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274 lines
8.8 KiB
274 lines
8.8 KiB
diff -up openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.gen-timing openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c |
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--- openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.gen-timing 2018-06-18 13:46:24.323138691 +0200 |
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+++ openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c 2018-06-18 14:53:26.361975922 +0200 |
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ |
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/* crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c */ |
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
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- * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. |
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+ * Copyright (C) 2013, 2018 Red Hat, Inc. |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
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@@ -175,14 +175,13 @@ static int FIPS_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA * |
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BN_GENCB *cb) |
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{ |
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BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp; |
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- BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p; |
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- BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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int ok = -1; |
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int i; |
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int n = 0; |
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int test = 0; |
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int pbits = bits / 2; |
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+ unsigned long error = 0; |
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|
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if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) { |
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FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); |
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@@ -251,6 +250,12 @@ static int FIPS_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA * |
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if (!BN_is_zero(rsa->p) && !BN_is_zero(rsa->q)) |
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test = 1; |
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|
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+ BN_set_flags(r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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+ BN_set_flags(r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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+ |
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retry: |
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/* generate p and q */ |
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for (i = 0; i < 5 * pbits; i++) { |
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@@ -266,9 +271,9 @@ static int FIPS_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA * |
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|
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) |
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goto err; |
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) |
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- goto err; |
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- if (BN_is_one(r1)) { |
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+ ERR_set_mark(); |
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { |
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ |
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int r; |
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r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(rsa->p, pbits > 1024 ? 4 : 5, ctx, 0, |
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cb); |
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@@ -276,8 +281,16 @@ static int FIPS_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA * |
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goto err; |
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if (r > 0) |
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break; |
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+ } else { |
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error(); |
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN |
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { |
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+ /* GCD != 1 */ |
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
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+ } else { |
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+ goto err; |
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+ } |
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} |
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- |
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) |
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goto err; |
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} |
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@@ -309,9 +322,9 @@ static int FIPS_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA * |
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|
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) |
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goto err; |
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) |
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- goto err; |
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- if (BN_is_one(r1)) { |
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+ ERR_set_mark(); |
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { |
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ |
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int r; |
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r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(rsa->q, pbits > 1024 ? 4 : 5, ctx, 0, |
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cb); |
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@@ -319,8 +332,16 @@ static int FIPS_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA * |
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goto err; |
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if (r > 0) |
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break; |
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+ } else { |
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error(); |
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN |
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { |
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+ /* GCD != 1 */ |
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
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+ } else { |
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+ goto err; |
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+ } |
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} |
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- |
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) |
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goto err; |
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} |
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@@ -355,51 +376,44 @@ static int FIPS_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA * |
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) |
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goto err; /* q-1 */ |
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|
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+ /* note that computing gcd is not safe to timing attacks */ |
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if (!BN_gcd(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) |
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goto err; |
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- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
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- pr0 = &local_r0; |
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- BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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- } else |
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- pr0 = r0; |
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- if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, r1, pr0, ctx)) |
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- goto err; |
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- if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, r2, ctx)) |
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- goto err; /* lcm(p-1, q-1) */ |
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- |
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- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
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- pr0 = &local_r0; |
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- BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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- } else |
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- pr0 = r0; |
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- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) |
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- goto err; /* d */ |
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+ |
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+ { |
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+ if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, r1, r0, ctx)) |
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+ goto err; |
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+ |
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+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, r2, ctx)) /* lcm(p-1, q-1) */ |
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+ goto err; |
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+ |
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+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, r0, ctx)) /* d */ |
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+ goto err; |
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+ } |
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if (BN_num_bits(rsa->d) < pbits) |
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goto retry; /* d is too small */ |
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|
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- /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ |
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- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
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- d = &local_d; |
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- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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- } else |
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- d = rsa->d; |
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+ { |
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+ BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); |
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|
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- /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ |
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- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) |
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- goto err; |
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+ if (d == NULL) |
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+ goto err; |
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+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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|
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- /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ |
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- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) |
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- goto err; |
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+ if (/* calculate d mod (p-1) */ |
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+ !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx) |
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+ /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ |
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+ || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) { |
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+ BN_free(d); |
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+ goto err; |
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+ } |
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+ /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ |
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+ BN_free(d); |
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+ } |
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/* calculate inverse of q mod p */ |
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- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
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- p = &local_p; |
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- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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- } else |
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- p = rsa->p; |
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- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) |
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+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx)) |
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goto err; |
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if (fips_rsa_pairwise_fail) |
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@@ -431,6 +445,17 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, |
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BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p; |
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int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0; |
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
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+ unsigned long error = 0; |
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+ |
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+ /* |
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+ * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck |
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+ * continually regenerating the same prime values. |
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+ */ |
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+ if (bits < 16) { |
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+ ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ |
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+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
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+ goto err; |
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+ } |
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#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS |
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if (FIPS_module_mode()) { |
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@@ -483,45 +508,55 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, |
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if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) |
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goto err; |
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
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/* generate p and q */ |
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for (;;) { |
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) |
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goto err; |
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) |
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goto err; |
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) |
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- goto err; |
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- if (BN_is_one(r1)) |
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+ ERR_set_mark(); |
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { |
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ |
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break; |
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+ } |
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error(); |
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN |
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { |
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+ /* GCD != 1 */ |
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
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+ } else { |
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+ goto err; |
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+ } |
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) |
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goto err; |
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} |
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) |
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goto err; |
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for (;;) { |
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- /* |
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- * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck |
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- * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and |
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- * bail if it happens 3 times. |
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- */ |
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- unsigned int degenerate = 0; |
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do { |
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) |
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goto err; |
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, rsa->p)) |
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goto err; |
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- } while ((BN_ucmp(r2, r3) <= 0) && (++degenerate < 3)); |
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- if (degenerate == 3) { |
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- ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ |
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- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
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- goto err; |
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- } |
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+ } while (BN_ucmp(r2, r3) <= 0); |
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) |
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goto err; |
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) |
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- goto err; |
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- if (BN_is_one(r1)) |
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+ ERR_set_mark(); |
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { |
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ |
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break; |
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+ } |
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error(); |
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN |
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { |
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+ /* GCD != 1 */ |
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
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+ } else { |
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+ goto err; |
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+ } |
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) |
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goto err; |
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}
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