f943428301682045 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:b9b6c45f7279218fa09894e06366a3a1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0f384339670aaed4b89ecb7e |
|
+Output = ee5fad414e32fad5d52a2bf61a7f6c72 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:08b7140e2cd0a4abd79171e4d5a71cad |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:099211f0d8a2e02dbb5958c0 |
|
+Output = 6162f5142e057efafd2c4f2bad5985a1 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a2 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f4853 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493d |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759a |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac704 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbe |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf1050 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f3 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8b |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f22 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f227688 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f2276885abf |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f2276885abfbc3e |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f2276885abfbc3e811a |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f2276885abfbc3e811a568d |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f2276885abfbc3e811a568d480d |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:ebe28edbae5a410b87a479243db3f690 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:e60dd8b28228ce5b9be74d3b |
|
+Output = b4a23963e07f485382cb358a493daec1759ac7043dbeac37152c6ddf105031f0f239f270b7f30616166f10e5d2b4cb11ba8bf4ba3f2276885abfbc3e811a568d480d9192 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:d7e6 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = 31e798e9931b612a3ad1b9b1008faa8c |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:4646779d |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = 139f68bcca879b490e268e569087d04d |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:d9811c81d4c6 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = 914dc4f09cb633a76e6c389e04c64485 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:8838f9d99ec46f09 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = 4f07dfb6f7a5bf348689e08b2e29c948 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:3e0939b33f34e779f30e |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = b42c7a98c23be19d1187ff960e87557f |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:f36230cacca4d245d303058c |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = 50f2068d8010d355d56c5e34aaffbc67 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:7005d32c3d4284c73c3aefc70438 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = 66fd712ccf5462bbd41e89041ea7ea26 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:c01c83150b7734f8dbd6efd6f54d7365 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:0bbe1fa8722023d7c3da4fff |
|
+Output = 5c5edb0ceda9cd0c7f1f3d9e239c67d5 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:9949 |
|
+Output = 33c83f54ed00fb1bccd2113e88550941 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:17144da6 |
|
+Output = a999c28961424cab35ec06015e8c376a |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:dffdee1062eb |
|
+Output = 4101ad50e626ed6f957bff926dfbb7db |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:9f365043e23b4648 |
|
+Output = 4d3e4b971b88771f229df9f564984832 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:a885a0c4567ddc4f96da |
|
+Output = bebbc30f5a83df5e9c9b57db33c0c879 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:c9d86183295bfe4c3d85f0fd |
|
+Output = 87c947e45407db63eb94cbaa02d14e94 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:825fadce46964236a486732c5dad |
|
+Output = 192370a85ff78e3c0245129d9b398558 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:da69f1dbbebc837480af692e7e9ee6b9 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:5c0b5eb3ac9f342347d73d7a521723aa |
|
+Output = c7b7634fd809383e87c4b1b3e728be56 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:8d7a4e7d5cf34b3f74873b862aeb33b7 |
|
+Output = 6a5594f402f74f69 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:9b208e7ee1e641fac1dff48fc1beb2d2 |
|
+Output = 556ed67e24ac0c7c46cc432da8bdb23c |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:4d2572539fed433211da28c8a0eebac3 |
|
+Output = 5a4054c59c5b92814025578f43c1b79fe84968fc284e240b |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:4e1e70c9886819a31bc29a537911add9 |
|
+Output = ddbfc440449aab4131c6d8aec08ce1496f2702241d0e27cc155c5c7c3cda75b5 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:68f144c952528e540c686dc353b766f2 |
|
+Output = 59ed66bb6f54a9688a0b891d0b2ea6743621d9e1b5cc098cf3a55e6f864f9af8a95e4d945d2f987f |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:b66c9d507c9f837fbe60b6675fdbf38b |
|
+Output = c282787ddf421a72fc88811be81b08d0d6ab66c92d1011974aa58335a6bbbd62e9e982bfae5929865ea1d517247089d2 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:34e730b49e46c7ed2fb25975a4cccd2d |
|
+Output = 39e76e6571cb00740260b9070accbdcc4a492c295cbef33d9e37dac21e5e9d07e0f12dc7063d2172641475d4e08b8e3712fb26a10c8376b8 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:e340d87e2d7adbc1b95ec2dbdc3b82be |
|
+Output = a660c0037a53f76f1e7667043f5869348ad07ac0e272e615ce31f16d4ab90d4b35fe5c370c0010ce79aff45682c6fb8b97f9a05b7d40b5af3c62999a10df9c6d |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:afc4e154498d4770aa8365f6903dc83b |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:662af20379b29d5ef813e655 |
|
+Output = f0b80d6ae4c1e19e2105a37024e35dc6 |
|
+ |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA512 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:108cf63318555c787fa578731dd4f037 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:53191b1dd3f94d83084d61d6 |
|
+Output = 0ad475c1826da3007637970c8b92b993 |
|
+ |
|
+Title = SSKDF Test vectors from RFC 8636 Section 8 (With precoumputed ASN.1 info) |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA1 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:307e300a06082b06010502030601a01f041d301ba0071b0553552e5345a110300ea003020101a10730051b036c6861a12904273025a0071b0553552e5345a11a3018a003020101a111300f1b066b72627467741b0553552e5345a22404223020a003020112a10c040aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa20b0409bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb |
|
+Output = e6ab38c9413e035bb079201ed0b6b73d8d49a814a737c04ee6649614206f73ad |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:307e300a06082b06010502030602a01f041d301ba0071b0553552e5345a110300ea003020101a10730051b036c6861a12904273025a0071b0553552e5345a11a3018a003020101a111300f1b066b72627467741b0553552e5345a22404223020a003020112a10c040aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa20b0409bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb |
|
+Output = 77ef4e48c420ae3fec75109d7981697eed5d295c90c62564f7bfd101fa9bc1d5 |
|
+ |
|
+KDF = SSKDF |
|
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA512 |
|
+Ctrl.hexsecret = hexsecret:00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
|
+Ctrl.hexinfo = hexinfo:307e300a06082b06010502030603a01f041d301ba0071b0553552e5345a110300ea003020101a10730051b036c6861a12904273025a0071b0553552e5345a11a3018a003020101a111300f1b066b72627467741b0553552e5345a22404223020a003020110a10c040aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa20b0409bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb |
|
+Output = d3c78b78d75313e9a926f75dfb012363fa17fa01db
|
|
|