base/SOURCES/0164-sulogin-improve-support-for-locked-root-account.patch

From a08c1a6aadaa27e4070fe58242d55464d6c7a3e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 May 2015 15:30:52 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 164/173] sulogin: improve support for locked root account

Some installations and distributions don't use a root account password
for security reasons and use sudo instead. In that case, asking for the
password makes no sense, and it is not even considered as valid as it's just
"*" or "!".

In these cases --force is required to just start a root shell and no
ask for password.

I don't think it's a good idea to automatically start root shell when
locked account is detected. It's possible that the machine is on
public place and for example Ubuntu uses root account disabled by
default (and also Fedora when installed by yum/dnf without anaconda).

The --force option forces admins to think about it...

The distro maintainers can also use --force in their initscripts or
systemd emergency.service if they believe that promiscuous setting is
the right thing for the distro.

Addresses: https://bugs.debian.org/326678
Addresses: http://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1561200
Upstream: http://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/7ff1162e67164cb4ece19dd809c26272461aa254
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
---
 login-utils/sulogin.8 | 13 +++++++++----
 login-utils/sulogin.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/login-utils/sulogin.8 b/login-utils/sulogin.8
index b9dec165c..702487985 100644
--- a/login-utils/sulogin.8
+++ b/login-utils/sulogin.8
@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ Give root password for system maintenance
 .br
 (or type Control\-D for normal startup):
 .PP
-.I sulogin
-will be connected to the current terminal, or to the optional tty device that
+If the root account is locked and --force is specified, no password is required.
+.PP
+.B sulogin
+will be connected to the current terminal, or to the optional \fItty\fR device that
 can be specified on the command line (typically
 .BR /dev/console ).
 .PP
@@ -50,8 +52,11 @@ from the system fails, manually examine
 .I /etc/passwd
 and
 .I /etc/shadow
-to get the password.  If they are damaged or nonexistent, sulogin will start
-a root shell without asking for a password.
+to get the password.  If these files are damaged or nonexistent, or when
+root account is locked by '!' or '*' at the begin of the password then
+.B sulogin
+will \fBstart a root shell without asking for a password\fP.
+.PP
 .IP
 Only use the
 .B \-e
diff --git a/login-utils/sulogin.c b/login-utils/sulogin.c
index 6d03bc5ae..a17b91d71 100644
--- a/login-utils/sulogin.c
+++ b/login-utils/sulogin.c
@@ -81,6 +81,13 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t sigchild;
 # define IUCLC		0
 #endif
 
+static int locked_account_password(const char *passwd)
+{
+	if (passwd && (*passwd == '*' || *passwd == '!'))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Fix the tty modes and set reasonable defaults.
  */
@@ -423,7 +430,6 @@ static struct passwd *getrootpwent(int try_manually)
 		p = line;
 		break;
 	}
-
 	fclose(fp);
 
 	/*
@@ -460,7 +466,8 @@ static struct passwd *getrootpwent(int try_manually)
 		warnx(_("%s: no entry for root"), _PATH_SHADOW_PASSWD);
 		*pwd.pw_passwd = '\0';
 	}
-	if (!valid(pwd.pw_passwd)) {
+	/* locked accont passwords are valid too */
+	if (!locked_account_password(pwd.pw_passwd) && !valid(pwd.pw_passwd)) {
 		warnx(_("%s: root password garbled"), _PATH_SHADOW_PASSWD);
 		*pwd.pw_passwd = '\0';
 	}
@@ -470,7 +477,7 @@ static struct passwd *getrootpwent(int try_manually)
 /*
  * Ask by prompt for the password.
  */
-static void doprompt(const char *crypted, struct console *con)
+static void doprompt(const char *crypted, struct console *con, int deny)
 {
 	struct termios tty;
 
@@ -487,18 +494,25 @@ static void doprompt(const char *crypted, struct console *con)
 		if  ((con->file = fdopen(con->fd, "r+")) == (FILE*)0)
 			goto err;
 	}
+
+	if (deny)
+		fprintf(con->file, _("\nCannot open access to console, the root account is locked.\n"
+				     "See sulogin(8) man page for more details.\n\n"
+				     "Press Enter to continue.\n"));
+	else {
 #if defined(USE_ONELINE)
-	if (crypted[0])
-		fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for login: "));
-	else
-		fprintf(con->file, _("Press enter for login: "));
+		if (crypted[0] && !locked_account_password(crypted))
+			fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for login: "));
+		else
+			fprintf(con->file, _("Press Enter for login: "));
 #else
-	if (crypted[0])
-		fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for maintenance\n"));
-	else
-		fprintf(con->file, _("Press enter for maintenance"));
-	fprintf(con->file, _("(or type Control-D to continue): "));
+		if (crypted[0] && !locked_account_password(crypted))
+			fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for maintenance\n"));
+		else
+			fprintf(con->file, _("Press Enter for maintenance\n"));
+		fprintf(con->file, _("(or press Control-D to continue): "));
 #endif
+	}
 	fflush(con->file);
 err:
 	if (con->flags & CON_SERIAL)
@@ -914,6 +928,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		goto nofork;
 	}
 
+
 	mask_signal(SIGCHLD, chld_handler, &saved_sigchld);
 	do {
 		con = list_entry(ptr, struct console, entry);
@@ -930,12 +945,17 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 				const char *passwd = pwd->pw_passwd;
 				const char *answer;
 				int failed = 0, doshell = 0;
+				int deny = !opt_e && locked_account_password(pwd->pw_passwd);
+
+				doprompt(passwd, con, deny);
 
-				doprompt(passwd, con);
 				if ((answer = getpasswd(con)) == NULL)
 					break;
+				if (deny)
+					exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 
-				if (passwd[0] == '\0')
+				/* no password or locked account */
+				if (!passwd[0] || locked_account_password(passwd))
 					doshell++;
 				else {
 					const char *cryptbuf;
-- 
2.14.4