openssh package update

Signed-off-by: basebuilder_pel7ppc64bebuilder0 <basebuilder@powerel.org>

SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
+@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+ 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
+ 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-				     "Could not grab %s. "
+-				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+-				     "on your session.", what);
++				     "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
++				     "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
++				     "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
++				     "on your session.\n"
++				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
++				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
+ 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 
+ 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));

SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <X11/Xlib.h>
++#include <glib.h>
+ #include <gtk/gtk.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+ 
+@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+ 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
++{
++	gdouble step;
++	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
++	
++	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
++	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
++	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
++}
++
+ static int
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ {
+ 	const char *failed;
+ 	char *passphrase, *local;
+ 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
++	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+ 	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 
+ 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 					"%s",
+ 					message);
+ 
++	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++	    FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
+ 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ 	gtk_box_pack_start(
+-	    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
+-	    FALSE, FALSE, 0);
++	    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry,
++	    TRUE, FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ 
++	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++	    FALSE, 8);
++	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
++	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
++	
++	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
++	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
++	    TRUE, 5);
++	gtk_widget_show(progress);
++
+ 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+ 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
++	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
++			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
+ 
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage openssh-5.1p1/scp.1
+--- openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage	2008-07-12 09:12:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.1p1/scp.1	2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ treating file names containing
+ as host specifiers.
+ Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
+ .Pp
++When copying a source file to a target file which already exists,
++.Nm 
++will replace the contents of the target file (keeping the inode).
++.Pp
++If the target file does not yet exist, an empty file with the target
++file name is created, then filled with the source file contents.
++No attempt is made at "near-atomic" transfer using temporary files.
++.Pp
+ The options are as follows:
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Fl 1

SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935	2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c	2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
++connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
+ {
+ 	int sock;
+ 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ 
++	if (len <= 0)
++		return -1;
+ 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ 	if (sock < 0)
+ 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+-	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
++	if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
++		len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
++	memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof addr - (sizeof addr.sun_path - len) ) == 0)
+ 		return sock;
+ 	close(sock);
+-	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -3207,8 +3210,18 @@ static int
+ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+ {
+ 	char buf[1024];
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+-	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
++	int len, ret;
++	len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
++#ifdef linux
++	/* try abstract socket first */
++	buf[0] = '\0';
++	if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0)
++		return ret;
++#endif
++	if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf + 1, len)) >= 0)
++		return ret;
++	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", buf + 1, strerror(errno));
++	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ int

SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:12:54.427852524 +0100
++++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2012-02-14 16:13:22.818928690 +0100
+@@ -3275,6 +3275,9 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
++#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
++		hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
++#endif
+ 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ 		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ 		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:09:25.057964291 +0100
++++ openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c	2012-02-14 16:09:25.106047007 +0100
+@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct soc
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = family;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_V4MAPPED | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+ 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,

SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob	2011-03-07 20:17:34.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c	2011-03-07 20:18:47.000000000 +0100
+@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 	memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
+ 	cur.conn = conn;
+ 
+-	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
++	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_LIMIT | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
+ }
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/openbsd-compat/glob.c
+index 742b4b9..acae399 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/glob.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/glob.c
+@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ typedef char Char;
+ #define	M_CLASS		META(':')
+ #define	ismeta(c)	(((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
+ 
+-#define	GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC	65536
+-#define	GLOB_LIMIT_STAT		128
++#define	GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC	65536*64
++#define	GLOB_LIMIT_STAT		128*64
+ #define	GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR	16384
+ 
+ /* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */

SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet	2011-04-05 13:29:06.998648899 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1/packet.c	2011-04-05 13:30:32.967648596 +0200
+@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
+ 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+ 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+ 
++	if (!state)
++		return 0;
+ 	if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
+ 		return 0;
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
+--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
+@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+ 
++	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
++
+ 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+ 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+ .Nm
+ exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
+ if an error occurred.
++.Sh IPV6
++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
+--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
+@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
++.Sh IPV6
++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,

SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm	2011-08-05 22:15:18.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-12 16:24:18.643674014 +0200
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b
+ 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
+ 	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+ 	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+-	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
++	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o whereIam.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
+ 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm openssh-5.9p1/log.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/log.h	2011-09-12 16:34:52.984674326 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ void     verbose(const char *, ...) __at
+ void     debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ void     debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ void     debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
++void	 _debug_wIm_body(const char *, int, const char *, const char *, int);
++#define	debug_wIm(a,b) _debug_wIm_body(a,b,__func__,__FILE__,__LINE__)
+ 
+ 
+ void	 set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-12 16:38:35.787816490 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ int deny_severity;
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
++/* trace of fork processes */
++extern int whereIam;
++
+ /* Server configuration options. */
+ ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -666,6 +669,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* child */
++		whereIam = 1;
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ 
+@@ -715,6 +719,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	/* child */
+ 
++	whereIam = 2;
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+ 
+@@ -1325,6 +1330,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	Key *key;
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt;
+ 
++	whereIam = 0;
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm	2011-09-12 16:24:18.722674167 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c	2011-09-12 16:24:18.724674418 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++
++int whereIam = -1;
++
++void _debug_wIm_body(const char *txt, int val, const char *func, const char *file, int line)
++{
++	if (txt)
++		debug("%s=%d, %s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", txt, val, func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
++	else
++		debug("%s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
++}
++
++

SOURCES/openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+From 5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2014 13:44:47 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH]  - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c
+ version.h]    OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the
+ curve25519    key exchange incorrectly, causing connection failures about
+ 0.2% of    the time when this method is used against a peer that implements  
+  the method properly.
+
+   Fix the problem and disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to
+   OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6. This version will identify itself as 6.6.1
+   to enable the compatability code.
+---
+ ChangeLog     | 11 +++++++++++
+ bufaux.c      |  5 ++++-
+ compat.c      | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
+ compat.h      |  2 ++
+ sshconnect2.c |  2 ++
+ sshd.c        |  3 +++
+ version.h     |  2 +-
+ 7 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 1603a07..928999d 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@
+ 20140420
+-   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
+-     [sshconnect.c]
+-     When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
+-     certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
+-     
+-     Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
+-     dialog by offering only certificate keys.
+-     
+-     Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
++ - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
++   OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519
++   key exchange incorrectly, causing connection failures about 0.2% of
++   the time when this method is used against a peer that implements
++   the method properly.
++
++   Fix the problem and disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to
++   OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6. This version will identify itself as 6.6.1
++   to enable the compatability code.
++
++ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
++   [sshconnect.c]
++   When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
++   certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
++   
++   Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
++   dialog by offering only certificate keys.
++   
++   Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
+ 
+ 20140313
+  - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
+diff --git a/bufaux.c b/bufaux.c
+index e24b5fc..f6a6f2a 100644
+--- a/bufaux.c
++++ b/bufaux.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -372,6 +372,9 @@ buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
+ 
+ 	if (l > 8 * 1024)
+ 		fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l);
++	/* Skip leading zero bytes */
++	for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++)
++		;
+ 	p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
+diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
+index 9d9fabe..2709dc5 100644
+--- a/compat.c
++++ b/compat.c
+@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+ 		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+ 		{ "OpenSSH_4*",		0 },
+ 		{ "OpenSSH_5*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT},
++		{ "OpenSSH_6.6.1*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH},
++		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
++		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD},
+ 		{ "OpenSSH*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
+ 		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },
+ 		{ "2.1.0*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+@@ -251,7 +254,6 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
+ 	return cipher_prop;
+ }
+ 
+-
+ char *
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
+ {
+@@ -265,3 +267,16 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
+ 	return pkalg_prop;
+ }
+ 
++char *
++compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop)
++{
++	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD))
++		return kex_prop;
++	debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
++	kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
++	debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
++	if (*kex_prop == '\0')
++		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
++	return kex_prop;
++}
++
+diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
+index b174fa1..a6c3f3d 100644
+--- a/compat.h
++++ b/compat.h
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR	0x02000000
+ #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH		0x04000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT	0x08000000
++#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
+ 
+ void     enable_compat13(void);
+ void     enable_compat20(void);
+@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ void     compat_datafellows(const char *);
+ int	 proto_spec(const char *);
+ char	*compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
+ char	*compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
++char	*compat_kex_proposal(char *);
+ 
+ extern int compat13;
+ extern int compat20;
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index bb9292f..b00658b 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
++	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index e4e406e..512c7ed 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2488,6 +2488,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+ 
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
++	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
++
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ 		packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
+ 		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
+index a1579ac..a33e77c 100644
+--- a/version.h
++++ b/version.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.6"
++#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.6.1"
+ 
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+ #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE

SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile
+--- openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld	2012-05-19 07:24:37.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile	2012-09-14 20:35:47.565704718 +0200
+@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all:
+ 	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
+ 
+ gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
+-	$(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
++	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ 		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
+ 		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+ 
+ gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+-	$(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
++	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ 		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
+ 		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost	2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100
+@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
+-	const char *gss_host;
++	const char *gss_host = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (options.gss_server_identity)
+ 		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+-	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++	else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ 		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++		if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" )  == 0 )
++			gss_host = authctxt->host;
++	}
+ 	else
+ 		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.977836854 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac	2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -4930,6 +4930,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
++AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel,
++  [  --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG  specify a vendor patch level],
++  [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
++   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"],
++  [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
++   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none])
+ 
+ dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
+ dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
+@@ -5194,6 +5200,7 @@ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+ echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+ echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
++echo "                Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->max_authtries = -1;
+ 	options->max_sessions = -1;
+ 	options->banner = NULL;
++	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
+ 	options->use_dns = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+@@ -325,6 +326,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+ 	if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
+ 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
++	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
++		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -402,7 +405,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile,
+ 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+-	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
++	sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+@@ -528,6 +531,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1369,6 +1373,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
++	case sShowPatchLevel:
++		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sAllowUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+@@ -2269,6 +2277,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	max_authtries;
+ 	int	max_sessions;
+ 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
++	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
+ 	int	use_dns;
+ 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
+ 					 * poke the client this often to
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.990836761 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
+@@ -1334,6 +1334,14 @@ an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
++.It Cm ShowPatchLevel 
++Specifies whether 
++.Nm sshd 
++will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. 
++The patch level is set at compile-time. 
++The default is 
++.Dq no . 
++This option applies to protocol version 1 only. 
+ .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+ Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+ .Pq umask
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.990836761 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
+@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #Compression delayed
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
++#ShowPatchLevel no
+ #UseDNS no
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10:30:100
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-10 10:48:41.633648667 +0100
+@@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh
+ 	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+ 
+ 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+-	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
++	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
++	    (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+ 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+ 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+ 
+@@ -1654,7 +1655,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
++	debug("sshd version %s, %s",
++	    (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	    SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+ #else

SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
+ 
+ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
+ {
+-	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
+ 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ };
+ 
+@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
+ {
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+ 	size_t n = 0;
+-	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
++	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
+ 
+ 	if (len == 0)
+ 		return (1);
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
+ 		return (0);
+ 
+-	while ((len--) > 0) {
++	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
++		u_int r,a,b;
++
+ 		if (n == 0) {
+-			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
+-			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			int outl, i, buflen;
++
++			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
++
++			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			}
++
++			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
++				ctrbuf, buflen);
+ 		}
+-		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
+-		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
++		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
++		r = a ^ b;
++		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
++		src += sizeof(a);
++		dest += sizeof(r);
++
++		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
+ 	}
++	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
++	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
+ 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+ 	}
+-	if (key != NULL)
+-		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+-		    &c->aes_ctx);
++
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
++
++	if (key != NULL) {
++		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
++		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
++			case 128:
++				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
++				break;
++			case 192:
++				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
++				break;
++			case 256:
++				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
++				break;
++			default:
++				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
++		}
++		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
++			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
++	}
+ 	if (iv != NULL)
+ 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ 	return (1);
+@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+ 
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
+ 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ 		free(c);
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2013-10-23 22:03:52.322950759 +0200
++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c	2013-10-23 22:04:24.295799873 +0200
+@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <krb5.h>
++#include <profile.h>
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
+@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ #endif
+ 	krb5_error_code problem;
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++	const char *ccache_type;
+ 	int len;
+ 	char *client, *platform_client;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+@@ -191,12 +194,30 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 		goto out;
+ #endif
+ 
++	ccache_type = krb5_cc_get_type(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 
+-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
++	if (authctxt->krb5_ticket_file[0] == ':')
++		authctxt->krb5_ticket_file++;
++
++	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + strlen(ccache_type) + 2;
+ 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
++
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
+ 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
++	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "%s:%s",
++	    ccache_type, authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
++
++	if (strcmp(ccache_type, "DIR") == 0) {
++		char *p;
++		p = strrchr(authctxt->krb5_ccname, '/');
++		if (p)
++			*p = '\0';
++	}
++
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -235,10 +256,34 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ void
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
++	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
++	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
++
+ 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
++
++		strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
++		krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
++		*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
++		if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
++
++			strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
++
++			if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
++				if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
++					krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
++					*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
++					if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
++						debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
++				}
++				else
++					debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
++						krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno)
++						);
++			}
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+@@ -250,34 +295,139 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
++	char *src, *old;
++	va_list ap;
++	int i;
++
++	va_start(ap, fmt);
++	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
++	va_end(ap);
++
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	old = *dsc;
++
++	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
++		free(src);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	free(old);
++	free(src);
++
++	return i;
++}
++
++int
++ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
++	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
++
++	if (template == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
++	r = xstrdup("");
++
++	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
++
++		*p_n++ = '\0';
++		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
++			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		}
++		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		} else {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			p_o = '\0';
++			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
++			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++		goto cleanup;
++
++	*result = r;
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++	free(r);
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return -1;
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++	char *value = NULL;
++
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+ 	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
++	char *ccname;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
++	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
+-	}
++#endif
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++	if (ret) {
++		ret = asprintf(&ccname, cctemplate, geteuid());
++		if (ret == -1)
++			return ENOMEM;
++		old_umask = umask(0177);
++		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++		umask(old_umask);
++		if (tmpfd == -1) {
++			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			return oerrno;
++		}
++
++		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++			oerrno = errno;
++			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			close(tmpfd);
++			return oerrno;
++		}
+ 		close(tmpfd);
+-		return oerrno;
+ 	}
+-	close(tmpfd);
++	debug("%s: Setting ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
+ 
+ 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }

SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -865,17 +865,24 @@ ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms
+ time_t
+ monotime(void)
+ {
+-#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
++#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \
++    (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME))
+ 	struct timespec ts;
+ 	static int gettime_failed = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!gettime_failed) {
++#if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)
++		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0)
++			return (ts.tv_sec);
++#endif
++#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
+ 		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
+ 			return (ts.tv_sec);
++#endif
+ 		debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 		gettime_failed = 1;
+ 	}
+-#endif
++#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
+ 
+ 	return time(NULL);
+ }

SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
++			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
++				addargs(&alist, "-t");
++			else
++				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);

SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+--- openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id	2013-03-22 00:17:37.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1	2014-01-28 17:12:49.197542425 +0100
+@@ -180,6 +180,19 @@ should prove enlightening (N.B. the mode
+ .Fl W
+ option, rather than
+ .Xr nc 1 ) .
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
++environment variable is set, the
++.Nm
++is run in a legacy mode. In this mode, the 
++.Nm
++doesn't check an existence of a private key and doesn't do remote checks
++of the remote server versions or if public keys are already installed.
++.El
+ .Sh "SEE ALSO"
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+--- openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id	2013-06-05 14:48:45.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2014-01-28 17:11:51.538833032 +0100
+@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ use_id_file() {
+     PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
+   fi
+ 
+-  PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
++  [ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
+ 
+   # check that the files are readable
+   for f in $PUB_ID_FILE $PRIV_ID_FILE ; do
+@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
+   printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
+ }
+ 
+-REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
++[ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] || REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
+                  sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
+ 
+ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
+@@ -268,7 +268,11 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
+     ;;
+   *)
+     # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
+-    populate_new_ids 0
++    if [ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ]; then
++      NEW_IDS=`eval "$GET_ID"`
++    else
++      populate_new_ids 0
++    fi
+     [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
+ 		umask 077 ;
+ 		mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 928999d..3887495 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
++20140703
++ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
++   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09
++     [gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c]
++     standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about
++     1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant
++
+ 20140420
+  - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
+    OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 14f540e..29916d3 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+@@ -102,14 +102,14 @@ static OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 status;
+-	char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
++	char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 	gss_OID_set oidset;
+ 
+ 	if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
+ 		gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ 		gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+ 
+-		if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
++		if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
+ 			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ 			return (-1);
+ 		}
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index ba4589b..e4add93 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <grp.h>
++#include <netdb.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+ #include <paths.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -2669,7 +2670,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+ {
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	char display[512], auth_display[512];
+-	char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
++	char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 482dc1c..66198e6 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int rounds = 0;
+ /* argv0 */
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
+-char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
++char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 
+ /* moduli.c */
+ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+index 5160869..c7a1b47 100644
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
+index 6954fc1..6686f6a 100644
+--- a/audit-linux.c
++++ b/audit-linux.c
+@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+ const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+ 
+ void
+-audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
+ 	       uid_t uid)
+ {
+ #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+@@ -306,8 +306,8 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ 	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
+ 	char *s;
+ 
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+-		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac,
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs,
+ 		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ 		get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
+ 	free(s);
+diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
+index 13c6849..5b49434 100644
+--- a/audit.c
++++ b/audit.c
+@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ audit_unsupported(int what)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
+ {
+-	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
++	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -270,11 +270,11 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+  * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
+  */
+ void
+-audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
+ 	       uid_t uid)
+ {
+-	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+-		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
++	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
+ 	        (unsigned)uid);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
+index a2dc3ff..903df66 100644
+--- a/audit.h
++++ b/audit.h
+@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+ int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(int);
+-void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
++void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+-void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+ void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c
+index 45817e0..116f460 100644
+--- a/auditstub.c
++++ b/auditstub.c
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ audit_unsupported(int n)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
+ {
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index ede7b67..eb5f333 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -553,13 +553,12 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
+ 		    newkeys->enc.name,
+ 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
+ 		    newkeys->comp.name);
+-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+-		audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
+-#endif
+ 	}
++
+ 	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+ 	choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
++
+ 	need = dh_need = 0;
+ 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ 		newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
+@@ -571,11 +570,16 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
+ 		dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+ 		dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+ 		dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
++		debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	/* XXX need runden? */
+ 	kex->we_need = need;
+ 	kex->dh_need = dh_need;
+ 
++
+ 	/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
+ 	if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
+ 	    !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 70b9b4c..81bc9c1 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -2396,7 +2396,7 @@ int
+ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ 	int ctos, len;
+-	char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
++	char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs;
+ 	pid_t pid;
+ 	uid_t uid;
+ 
+@@ -2404,14 +2404,16 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ 	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ 	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ 
+-	audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
++	audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid);
+ 
+ 	free(cipher);
+ 	free(mac);
+ 	free(compress);
++	free(pfs);
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 93f6535..69b29d8 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid,
+ 		  uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	Buffer m;
+@@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : ""));
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps);
+ 	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ 	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 4cf0c78..e43109f 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+-void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index ee94825..41a94a7 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2430,7 +2430,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
+ 			packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+-	audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
++	audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none", "none");
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,844 @@
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index cd1a775..690711e 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
+ 	if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
+ 		return (sshpam_thread_status);
+ 	signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+-	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
++	while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) {                     
++		if (errno == EINTR)                                
++			continue;
++		fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,         
++				strerror(errno));                      
++	}
+ 	return (status);
+ }
+ #endif
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index af3fdc2..39c9f89 100644
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
+ 
+-	if (rfd != -1)
++	if (rfd >= 0)
+ 		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
++	if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
+ 		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
++	if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+ 		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ 
+ 	c->rfd = rfd;
+@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ 
+ 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+ 	if (nonblock) {
+-		if (rfd != -1)
++		if (rfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(rfd);
+-		if (wfd != -1)
++		if (wfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(wfd);
+-		if (efd != -1)
++		if (efd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(efd);
+ 	}
+ }
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 9c60108..d372b53 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -2081,14 +2081,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	char *rtype;
+ 	int want_reply;
+ 	int success = 0;
++/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */
+ 
+ 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
+ 	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
+ 	    rtype, want_reply);
+ 	if (want_reply) {
+-		packet_start(success ?
+-		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
++		packet_start(/*success ?
++		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ 		packet_send();
+ 		packet_write_wait();
+ 	}
+diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
+index a2050f6..6487d81 100644
+--- a/key.c
++++ b/key.c
+@@ -880,8 +880,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
+ 		success = 1;
+ /*XXXX*/
+ 		key_free(k);
++/*XXXX
+ 		if (success != 1)
+ 			break;
++XXXX*/
+ 		/* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
+ 		while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+ 			cp++;
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 3ff62b0..70b9b4c 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+@@ -1254,6 +1254,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
++	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
++
+ 	if (key != NULL)
+ 		key_free(key);
+ 
+@@ -1275,9 +1279,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 		free(chost);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+-	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+-
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ 	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 6df236a..93f6535 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -743,10 +743,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
+ 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+-		if (tmp1 > 0)
++		if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ 			close(tmp1);
+-		if (tmp2 > 0)
+-			close(tmp2);
++		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
++			close(tmp2);*/
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmp1);
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+index c89f214..80115c2 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index f5b122b..1305e87 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1234,6 +1234,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
+ 		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
+ 			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
+ 			    "network attack detected");
++			break;
+ 		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
+ 			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
+ 			    "service detected");
+diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
+index bbbc706..ae6d1aa 100644
+--- a/progressmeter.c
++++ b/progressmeter.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int);
+ 
+ static time_t start;		/* start progress */
+ static time_t last_update;	/* last progress update */
+-static char *file;		/* name of the file being transferred */
++static const char *file;	/* name of the file being transferred */
+ static off_t start_pos;		/* initial position of transfer */
+ static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
+ static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
+@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
++start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
+ {
+ 	start = last_update = monotime();
+ 	file = f;
+diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h
+index 10bab99..e9ca8f0 100644
+--- a/progressmeter.h
++++ b/progressmeter.h
+@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  */
+ 
+-void	start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
++void	start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
+ void	stop_progress_meter(void);
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 1178a07..d9bc016 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (signo)
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 3839928..d482e79 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!*activep) {
+-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+@@ -1473,8 +1473,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 2f8e3a0..e03bc6c 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
+ }
+ 
+@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+ 		 * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
+ 		 * to the program.
+ 		 */
+-		if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
++		if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
+ 			FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
+ 	}
+ 	notify_prepare(*readsetp);
+@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+ 	int len;
+ 
+ 	/* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
+-	if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
++	if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
+ 		data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
+ 		dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+ 		len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
+@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
+ 	set_nonblock(fdin);
+ 	set_nonblock(fdout);
+ 	/* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
+-	if (fderr != -1)
++	if (fderr >= 0)
+ 		set_nonblock(fderr);
+ 
+ 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
+@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
+ 	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+ 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+-	if (fderr != -1)
++	if (fderr >= 0)
+ 		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
+ 		 * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
+ 		 * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
+ 		 */
+-		if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
++		if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+ 			if (fdin != fdout)
+ 				close(fdin);
+ 			else
+@@ -740,15 +740,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
+ 	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+ 
+ 	/* Close the file descriptors. */
+-	if (fdout != -1)
++	if (fdout >= 0)
+ 		close(fdout);
+ 	fdout = -1;
+ 	fdout_eof = 1;
+-	if (fderr != -1)
++	if (fderr >= 0)
+ 		close(fderr);
+ 	fderr = -1;
+ 	fderr_eof = 1;
+-	if (fdin != -1)
++	if (fdin >= 0)
+ 		close(fdin);
+ 	fdin = -1;
+ 
+@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 
+ 	debug("Window change received.");
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+-	if (fdin != -1)
++	if (fdin >= 0)
+ 		pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	tun = packet_get_int();
+-	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+ 			goto done;
+ 		tun = forced_tun_device;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 2f5907c..3a2affd 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
++++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *m)
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
++send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
+     u_int len)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
+ 
+ static void
+ send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
+-    char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
++    const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 
+@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
++do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ {
+ 	u_int id, status;
+ 	Buffer msg;
+@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ 
+ 
+ static int
+-do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag,
++do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
+     SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
++do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+ {
+ 	return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
+ }
+@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
++do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+ }
+ 
+ Attrib *
+-do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
++do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+ {
+ 	u_int id;
+ 
+@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
+ }
+ 
+ Attrib *
+-do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
++do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+ {
+ 	u_int id;
+ 
+@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
+ 
+ #ifdef notyet
+ Attrib *
+-do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
++do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
+ {
+ 	u_int id;
+ 
+@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
+ #endif
+ 
+ int
+-do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
++do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
++do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+     Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath,
++do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath,
+     int force_legacy)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
++do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
++do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
++do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ 
+ #ifdef notyet
+ char *
+-do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ 
+ static void
+ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
+-    u_int len, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
++    u_int len, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 
+@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
++do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path,
+     Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
+ {
+ 	Attrib junk;
+@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
++download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth,
+     Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
+     int fsync_flag)
+ {
+@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
++download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+     int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
+ {
+@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
++do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path,
+     int preserve_flag, int fsync_flag)
+ {
+ 	int local_fd;
+@@ -1607,7 +1607,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
++upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int fsync_flag)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 0, status;
+@@ -1700,7 +1700,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag,
++upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag,
+     int print_flag, int fsync_flag)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag,
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
++path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
+ {
+ 	char *ret;
+ 	size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+index ba92ad0..c085423 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.h
++++ b/sftp-client.h
+@@ -56,79 +56,79 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t);
+ u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
+ 
+ /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
+-int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
++int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int);
+ 
+ /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
+-int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
++int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
+ 
+ /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
+ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
+ 
+ /* Delete file 'path' */
+-int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
++int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Create directory 'path' */
+-int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int);
++int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
+ 
+ /* Remove directory 'path' */
+-int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
++int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
+-Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
++Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
+-Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
++Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Set file attributes of 'path' */
+-int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
++int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
+ 
+ /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
+-int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
++int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
++char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
+ int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
+ 
+ /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+-int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *m, int force_legacy);
++int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *m, int force_legacy);
+ 
+ /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+-int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
++int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+-int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
++int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
+-int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *, u_int);
++int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *, u_int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
++int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve 
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int,
++int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int,
+     int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int);
++int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve 
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int, int);
++int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
+-char *path_append(char *, char *);
++char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index ad1f8c8..3987117 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (sshpid > 1) {
+ 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args)
+ 
+ /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
+ static char *
+-path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
++path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+-make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
++make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
+ {
+ 	char *abs_str;
+ 
+@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-is_dir(char *path)
++is_dir(const char *path)
+ {
+ 	struct stat sb;
+ 
+@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ is_dir(char *path)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	Attrib *a;
+ 
+@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+ 
+ /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
+ static int
+-pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
++pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
+ {
+ 	size_t l = strlen(pathname);
+ 
+@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
++process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
+     int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
+ {
+ 	char *abs_src = NULL;
+@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ out:
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
++process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
+     int pflag, int rflag, int fflag)
+ {
+ 	char *tmp_dst = NULL;
+@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
+ 
+ /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
+ static int
+-do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
++do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag)
+ {
+ 	int n;
+ 	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
+ 
+ /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
+ static int
+-do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
++do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path,
+     int lflag)
+ {
+ 	char *fname, *lname;
+@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
++do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
+ {
+ 	struct sftp_statvfs st;
+ 	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 117fdde..2b50132 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1037,8 +1037,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	/* drop */
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	setgid(getgid());
++	(void) setegid(getgid());
++	(void) setgid(getgid());
+ 
+ #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+ 	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 773bb02..1eaa9f7 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -771,8 +771,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+ 			privsep_preauth_child();
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			free(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1439,6 +1441,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+ 		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
++
++	if (fdset != NULL)
++		free(fdset);
+ }
+ 
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 3887495..a4dc72f 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
++20140823
++ - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on
++   lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263
++ - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth
++   monitor, not preauth; bz#2263
++
+ 20140703
+  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index bdabe21..5a65114 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
++#ifdef SIGXFSZ
++	signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (compat20) {
+ 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-localdomain.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index 03a228f..49a4f6c 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
++++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -46,3 +46,7 @@
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
++#
++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
++# Host *.local
++#   CheckHostIP no

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index 32e1d2e..d4caeb5 100644
+--- a/log.c
++++ b/log.c
+@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+ void
+ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+ {
++	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
++}
++
++void
++log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+@@ -264,8 +269,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_handler = NULL;
+-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	if (reset_handler) {
++		log_handler = NULL;
++		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ 	if (on_stderr)
+diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
+index ae7df25..30c3310 100644
+--- a/log.h
++++ b/log.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+ 
+ void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ void     log_change_level(LogLevel);
+ int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
+ void     log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 7461fae..da2f766 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
++
+ 	authctxt = _authctxt;
+ 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ 
+@@ -472,6 +474,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
++
+ 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -552,7 +556,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ 		    __func__, level);
+-	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ 	free(msg);
+@@ -2083,13 +2087,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ 		mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
+ 	}
+ 
++	mon->m_state = "";
++
+ 	return mon;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
+ {
+-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
++	char *dev_log_path;
++	int do_logfds = 0;
++
++	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
++		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
++
++		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			do_logfds = 1;
++		}
++		free(dev_log_path);
++	}
++	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index ff79fbb..00c2028 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+ 	struct mm_master	*m_zlib;
+ 	struct Kex		**m_pkex;
+ 	pid_t			 m_pid;
++	char		*m_state;
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
+ void monitor_sync(struct monitor *);
+ 
+ struct Authctxt;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index e4add93..bc4a8dd 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+ 
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ 
++static int have_dev_log = 1;
++
+ /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+ static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+@@ -523,8 +525,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		is_child = 1;
+ 
+ 		/* Child.  Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
+-		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+-		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
++		log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
++		    options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+@@ -692,8 +694,8 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		close(ptymaster);
+ 
+ 		/* Child.  Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
+-		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+-		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
++		log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
++		    options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
+ 		/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ptyfd);
+ 
+@@ -797,6 +799,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	int ret;
+ 	const char *forced = NULL;
+ 	char session_type[1024], *tty = NULL;
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
+ 
+ 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ 		original_command = command;
+@@ -854,6 +857,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++		have_dev_log = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+@@ -1681,14 +1688,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	 * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed later.
+ 	 */
+ 	endpwent();
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+-	 * descriptors open.
+-	 */
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1834,8 +1833,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 			exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+-
+ 	if (!options.use_login)
+ 		do_rc_files(s, shell);
+ 
+@@ -1859,9 +1856,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
++		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
++	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
++	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
++	 * descriptors open.
++	 */
++	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
++
+ 	fflush(NULL);
+ 
+ 	if (options.use_login) {
+diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
+index 7e644ab..e162b7a 100644
+--- a/sftp-server-main.c
++++ b/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index b8eb59c..a0e644c 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
+ {
+ 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ 	int i, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
+ 		client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
+diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
+index 2bde8bb..ddf1a39 100644
+--- a/sftp.h
++++ b/sftp.h
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+ 
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 3eee75a..9c00bcb 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* New socket pair */
+-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
++	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
+ 
+ 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+@@ -763,6 +763,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
++	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
++	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
++
++	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
++		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 626a642..b186ca1 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1859,6 +1859,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 
+ 	if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
+ 		printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
++		logit("The session allows sftp connections only");
+ 		fflush(NULL);
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	} else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-mls-fix-labeling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 22ea8ef..2660085 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -116,7 +116,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
++		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index d9b440a..ec0bf12 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -355,8 +355,9 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
+ 		authctxt->success = 1;
+ 	} else {
+ 
+-		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+-		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
++		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty
++		 * Partial succes is not failure */
++		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && !partial &&
+ 		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ 			authctxt->failures++;
+ 		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index b7f3294..bc1e909 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sForceCommand:
+-		if (cp == NULL)
++		if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ 			    linenum);
+ 		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sVersionAddendum:
+-		if (cp == NULL)
++		if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ 			    linenum);
+ 		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+@@ -1630,6 +1630,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sAuthenticationMethods:
++		if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+ 			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 				if (options->num_auth_methods >=

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,994 @@
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 2ad26ff..0f0d39f 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+ 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+ 	ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+ 	kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+-	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
++	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o utf8_stringprep.o \
+ 	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index d4df619..d98b83d 100644
+--- a/misc.h
++++ b/misc.h
+@@ -106,4 +106,7 @@ char	*read_passphrase(const char *, int);
+ int	 ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ int	 read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
+ 
++/* utf8_stringprep.c */
++int utf8_stringprep(const char *, char *, size_t);
++
+ #endif /* _MISC_H */
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index b00658b..08064f4 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <langinfo.h>
++#include <locale.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+@@ -519,21 +521,51 @@ input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	    "type %d", type);
+ }
+ 
++/* Check whether we can display UTF-8 safely */
++static int
++utf8_ok(void)
++{
++	static int ret = -1;
++	char *cp;
++
++	if (ret == -1) {
++		setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
++		cp = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
++		ret = strcmp(cp, "UTF-8") == 0;
++	}
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* ARGSUSED */
+ void
+ input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ {
+ 	char *msg, *raw, *lang;
+-	u_int len;
++	u_int done, len;
+ 
+ 	debug3("input_userauth_banner");
++
+ 	raw = packet_get_string(&len);
+ 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ 	if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+ 		if (len > 65536)
+ 			len = 65536;
+ 		msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
+-		strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH);
++		done = 0;
++		if (utf8_ok()) {
++			if (utf8_stringprep(raw, msg, len * 4 + 1) == 0)
++				done = 1;
++			else
++				debug2("%s: UTF8 stringprep failed", __func__);
++		}
++		/*
++		 * Fallback to strnvis if UTF8 display not supported or
++		 * conversion failed.
++		 */
++		if (!done) {
++			strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1,
++			    VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH);
++		}
+ 		fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+ 		free(msg);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/stringprep-tables.c b/stringprep-tables.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..49f4d9d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/stringprep-tables.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,661 @@
++/* Public domain.  */
++
++/* $OpenBSD$ */
++
++/*
++ * Tables for RFC3454 stringprep algorithm, updated with a table of allocated
++ * characters generated from Unicode.6.2's UnicodeData.txt
++ *
++ * Intended to be included directly from utf8_stringprep.c
++ */
++
++/* Unassigned characters in Unicode 6.2 */
++static const struct u32_range unassigned[] = {
++	{ 0x0378, 0x0379 },
++	{ 0x037F, 0x0383 },
++	{ 0x038B, 0x038B },
++	{ 0x038D, 0x038D },
++	{ 0x03A2, 0x03A2 },
++	{ 0x0528, 0x0530 },
++	{ 0x0557, 0x0558 },
++	{ 0x0560, 0x0560 },
++	{ 0x0588, 0x0588 },
++	{ 0x058B, 0x058E },
++	{ 0x0590, 0x0590 },
++	{ 0x05C8, 0x05CF },
++	{ 0x05EB, 0x05EF },
++	{ 0x05F5, 0x05FF },
++	{ 0x0605, 0x0605 },
++	{ 0x061C, 0x061D },
++	{ 0x070E, 0x070E },
++	{ 0x074B, 0x074C },
++	{ 0x07B2, 0x07BF },
++	{ 0x07FB, 0x07FF },
++	{ 0x082E, 0x082F },
++	{ 0x083F, 0x083F },
++	{ 0x085C, 0x085D },
++	{ 0x085F, 0x089F },
++	{ 0x08A1, 0x08A1 },
++	{ 0x08AD, 0x08E3 },
++	{ 0x08FF, 0x08FF },
++	{ 0x0978, 0x0978 },
++	{ 0x0980, 0x0980 },
++	{ 0x0984, 0x0984 },
++	{ 0x098D, 0x098E },
++	{ 0x0991, 0x0992 },
++	{ 0x09A9, 0x09A9 },
++	{ 0x09B1, 0x09B1 },
++	{ 0x09B3, 0x09B5 },
++	{ 0x09BA, 0x09BB },
++	{ 0x09C5, 0x09C6 },
++	{ 0x09C9, 0x09CA },
++	{ 0x09CF, 0x09D6 },
++	{ 0x09D8, 0x09DB },
++	{ 0x09DE, 0x09DE },
++	{ 0x09E4, 0x09E5 },
++	{ 0x09FC, 0x0A00 },
++	{ 0x0A04, 0x0A04 },
++	{ 0x0A0B, 0x0A0E },
++	{ 0x0A11, 0x0A12 },
++	{ 0x0A29, 0x0A29 },
++	{ 0x0A31, 0x0A31 },
++	{ 0x0A34, 0x0A34 },
++	{ 0x0A37, 0x0A37 },
++	{ 0x0A3A, 0x0A3B },
++	{ 0x0A3D, 0x0A3D },
++	{ 0x0A43, 0x0A46 },
++	{ 0x0A49, 0x0A4A },
++	{ 0x0A4E, 0x0A50 },
++	{ 0x0A52, 0x0A58 },
++	{ 0x0A5D, 0x0A5D },
++	{ 0x0A5F, 0x0A65 },
++	{ 0x0A76, 0x0A80 },
++	{ 0x0A84, 0x0A84 },
++	{ 0x0A8E, 0x0A8E },
++	{ 0x0A92, 0x0A92 },
++	{ 0x0AA9, 0x0AA9 },
++	{ 0x0AB1, 0x0AB1 },
++	{ 0x0AB4, 0x0AB4 },
++	{ 0x0ABA, 0x0ABB },
++	{ 0x0AC6, 0x0AC6 },
++	{ 0x0ACA, 0x0ACA },
++	{ 0x0ACE, 0x0ACF },
++	{ 0x0AD1, 0x0ADF },
++	{ 0x0AE4, 0x0AE5 },
++	{ 0x0AF2, 0x0B00 },
++	{ 0x0B04, 0x0B04 },
++	{ 0x0B0D, 0x0B0E },
++	{ 0x0B11, 0x0B12 },
++	{ 0x0B29, 0x0B29 },
++	{ 0x0B31, 0x0B31 },
++	{ 0x0B34, 0x0B34 },
++	{ 0x0B3A, 0x0B3B },
++	{ 0x0B45, 0x0B46 },
++	{ 0x0B49, 0x0B4A },
++	{ 0x0B4E, 0x0B55 },
++	{ 0x0B58, 0x0B5B },
++	{ 0x0B5E, 0x0B5E },
++	{ 0x0B64, 0x0B65 },
++	{ 0x0B78, 0x0B81 },
++	{ 0x0B84, 0x0B84 },
++	{ 0x0B8B, 0x0B8D },
++	{ 0x0B91, 0x0B91 },
++	{ 0x0B96, 0x0B98 },
++	{ 0x0B9B, 0x0B9B },
++	{ 0x0B9D, 0x0B9D },
++	{ 0x0BA0, 0x0BA2 },
++	{ 0x0BA5, 0x0BA7 },
++	{ 0x0BAB, 0x0BAD },
++	{ 0x0BBA, 0x0BBD },
++	{ 0x0BC3, 0x0BC5 },
++	{ 0x0BC9, 0x0BC9 },
++	{ 0x0BCE, 0x0BCF },
++	{ 0x0BD1, 0x0BD6 },
++	{ 0x0BD8, 0x0BE5 },
++	{ 0x0BFB, 0x0C00 },
++	{ 0x0C04, 0x0C04 },
++	{ 0x0C0D, 0x0C0D },
++	{ 0x0C11, 0x0C11 },
++	{ 0x0C29, 0x0C29 },
++	{ 0x0C34, 0x0C34 },
++	{ 0x0C3A, 0x0C3C },
++	{ 0x0C45, 0x0C45 },
++	{ 0x0C49, 0x0C49 },
++	{ 0x0C4E, 0x0C54 },
++	{ 0x0C57, 0x0C57 },
++	{ 0x0C5A, 0x0C5F },
++	{ 0x0C64, 0x0C65 },
++	{ 0x0C70, 0x0C77 },
++	{ 0x0C80, 0x0C81 },
++	{ 0x0C84, 0x0C84 },
++	{ 0x0C8D, 0x0C8D },
++	{ 0x0C91, 0x0C91 },
++	{ 0x0CA9, 0x0CA9 },
++	{ 0x0CB4, 0x0CB4 },
++	{ 0x0CBA, 0x0CBB },
++	{ 0x0CC5, 0x0CC5 },
++	{ 0x0CC9, 0x0CC9 },
++	{ 0x0CCE, 0x0CD4 },
++	{ 0x0CD7, 0x0CDD },
++	{ 0x0CDF, 0x0CDF },
++	{ 0x0CE4, 0x0CE5 },
++	{ 0x0CF0, 0x0CF0 },
++	{ 0x0CF3, 0x0D01 },
++	{ 0x0D04, 0x0D04 },
++	{ 0x0D0D, 0x0D0D },
++	{ 0x0D11, 0x0D11 },
++	{ 0x0D3B, 0x0D3C },
++	{ 0x0D45, 0x0D45 },
++	{ 0x0D49, 0x0D49 },
++	{ 0x0D4F, 0x0D56 },
++	{ 0x0D58, 0x0D5F },
++	{ 0x0D64, 0x0D65 },
++	{ 0x0D76, 0x0D78 },
++	{ 0x0D80, 0x0D81 },
++	{ 0x0D84, 0x0D84 },
++	{ 0x0D97, 0x0D99 },
++	{ 0x0DB2, 0x0DB2 },
++	{ 0x0DBC, 0x0DBC },
++	{ 0x0DBE, 0x0DBF },
++	{ 0x0DC7, 0x0DC9 },
++	{ 0x0DCB, 0x0DCE },
++	{ 0x0DD5, 0x0DD5 },
++	{ 0x0DD7, 0x0DD7 },
++	{ 0x0DE0, 0x0DF1 },
++	{ 0x0DF5, 0x0E00 },
++	{ 0x0E3B, 0x0E3E },
++	{ 0x0E5C, 0x0E80 },
++	{ 0x0E83, 0x0E83 },
++	{ 0x0E85, 0x0E86 },
++	{ 0x0E89, 0x0E89 },
++	{ 0x0E8B, 0x0E8C },
++	{ 0x0E8E, 0x0E93 },
++	{ 0x0E98, 0x0E98 },
++	{ 0x0EA0, 0x0EA0 },
++	{ 0x0EA4, 0x0EA4 },
++	{ 0x0EA6, 0x0EA6 },
++	{ 0x0EA8, 0x0EA9 },
++	{ 0x0EAC, 0x0EAC },
++	{ 0x0EBA, 0x0EBA },
++	{ 0x0EBE, 0x0EBF },
++	{ 0x0EC5, 0x0EC5 },
++	{ 0x0EC7, 0x0EC7 },
++	{ 0x0ECE, 0x0ECF },
++	{ 0x0EDA, 0x0EDB },
++	{ 0x0EE0, 0x0EFF },
++	{ 0x0F48, 0x0F48 },
++	{ 0x0F6D, 0x0F70 },
++	{ 0x0F98, 0x0F98 },
++	{ 0x0FBD, 0x0FBD },
++	{ 0x0FCD, 0x0FCD },
++	{ 0x0FDB, 0x0FFF },
++	{ 0x10C6, 0x10C6 },
++	{ 0x10C8, 0x10CC },
++	{ 0x10CE, 0x10CF },
++	{ 0x1249, 0x1249 },
++	{ 0x124E, 0x124F },
++	{ 0x1257, 0x1257 },
++	{ 0x1259, 0x1259 },
++	{ 0x125E, 0x125F },
++	{ 0x1289, 0x1289 },
++	{ 0x128E, 0x128F },
++	{ 0x12B1, 0x12B1 },
++	{ 0x12B6, 0x12B7 },
++	{ 0x12BF, 0x12BF },
++	{ 0x12C1, 0x12C1 },
++	{ 0x12C6, 0x12C7 },
++	{ 0x12D7, 0x12D7 },
++	{ 0x1311, 0x1311 },
++	{ 0x1316, 0x1317 },
++	{ 0x135B, 0x135C },
++	{ 0x137D, 0x137F },
++	{ 0x139A, 0x139F },
++	{ 0x13F5, 0x13FF },
++	{ 0x169D, 0x169F },
++	{ 0x16F1, 0x16FF },
++	{ 0x170D, 0x170D },
++	{ 0x1715, 0x171F },
++	{ 0x1737, 0x173F },
++	{ 0x1754, 0x175F },
++	{ 0x176D, 0x176D },
++	{ 0x1771, 0x1771 },
++	{ 0x1774, 0x177F },
++	{ 0x17DE, 0x17DF },
++	{ 0x17EA, 0x17EF },
++	{ 0x17FA, 0x17FF },
++	{ 0x180F, 0x180F },
++	{ 0x181A, 0x181F },
++	{ 0x1878, 0x187F },
++	{ 0x18AB, 0x18AF },
++	{ 0x18F6, 0x18FF },
++	{ 0x191D, 0x191F },
++	{ 0x192C, 0x192F },
++	{ 0x193C, 0x193F },
++	{ 0x1941, 0x1943 },
++	{ 0x196E, 0x196F },
++	{ 0x1975, 0x197F },
++	{ 0x19AC, 0x19AF },
++	{ 0x19CA, 0x19CF },
++	{ 0x19DB, 0x19DD },
++	{ 0x1A1C, 0x1A1D },
++	{ 0x1A5F, 0x1A5F },
++	{ 0x1A7D, 0x1A7E },
++	{ 0x1A8A, 0x1A8F },
++	{ 0x1A9A, 0x1A9F },
++	{ 0x1AAE, 0x1AFF },
++	{ 0x1B4C, 0x1B4F },
++	{ 0x1B7D, 0x1B7F },
++	{ 0x1BF4, 0x1BFB },
++	{ 0x1C38, 0x1C3A },
++	{ 0x1C4A, 0x1C4C },
++	{ 0x1C80, 0x1CBF },
++	{ 0x1CC8, 0x1CCF },
++	{ 0x1CF7, 0x1CFF },
++	{ 0x1DE7, 0x1DFB },
++	{ 0x1F16, 0x1F17 },
++	{ 0x1F1E, 0x1F1F },
++	{ 0x1F46, 0x1F47 },
++	{ 0x1F4E, 0x1F4F },
++	{ 0x1F58, 0x1F58 },
++	{ 0x1F5A, 0x1F5A },
++	{ 0x1F5C, 0x1F5C },
++	{ 0x1F5E, 0x1F5E },
++	{ 0x1F7E, 0x1F7F },
++	{ 0x1FB5, 0x1FB5 },
++	{ 0x1FC5, 0x1FC5 },
++	{ 0x1FD4, 0x1FD5 },
++	{ 0x1FDC, 0x1FDC },
++	{ 0x1FF0, 0x1FF1 },
++	{ 0x1FF5, 0x1FF5 },
++	{ 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF },
++	{ 0x2065, 0x2069 },
++	{ 0x2072, 0x2073 },
++	{ 0x208F, 0x208F },
++	{ 0x209D, 0x209F },
++	{ 0x20BB, 0x20CF },
++	{ 0x20F1, 0x20FF },
++	{ 0x218A, 0x218F },
++	{ 0x23F4, 0x23FF },
++	{ 0x2427, 0x243F },
++	{ 0x244B, 0x245F },
++	{ 0x2700, 0x2700 },
++	{ 0x2B4D, 0x2B4F },
++	{ 0x2B5A, 0x2BFF },
++	{ 0x2C2F, 0x2C2F },
++	{ 0x2C5F, 0x2C5F },
++	{ 0x2CF4, 0x2CF8 },
++	{ 0x2D26, 0x2D26 },
++	{ 0x2D28, 0x2D2C },
++	{ 0x2D2E, 0x2D2F },
++	{ 0x2D68, 0x2D6E },
++	{ 0x2D71, 0x2D7E },
++	{ 0x2D97, 0x2D9F },
++	{ 0x2DA7, 0x2DA7 },
++	{ 0x2DAF, 0x2DAF },
++	{ 0x2DB7, 0x2DB7 },
++	{ 0x2DBF, 0x2DBF },
++	{ 0x2DC7, 0x2DC7 },
++	{ 0x2DCF, 0x2DCF },
++	{ 0x2DD7, 0x2DD7 },
++	{ 0x2DDF, 0x2DDF },
++	{ 0x2E3C, 0x2E7F },
++	{ 0x2E9A, 0x2E9A },
++	{ 0x2EF4, 0x2EFF },
++	{ 0x2FD6, 0x2FEF },
++	{ 0x2FFC, 0x2FFF },
++	{ 0x3040, 0x3040 },
++	{ 0x3097, 0x3098 },
++	{ 0x3100, 0x3104 },
++	{ 0x312E, 0x3130 },
++	{ 0x318F, 0x318F },
++	{ 0x31BB, 0x31BF },
++	{ 0x31E4, 0x31EF },
++	{ 0x321F, 0x321F },
++	{ 0x32FF, 0x32FF },
++	{ 0x4DB6, 0x4DBF },
++	{ 0x9FA6, 0x9FCB },
++	{ 0x9FCD, 0x9FFF },
++	{ 0xA48D, 0xA48F },
++	{ 0xA4C7, 0xA4CF },
++	{ 0xA62C, 0xA63F },
++	{ 0xA698, 0xA69E },
++	{ 0xA6F8, 0xA6FF },
++	{ 0xA78F, 0xA78F },
++	{ 0xA794, 0xA79F },
++	{ 0xA7AB, 0xA7F7 },
++	{ 0xA82C, 0xA82F },
++	{ 0xA83A, 0xA83F },
++	{ 0xA878, 0xA87F },
++	{ 0xA8C5, 0xA8CD },
++	{ 0xA8DA, 0xA8DF },
++	{ 0xA8FC, 0xA8FF },
++	{ 0xA954, 0xA95E },
++	{ 0xA97D, 0xA97F },
++	{ 0xA9CE, 0xA9CE },
++	{ 0xA9DA, 0xA9DD },
++	{ 0xA9E0, 0xA9FF },
++	{ 0xAA37, 0xAA3F },
++	{ 0xAA4E, 0xAA4F },
++	{ 0xAA5A, 0xAA5B },
++	{ 0xAA7C, 0xAA7F },
++	{ 0xAAC3, 0xAADA },
++	{ 0xAAF7, 0xAB00 },
++	{ 0xAB07, 0xAB08 },
++	{ 0xAB0F, 0xAB10 },
++	{ 0xAB17, 0xAB1F },
++	{ 0xAB27, 0xAB27 },
++	{ 0xAB2F, 0xABBF },
++	{ 0xABEE, 0xABEF },
++	{ 0xABFA, 0xABFF },
++	{ 0xD7A4, 0xD7AF },
++	{ 0xD7C7, 0xD7CA },
++	{ 0xD7FC, 0xD7FF },
++	{ 0xFA6E, 0xFA6F },
++	{ 0xFADA, 0xFAFF },
++	{ 0xFB07, 0xFB12 },
++	{ 0xFB18, 0xFB1C },
++	{ 0xFB37, 0xFB37 },
++	{ 0xFB3D, 0xFB3D },
++	{ 0xFB3F, 0xFB3F },
++	{ 0xFB42, 0xFB42 },
++	{ 0xFB45, 0xFB45 },
++	{ 0xFBC2, 0xFBD2 },
++	{ 0xFD40, 0xFD4F },
++	{ 0xFD90, 0xFD91 },
++	{ 0xFDC8, 0xFDCF },
++	{ 0xFDFE, 0xFDFF },
++	{ 0xFE1A, 0xFE1F },
++	{ 0xFE27, 0xFE2F },
++	{ 0xFE53, 0xFE53 },
++	{ 0xFE67, 0xFE67 },
++	{ 0xFE6C, 0xFE6F },
++	{ 0xFE75, 0xFE75 },
++	{ 0xFEFD, 0xFEFE },
++	{ 0xFF00, 0xFF00 },
++	{ 0xFFBF, 0xFFC1 },
++	{ 0xFFC8, 0xFFC9 },
++	{ 0xFFD0, 0xFFD1 },
++	{ 0xFFD8, 0xFFD9 },
++	{ 0xFFDD, 0xFFDF },
++	{ 0xFFE7, 0xFFE7 },
++	{ 0xFFEF, 0xFFF8 },
++	{ 0x1000C, 0x1000C },
++	{ 0x10027, 0x10027 },
++	{ 0x1003B, 0x1003B },
++	{ 0x1003E, 0x1003E },
++	{ 0x1004E, 0x1004F },
++	{ 0x1005E, 0x1007F },
++	{ 0x100FB, 0x100FF },
++	{ 0x10103, 0x10106 },
++	{ 0x10134, 0x10136 },
++	{ 0x1018B, 0x1018F },
++	{ 0x1019C, 0x101CF },
++	{ 0x101FE, 0x1027F },
++	{ 0x1029D, 0x1029F },
++	{ 0x102D1, 0x102FF },
++	{ 0x1031F, 0x1031F },
++	{ 0x10324, 0x1032F },
++	{ 0x1034B, 0x1037F },
++	{ 0x1039E, 0x1039E },
++	{ 0x103C4, 0x103C7 },
++	{ 0x103D6, 0x103FF },
++	{ 0x1049E, 0x1049F },
++	{ 0x104AA, 0x107FF },
++	{ 0x10806, 0x10807 },
++	{ 0x10809, 0x10809 },
++	{ 0x10836, 0x10836 },
++	{ 0x10839, 0x1083B },
++	{ 0x1083D, 0x1083E },
++	{ 0x10856, 0x10856 },
++	{ 0x10860, 0x108FF },
++	{ 0x1091C, 0x1091E },
++	{ 0x1093A, 0x1093E },
++	{ 0x10940, 0x1097F },
++	{ 0x109B8, 0x109BD },
++	{ 0x109C0, 0x109FF },
++	{ 0x10A04, 0x10A04 },
++	{ 0x10A07, 0x10A0B },
++	{ 0x10A14, 0x10A14 },
++	{ 0x10A18, 0x10A18 },
++	{ 0x10A34, 0x10A37 },
++	{ 0x10A3B, 0x10A3E },
++	{ 0x10A48, 0x10A4F },
++	{ 0x10A59, 0x10A5F },
++	{ 0x10A80, 0x10AFF },
++	{ 0x10B36, 0x10B38 },
++	{ 0x10B56, 0x10B57 },
++	{ 0x10B73, 0x10B77 },
++	{ 0x10B80, 0x10BFF },
++	{ 0x10C49, 0x10E5F },
++	{ 0x10E7F, 0x10FFF },
++	{ 0x1104E, 0x11051 },
++	{ 0x11070, 0x1107F },
++	{ 0x110C2, 0x110CF },
++	{ 0x110E9, 0x110EF },
++	{ 0x110FA, 0x110FF },
++	{ 0x11135, 0x11135 },
++	{ 0x11144, 0x1117F },
++	{ 0x111C9, 0x111CF },
++	{ 0x111DA, 0x1167F },
++	{ 0x116B8, 0x116BF },
++	{ 0x116CA, 0x11FFF },
++	{ 0x1236F, 0x123FF },
++	{ 0x12463, 0x1246F },
++	{ 0x12474, 0x12FFF },
++	{ 0x1342F, 0x167FF },
++	{ 0x16A39, 0x16EFF },
++	{ 0x16F45, 0x16F4F },
++	{ 0x16F7F, 0x16F8E },
++	{ 0x16FA0, 0x1AFFF },
++	{ 0x1B002, 0x1CFFF },
++	{ 0x1D0F6, 0x1D0FF },
++	{ 0x1D127, 0x1D128 },
++	{ 0x1D1DE, 0x1D1FF },
++	{ 0x1D246, 0x1D2FF },
++	{ 0x1D357, 0x1D35F },
++	{ 0x1D372, 0x1D3FF },
++	{ 0x1D455, 0x1D455 },
++	{ 0x1D49D, 0x1D49D },
++	{ 0x1D4A0, 0x1D4A1 },
++	{ 0x1D4A3, 0x1D4A4 },
++	{ 0x1D4A7, 0x1D4A8 },
++	{ 0x1D4AD, 0x1D4AD },
++	{ 0x1D4BA, 0x1D4BA },
++	{ 0x1D4BC, 0x1D4BC },
++	{ 0x1D4C4, 0x1D4C4 },
++	{ 0x1D506, 0x1D506 },
++	{ 0x1D50B, 0x1D50C },
++	{ 0x1D515, 0x1D515 },
++	{ 0x1D51D, 0x1D51D },
++	{ 0x1D53A, 0x1D53A },
++	{ 0x1D53F, 0x1D53F },
++	{ 0x1D545, 0x1D545 },
++	{ 0x1D547, 0x1D549 },
++	{ 0x1D551, 0x1D551 },
++	{ 0x1D6A6, 0x1D6A7 },
++	{ 0x1D7CC, 0x1D7CD },
++	{ 0x1D800, 0x1EDFF },
++	{ 0x1EE04, 0x1EE04 },
++	{ 0x1EE20, 0x1EE20 },
++	{ 0x1EE23, 0x1EE23 },
++	{ 0x1EE25, 0x1EE26 },
++	{ 0x1EE28, 0x1EE28 },
++	{ 0x1EE33, 0x1EE33 },
++	{ 0x1EE38, 0x1EE38 },
++	{ 0x1EE3A, 0x1EE3A },
++	{ 0x1EE3C, 0x1EE41 },
++	{ 0x1EE43, 0x1EE46 },
++	{ 0x1EE48, 0x1EE48 },
++	{ 0x1EE4A, 0x1EE4A },
++	{ 0x1EE4C, 0x1EE4C },
++	{ 0x1EE50, 0x1EE50 },
++	{ 0x1EE53, 0x1EE53 },
++	{ 0x1EE55, 0x1EE56 },
++	{ 0x1EE58, 0x1EE58 },
++	{ 0x1EE5A, 0x1EE5A },
++	{ 0x1EE5C, 0x1EE5C },
++	{ 0x1EE5E, 0x1EE5E },
++	{ 0x1EE60, 0x1EE60 },
++	{ 0x1EE63, 0x1EE63 },
++	{ 0x1EE65, 0x1EE66 },
++	{ 0x1EE6B, 0x1EE6B },
++	{ 0x1EE73, 0x1EE73 },
++	{ 0x1EE78, 0x1EE78 },
++	{ 0x1EE7D, 0x1EE7D },
++	{ 0x1EE7F, 0x1EE7F },
++	{ 0x1EE8A, 0x1EE8A },
++	{ 0x1EE9C, 0x1EEA0 },
++	{ 0x1EEA4, 0x1EEA4 },
++	{ 0x1EEAA, 0x1EEAA },
++	{ 0x1EEBC, 0x1EEEF },
++	{ 0x1EEF2, 0x1EFFF },
++	{ 0x1F02C, 0x1F02F },
++	{ 0x1F094, 0x1F09F },
++	{ 0x1F0AF, 0x1F0B0 },
++	{ 0x1F0BF, 0x1F0C0 },
++	{ 0x1F0D0, 0x1F0D0 },
++	{ 0x1F0E0, 0x1F0FF },
++	{ 0x1F10B, 0x1F10F },
++	{ 0x1F12F, 0x1F12F },
++	{ 0x1F16C, 0x1F16F },
++	{ 0x1F19B, 0x1F1E5 },
++	{ 0x1F203, 0x1F20F },
++	{ 0x1F23B, 0x1F23F },
++	{ 0x1F249, 0x1F24F },
++	{ 0x1F252, 0x1F2FF },
++	{ 0x1F321, 0x1F32F },
++	{ 0x1F336, 0x1F336 },
++	{ 0x1F37D, 0x1F37F },
++	{ 0x1F394, 0x1F39F },
++	{ 0x1F3C5, 0x1F3C5 },
++	{ 0x1F3CB, 0x1F3DF },
++	{ 0x1F3F1, 0x1F3FF },
++	{ 0x1F43F, 0x1F43F },
++	{ 0x1F441, 0x1F441 },
++	{ 0x1F4F8, 0x1F4F8 },
++	{ 0x1F4FD, 0x1F4FF },
++	{ 0x1F53E, 0x1F53F },
++	{ 0x1F544, 0x1F54F },
++	{ 0x1F568, 0x1F5FA },
++	{ 0x1F641, 0x1F644 },
++	{ 0x1F650, 0x1F67F },
++	{ 0x1F6C6, 0x1F6FF },
++	{ 0x1F774, 0x1FFFD },
++	{ 0x2A6D7, 0x2A6FF },
++	{ 0x2A701, 0x2B733 },
++	{ 0x2B735, 0x2B73F },
++	{ 0x2B741, 0x2B81C },
++	{ 0x2B81E, 0x2F7FF },
++	{ 0x2FA1E, 0x2FFFD },
++	{ 0x30000, 0x3FFFD },
++	{ 0x40000, 0x4FFFD },
++	{ 0x50000, 0x5FFFD },
++	{ 0x60000, 0x6FFFD },
++	{ 0x70000, 0x7FFFD },
++	{ 0x80000, 0x8FFFD },
++	{ 0x90000, 0x9FFFD },
++	{ 0xA0000, 0xAFFFD },
++	{ 0xB0000, 0xBFFFD },
++	{ 0xC0000, 0xCFFFD },
++	{ 0xD0000, 0xDFFFD },
++	{ 0xE0000, 0xE0000 },
++	{ 0xE0002, 0xE001F },
++	{ 0xE0080, 0xE00FF },
++	{ 0xE01F0, 0xEFFFD },
++};
++
++/* RFC3454 Table B.1 */
++static const struct u32_range map_to_nothing[] = {
++	{ 0x00AD, 0x00AD },
++	{ 0x034F, 0x034F },
++	{ 0x1806, 0x1806 },
++	{ 0x180B, 0x180D },
++	{ 0x200B, 0x200D },
++	{ 0x2060, 0x2060 },
++	{ 0xFE00, 0xFE0F },
++	{ 0xFEFF, 0xFEFF },
++};
++
++/* Local: allow tab, CR and LF */
++static const struct u32_range whitelist[] = {
++	{ 0x09, 0x09 },
++	{ 0x0a, 0x0a },
++	{ 0x0d, 0x0d },
++};
++
++/* RFC3454 Tables in appendix C */
++static const struct u32_range prohibited[] = {
++	/* C.2.1 ASCII control characters */
++	{ 0x0000, 0x001F },
++	{ 0x007F, 0x007F },
++	/* C.2.2 Non-ASCII control characters */
++	{ 0x0080, 0x009F },
++	{ 0x06DD, 0x06DD },
++	{ 0x070F, 0x070F },
++	{ 0x180E, 0x180E },
++	{ 0x200C, 0x200C },
++	{ 0x200D, 0x200D },
++	{ 0x2028, 0x2028 },
++	{ 0x2029, 0x2029 },
++	{ 0x2060, 0x2060 },
++	{ 0x2061, 0x2061 },
++	{ 0x2062, 0x2062 },
++	{ 0x2063, 0x2063 },
++	{ 0x206A, 0x206F },
++	{ 0xFEFF, 0xFEFF },
++	{ 0xFFF9, 0xFFFC },
++	{ 0x1D173, 0x1D17A },
++	/* C.3 Private use */
++	{ 0xE000, 0xF8FF },
++	{ 0xF0000, 0xFFFFD },
++	{ 0x100000, 0x10FFFD },
++	/* C.4 Non-character code points */
++	{ 0xFDD0, 0xFDEF },
++	{ 0xFFFE, 0xFFFF },
++	{ 0x1FFFE, 0x1FFFF },
++	{ 0x2FFFE, 0x2FFFF },
++	{ 0x3FFFE, 0x3FFFF },
++	{ 0x4FFFE, 0x4FFFF },
++	{ 0x5FFFE, 0x5FFFF },
++	{ 0x6FFFE, 0x6FFFF },
++	{ 0x7FFFE, 0x7FFFF },
++	{ 0x8FFFE, 0x8FFFF },
++	{ 0x9FFFE, 0x9FFFF },
++	{ 0xAFFFE, 0xAFFFF },
++	{ 0xBFFFE, 0xBFFFF },
++	{ 0xCFFFE, 0xCFFFF },
++	{ 0xDFFFE, 0xDFFFF },
++	{ 0xEFFFE, 0xEFFFF },
++	{ 0xFFFFE, 0xFFFFF },
++	{ 0x10FFFE, 0x10FFFF },
++	/* C.5 Surrogate codes */
++	{ 0xD800, 0xDFFF },
++	/* C.6 Inappropriate for plain text */
++	{ 0xFFF9, 0xFFF9 },
++	{ 0xFFFA, 0xFFFA },
++	{ 0xFFFB, 0xFFFB },
++	{ 0xFFFC, 0xFFFC },
++	{ 0xFFFD, 0xFFFD },
++	/* C.7 Inappropriate for canonical representation */
++	{ 0x2FF0, 0x2FFB },
++	/* C.8 Change display properties or are deprecated */
++	{ 0x0340, 0x0340 },
++	{ 0x0341, 0x0341 },
++	{ 0x200E, 0x200E },
++	{ 0x200F, 0x200F },
++	{ 0x202A, 0x202A },
++	{ 0x202B, 0x202B },
++	{ 0x202C, 0x202C },
++	{ 0x202D, 0x202D },
++	{ 0x202E, 0x202E },
++	{ 0x206A, 0x206A },
++	{ 0x206B, 0x206B },
++	{ 0x206C, 0x206C },
++	{ 0x206D, 0x206D },
++	{ 0x206E, 0x206E },
++	{ 0x206F, 0x206F },
++	/* C.9 Tagging characters */
++	{ 0xE0001, 0xE0001 },
++	{ 0xE0020, 0xE007F },
++};
++
+diff --git a/utf8_stringprep.c b/utf8_stringprep.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bcafae7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/utf8_stringprep.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * This is a simple RFC3454 stringprep profile to sanitise UTF-8 strings
++ * from untrusted sources.
++ *
++ * It is intended to be used prior to display of untrusted strings only.
++ * It should not be used for logging because of bi-di ambiguity. It
++ * should also not be used in any case where lack of normalisation may
++ * cause problems.
++ *
++ * This profile uses the prohibition and mapping tables from RFC3454
++ * (listed below) but the unassigned character table has been updated to
++ * Unicode 6.2. It uses a local whitelist of whitespace characters (\n,
++ * \a and \t). Unicode normalisation and bi-di testing are not used.
++ *
++ * XXX: implement bi-di handling (needed for logs)
++ * XXX: implement KC normalisation (needed for passing to libs/syscalls)
++ */
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <limits.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++
++#include "misc.h"
++
++struct u32_range {
++	u_int32_t lo, hi;  /* Inclusive */
++};
++
++#include "stringprep-tables.c"
++
++/* Returns 1 if code 'c' appears in the table or 0 otherwise */
++static int
++code_in_table(u_int32_t c, const struct u32_range *table, size_t tlen)
++{
++	const struct u32_range *e, *end = (void *)(tlen + (char *)table);
++
++	for (e = table; e < end; e++) {
++		if (c >= e->lo && c <= e->hi)
++			return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Decode the next valid UCS character from a UTF-8 string, skipping past bad
++ * codes. Returns the decoded character or 0 for end-of-string and updates
++ * nextc to point to the start of the next character (if any).
++ * had_error is set if an invalid code was encountered.
++ */
++static u_int32_t
++decode_utf8(const char *in, const char **nextc, int *had_error)
++{
++	int state = 0;
++	size_t i;
++	u_int32_t c, e;
++
++	e = c = 0;
++	for (i = 0; in[i] != '\0'; i++) {
++		e = (u_char)in[i];
++		/* Invalid code point state */
++		if (state == -1) {
++			/*
++			 * Continue eating continuation characters until
++			 * a new start character comes along.
++			 */
++			if ((e & 0xc0) == 0x80)
++				continue;
++			state = 0;
++		}
++
++		/* New code point state */
++		if (state == 0) {
++			if ((e & 0x80) == 0) { /* 7 bit code */
++				c = e & 0x7f;
++				goto have_code;
++			} else if ((e & 0xe0) == 0xc0) { /* 11 bit code point */
++				state = 1;
++				c = (e & 0x1f) << 6;
++			} else if ((e & 0xf0) == 0xe0) { /* 16 bit code point */
++				state = 2;
++				c = (e & 0xf) << 12;
++			} else if ((e & 0xf8) == 0xf0) { /* 21 bit code point */
++				state = 3;
++				c = (e & 0x7) << 18;
++			} else {
++				/* A five or six byte header, or 0xff */
++				goto bad_encoding;
++			}
++			/*
++			 * Check that the header byte has some non-zero data
++			 * after masking off the length marker. If not it is
++			 * an invalid encoding.
++			 */
++			if (c == 0) {
++ bad_encoding:
++				c = 0;
++				state = -1;
++				if (had_error != NULL)
++					*had_error = 1;
++			}
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		/* Sanity check: should never happen */
++		if (state < 1 || state > 5) {
++			*nextc = NULL;
++			if (had_error != NULL)
++				*had_error = 1;
++			return 0;
++		}
++		/* Multibyte code point state */
++		state--;
++		c |= (e & 0x3f) << (state * 6);	
++		if (state > 0)
++			continue;
++
++		/* RFC3629 bans codepoints > U+10FFFF */
++		if (c > 0x10FFFF) {
++			if (had_error != NULL)
++				*had_error = 1;
++			continue;
++		}
++ have_code:
++		*nextc = in + i + 1;
++		return c;
++	}
++	if (state != 0 && had_error != NULL)
++		*had_error = 1;
++	*nextc = in + i;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Attempt to encode a UCS character as a UTF-8 sequence. Returns the number
++ * of characters used or -1 on error (insufficient space or bad code).
++ */
++static int
++encode_utf8(u_int32_t c, char *s, size_t slen)
++{
++	size_t i, need;
++	u_char h;
++
++	if (c < 0x80) {
++		if (slen >= 1) {
++			s[0] = (char)c;
++		}
++		return 1;
++	} else if (c < 0x800) {
++		need = 2;
++		h = 0xc0;
++	} else if (c < 0x10000) {
++		need = 3;
++		h = 0xe0;
++	} else if (c < 0x200000) {
++		need = 4;
++		h = 0xf0;
++	} else {
++		/* Invalid code point > U+10FFFF */
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (need > slen)
++		return -1;
++	for (i = 0; i < need; i++) {
++		s[i] = (i == 0 ? h : 0x80);
++		s[i] |= (c >> (need - i - 1) * 6) & 0x3f;
++	}
++	return need;
++}
++
++
++/*
++ * Normalise a UTF-8 string using the RFC3454 stringprep algorithm.
++ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (prohibited code or insufficient
++ * length in the output string.
++ * Requires an output buffer at most the same length as the input.
++ */
++int
++utf8_stringprep(const char *in, char *out, size_t olen)
++{
++	int r;
++	size_t o;
++	u_int32_t c;
++
++	if (olen < 1)
++		return -1;
++
++	for (o = 0; (c = decode_utf8(in, &in, NULL)) != 0;) {
++		/* Mapping */
++		if (code_in_table(c, map_to_nothing, sizeof(map_to_nothing)))
++			continue;
++
++		/* Prohibitied output */
++		if (code_in_table(c, prohibited, sizeof(prohibited)) &&
++		    !code_in_table(c, whitelist, sizeof(whitelist)))
++			return -1;
++
++		/* Map unassigned code points to U+FFFD */
++		if (code_in_table(c, unassigned, sizeof(unassigned)))
++			c = 0xFFFD;
++
++		/* Encode the character */
++		r = encode_utf8(c, out + o, olen - o - 1);
++		if (r < 0)
++			return -1;
++		o += r;
++	}
++	out[o] = '\0';
++	return 0;
++}
++

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 38de846..1603a07 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
++20140420
++   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
++     [sshconnect.c]
++     When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
++     certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
++     
++     Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
++     dialog by offering only certificate keys.
++     
++     Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
++
+ 20140313
+  - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
+ 
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 394cca8..e636f33 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1219,30 +1219,40 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	int flags = 0;
+ 	char *fp;
++	Key *plain = NULL;
+ 
+ 	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 	debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
+ 	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+-	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
+-	if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
+-	    verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
+-		if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
+-
+-			if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
+-			    flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
+-			    flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
+-				return 0;
+-
+-			if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
+-				matching_host_key_dns = 1;
+-			} else {
+-				warn_changed_key(host_key);
+-				error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
+-				    "host key to get rid of this message.");
++	if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
++		/*
++		 * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
++		 * them and try the plain key.
++		 */
++		plain = key_from_private(host_key);
++		if (key_is_cert(plain))
++			key_drop_cert(plain);
++		if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
++			if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
++				if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
++				    flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
++				    flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
++					key_free(plain);
++					return 0;
++				}
++				if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
++					matching_host_key_dns = 1;
++				} else {
++					warn_changed_key(plain);
++					error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
++					    "with the new host key to get rid "
++					    "of this message.");
++				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
++		key_free(plain);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 9a75c62..4859245 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ 
++#include <ctype.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <grp.h>
+@@ -292,6 +293,21 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	do_cleanup(authctxt);
+ }
+ 
++/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
++static int
++xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
++		if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
++		    s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
++		    s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
++		return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Prepares for an interactive session.  This is called after the user has
+  * been successfully authenticated.  During this message exchange, pseudo
+@@ -365,7 +381,13 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 				s->screen = 0;
+ 			}
+ 			packet_check_eom();
+-			success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++			if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
++			    xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
++				success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++			else {
++				success = 0;
++				error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
++			}
+ 			if (!success) {
+ 				free(s->auth_proto);
+ 				free(s->auth_data);
+@@ -2219,7 +2241,13 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s)
+ 	s->screen = packet_get_int();
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
+-	success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++	if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
++	    xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
++		success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++	else {
++		success = 0;
++		error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
++	}
+ 	if (!success) {
+ 		free(s->auth_proto);
+ 		free(s->auth_data);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.403859893 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2017-02-09 10:10:47.414859882 +0100
+@@ -260,7 +260,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	FILE *fp;
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	char line[BUFSIZ];
+-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ 	int found_principal = 0;
+@@ -269,7 +268,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
++	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
+                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+                                         k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 10:18:45.800385543 +0100
+@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
++	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ }
+@@ -337,6 +338,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
+ 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+ 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
++	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
++		options->enable_k5users = 0;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -497,12 +500,14 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssEnablek5users:
++		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 
+@@ -2319,6 +2329,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
+@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	int	num_permitted_opens;
+ 
+-	int	use_kuserok;
++	int		use_kuserok;
++	int		enable_k5users;
+ 	char   *chroot_directory;
+ 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-09 10:19:29.420336796 +0100
+@@ -633,6 +633,12 @@ Specifies whether key exchange based on
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
++Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
++access control. Further details are described in
++.Xr ksu 1 .
++The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+ Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
+ a client authenticates against.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+-		text[0] = '\0';
+-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+-			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+-		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++		i = 0;
++		do {
++			switch (opts[i]) {
++				case 0:
++				case 1:
++					++i;
++					break;
++				case 130:
++				case 133:
++				case 134:
++					i += opts[i + 1];
++					break;
++				default:
++				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
++			 	 * source routing options. */
++					text[0] = '\0';
++					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
++						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
++							" %2.2x", opts[i]);
++					fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
++						ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++			}
++		} while (i < option_size);
+ 	}
+ 	return;
+ #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allowGroups-documentation.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 2320128..6244e68 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
++All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
++is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+@@ -160,6 +162,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
++All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
++is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+@@ -430,6 +434,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
++All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
++is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+@@ -449,6 +455,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
++All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
++is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2017-02-09 14:07:56.870994116 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2017-02-09 14:07:56.874994112 +0100
+@@ -1107,4 +1107,48 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
++
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
++{
++	u_char buf[4];
++	u_int blen, msg_len;
++	Buffer m;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	do {
++		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
++			break;
++		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
++		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
++			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++		buffer_clear(&m);
++		buffer_append_space(&m, msg_len);
++		if (atomicio(read, fdin, buffer_ptr(&m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
++		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++	} while (1);
++	buffer_free(&m);
++	return ret;
++}
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
++{
++	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2017-02-09 14:07:56.870994116 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2017-02-09 14:07:56.874994112 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2017-02-09 14:07:56.871994115 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2017-02-09 14:09:44.710893783 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int paudit[2];
++#endif
++
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+ static int have_dev_log = 1;
+@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++void child_destory_sensitive_data();
++
+ #define USE_PIPES 1
+ /*
+  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+ 		cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+ #endif
+ 
++		child_destory_sensitive_data();
++
+ 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ 		do_child(s, command);
+ 		/* NOTREACHED */
+@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ttyfd);
+ 
++		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
++		child_destory_sensitive_data();
++
+ 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+ #ifdef _UNICOS
+ 		cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	}
+ 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
+ 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
++	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
++		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
+@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	 */
+ 	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	close(paudit[1]);
++	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++		/*
++		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
++		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
++		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
++		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
++		 */
++		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
++	}
++	close(paudit[0]);
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1542,6 +1569,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	endpwent();
+ }
+ 
++void
++child_destory_sensitive_data()
++{
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	int pparent = paudit[1];
++	close(paudit[0]);
++	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
++	if (use_privsep)
++		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++#endif
++
++	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
++	destroy_sensitive_data(use_privsep);
++	/*
++	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
++	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
++	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
++	 */
++	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	/* Notify parent that we are done */
++	close(pparent);
++#endif
++
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+@@ -1558,12 +1612,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 
+-	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+-	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+-
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-authentication-limits-bypass.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 5b64f85bb811246c59ebab70aed331f26ba37b18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 07:57:14 +0000
+Subject: upstream commit
+
+only query each keyboard-interactive device once per
+ authentication request regardless of how many times it is listed; ok markus@
+
+Upstream-ID: d73fafba6e86030436ff673656ec1f33d9ffeda1
+---
+ auth2-chall.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
+index ddabe1a..4aff09d 100644
+--- a/auth2-chall.c
++++ b/auth2-chall.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct KbdintAuthctxt
+ 	void *ctxt;
+ 	KbdintDevice *device;
+ 	u_int nreq;
++	u_int devices_done;
+ };
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -169,11 +170,15 @@ kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+ 		if (len == 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
+-			if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
++			if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
++			    !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
+ 			    "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
+ 				continue;
+-			if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0)
++			if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
++			    len) == 0) {
+ 				kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
++				kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
++			}
+ 		}
+ 		t = kbdintctxt->devices;
+ 		kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
+-- 
+cgit v0.11.2
+
+

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 4ab6717..581b121 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+ 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
+@@ -180,6 +181,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
+ 
++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -288,6 +292,7 @@ install-files:
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff --git a/ctr-cavstest.c b/ctr-cavstest.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bbcbe8a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ctr-cavstest.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
++/*
++ *
++ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
++ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/param.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++
++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++
++void usage(void) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
++                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
++                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
++                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
++                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
++        exit(1);
++}
++
++void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
++{
++        unsigned char *bin;
++        char *p;
++        size_t n = 0;
++        int shift = 4;
++        unsigned char out = 0;
++        unsigned char *optr;
++
++        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
++        optr = bin;
++
++        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
++                unsigned char c;
++
++                c = *p;
++                if (isspace(c))
++                        continue;
++
++                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
++                        c = c - '0';
++                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
++                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
++                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
++                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
++                } else {
++                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
++                        break;
++                }
++
++                out |= c << shift;
++                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
++
++                if (shift) {
++                        *(optr++) = out;
++                        out = 0;
++                        ++n;
++                }
++        }
++
++        *len = n;
++        return bin;
++}
++
++#define READ_CHUNK 4096
++#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
++char *read_stdin(void)
++{
++        char *buf;
++        size_t n, total = 0;
++
++        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
++
++        do {
++                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
++                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
++                        break;
++
++                total += n;
++                buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
++        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
++        return buf;
++}
++
++int main (int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++
++        const Cipher *c;
++        CipherContext cc;
++        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
++        char *hexkey = NULL;
++        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
++        char *hexdata = NULL;
++        char *p;
++        int i;
++        int encrypt = 1;
++        void *key;
++        size_t keylen;
++        void *iv;
++        size_t ivlen;
++        void *data;
++        size_t datalen;
++        void *outdata;
++
++        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
++                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
++                        algo = argv[++i];
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
++                        hexkey = argv[++i];
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
++                        ++i;
++                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
++                                usage();
++                        }
++                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
++                                encrypt = 1;
++                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
++                                encrypt = 0;
++                        } else {
++                                usage();
++                        }
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
++                        hexiv = argv[++i];
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
++                        hexdata = argv[++i];
++                }
++        }
++
++        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
++                usage();
++        }
++
++	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++
++	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
++	if (c == NULL) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++        if (hexdata == NULL) {
++                hexdata = read_stdin();
++        } else {
++                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
++        }
++
++        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
++
++	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
++
++        if (ivlen != 16) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
++		return 2;
++        }
++
++        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
++
++	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
++
++        free(key);
++        free(iv);
++
++	outdata = malloc(datalen);
++	if(outdata == NULL) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
++
++        free(data);
++
++	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
++
++        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
++		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
++	}
++
++        free(outdata);
++
++        printf("\n");
++        return 0;
++}
++

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-disable-roaming.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.roaming openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.roaming	2016-01-13 15:42:00.423573980 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c	2016-01-13 15:43:03.565529448 +0100
+@@ -1608,7 +1608,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->tun_remote = -1;
+ 	options->local_command = NULL;
+ 	options->permit_local_command = -1;
+-	options->use_roaming = -1;
++	options->use_roaming = 0;
+ 	options->visual_host_key = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+@@ -1783,8 +1783,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+ 	if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
+ 		options->permit_local_command = 0;
+-	if (options->use_roaming == -1)
+-		options->use_roaming = 1;
++	options->use_roaming = 0;
+ 	if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
+ 		options->visual_host_key = 0;
+ 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-document-TERM-env.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index e7accd6..c95fda6 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1253,6 +1253,10 @@ should be sent to the server.
+ Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
+ The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
+ accept these environment variables.
++Note that the
++.Ev TERM
++environment variable is always sent whenever a
++pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
+ Refer to
+ .Cm AcceptEnv
+ in
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index aa9525d..2320128 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -70,7 +70,11 @@ See
+ in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+ for how to configure the client.
+-Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
++Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, and
++that the
++.Ev TERM
++environment variable is always sent whenever the client
++requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
+ Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
+ .Ql *
+ and

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
+index 2d483b3..b361a04 100644
+--- a/entropy.c
++++ b/entropy.c
+@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
++#ifdef __linux__
++	linux_seed();
++#endif /* __linux__ */
+ 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+ 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+ }
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index b912dbe..9206337 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
+ 
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy	2016-12-23 18:34:27.747753563 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:34:27.769753570 +0100
+@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ void oom_adjust_restore(void);
+ void oom_adjust_setup(void);
+ #endif
+ 
++void linux_seed(void);
++
+ #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..92a617c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++void
++linux_seed(void)
++{
++	char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
++	char *random = "/dev/random";
++	size_t len, ienv, randlen = 14;
++
++	if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0"))
++		random = "/dev/urandom";
++	else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > randlen)
++		randlen = ienv;
++
++	errno = 0;
++	if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) {
++		if (errno)
++			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
++		else
++			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0
+index ba43fee..0b2629a 100644
+--- a/ssh-add.0
++++ b/ssh-add.0
+@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT
+              Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+              with the agent.
+ 
++     SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++             The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done
++             from /dev/urandom.  If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari-
++             able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is
++             reseeded from /dev/random.  The number of bytes read is defined
++             by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.  Minimum is 14 bytes.  This set-
++             ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++             random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec-
++             tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++
+ FILES
+      ~/.ssh/identity
+              Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
+index 4812448..16305bf 100644
+--- a/ssh-add.1
++++ b/ssh-add.1
+@@ -161,6 +161,20 @@ to make this work.)
+ Identifies the path of a
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ socket used to communicate with the agent.
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 14 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
+index 281ecbd..1a9a635 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.1
++++ b/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
+ These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+ The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 14 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
+index 12e00d4..1b51a4a 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.1
++++ b/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -832,6 +832,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 14 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
+index 69d0829..02d79f8 100644
+--- a/ssh-keysign.8
++++ b/ssh-keysign.8
+@@ -80,6 +80,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+ information corresponding with the private keys above.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 14 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 929904b..f65e42f 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1309,6 +1309,23 @@ For more information, see the
+ .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+ option in
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 .
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 14 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+ .It Pa ~/.rhosts
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index c2c237f..058d37a 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -951,6 +951,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 14 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh IPV6
+ IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+From f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "mmcc@openbsd.org" <mmcc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 03:36:35 +0000
+Subject: upstream commit
+
+Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory.
+
+ok djm@
+
+Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e
+---
+ clientloop.c | 9 ++-------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 87ceb3d..1e05cba 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -311,11 +311,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 	static char proto[512], data[512];
+ 	FILE *f;
+ 	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+-	char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
++	char xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN] = "", xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN] = "";
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+ 
+-	xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
+ 	*_proto = proto;
+ 	*_data = data;
+ 	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
+@@ -343,8 +342,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 			display = xdisplay;
+ 		}
+ 		if (trusted == 0) {
+-			xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+-			xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ 			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
+ 			/*
+ 			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+@@ -407,8 +404,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 		unlink(xauthfile);
+ 		rmdir(xauthdir);
+ 	}
+-	free(xauthdir);
+-	free(xauthfile);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+-- 
+cgit v0.11.2
+
+From ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 23:04:47 +0000
+Subject: upstream commit
+
+eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted
+ forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by
+ Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@
+
+Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938
+---
+ clientloop.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ clientloop.h |   4 +--
+ mux.c        |  22 ++++++------
+ ssh.c        |  23 +++++-------
+ 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index f555451..c0386d5 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
+ {
+ 	size_t i, dlen;
+ 
++	if (display == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
+ 	dlen = strlen(display);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
+ 		if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
+@@ -301,34 +304,33 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
+ 
+ #define SSH_X11_PROTO		"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+ #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK	60
+-void
++int
+ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+     u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
+ {
+-	char cmd[1024];
+-	char line[512];
+-	char xdisplay[512];
++	char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512];
++	char xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN], xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	static char proto[512], data[512];
+ 	FILE *f;
+-	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+-	char xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN] = "", xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN] = "";
++	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+ 
+ 	*_proto = proto;
+ 	*_data = data;
+-	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
++	proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+ 
+-	if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
+-		debug("No xauth program.");
+-	} else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+-		logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data",
++	if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
++		logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
+ 		    display);
+-	} else {
+-		if (display == NULL) {
+-			debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
+-			return;
+-		}
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
++		debug("No xauth program.");
++		xauth_path = NULL;
++	}
++
++	if (xauth_path != NULL) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
+ 		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
+@@ -337,43 +339,60 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 		 *      is not perfect.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
+-			snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+-			    display + 10);
++			if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
++			    display + 10)) < 0 ||
++			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
++				error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
++				return -1;
++			}
+ 			display = xdisplay;
+ 		}
+ 		if (trusted == 0) {
+-			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
+ 			/*
++			 * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
++			 *
+ 			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+ 			 * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
+ 			 * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
+ 			 */
++			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
++			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
++				error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
++				    __func__, strerror(errno));
++				return -1;
++			}
++			do_unlink = 1;
++			if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
++			    "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
++			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
++				error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
++				unlink(xauthfile);
++				rmdir(xauthdir);
++				return -1;
++			}
++
+ 			if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
+ 				x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
+ 			else
+ 				x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
+-			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
+-				do_unlink = 1;
+-				snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
+-				    xauthdir);
+-				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+-				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+-				    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+-				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+-				    x11_timeout_real);
+-				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+-				if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
+-					now = monotime() + 1;
+-					if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
+-						x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
+-					else
+-						x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
+-					channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
+-					    x11_refuse_time);
+-				}
+-				if (system(cmd) == 0)
+-					generated = 1;
++			if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
++			    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
++			    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
++			    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
++			    x11_timeout_real)) < 0 ||
++			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd))
++				fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__);
++			debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd);
++			if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
++				now = monotime() + 1;
++				if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
++					x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
++				else
++					x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
++				channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time);
+ 			}
++			if (system(cmd) == 0)
++				generated = 1;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/*
+@@ -395,9 +414,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 				got_data = 1;
+ 			if (f)
+ 				pclose(f);
+-		} else
+-			error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+-			    "xauth key data not generated");
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (do_unlink) {
+@@ -405,6 +422,13 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 		rmdir(xauthdir);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
++	if (!trusted && !got_data) {
++		error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
++		    "xauth key data not generated");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+ 	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+@@ -427,6 +451,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 			rnd >>= 8;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/clientloop.h b/clientloop.h
+index 338d451..f4d4c69 100644
+--- a/clientloop.h
++++ b/clientloop.h
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
+ 
+ /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
+ int	 client_loop(int, int, int);
+-void	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
++int	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
+ 	    char **, char **);
+ void	 client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	 client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
+diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
+index f9c3af6..6bf53eb 100644
+--- a/mux.c
++++ b/mux.c
+@@ -1354,16 +1354,18 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
+ 		char *proto, *data;
+ 
+ 		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
++		if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+ 		    options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
+-		    &proto, &data);
+-		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+-		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+-		    "spoofing.");
+-		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
+-		    data, 1);
+-		client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
+-		/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
++		    &proto, &data) == 0) {
++			/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
++			debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
++			    "spoofing.");
++			x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
++			    data, 1);
++			/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
++			client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding",
++			    CONFIRM_WARN);
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 81704ab..096c5b5 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1626,6 +1626,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
+ 	struct winsize ws;
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	const char *display;
++	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Enable compression if requested. */
+ 	if (options.compression) {
+@@ -1696,13 +1697,9 @@ ssh_session(void)
+ 	}
+ 	/* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
+ 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+-	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+-		char *proto, *data;
+-		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+-		    options.forward_x11_trusted,
+-		    options.forward_x11_timeout,
+-		    &proto, &data);
++	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
++	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
++	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ 		    "spoofing.");
+@@ -1792,6 +1789,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
+ 	extern char **environ;
+ 	const char *display;
+ 	int interactive = tty_flag;
++	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!success)
+ 		return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
+@@ -1799,12 +1797,9 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
+ 		return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
+ 
+ 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+-	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+-		char *proto, *data;
+-		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+-		    options.forward_x11_trusted,
+-		    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data);
++	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
++	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
++	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ 		    "spoofing.");
+-- 
+cgit v0.11.2
+
+From 5658ef2501e785fbbdf5de2dc33b1ff7a4dca73a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "millert@openbsd.org" <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 21:18:17 +0000
+Subject: upstream commit
+
+Avoid ugly "DISPLAY "(null)" invalid; disabling X11
+ forwarding" message when DISPLAY is not set.  This could also result in a
+ crash on systems with a printf that doesn't handle NULL.  OK djm@
+
+Upstream-ID: 20ee0cfbda678a247264c20ed75362042b90b412
+---
+ clientloop.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index f8f9a3f..f0a08f2 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -318,8 +318,9 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 	proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+ 
+ 	if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+-		logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
+-		    display);
++		if (display != NULL)
++			logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
++			    display);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
+-- 
+cgit v0.11.2
+
+

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index 9a36f1d..420a85b 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
+ 	case 1:
+  revoked:
+ 		/* Key revoked */
+-		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
+-		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
++		    "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),
++		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
+ 		free(key_fp);
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index 488008f..eca0069 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -206,16 +206,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
+ 
+ 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+ 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
++			    SSH_FP_HEX);		
+ 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
+-			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
+-			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
++			    "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
++			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
+ 			    cuser, lookup);
+ 		} else {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
+-			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",
++			    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
++			    fp, cuser, lookup);
+ 		}
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 0fd27bb..749b11a 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -365,10 +365,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
+ 				continue;
+ 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
+ 				continue;
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-			    SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
+-			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",
++			    file, linenum, key_type(found),
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 			/*
+ 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
+ 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
+@@ -406,9 +406,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
+ 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
+ 				continue;
+ 			found_key = 1;
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
+-			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
++			    key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 			free(fp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+ 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+ 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
+-		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
+-		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
++		debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
++		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,
+ 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
+index 168e1b7..eb98ea8 100644
+--- a/key.c
++++ b/key.c
+@@ -628,6 +628,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
++enum fp_type
++key_fingerprint_selection(void)
++{
++	static enum fp_type rv;
++	static char rv_defined = 0;
++	char *env;
++
++	if (!rv_defined) {
++		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
++		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
++			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		rv_defined = 1;
++	}
++	return rv;
++}
++
++char *
++key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
++{
++	return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);
++}
++
++char *
++key_fingerprint_prefix(void)
++{
++	return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
+diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
+index d8ad13d..0e3eea5 100644
+--- a/key.h
++++ b/key.h
+@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *);
+ int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
+ char		*key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
+ u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
++enum fp_type	 key_fingerprint_selection(void);
++char		*key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
++char		*key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
+ const char	*key_type(const Key *);
+ const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
+ int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
+diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
+index 3421452..691949f 100644
+--- a/ssh-add.c
++++ b/ssh-add.c
+@@ -330,10 +330,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
+ 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
+ 			had_identities = 1;
+ 			if (do_fp) {
+-				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-				    SSH_FP_HEX);
+-				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
+-				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
++				fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++				printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",
++				    key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
++				    fp, comment, key_type(key));
+ 				free(fp);
+ 			} else {
+ 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index ba24612..117fdde 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
+ 	char *p;
+ 	int ret = -1;
+ 
+-	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
+-	    id->comment, p))
++	p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",
++	    id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))
+ 		ret = 0;
+ 	free(p);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 2a316bc..482dc1c 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -783,13 +783,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f;
+ 	Key *public;
+-	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
++	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;
+ 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
+ 	enum fp_rep rep;
+ 	enum fp_type fptype;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
++	pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
+ 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+ 
+ 	if (!have_identity)
+@@ -801,8 +802,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
+ 	if (public != NULL) {
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,
+ 		    key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+@@ -867,8 +868,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		}
+ 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,
+ 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+@@ -986,13 +987,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)
+ 	if (print_fingerprint) {
+ 		enum fp_rep rep;
+ 		enum fp_type fptype;
+-		char *fp, *ra;
++		char *fp, *ra, *pfx;
+ 
+-		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
++		pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
+ 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
++
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,
+ 		    key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+@@ -1878,16 +1881,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
+ 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
+ 
+-	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
+ 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
+ 	    key_cert_type(key));
+-	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
+-	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",
+-	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
++	printf("        Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
++	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",
++	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);
+ 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+ 	if (!v00) {
+ 		printf("        Serial: %llu\n",
+@@ -2686,13 +2690,12 @@ passphrase_again:
+ 	fclose(f);
+ 
+ 	if (!quiet) {
+-		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ 		    identity_file);
+ 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+-		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
++		printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);
+ 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+ 		printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 		free(ra);
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 573d7a8..394cca8 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -914,10 +914,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+ 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);
+ 			free(ra);
+ 			free(fp);
+ 		}
+@@ -955,9 +955,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 			else
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ 			/* The default */
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			msg2[0] = '\0';
+ 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
+@@ -972,10 +971,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+ 			    "established%s\n"
+-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
++			    "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"
+ 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+ 			    "(yes/no)? ",
+-			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
++			    host, ip, msg1, type,
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
+ 			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+ 			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+ 			    msg2);
+@@ -1220,8 +1220,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+ 	int flags = 0;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+ 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
+@@ -1327,14 +1328,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ 			continue;
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+ 		    "in %s:%lu\n"
+-		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
++		    "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",
+ 		    key_type(found->key),
+ 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
+-		    key_type(found->key), fp);
++		    key_type(found->key),
++		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 		if (options.visual_host_key)
+ 			logit("%s", ra);
+ 		free(ra);
+@@ -1349,7 +1351,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
+@@ -1357,8 +1359,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
+-	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+-	    key_type(host_key), fp);
++	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",
++	    key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(),  fp);
+ 	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+ 
+ 	free(fp);
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 7f4ff41..adbbfc7 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -986,8 +987,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+ 	int have_sig = 1;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	free(fp);
+ 
+ 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,813 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.343350136 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in	2015-08-13 15:09:43.356350114 +0200
+@@ -154,25 +154,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ 	$(RANLIB) $@
+ 
+ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+ 
+ sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
+ 
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libs
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.344350134 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
+@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p
+ 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+ 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+ 
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
+ 		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
+ 		free(fp);
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.345350133 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.353350119 +0200
+@@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-		    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
+ 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
+ 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+@@ -223,7 +222,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
+ 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	} else {
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
+ 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+ 		free(fp);
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.213350355 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+@@ -1008,7 +1009,10 @@ key_parse_private_type(Buffer *blob, int
+ 
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+-		return key_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, commentp);
++		if (! FIPS_mode())
++			return key_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, commentp);
++		error("%s: cannot parse rsa1 key in FIPS mode", __func__);
++		break;
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA:
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+@@ -1068,7 +1072,7 @@ Key *
+ key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const char *filename,
+     const char *passphrase, char **commentp)
+ {
+-	Key *pub, *prv;
++	Key *pub, *prv = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
+ 	pub = key_parse_public_rsa1(buffer, commentp);
+@@ -1080,9 +1084,10 @@ key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const
+ 			*commentp = xstrdup(filename);
+ 	} else {
+ 		key_free(pub);
+-		/* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */
+-		prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase,
+-		    NULL);
++		if (! FIPS_mode())
++			/* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */
++			prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase,
++			    NULL);
+ 	}
+ 	return prv;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.254350286 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
+@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+ 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+ #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
++	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
++	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
+ #endif
+ 	return (&aes_ctr);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.345350133 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -90,6 +92,25 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
+ 	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+ };
+ 
++static const struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = {
++	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
++	{ "3des-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
++	{ "aes128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
++	{ "aes192-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
++	{ "aes256-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
++			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++	{ "aes128-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
++	{ "aes192-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
++	{ "aes256-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
++	{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
++			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
++	{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
++			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
++#endif
++	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
++};
+ /*--*/
+ 
+ /* Returns a list of supported ciphers separated by the specified char. */
+@@ -100,7 +121,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
+ 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ 	const Cipher *c;
+ 
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
+ 		if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
+@@ -180,7 +201,7 @@ const Cipher *
+ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const Cipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -190,7 +211,7 @@ const Cipher *
+ cipher_by_number(int id)
+ {
+ 	const Cipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (c->number == id)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -232,7 +253,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
+ 	const Cipher *c;
+ 	if (name == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c->number;
+ 	return -1;
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-6.6p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-6.6p1/dh.h.fips	2013-10-10 01:32:40.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/dh.h	2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ 
+ /* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
+ #define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
++#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS	2048
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+ 
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.238350313 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
+@@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+ 
++	/* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
++	atexit(RAND_cleanup);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.350350124 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/kex.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -103,6 +104,25 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
+ 
++static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = {
++	{ KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++#endif
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
++	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
++	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
++# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
++	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
++	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++# endif
++#endif
++	{ NULL, -1, -1, NULL},
++};
++
+ char *
+ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+ {
+@@ -126,7 +146,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+-	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++	for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+@@ -151,7 +171,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c.fips	2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
+@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
+ 
+ 	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	memset(hash, 0, hashlen);
+ 	kex_finish(kex);
+ }
+ #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c.fips	2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
+@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
+ 
+ 	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	memset(hash, 0, hashlen);
+ 	kex_finish(kex);
+ }
+ #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -64,13 +66,13 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
+ 		/* Old GEX request */
+ 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
+ 		packet_put_int(nbits);
+-		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++		min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
+ 		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ 
+ 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits);
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* New GEX request */
+-		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++		min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
+ 		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
+ 		packet_put_int(min);
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c.fips	2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
+@@ -76,16 +76,16 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
+ 		omin = min = packet_get_int();
+ 		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
+ 		omax = max = packet_get_int();
+-		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++		min = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+ 		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+-		nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
++		nbits = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+ 		nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
+ 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
+ 		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
+ 		/* unused for old GEX */
+-		omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++		omin = min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
+ 		omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/key.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/key.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/key.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.345350133 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/key.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.356350114 +0200
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+@@ -636,9 +637,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void)
+ 	char *env;
+ 
+ 	if (!rv_defined) {
+-		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
+-		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
+-			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			rv = SSH_FP_SHA1;
++		else {
++			env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
++			rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
++				SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		}
+ 		rv_defined = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	return rv;
+@@ -1168,8 +1173,11 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
+ 		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4))
+ 		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+-	if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL))
++	if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
+ 		fatal("%s: key generation failed.", __func__);
++	}
+ 	BN_free(f4);
+ 	return private;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/mac.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/mac.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.346350131 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/mac.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.356350114 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ struct macalg {
+ 	int		etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+ };
+ 
+-static const struct macalg macs[] = {
++static const struct macalg all_macs[] = {
+ 	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+@@ -91,6 +93,24 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL,					0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
++static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = {
++	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
++	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++#endif
++
++	/* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
++	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++#endif
++
++	{ NULL,					0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
++};
++
+ /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
+ char *
+ mac_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -99,7 +119,7 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep)
+ 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ 	const struct macalg *m;
+ 
+-	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
++	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ 		if (ret != NULL)
+ 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ 		nlen = strlen(m->name);
+@@ -133,7 +153,7 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct macalg *m;
+ 
+-	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
++	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (mac != NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2013-12-07 01:24:02.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h	2015-08-13 15:10:30.288271102 +0200
+@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@
+ 	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
+ 	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+ 
++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
++	KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
++
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
+ 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+@@ -133,6 +139,22 @@
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++#else
++#define        KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++       "hmac-sha1"
++#endif
+ 
+ static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+ 	KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.296350215 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.360350107 +0200
+@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, u_int32_t *bit
+ 		fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits);
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
+ 		fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
+ 	else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768)
+@@ -746,7 +752,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	enum fp_type fptype;
+ 	char *fp, *ra;
+ 
+-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
+ 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+ 
+ 	pkcs11_init(0);
+@@ -756,8 +762,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ 		if (print_fingerprint) {
+ 			fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
+-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
+ 			    fp, key_type(keys[i]));
+ 			if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2014-02-27 00:17:13.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.357350112 +0200
+@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -427,6 +429,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
++        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
++		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL))
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++			else
++				logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
+ 
+ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+@@ -504,6 +513,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	    "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (opt) {
+ 		case '1':
++			if (FIPS_mode()) {
++				fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
++			}
+ 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+ 			break;
+ 		case '2':
+@@ -828,7 +840,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+@@ -973,6 +984,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	if (options.user == NULL)
+ 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ 
+@@ -1020,6 +1035,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
++		if (options.protocol == 0)
++			fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+ 	if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ 	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.342350138 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.357350112 +0200
+@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -170,21 +172,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
+-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+-		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+-
+-		if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+-			gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
+-		else
+-			gss_host = host;
+-
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
++			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++			if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++				gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++			else
++				gss_host = host;
++
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++			if (gss) {
++				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+@@ -196,6 +203,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
++
+ 	}
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+@@ -211,7 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
+ 	}
++
+ 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+@@ -223,9 +238,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
++	else if (FIPS_mode())
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS;
++
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+-
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+ 	 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2015-08-13 15:09:43.352350121 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c	2015-08-13 15:09:43.359350109 +0200
+@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+@@ -1473,6 +1475,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 
++        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
++		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
++			openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
++			if (FIPS_mode()) {
++				syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++				cleanup_exit(255);
++			}
++			else
++				syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++			closelog();
++		}
+ 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ 	saved_argc = ac;
+ 	rexec_argc = ac;
+@@ -1624,8 +1638,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	else
+ 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+ 
+-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+-
+ 	/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
+ 	if (logfile != NULL) {
+ 		log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
+@@ -1803,6 +1815,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype,
+ 		    key_type(key ? key : pubkey));
+ 	}
++	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
++		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
++	}
+ 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
+ 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+@@ -1966,6 +1982,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	   unmounted if desired. */
+ 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+@@ -2537,6 +2557,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
+ 	}
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+@@ -2546,6 +2569,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+@@ -2556,6 +2582,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
++	else if (FIPS_mode())
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS;
+ 
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+@@ -2582,10 +2610,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ 		orig = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (options.gss_keyex)
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+-	else
+-		gss = NULL;
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fix-ssh-copy-id-on-non-sh-shell.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index 8e1091c..4bba5d6 100644
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -274,9 +274,7 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
+       populate_new_ids 0
+     fi
+     [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
+-		umask 077 ;
++		exec sh -c 'umask 077; mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys; fi'" \
+-		mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;
+-		if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi" \
+       || exit 1
+     ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+     ;;

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 42de994..60de320 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ #ifdef HEIMDAL
+@@ -55,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++/* all commands are allowed by default */
++char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
++
++static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
++static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
++    int);
++
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+ 	int retval;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
++	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -98,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
++	/* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login.
++	 * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */
++	k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
++	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
++	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
++	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
++	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
++		name, k5login_exists)) {
++		retval = 1;
++		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
++		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
++		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ 	} else
+ 		retval = 0;
+ 
+@@ -109,6 +133,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
++/* Test for existence of .k5login.
++ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok()
++ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself.
++ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence
++ * of .k5login to authorize self-login.  (absence of both is required)
++ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
++{
++	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
++	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++
++	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
++	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
++}
++
++/* check .k5users for login or command authorization
++ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise.
++ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
++    const char *luser, int k5login_exists)
++{
++	FILE *fp;
++	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
++	char line[BUFSIZ];
++	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
++	struct stat st;
++	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++	int found_principal = 0;
++	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
++	u_long linenum;
++
++	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
++	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
++	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
++		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
++		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
++		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++	}
++	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
++		int saved_errno = errno;
++		/* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong.
++		 * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */
++		if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) {
++			logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s",
++			    pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno));
++		}
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */
++	if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) {
++		/* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */
++		logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s",
++		    pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno));
++		fclose(fp);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) {
++		logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user",
++		    pw->pw_name, file);
++		fclose(fp);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* .k5users must be a regular file.  krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this
++	  * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */
++	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
++		logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file);
++		fclose(fp);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */
++	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
++	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
++
++	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines.  We don't. */
++	while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line),
++	    &linenum) != -1) {
++		char *token;
++
++		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
++		if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL)
++			continue;
++		if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) {
++			/* we matched on client principal */
++			found_principal = 1;
++			if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) {
++				/* only shell is allowed */
++				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
++				    xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
++				k5users_allowed_cmds =
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
++				break;
++			}
++			/* process the allowed commands */
++			while (token) {
++				if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) {
++					allcommands = 1;
++					break;
++				}
++				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
++				    xstrdup(token);
++				k5users_allowed_cmds =
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
++				token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
++			}
++		}
++       }
++	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
++		/* terminate vector */
++		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
++		/* if all commands are allowed, free vector */
++		if (allcommands) {
++			int i;
++			for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) {
++				free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]);
++			}
++			free(k5users_allowed_cmds);
++			k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++	fclose(fp);
++	return found_principal;
++}
++ 
+ 
+ /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index b5dc144..ba4589b 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -806,6 +806,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		command = forced_command;
+ 		forced = "(key-option)";
+ 	}
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
++	else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
++		const char *match = command;
++		int allowed = 0, i = 0;
++
++		if (!match)
++			match = s->pw->pw_shell;
++		while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
++			if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) {
++				debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match);
++				allowed = 1;
++				break;
++			}
++		}
++		if (!allowed) {
++			debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match);
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ 	if (forced != NULL) {
+ 		if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
+ 			s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 0374c88..509109a 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
+ #  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
+ 
+ # endif /* !HEIMDAL */
++
++/* .k5users support */
++extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
++
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+ 
+ /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 058d37a..5c4f15b 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+ The client tries to authenticate itself using
+ host-based authentication,
+ public key authentication,
++GSSAPI authentication,
+ challenge-response authentication,
+ or password authentication.
+ .Pp
+@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+ but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+ .Pp
++.It Pa ~/.k5login
++.It Pa ~/.k5users
++These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
++Further details are described in
++.Xr ksu 1 .
++.Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+ and authentication information.

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:33.271343064 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c	2015-08-14 16:07:33.338342936 +0200
+@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
+  */
+ 
+ char *
+-ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client,
++    const char *kex) {
+ 	gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+ 	OM_uint32 min_status;
+ 
+@@ -84,12 +85,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+ 	return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+-	    host, client));
++	    host, client, kex));
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+-    const char *host, const char *client) {
++    const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) {
+ 	Buffer buf;
+ 	size_t i;
+ 	int oidpos, enclen;
+@@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 	char deroid[2];
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++	char *s, *cp, *p;
+ 
+ 	if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+ 		for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+@@ -111,6 +113,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 	buffer_init(&buf);
+ 
+ 	oidpos = 0;
++	s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+ 		    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+@@ -129,26 +132,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
+ 			    encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+ 
+-			if (oidpos != 0)
+-				buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+-
+-			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+-			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+-			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+-			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+-			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
+-			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+-			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+-			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+-			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+-			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+-			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
++				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
++				if (buffer_len(&buf) != 0)
++					buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++				buffer_append(&buf, p,
++				    strlen(p));
++				buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			}
+ 
+ 			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+ 			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+ 			oidpos++;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	free(s);
+ 	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+ 	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:33.296343016 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c	2015-08-14 16:07:33.338342936 +0200
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
+ 
+ 	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
+ 	return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
+-	    NULL, NULL));
++	    NULL, NULL, options.gss_kex_algorithms));
+ }
+ 
+ /* Unprivileged */
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:33.271343064 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/kex.c	2015-08-14 16:07:33.339342935 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,29 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
++int
++gss_kex_names_valid(const char *names)
++{
++	char *s, *cp, *p;
++
++	if (names == NULL || *names == '\0')
++		return 0;
++	s = cp = xstrdup(names);
++	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
++	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
++		if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0
++		  || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
++			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			free(s);
++			return 0;
++		}
++	}
++	debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names);
++	free(s);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
+ static void
+ kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:33.274343058 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c	2015-08-14 16:14:17.600574919 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "mac.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ /* Format of the configuration file:
+ 
+@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ 	oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+-	oGssServerIdentity, 
++	oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+ 	{ "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
+ 	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -876,6 +879,18 @@ parse_time:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssKexAlgorithms:
++		arg = strdelim(&s);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum);
++		if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
++			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++		if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1534,6 +1549,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+ 	options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
++	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1660,6 +1676,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+ 		options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
++	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:33.274343058 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h	2015-08-14 16:07:33.339342935 +0200
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	gss_renewal_rekey;	/* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+ 	char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+ 	char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
++	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:45.704319443 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c	2015-08-14 16:14:15.306579277 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
+ #include "packet.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+ static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
++	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -258,6 +260,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ 		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
++	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -360,7 +364,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+-	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sGssKexAlgorithms, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ 	sHostCertificate,
+@@ -434,6 +438,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -442,6 +447,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1137,6 +1143,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssKexAlgorithms:
++		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum);
++		if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
++			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++		if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2068,6 +2086,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
++	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:48.160314777 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h	2015-08-14 16:09:34.447112854 +0200
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ 	int 	gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ 	int 	gss_store_rekey;
++	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:33.304343001 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2015-08-14 16:07:33.339342935 +0200
+@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 		else
+ 			gss_host = host;
+ 
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ 		if (gss) {
+ 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg	2015-08-14 16:07:33.278343050 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2015-08-14 16:07:33.340342932 +0200
+@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ #define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID				"gss-group14-sha1-"
+ #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID				"gss-gex-sha1-"
+ 
++#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
++	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID
++
+ typedef struct {
+ 	char *filename;
+ 	char *envvar;
+@@ -147,9 +152,9 @@ int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssct
+ /* In the server */
+ typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
+     const char *);
+-char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+-    const char *);
++    const char *, const char *);
+ gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+ int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
+     const char *);
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 4a7d1cd..c795c40 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ .It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+ .It GSSAPITrustDns
++.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+ .It HashKnownHosts
+ .It Host
+ .It HostbasedAuthentication
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index c95fda6..a2af9c4 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -719,6 +719,18 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
++key exchange. Possible values are
++.Bd -literal -offset 3n
++gss-gex-sha1-,
++gss-group1-sha1-,
++gss-group14-sha1-
++.Ed
++.Pp
++The default is
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 5e8c6c6..4c670aa 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -545,6 +545,18 @@ Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
+ successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
+ or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
++key exchange. Possible values are
++.Bd -literal -offset 3n
++gss-gex-sha1-,
++gss-group1-sha1-,
++gss-group14-sha1-
++.Ed
++.Pp
++The default is
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -375,6 +375,22 @@ cleanup:
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
++ */
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
++		k5login_directory);
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
+ 	profile_t p;
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -222,5 +222,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ #include <krb5.h>
+ krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
++	char **k5login_directory);
+ #endif
+ #endif
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+ {
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++	char *k5login_directory = NULL;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
++	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
++	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
++		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
++		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
++	} else {
++		/* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
++		 * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
++		 * local username.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, 
++			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
++			pw->pw_name);
++	}
++	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
+ 
+-	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+ These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
+ Further details are described in
+ .Xr ksu 1 .
++The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
++.Cm k5login_directory
++in the
++.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2017-02-08 14:40:26.125216292 +0100
+@@ -1043,6 +1043,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd
+ 		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(127);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.keycat openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.011581451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac	2017-02-08 14:32:33.016581448 +0100
+@@ -3129,6 +3129,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+ 
+@@ -3139,6 +3140,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4255,6 +4257,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5206,6 +5209,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+ echo "          +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+--- openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.014581449 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.014581449 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
++of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
++polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled.
++
++To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
++        AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
++        AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
++
++Do not forget to enable public key authentication:
++        PubkeyAuthentication yes
++
++
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.012581451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in	2017-02-08 14:38:28.839306815 +0100
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
++SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+ SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
++KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ AR=@AR@
+ AWK=@AWK@
+@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+@@ -190,6 +192,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -332,6 +337,7 @@ install-files:
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	fi
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.009581453 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.008581454 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
+ 
++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
++int
++sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
++{
++	static int enabled = -1;
++
++	if (enabled == -1) {
++		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
++		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
++	}
++
++	return (enabled);
++}
++
+ /* Send audit message */
+ static int
+ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+@@ -307,7 +321,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+ {
+ 	const char *reqlvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -318,16 +332,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+ 
+ 	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+ 
+-	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ 
+ 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 		use_current = "1";
+ 	} else {
+ 		use_current = "";
+-		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++		rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ 	}
+ 
+-	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++	rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+ 
+ 	if (role != NULL)
+ 		free(role);
+@@ -335,6 +349,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+ 	return rv;
+ }
+ 
++static int
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++}
++
++static int
++do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
++{
++	return setenv(name, value, 1);
++}
++
++int
++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++{
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++}
++
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -343,7 +375,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+@@ -414,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t *ctx;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/platform.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.007581455 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/platform.c	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+-	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
++	(void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
++/*
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
++ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
++ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
++ *    written permission.
++ *
++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
++ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
++ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
++ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
++ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
++ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
++ * Written by Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
++*/
++
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++
++#include "config.h"
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <pwd.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++
++#include <security/pam_appl.h>
++
++#include "uidswap.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++
++#define ERR_USAGE 1
++#define ERR_PAM_START 2
++#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3
++#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4
++#define ERR_PAM_END 5
++#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6
++#define ERR_MEMORY 7
++#define ERR_OPEN 8
++#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9
++#define ERR_FDOPEN 10
++#define ERR_STAT 11
++#define ERR_WRITE 12
++#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13
++#define BUFLEN 4096
++
++/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */
++static int
++dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm,
++	   struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr)
++{
++	struct pam_response *rsp;
++
++	(void)msgm;
++	(void)appdata_ptr;
++
++	if (num_msg <= 0)
++		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
++
++	/* Just allocate the array as empty responses */
++	rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response));
++	if (rsp == NULL)
++		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
++
++	*response = rsp;
++	return PAM_SUCCESS;
++}
++
++static struct pam_conv conv = {
++	dummy_conv,
++	NULL
++};
++
++char *
++make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd)
++{
++	char *fname;
++
++	if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	return fname;
++}
++
++int
++dump_keys(const char *user)
++{
++	struct passwd *pwd;
++	int fd = -1;
++	FILE *f = NULL;
++	char *fname = NULL;
++	int rv = 0;
++	char buf[BUFLEN];
++	size_t len;
++	struct stat st;
++
++	if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
++		return ERR_GETPWNAM;
++	}
++
++	if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) {
++		return ERR_MEMORY;
++	}
++
++	temporarily_use_uid(pwd);
++
++	if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) {
++		rv = ERR_OPEN;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
++		rv = ERR_STAT;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || 
++		(st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) {
++		rv = ERR_FILE_MODE;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	unset_nonblock(fd);
++
++	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
++		rv = ERR_FDOPEN;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	fd = -1;
++
++	while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) {
++		rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0;
++	}
++
++fail:
++	if (fd != -1)
++		close(fd);
++	if (f != NULL)
++		fclose(f);
++	free(fname);
++	restore_uid();
++	return rv;
++}
++
++static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED",
++	"SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED",
++	"SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE"
++};
++
++extern char **environ;
++
++int
++set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh)
++{
++	int i;
++	size_t j;
++
++	for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) {
++		int len = strlen(env_names[j]);
++
++		for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) {
++			if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 &&
++			    environ[i][len] == '=') {
++				if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++					return ERR_PAM_PUTENV;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++	int retval;
++	int ev = 0;
++
++	if (argc != 2) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <user-name>\n", argv[0]);
++		return ERR_USAGE;
++	}
++
++	retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		return ERR_PAM_START;
++	}
++
++	ev = set_pam_environment(pamh);
++	if (ev != 0)
++		goto finish;
++
++	retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION;
++		goto finish;
++	}
++
++	ev = dump_keys(argv[1]);
++
++	retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION;
++	}
++
++finish:
++	retval = pam_end (pamh,retval);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		ev = ERR_PAM_END;
++	}
++	return ev;
++}

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c	2014-05-05 15:20:43.075246776 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -979,6 +980,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename
+ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+ #endif
++	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
++		struct group *gr;
++
++		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
++			st.st_mode &= ~040;
++	}
++
+ 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 6c62bdf..11c8562 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,21 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
++int
++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
++                 int k5login_exists)
++{
++	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
++		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
++	else {
++		char kuser[65];
++
++		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
++			return 0;
++		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
++	}
++}
++
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -157,8 +172,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
++	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
++	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
++	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
+ 		problem = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 60de320..0a4930e 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
+     int);
+ 
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+ 
+@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+  */
+ 
++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
++ *
++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
++ *
++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
++ * not.
++ *
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
++ * given environment.
++ *
++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
++ * access control behavior:
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
++ * restrictions mentioned above.
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
++ *
++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
++ *
++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
++ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
++ *
++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
++ * during upgrade:
++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
++ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
++ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
++ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
++ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
++ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
++
+ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
++			&& k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+@@ -171,9 +270,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+-		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+-		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+-		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
++                                        k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+ 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		int saved_errno = errno;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 68fb9ef..904c869 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
++	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -312,6 +313,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+ 	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
+ 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
++	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
++		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 
+ 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+ 	if (use_privsep == -1)
+@@ -338,7 +341,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+ 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -410,11 +413,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1526,6 +1531,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		*activep = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
++		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+@@ -1811,6 +1820,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 
+@@ -2062,6 +2072,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 37cfa9b..5117dfa 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	int	num_permitted_opens;
+ 
++	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	char   *chroot_directory;
+ 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index adfd7b1..e772ed5 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 1fb002d..e0e5fff 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -697,6 +697,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -862,6 +866,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+ .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index a7b8b6a..24ab272 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1620,6 +1620,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+ 	    &cfg, NULL);
+ 
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux */
++	if (! options.use_pam)
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several problems.");
++
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
+ 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 36cb27a..c1b7c03 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several
++# problems.
+ UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.memory-problems openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.memory-problems	2017-02-09 10:41:42.483123417 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 10:42:16.392102462 +0100
+@@ -2006,6 +2006,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 		dst->n = src->n; \
+ } while (0)
+ 
++	u_int i;
++
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+@@ -2058,8 +2060,10 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ } while(0)
+ #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\
+ 	if (src->num_n != 0) { \
++		for (i = 0; i < dst->num_n; i++) \
++			free(dst->n[i]); \
+ 		for (dst->num_n = 0; dst->num_n < src->num_n; dst->num_n++) \
+-			dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \
++			dst->n[dst->num_n] = src->n[dst->num_n]; \
+ 	} \
+ } while(0)
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.memory-problems openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index c18524e..d04f4ed 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -409,6 +409,25 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 8ef6cc4..b18893c 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 2bcf818..b5dc144 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1538,6 +1538,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			    pw->pw_uid);
+ 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1565,6 +1568,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
++		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1826,9 +1835,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 07f9926..a97f8b7 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+@@ -768,6 +772,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+ 
+  skip:
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	/* switch SELinux content for root too */
++	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
++		sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+ 	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.redhat	2017-02-08 15:22:30.811307915 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config	2017-02-08 15:22:30.812307915 +0100
+@@ -52,3 +52,15 @@
+ # Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
+ # Host *.local
+ #   CheckHostIP no
++
++Host *
++	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
++# mode correctly we set this to yes.
++	ForwardX11Trusted yes
++# Send locale-related environment variables
++	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2016-12-19 06:21:22.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0	2017-02-08 15:22:30.813307914 +0100
+@@ -837,9 +837,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
++             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-08 15:22:30.813307914 +0100
+@@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.redhat	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-08 15:33:24.705736576 +0100
+@@ -10,21 +10,26 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+ 
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+ #ListenAddress ::
+ 
+-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
++HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
++HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
++HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ 
+ # Ciphers and keying
+ #RekeyLimit default none
+ 
+ # Logging
+ #SyslogFacility AUTH
++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+ #LogLevel INFO
+ 
+ # Authentication:
+@@ -57,9 +62,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
++PasswordAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+@@ -68,8 +75,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+-#GSSAPIAuthentication no
+-#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+@@ -80,12 +87,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
++UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+-#X11Forwarding no
++X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes
+@@ -108,6 +115,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
++# Accept locale-related environment variables
++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
++
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,896 @@
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index d789bad..cd1a775 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
+index a1a2b52..b109a5a 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.h
++++ b/auth-pam.h
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void);
+ void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 124e597..4605588 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char		*role;
++#endif
+ 	void		*kbdintctxt;
+ 	char		*info;		/* Extra info for next auth_log */
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
+index 0f870b3..df040bb 100644
+--- a/auth1.c
++++ b/auth1.c
+@@ -381,6 +381,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	u_int ulen;
+ 	char *user, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char *role=NULL;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
+ 	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+@@ -389,11 +392,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = '\0';
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = '\0';
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	else
++		if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
++			*style++ = '\0';
++#endif
+ 
+ 	authctxt->user = user;
+ 	authctxt->style = style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	authctxt->role = role;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
+ 	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index c28a705..4756dd7 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
++	char *micuser;
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	u_int len;
+@@ -263,7 +264,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ 	mic.length = len;
+ 
+-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
++		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
++	else
++#endif
++		micuser = authctxt->user;
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 
+ 	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+@@ -275,6 +282,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&b);
++	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
++		free(micuser);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index eca0069..95d678e 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -112,7 +112,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ 	/* reconstruct packet */
+ 	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role) {
++		buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
++		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
++		buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
++		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
++	} else 
++#endif
++		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 749b11a..c0ae0d4 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -133,9 +133,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+ 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
++		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+-		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
++		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
++		    authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
++		    authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : "");
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
+ 		free(userstyle);
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index a5490c0..5f4f26f 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char *role = NULL;
++#endif
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+@@ -226,6 +229,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -251,8 +259,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
++		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
++		}
+ 		userauth_banner();
+ 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ 			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index e4c8c32..f31cd91 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
++	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -445,6 +446,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp);
+ 		if (*cp == '/')
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (start) {
++		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
++			if (*cp == '/')
++				return (0);
++			if (*cp != '.')
++				start = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 531c4f9..229fada 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
++#endif
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
++#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -805,6 +811,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	else {
+ 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
++#endif
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 	}
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -846,6 +855,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int
++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
++
++	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	debug3("%s: role=%s",
++	    __func__, authctxt->role);
++
++	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
++		free(authctxt->role);
++		authctxt->role = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return (0);
++}
++#endif
++
+ int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+@@ -1220,7 +1248,7 @@ static int
+ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+-	char *p, *userstyle;
++	char *p, *r, *userstyle;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1246,6 +1274,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
++	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
++		*r = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+@@ -1281,7 +1311,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
+     char *chost)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+-	char *p, *userstyle;
++	char *p, *r, *userstyle;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1298,6 +1328,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
++	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
++		*r = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 5bc41b5..20e2b4a 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
++#endif
++
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 1a47e41..d1b6d99 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -336,6 +336,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ 
++/* Inform the privileged process about role */
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void
++mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 18c2501..9d5e5ba 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
++#endif
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index 6ecfb93..b912dbe 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
+ 
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c18524e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/flask.h>
++#include <selinux/context.h>
++#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
++#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
++
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++
++/* Send audit message */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
++		       security_context_t selected_context)
++{
++	int rc=0;
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++	char *msg = NULL;
++	int audit_fd = audit_open();
++	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
++	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
++	rc = -1;
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
++		return rc;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating default context.");
++		default_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating selected context.");
++		selected_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
++		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
++		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
++		error("Error allocating memory.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
++				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
++		error("Error sending audit message.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	rc = 0;
++      out:
++	free(msg);
++	freecon(default_raw);
++	freecon(selected_raw);
++	close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++	return rc;
++}
++
++static int
++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
++{
++	struct av_decision avd;
++	int retval;
++	unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
++
++	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
++	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
++	security_context_t *sc) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
++	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
++	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
++#endif
++		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++			*sc = NULL;
++			return -1;
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	}
++#endif
++	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++		context_t con;
++		char *type=NULL;
++		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
++			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
++				role);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_role_set(con, role);
++		context_type_set(con, type);
++		freecon(*sc);
++		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++		context_free(con);
++		if (!*sc)
++			return -1;
++	}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
++		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
++		context_t con;
++		security_context_t obtained_raw;
++		security_context_t requested_raw;
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_range_set(con, lvl);
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
++			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
++		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
++			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
++			freecon(requested_raw);
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			freecon(*sc);
++			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++			context_free(con);
++			return -1;
++		}
++		freecon(requested_raw);
++		freecon(obtained_raw);
++		context_free(con);
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++      out:
++	freecon(*sc);
++	*sc = NULL;
++	return -1;
++}
++
++static void
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++{
++	*role = NULL;
++	*level = NULL;
++	if (the_authctxt) {
++		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
++			char *slash;
++			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
++			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
++				*slash = '\0';
++				*level = slash + 1;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++}
++
++/* Return the default security context for the given username */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++{
++	char *sename, *lvl;
++	char *role;
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	int r = 0;
++	context_t con = NULL;
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
++		sename = NULL;
++		lvl = NULL;
++	}
++#else
++	sename = pwname;
++	lvl = "";
++#endif
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
++#else
++		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
++#endif
++	}
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
++		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
++
++			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
++				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
++
++			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
++				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
++			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
++			freecon(sshdsc);
++			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
++			    /* we actually don't change level */
++			    reqlvl = "";
++
++			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++
++		}
++
++		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
++			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
++
++			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
++				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
++						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				}
++				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
++				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
++					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				} else {
++					r = -1;
++					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				}
++				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
++					freecon(default_level_sc);
++			}
++		} else {
++			*user_sc = *default_sc;
++		}
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++	}
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	free(sename);
++	free(lvl);
++#endif
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++	if (con)
++		context_free(con);
++
++	return (r);
++}
++
++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	char *role;
++	char *use_current;
++	int rv;
++
++	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++
++	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		use_current = "1";
++	} else {
++		use_current = "";
++		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++	}
++
++	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++
++	return rv;
++}
++
++/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
++void
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++{
++	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (options.use_pam) {
++		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++			switch (security_getenforce()) {
++			case -1:
++				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			case 0:
++				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++				    __func__);
++			break;
++			default:
++				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
++				    __func__);
++			}
++		}
++		return;
++	}
++
++	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	if (r >= 0) {
++		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
++		if (r < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
++		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
++		user_ctx = default_ctx;
++	}
++	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
++		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
++		   a failure */
++		sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
++	}
++	if (r < 0) {
++		switch (security_getenforce()) {
++		case -1:
++			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++		case 0:
++			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++			    __func__);
++			break;
++		default:
++			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++			    __func__);
++		}
++	}
++	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
++		freecon(user_ctx);
++	if (default_ctx != NULL)
++		freecon(default_ctx);
++
++	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++}
++
++#endif
++#endif
++
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 4637a7a..22ea8ef 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -103,37 +103,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index e3d1004..8ef6cc4 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 30fc609..0d39ab2 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 7523de9..07f9926 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2138,6 +2138,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
+
+All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
+sshd process to handle a new client connection is
+spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
+without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
+files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
+closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
+
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+ 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+ 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+ 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
++#ifdef __s390__
++		{
++		    /*
++		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
++		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
++		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
++		     */
++		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
++		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
++				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
++		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
++			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
++			if (len > 0) {
++			    lpath[len] = 0;
++			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
++				fd = -1;
++			}
++		    }
++		    if (fd >= 0)
++			(void) close((int) fd);
++		}
++#else
+ 		(void) close((int) fd);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	(void) closedir(dirp);
+     } else
+

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-security-7.0.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index b410965..f1b873d 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -1084,9 +1084,7 @@ extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+ int
+ mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+-
+ 	debug3("%s", __func__);
+-	authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ 	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
+ 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+@@ -1166,14 +1166,16 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ int
+ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
++	int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s", __func__);
+ 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
++	sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+ 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ 	auth_submethod = "pam";
+-	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
++	return r;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index e6217b3..eac421b 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -614,7 +614,6 @@ mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s", __func__);
+ 	buffer_init(&m);
+-	buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
+ 	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
+ 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
+index 97ce58c..1f9320a 100644
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -338,6 +338,21 @@ clear_cached_addr(void)
+ 	cached_port = -1;
+ }
+ 
++void set_remote_ipaddr(void) {
++	if (canonical_host_ip != NULL)
++		free(canonical_host_ip);
++
++	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
++		canonical_host_ip =
++		    get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
++		if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
++			cleanup_exit(255);
++	} else {
++		/* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
++		canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
++	}
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
+  * string must not be freed.
+@@ -347,17 +362,9 @@ const char *
+ get_remote_ipaddr(void)
+ {
+ 	/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
+-	if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
+-		if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+-			canonical_host_ip =
+-			    get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
+-			if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
+-				cleanup_exit(255);
+-		} else {
+-			/* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
+-			canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+-		}
+-	}
++	if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
++		set_remote_ipaddr();
++
+ 	return canonical_host_ip;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
+index 4c8636f..4079953 100644
+--- a/canohost.h
++++ b/canohost.h
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ const char	*get_canonical_hostname(int);
++void		 set_remote_ipaddr(void);
+ const char	*get_remote_ipaddr(void);
+ const char	*get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index e636f33..451a58b 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "version.h"
++#include "canohost.h"
+ 
+ char *client_version_string = NULL;
+ char *server_version_string = NULL;
+@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port,
+ 
+ 	/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
+ 	packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
++	set_remote_ipaddr();
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -492,6 +494,7 @@ ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
+ 
+ 	/* Set the connection. */
+ 	packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
++	set_remote_ipaddr();
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8	2017-02-09 10:35:41.926475399 +0100
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+@@ -138,6 +139,10 @@ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
++.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
++of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2017-02-09 10:22:36.498019921 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2017-02-09 10:35:07.190520959 +0100
+@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+ /* Version of client */
+ static u_int version;
+ 
++/* Force file permissions */
++int permforce = 0;
++long permforcemode;
++
+ /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+@@ -679,6 +683,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	Attrib a;
+ 	char *name;
+ 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
++	mode_t old_umask = 0;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+@@ -688,6 +693,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
++	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
++		mode = permforcemode;
++		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
++	}
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+@@ -709,6 +718,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (permforce == 1)
++		(void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
+ 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ 		send_status(id, status);
+ 	free(name);
+@@ -1490,7 +1501,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+@@ -1516,7 +1527,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
++	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+@@ -1576,6 +1587,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
++		case 'm':
++			/* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
++			permforce = 1;
++			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
++			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
++			    *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
++			    errno != 0))
++				fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
++			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ssh-agent-and-xsecurity-bypass.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.security openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.security	2015-07-01 19:27:08.521162690 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/channels.c	2015-07-01 19:27:08.597162521 +0200
+@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
+ static char *x11_saved_data = NULL;
+ static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
+ 
++/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
++static u_int x11_refuse_time;
++
+ /*
+  * Fake X11 authentication data.  This is what the server will be sending us;
+  * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
+@@ -894,6 +897,13 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
+ 	u_char *ucp;
+ 	u_int proto_len, data_len;
+ 
++	/* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
++	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
++		verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
++		    "expired");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+ 	if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -1457,6 +1467,12 @@ channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd)
+ 		error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ 
++void
++channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time)
++{
++	x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
+  */
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.h.security openssh-6.6p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-6.6p1/channels.h.security	2015-07-01 19:27:08.597162521 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/channels.h	2015-07-01 19:43:32.900950560 +0200
+@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+ 
+ /* x11 forwarding */
+ 
++void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int);
+ int	 x11_connect_display(void);
+ int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+ void     x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c.security openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c.security	2015-07-01 19:27:08.540162648 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c	2015-07-01 19:44:51.139761508 +0200
+@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int connection_in;	/* Connection
+ static int connection_out;	/* Connection to server (output). */
+ static int need_rekeying;	/* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
+ static int session_closed;	/* In SSH2: login session closed. */
+-static int x11_refuse_time;	/* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
++static u_int x11_refuse_time;	/* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
+ 
+ static void client_init_dispatch(void);
+ int	session_ident = -1;
+@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
++#define SSH_X11_PROTO		"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
++#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK	60
+ void
+ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+     u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
+@@ -315,7 +316,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ 	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+ 	char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
+ 	struct stat st;
+-	u_int now;
++	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+ 
+ 	xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
+ 	*_proto = proto;
+@@ -348,6 +349,15 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ 			xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ 			xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ 			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
++			/*
++			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
++			 * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
++			 * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
++			 */
++			if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
++				x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
++			else
++				x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
+ 			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
+ 				do_unlink = 1;
+ 				snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
+@@ -355,17 +365,20 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ 				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ 				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+ 				    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+-				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout);
++				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
++				    x11_timeout_real);
+ 				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+-				if (system(cmd) == 0)
+-					generated = 1;
+ 				if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
+ 					now = monotime() + 1;
+ 					if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
+ 						x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
+ 					else
+ 						x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
++					channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
++					    x11_refuse_time);
+ 				}
++				if (system(cmd) == 0)
++					generated = 1;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -1884,7 +1897,7 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_t
+ 		    "malicious server.");
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+-	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
++	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
+ 		verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
+ 		    "expired");
+ 		return NULL;
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c.security openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c.security	2015-07-01 19:27:08.597162521 +0200
++++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c	2015-07-01 19:42:35.691088800 +0200
+@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
++#include <util.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -129,8 +130,12 @@ char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 
+ /* locking */
++#define LOCK_SIZE	32
++#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
++#define LOCK_ROUNDS	1
+ int locked = 0;
+-char *lock_passwd = NULL;
++char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE];
++char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
+@@ -548,22 +553,45 @@ send:
+ static void
+ process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
+ {
+-	int success = 0;
+-	char *passwd;
++	int success = 0, delay;
++	char *passwd, passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
++	static u_int fail_count = 0;
++	size_t pwlen;
+ 
+ 	passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+-	if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
+-		locked = 0;
+-		explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd));
+-		free(lock_passwd);
+-		lock_passwd = NULL;
+-		success = 1;
++	pwlen = strlen(passwd);
++	if (pwlen == 0) {
++		debug("empty password not supported");
++	} else if (locked && !lock) {
++		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
++		    passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
++			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
++		if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_passwd, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
++			debug("agent unlocked");
++			locked = 0;
++			fail_count = 0;
++			explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd));
++			success = 1;
++		} else {
++			/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
++			if (fail_count < 100)
++				fail_count++;
++			delay = 100000 * fail_count;
++			debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
++			    (double)delay/1000000);
++			usleep(delay);
++		}
++		explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
+ 	} else if (!locked && lock) {
++		debug("agent locked");
+ 		locked = 1;
+-		lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd);
++		arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
++		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
++		    lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
++			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
+ 		success = 1;
+ 	}
+-	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
++	explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen);
+ 	free(passwd);
+ 
+ 	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
+
+    systemd stuff
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether user wants systemd support
++SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
++	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
++	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
++		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
++			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
++				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
++				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
++				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
++				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
++				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
++			else
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++			fi
++		fi
++	fi ]
++)
++
++
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
++echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e0d4923
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/contrib/sshd.service
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++[Unit]
++Description=OpenSSH server daemon
++Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
++After=network.target
++
++[Service]
++Type=notify
++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
++KillMode=process
++Restart=on-failure
++RestartPreventExitStatus=255
++
++[Install]
++WantedBy=multi-user.target
++
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1833,6 +1837,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++	/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
++	sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.sshd-t openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.sshd-t	2017-02-09 10:19:56.859306131 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 10:22:07.895104402 +0100
+@@ -2337,7 +2337,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner == NULL ? "none" : o->banner);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.sshd-t openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.sshd-t	2017-02-09 10:19:56.823306172 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1	2017-02-09 10:19:56.859306131 +0100
+@@ -512,7 +512,11 @@ For full details of the options listed b
+ .It GatewayPorts
+ .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ .It GSSAPIAuthentication
++.It GSSAPIKeyExchange
++.It GSSAPIClientIdentity
+ .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
++.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++.It GSSAPITrustDns
+ .It HashKnownHosts
+ .It Host
+ .It HostbasedAuthentication

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.690996627 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
+@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+ 
+ /* -- X11 forwarding */
+ 
+-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+-#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
++/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
++#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
+ 
+ /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
+ static char *x11_saved_display = NULL;
+@@ -4228,7 +4228,8 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+  */
+ int
+ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
+-    int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
++    int x11_max_displays, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp,
++    int **chanids)
+ {
+ 	Channel *nc = NULL;
+ 	int display_number, sock;
+@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 	if (chanids == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
++	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
++
+ 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
++	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
+ 	    display_number++) {
+-		port = 6000 + display_number;
++		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
++		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
++			break;
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 		if (num_socks > 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
+ 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
++	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+ 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* Connect it to the display. */
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 			close(sock);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	}
+ 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ 	if (!ai) {
+-		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
+-		    strerror(errno));
++		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
++		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	set_nodelay(sock);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2017-02-09 12:49:50.230929693 +0100
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+ 
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int);
+ int	 x11_connect_display(void);
+-int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
++int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+ int      x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
+ 	     const char *, int);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.741996552 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 12:51:03.167822492 +0100
+@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
++	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
+ 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+ 	options->permit_tty = -1;
+ 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+@@ -242,6 +243,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
++	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
++		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+ 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+ 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+@@ -416,7 +419,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
++	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+@@ -537,6 +540,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1313,6 +1317,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sX11MaxDisplays:
++		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+ 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2060,6 +2068,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+@@ -2312,6 +2321,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
++	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.741996552 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
++#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+ 
+ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+ 					 * searching at */
++	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
+ 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+ 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+ 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.742996550 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2017-02-09 12:49:04.745996546 +0100
+@@ -2502,8 +2502,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
+-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
++	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
++	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
++	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.742996550 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-09 12:51:24.656790909 +0100
+@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+ .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
++.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
+ .Cm X11Forwarding
+ and
+ .Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+@@ -1563,6 +1564,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+ X11 forwarding.
+ This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+ The default is 10.
++.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
++Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
++.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
++X11 forwarding.
++This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
++The default is 1000.
+ .It Cm X11Forwarding
+ Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+ The argument must be

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ControlPath_too_long.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/mux.c.controlPath openssh-7.4p1/mux.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/mux.c.controlPath	2017-05-04 14:49:44.629247946 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/mux.c	2017-05-04 14:52:54.955109022 +0200
+@@ -1290,6 +1290,12 @@ muxserver_listen(void)
+ 	oerrno = errno;
+ 	umask(old_umask);
+ 	if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
++		if (oerrno == ENAMETOOLONG) {
++			/* the error is already logged from unix_listener() */
++			error("ControlPath %s too long, "
++			    "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
++			goto disable_mux_master;
++		}
+ 		if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
+ 			error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
+ 			    "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-authorized_keys_command.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From ddd3d34e5c7979ca6f4a3a98a7d219a4ed3d98c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2016 22:08:02 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+fix deadlock when keys/principals command produces a lot of
+output and a key is matched early; bz#2655, patch from jboning AT gmail.com
+
+Upstream-ID: e19456429bf99087ea994432c16d00a642060afe
+---
+ auth2-pubkey.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 20f3309e1..70c021589 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 
+ 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
+ 
++	fclose(f);
++	f = NULL;
++
+ 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -1050,6 +1053,9 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
+ 
+ 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
+ 
++	fclose(f);
++	f = NULL;
++
+ 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-canonize-pkcs11-provider.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 1320cda..2441329 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ send:
+ static void
+ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+-	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
++	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ 	int r, version, success = 0;
+ 	Identity *id, *nxt;
+ 	Idtab *tab;
+@@ -831,6 +831,13 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	free(pin);
+ 
++	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
++		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
++		    provider, strerror(errno));
++		goto send;
++	}
++
++	debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+ 	for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
+ 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ 		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+@@ -838,18 +845,19 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 			/* Skip file--based keys */
+ 			if (id->provider == NULL)
+ 				continue;
+-			if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
++			if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
+ 				TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ 				free_identity(id);
+ 				tab->nentries--;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
++	if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
+ 		success = 1;
+ 	else
+ 		error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
+ 		    " pkcs11_del_provider failed");
++send:
+ 	free(provider);
+ 	send_status(e, success);
+ }
+

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-cbc-weakness.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+commit 0fb1a617a07b8df5de188dd5a0c8bf293d4bfc0e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Mar 11 13:07:35 2017 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Don't count the initial block twice when computing how
+    many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode.
+    ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL
+    
+    Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2
+
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 01e2d45..2f3a2ec 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1850,11 +1850,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ 				goto out;
+ 			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+-			if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
++			if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+ 				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
+ 			    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+-			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
++			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
+ 		}
+ 		/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
+ 		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.786064600 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2017-02-09 15:01:28.869890219 +0100
+@@ -266,11 +266,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, efd);
+ 
+-	if (rfd != -1)
++	if (rfd >= 0)
+ 		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
++	if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
+ 		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
++	if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+ 		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ 
+ 	c->rfd = rfd;
+@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 
+ 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+ 	if (nonblock) {
+-		if (rfd != -1)
++		if (rfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(rfd);
+-		if (wfd != -1)
++		if (wfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(wfd);
+-		if (efd != -1)
++		if (efd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(efd);
+ 	}
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/key.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/key.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.793064593 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.797064589 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+-		if (tmp1 > 0)
++		if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ 			close(tmp1);
+-		if (tmp2 > 0)
+-			close(tmp2);
++		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
++			close(tmp2);*/
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmp1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/packet.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/progressmeter.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.761064625 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.590058852 +0100
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (signo)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.801064585 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.591058851 +0100
+@@ -1544,7 +1544,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!*activep) {
+-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+@@ -1635,8 +1635,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.592058850 +0100
+@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
+ }
+ 
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	tun = packet_get_int();
+-	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+ 			goto done;
+ 		tun = forced_tun_device;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.598058844 +0100
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (sshpid > 1) {
+ 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:38.596058846 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c	2017-02-09 15:20:18.893624636 +0100
+@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
++do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.h.coverity        2017-02-10 09:28:10.951155129 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.h 2017-02-10 09:27:28.685069870 +0100
+@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, cons
+ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
+-int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int);
++int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *, u_int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:38.599058843 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2017-02-09 15:29:21.938917065 +0100
+@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	/* drop */
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	setgid(getgid());
++	(void) setegid(getgid());
++	(void) setgid(getgid());
+ 
+ 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:38.600058842 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-09 15:30:33.403800831 +0100
+@@ -679,8 +679,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 		privsep_preauth_child();
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			free(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1382,6 +1384,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
++
++	if (fdset != NULL)
++		free(fdset);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index e554ec4..bd16d80 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -834,6 +834,8 @@ fake_password(const char *wire_password)
+ 		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
+ 
+ 	ret = malloc(l + 1);
++	if (ret == NULL)
++		return NULL;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ 		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
+ 	ret[i] = '\0';
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index c6a4138..9b00e12 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+ 			free(response);
+ 			response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
+ 			    "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
+-			if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
++			if (response != NULL && strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
+ 				break;
+ 			else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
+ 			    strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
+diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
+index 13b63c2..dfa9b8d 100644
+--- a/digest-openssl.c
++++ b/digest-openssl.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+ 	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+ 	u_int l = dlen;
+ 
+-	if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
++	if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index a30dabe..a8ac91f 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
++	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -195,8 +195,10 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL)
++		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
++			free(m);
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
++		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -651,8 +653,10 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+ #endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
+ 	}
+-	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
++	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
++		free(name);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
+ 	enc->name = name;
+ 	enc->enabled = 0;
+ 	enc->iv = NULL;
+@@ -670,8 +674,10 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+ #endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
+ 	}
+-	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
++	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
++		free(name);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
+ 	/* truncate the key */
+ 	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+ 		mac->key_len = 16;
+@@ -695,6 +701,7 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+ 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ 		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
+ 	} else {
++		free(name);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	}
+ 	comp->name = name;
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 3e7a5d8..acc1391 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1500,6 +1500,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 			if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+ 				debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
+ 				    "files",filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				continue;
+ 			} else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
+ 				fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 6ab1cb4..5f2464a 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2284,8 +2284,6 @@ dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+ static void
+ dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
+ {
+-	if (val == NULL)
+-		return;
+ 	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
+ 	    val == NULL ? "none" : val);
+ }
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 07f80cd..5d4b41b 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1533,6 +1533,7 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
+ 	if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
+ 	    !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
+ 		debug3("user denied adding this key");
++		close(auth_sock);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1541,4 +1542,5 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
+ 		debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
+ 	else
+ 		debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
++	close(auth_sock);
+ }
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index f31c24c..aecf765 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1061,6 +1061,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+ 
+ 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ 		/* we cannot handle this key */
++		free(blob);
+ 		debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1170,6 +1171,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+ 
+ 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ 		/* we cannot handle this key */
++		free(blob);
+ 		debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 85fd1bd..58c1051 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -1375,8 +1375,6 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ 		retval = 0;
+ /*XXXX*/
+ 		sshkey_free(k);
+-		if (retval != 0)
+-			break;
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index e271a19..69bec99 100644
+--- a/krl.c
++++ b/krl.c
+@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+ 			break;
+ 		case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+ 			/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
+-			sshbuf_reset(sect);
++			sshbuf_free(sect);
+ 			sect = NULL;
+ 			if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
+ 				goto out;
+@@ -1288,7 +1288,8 @@ ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 	debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
+ 	r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
+  out:
+-	close(fd);
++	if (fd != -1)
++		close(fd);
+ 	sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+ 	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ 	if (r != 0)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index acc1391..c4dff15 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 		value = cipher_number(arg);
+ 		if (value == -1)
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
+ 			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
+ 			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+-				filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++				filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 		value = proto_spec(arg);
+ 		if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5f2464a..4564494 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1476,7 +1476,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (options->ciphers == NULL)
+ 			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (options->macs == NULL)
+ 			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index aaf712d..62a76b3 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -536,8 +536,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 				X509_free(x509);
+ 		}
+ 		if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
+-		    pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
+-			key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
++		    pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0 &&
++		    (key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) != NULL) {
+ 			key->rsa = rsa;
+ 			key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ 			key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
+index a045361..0e1a506 100644
+--- a/sshconnect1.c
++++ b/sshconnect1.c
+@@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ 		cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
+ 
+ 	/* Get the public key. */
+-	server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
++	if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
+ 	bits = packet_get_int();
+ 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
+ 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
+@@ -532,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ 		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+ 	}
+ 	/* Get the host key. */
+-	host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
++	if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
+ 	bits = packet_get_int();
+ 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+ 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 58c1051..6afacb5 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -1239,6 +1239,9 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ 	u_long bits;
+ #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ 
++	if (ret == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++
+ 	cp = *cpp;
+ 
+ 	switch (ret->type) {

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
+ 
++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
++/*
++ *
++ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
++ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/param.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++
++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++
++void usage(void) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
++                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
++                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
++                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
++                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
++        exit(1);
++}
++
++void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
++{
++        unsigned char *bin;
++        char *p;
++        size_t n = 0;
++        int shift = 4;
++        unsigned char out = 0;
++        unsigned char *optr;
++
++        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
++        optr = bin;
++
++        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
++                unsigned char c;
++
++                c = *p;
++                if (isspace(c))
++                        continue;
++
++                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
++                        c = c - '0';
++                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
++                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
++                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
++                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
++                } else {
++                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
++                        break;
++                }
++
++                out |= c << shift;
++                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
++
++                if (shift) {
++                        *(optr++) = out;
++                        out = 0;
++                        ++n;
++                }
++        }
++
++        *len = n;
++        return bin;
++}
++
++#define READ_CHUNK 4096
++#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
++char *read_stdin(void)
++{
++        char *buf;
++        size_t n, total = 0;
++
++        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
++
++        do {
++                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
++                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
++                        break;
++
++                total += n;
++                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
++        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
++        return buf;
++}
++
++int main (int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++
++        const struct sshcipher *c;
++        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
++        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
++        char *hexkey = NULL;
++        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
++        char *hexdata = NULL;
++        char *p;
++        int i;
++        int encrypt = 1;
++        void *key;
++        size_t keylen;
++        void *iv;
++        size_t ivlen;
++        void *data;
++        size_t datalen;
++        void *outdata;
++
++        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
++                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
++                        algo = argv[++i];
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
++                        hexkey = argv[++i];
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
++                        ++i;
++                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
++                                usage();
++                        }
++                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
++                                encrypt = 1;
++                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
++                                encrypt = 0;
++                        } else {
++                                usage();
++                        }
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
++                        hexiv = argv[++i];
++                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
++                        hexdata = argv[++i];
++                }
++        }
++
++        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
++                usage();
++        }
++
++	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++
++	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
++	if (c == NULL) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++        if (hexdata == NULL) {
++                hexdata = read_stdin();
++        } else {
++                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
++        }
++
++        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
++
++	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
++
++        if (ivlen != 16) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
++		return 2;
++        }
++
++        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
++
++	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
++
++        free(key);
++        free(iv);
++
++	outdata = malloc(datalen);
++	if(outdata == NULL) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
++
++        free(data);
++
++	cipher_free(cc);
++
++        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
++		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
++	}
++
++        free(outdata);
++
++        printf("\n");
++        return 0;
++}
++

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-debian-restore-tcp-wrappers.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.tcp_wrappers	2016-12-23 15:36:38.745411192 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac	2016-12-23 15:36:38.777411197 +0100
+@@ -1491,6 +1491,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
+ 	]
+ )
+ 
++# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
++TCPW_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
++	[  --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
++	[
++		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++			saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
++			saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
++			saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
++			if test -n "${withval}" && \
++			    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
++				if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
++					if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
++					else
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
++					fi
++				else
++					if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
++					else
++						LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
++					fi
++				fi
++				if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
++					CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
++				else
++					CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
++				fi
++			fi
++			LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
++			AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <tcpd.h>
++int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
++				]], [[
++	hosts_access(0);
++				]])], [
++					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++					AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
++						[Define if you want
++						TCP Wrappers support])
++					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
++					TCPW_MSG="yes"
++				], [
++					AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
++				
++			])
++			LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
++		fi
++	]
++)
++
+ # Check whether user wants to use ldns
+ LDNS_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+@@ -5214,6 +5270,7 @@ echo "                 KerberosV support
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
++echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
+ echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8.tcp_wrappers	2016-12-23 15:36:38.759411194 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8	2016-12-23 15:36:38.778411197 +0100
+@@ -836,6 +836,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes access
+ This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+ readable by anyone else.
+ .Pp
++.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
++.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
++Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
++Further details are described in
++.Xr hosts_access 5 .
++.Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+@@ -960,6 +966,7 @@ IPv6 address can be used everywhere wher
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
++.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+ .Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.tcp_wrappers	2016-12-23 15:36:38.772411196 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:37:15.032417028 +0100
+@@ -123,6 +123,13 @@
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
++#ifdef LIBWRAP
++#include <tcpd.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
++int allow_severity;
++int deny_severity;
++#endif /* LIBWRAP */
++
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD	(STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+@@ -2012,6 +2019,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+ #endif
++#ifdef LIBWRAP
++	allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
++	deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
++	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
++	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
++		struct request_info req;
++
++		request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
++		fromhost(&req);
++
++		if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
++			debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
++			refuse(&req);
++			/* NOTREACHED */
++			fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
++		}
++	}
++#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+ 
+ 	/* Log the connection. */
+ 	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-expose-pam.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.768447868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.818447876 +0100
+@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int
+     const char *submethod)
+ {
+ 	char *methods;
++	char *prev_auth_details;
+ 	int partial = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+@@ -340,6 +341,18 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int
+ 	if (authctxt->postponed)
+ 		return;
+ 
++	if (authenticated || partial) {
++		prev_auth_details = authctxt->auth_details;
++		xasprintf(&authctxt->auth_details, "%s%s%s%s%s",
++		    prev_auth_details ? prev_auth_details : "",
++		    prev_auth_details ? ", " : "", method,
++		    authctxt->last_details ? ": " : "",
++		    authctxt->last_details ? authctxt->last_details : "");
++		free(prev_auth_details);
++	}
++	free(authctxt->last_details);
++	authctxt->last_details = NULL;
++
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+ 		if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.769447868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.818447876 +0100
+@@ -276,6 +276,9 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
+ 	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->pw));
+ 
++	if (authenticated)
++		authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
++
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+@@ -322,6 +325,9 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	else
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
++	if (authenticated)
++		authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
++
+ 	buffer_free(&b);
+ 	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
+ 		free(micuser);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.731447862 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.818447876 +0100
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	Key *key = NULL;
+-	char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
++	char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service, *pubkey;
+ 	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+ 	u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ 	int pktype;
+@@ -140,15 +140,21 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	buffer_dump(&b);
+ #endif
+ 
+-	pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+-	    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
++	pubkey = sshkey_format_oneline(key, options.fingerprint_hash);
++	auth_info(authctxt,
++	    "%s, client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
++	    pubkey, cuser, chost);
+ 
+ 	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+ 	authenticated = 0;
+ 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+ 	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+-			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
++			buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+ 		authenticated = 1;
++		authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
++	} else {
++		free(pubkey);
++	}
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&b);
+ done:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.746447864 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	Key *key = NULL;
+-	char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
++	char *pkalg, *userstyle, *pubkey, *fp = NULL;
+ 	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+ 	u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ 	int have_sig, pktype;
+@@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ 		buffer_dump(&b);
+ #endif
+-		pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
++		pubkey = sshkey_format_oneline(key, options.fingerprint_hash);
++		auth_info(authctxt, "%s", pubkey);
+ 
+ 		/* test for correct signature */
+ 		authenticated = 0;
+@@ -185,9 +186,12 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+ 			authenticated = 1;
++			authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
+ 			/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
+ 			auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+ 			key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
++		} else {
++			free(pubkey);
+ 		}
+ 		buffer_free(&b);
+ 		free(sig);
+@@ -228,7 +232,7 @@ done:
+ void
+ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
+ {
+-	char *fp, *extra;
++	char *extra, *pubkey;
+ 	va_list ap;
+ 	int i;
+ 
+@@ -238,27 +242,13 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
+ 		i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
+ 		va_end(ap);
+ 		if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
+-			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);	
++			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+-		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+-		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
+-		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
+-		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+-		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+-		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+-		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+-		free(fp);
+-	} else {
+-		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+-		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+-		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
+-		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+-		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+-		free(fp);
+-	}
++	pubkey = sshkey_format_oneline(key, options.fingerprint_hash);
++	auth_info(authctxt, "%s%s%s", pubkey, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ",
++	    extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
++	free(pubkey);
+ 	free(extra);
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.782447870 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.h	2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 
+ 	struct sshkey	**prev_userkeys;
+ 	u_int		 nprev_userkeys;
++
++	char		*last_details;
++	char		*auth_details;
+ };
+ /*
+  * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.731447862 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -688,6 +688,11 @@ sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Notify PAM about any already successful auth methods */
++	if (options.expose_auth_methods >= EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY &&
++			authctxt->auth_details)
++		do_pam_putenv("SSH_USER_AUTH", authctxt->auth_details);
++
+ 	ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
+ 
+ 	/* Start the authentication thread */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.808447874 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
+ }
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
++char*
++ssh_gssapi_get_displayname(void)
++{
++	if (gssapi_client.displayname.length != 0 &&
++	    gssapi_client.displayname.value != NULL)
++		return strdup((char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/* Privileged */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.794447872 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:41:16.473455863 +0100
+@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ {
+ 	struct mon_table *ent;
+ 	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
++	char *prev_auth_details;
+ 
+ 	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+ 
+@@ -330,6 +331,18 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 		auth_submethod = NULL;
+ 		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+ 
++		if (authenticated) {
++			prev_auth_details = authctxt->auth_details;
++			xasprintf(&authctxt->auth_details, "%s%s%s%s%s",
++			    prev_auth_details ? prev_auth_details : "",
++			    prev_auth_details ? ", " : "", auth_method,
++			    authctxt->last_details ? ": " : "",
++			    authctxt->last_details ? authctxt->last_details : "");
++			free(prev_auth_details);
++		}
++		free(authctxt->last_details);
++		authctxt->last_details = NULL;
++
+ 		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
+ 		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ 			if (authenticated &&
+@@ -1417,6 +1430,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+ 
++	if (verified == 1)
++		authctxt->last_details = sshkey_format_oneline(key,
++		    options.fingerprint_hash);
++
+ 	/* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
+ 	if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+ 		auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+@@ -1860,6 +1877,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+ 
+ 	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+ 
++	if (authenticated)
++		authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
++
+ 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ 	return (authenticated);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.810447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:44:04.691482920 +0100
+@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
++	options->expose_auth_methods = -1;
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ }
+@@ -354,6 +355,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
+ 		options->enable_k5users = 0;
++	if (options->expose_auth_methods == -1)
++		options->expose_auth_methods = EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -439,6 +442,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+ 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+ 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
++	sExposeAuthenticationMethods,
+ 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -595,6 +599,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "exposeauthenticationmethods", sExposeAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -984,6 +989,12 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
+ 	{ "local",			FORWARD_LOCAL },
+ 	{ NULL, -1 }
+ };
++static const struct multistate multistate_exposeauthmeth[] = {
++	{ "never",			EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER },
++	{ "pam-only",			EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY },
++	{ "pam-and-env",		EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV },
++	{ NULL, -1}
++};
+ 
+ int
+ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1902,6 +1913,11 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			options->fingerprint_hash = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sExposeAuthenticationMethods:
++		intptr = &options->expose_auth_methods;
++		multistate_ptr = multistate_exposeauthmeth;
++		goto parse_multistate;
++
+ 	case sDeprecated:
+ 	case sIgnore:
+ 	case sUnsupported:
+@@ -2060,6 +2076,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(expose_auth_methods);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
+@@ -2176,6 +2193,8 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+ 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
+ 	case sFingerprintHash:
+ 		return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
++	case sExposeAuthenticationMethods:
++		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_exposeauthmeth);
+ 	default:
+ 		switch (val) {
+ 		case 0:
+@@ -2356,6 +2375,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthenticationMethods, o->expose_auth_methods);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.810447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:40:26.821447876 +0100
+@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@
+ #define FORWARD_LOCAL		(1<<1)
+ #define FORWARD_ALLOW		(FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
+ 
++/* Expose AuthenticationMethods */
++#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER   0
++#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY 1
++#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV  2
++
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
+ 
+@@ -195,6 +200,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
+ 
+ 	int	fingerprint_hash;
++
++	int	expose_auth_methods; /* EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_* above */
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.794447872 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.821447876 +0100
+@@ -997,6 +997,12 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
+ 		}
+ 		*var_val++ = '\0';
+ 
++		if (options.expose_auth_methods < EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV &&
++				strcmp(var_name, "SSH_USER_AUTH") == 0) {
++			free(var_name);
++			continue;
++		}
++
+ 		debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+ 		child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+ 
+@@ -1173,6 +1179,11 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+ 	}
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+ 
++	if (options.expose_auth_methods >= EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV &&
++			s->authctxt->auth_details)
++		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH",
++		     s->authctxt->auth_details);
++
+ 	if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ 		    auth_sock_name);
+@@ -2561,6 +2572,9 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
++	free(authctxt->auth_details);
++	authctxt->auth_details = NULL;
++
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		sshpam_cleanup();
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.810447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1	2016-12-23 15:40:26.822447877 +0100
+@@ -1421,6 +1421,10 @@ server IP address, and server port numbe
+ This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
+ is executed.
+ It can be used to extract the original arguments.
++.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
++This variable contains, for SSH2 only, a comma-separated list of authentication
++methods that were successfuly used to authenticate. When possible, these
++methods are extended with detailed information on the credential used.
+ .It Ev SSH_TTY
+ This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
+ with the current shell or command.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.822447877 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:45:22.411495421 +0100
+@@ -570,6 +570,21 @@ Disables all forwarding features, includ
+ TCP and StreamLocal.
+ This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may
+ simplify restricted configurations.
++.It Cm ExposeAuthenticationMethods
++When using SSH2, this option controls the exposure of the list of
++successful authentication methods to PAM during the authentication
++and to the shell environment via the
++.Cm SSH_USER_AUTH
++variable. See the description of this variable for more details.
++Valid options are:
++.Cm never
++(Do not expose successful authentication methods),
++.Cm pam-only
++(Only expose them to PAM during authentication, not afterwards),
++.Cm pam-and-env
++(Expose them to PAM and keep them in the shell environment).
++The default is
++.Cm never .
+ .It Cm FingerprintHash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
+ Valid options are:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.811447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h	2016-12-23 15:40:26.823447877 +0100
+@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt
+     const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
++char* ssh_gssapi_get_displayname(void);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.777447869 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c	2016-12-23 15:40:26.823447877 +0100
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ /* openssh private key file format */
+ #define MARK_BEGIN		"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+@@ -1191,6 +1192,30 @@ sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
++char *
++sshkey_format_oneline(const struct sshkey *key, int dgst_alg)
++{
++	char *fp, *result;
++
++	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
++		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, dgst_alg,
++		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++		xasprintf(&result, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s",
++		    sshkey_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
++		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
++		    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
++		free(fp);
++	} else {
++		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, dgst_alg, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++		xasprintf(&result, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key),
++		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
++		free(fp);
++	}
++
++	return result;
++}
++
+ #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /*
+  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.expose-pam	2016-12-23 15:40:26.777447869 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h	2016-12-23 15:40:26.823447877 +0100
+@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ char		*sshkey_fingerprint(const struct s
+     int, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
+ int		 sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
+     int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
++char		*sshkey_format_oneline(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg);
+ const char	*sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
+ const char	*sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
+ int		 sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,806 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.174347449 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -116,6 +118,20 @@ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[]
+ 	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+ };
+ 
++static const struct sshcipher fips_ciphers[] = {
++	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
++	{ "3des-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
++	{ "aes128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
++	{ "aes192-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
++	{ "aes256-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
++			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++	{ "aes128-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
++	{ "aes192-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
++	{ "aes256-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
++	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
++};
++
+ /*--*/
+ 
+ /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
+@@ -126,7 +142,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
+ 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ 	const struct sshcipher *c;
+ 
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
+ 		if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
+@@ -222,7 +238,7 @@ const struct sshcipher *
+ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct sshcipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -232,7 +248,7 @@ const struct sshcipher *
+ cipher_by_number(int id)
+ {
+ 	const struct sshcipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (c->number == id)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -273,7 +289,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
+ 	const struct sshcipher *c;
+ 	if (name == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c->number;
+ 	return -1;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.125347498 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+ 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+ #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
++	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
++	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
+ #endif
+ 	return (&aes_ctr);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.fips	2017-05-30 19:10:26.537505598 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c	2017-05-30 19:10:26.571505583 +0200
+@@ -2452,7 +2452,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
+ 		/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms ? options.hostkeyalgorithms :
+-		    KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, 0) != 1) {
++		    (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), 0) != 1) {
+ 			debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
+ 			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ 			continue;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.fips openssh-7.4p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.fips	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/dh.h	2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+  * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+  */
+ #define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
++#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS	2048
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+ 
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.116347507 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+ 
++	/* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
++	atexit(RAND_cleanup);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.174347449 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -124,6 +125,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
+ 
++static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = {
++	{ KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++	{ KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++	{ KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++	{ KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++#endif
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
++	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
++	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
++# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
++	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
++	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++# endif
++#endif
++	{ NULL, -1, -1, -1},
++};
++
+ char *
+ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+ {
+@@ -151,7 +169,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+-	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++	for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+@@ -177,7 +195,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
+ 
+-	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++	kex->min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
+ 	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ 	kex->nbits = nbits;
+ 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c.fips	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
+ 	kex->nbits = nbits;
+ 	kex->min = min;
+ 	kex->max = max;
+-	min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++	min = MAXIMUM(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+ 	max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+-	nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
++	nbits = MAXIMUM(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+ 	nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+ 
+ 	if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/mac.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/mac.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.175347448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/mac.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ struct macalg {
+ 	int		etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+ };
+ 
+-static const struct macalg macs[] = {
++static const struct macalg all_macs[] = {
+ 	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+@@ -89,6 +91,24 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL,					0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
++static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = {
++	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
++	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++#endif
++
++	/* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
++	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++#endif
++
++	{ NULL,					0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
++};
++
+ /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
+ char *
+ mac_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -97,7 +117,7 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep)
+ 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ 	const struct macalg *m;
+ 
+-	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
++	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ 		if (ret != NULL)
+ 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ 		nlen = strlen(m->name);
+@@ -136,7 +156,7 @@ mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name
+ {
+ 	const struct macalg *m;
+ 
+-	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
++	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (mac != NULL)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.175347448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in	2017-02-09 14:53:47.184347440 +0100
+@@ -168,25 +168,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ 	$(RANLIB) $@
+ 
+ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+ 
+ sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
+ 
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.fips	2017-05-30 19:10:26.535505599 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h	2017-05-30 19:10:26.574505582 +0200
+@@ -119,6 +119,14 @@
+ 	"ssh-rsa," \
+ 	"ssh-dss"
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
++	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
++	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
++	"rsa-sha2-512," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256," \
++	"ssh-rsa"
++
+ /* the actual algorithms */
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT \
+@@ -144,6 +152,37 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
++	KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++# define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++#else
++# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
++#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
++# else
++#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
++# endif
++#define        KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++       "hmac-sha1"
++#endif
++
+ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 
+ #define KEX_SERVER_KEX		\
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.184347440 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2017-02-09 14:55:25.123250447 +0100
+@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+             found_key = 1;
+             logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+                                   linenum);
+-            fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
++				SSH_FP_HEX);
+             logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+                                   key_type(found), fp);
+             free(fp);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.185347438 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c	2017-02-09 14:56:24.840191308 +0100
+@@ -2104,12 +2104,17 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	}
+ 	if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
+ 		options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+-	if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, &options->macs) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
++	if (kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT
++	        : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_MAC
++	        : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), &options->macs) != 0 ||
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS
++	        : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
+ 	    &options->hostbased_key_types) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
+ 	    &options->pubkey_key_types) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__);
+ 
+@@ -2559,7 +2564,8 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+ 	char buf[8];
+ 
+ 	/* This is normally prepared in ssh_kex2 */
+-	if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
++	if (kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	    : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__);
+ 
+ 	/* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.177347446 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.185347438 +0100
+@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++	SC_DENY(socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.fips	2017-06-07 13:07:28.403983349 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-06-07 13:09:46.710997099 +0200
+@@ -185,14 +185,20 @@ option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+ static void
+ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ {
+-	if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, &o->ciphers) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_MAC, &o->macs) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_KEX, &o->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
++	if (kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT
++	        : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), &o->ciphers) != 0 ||
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_MAC
++	        : KEX_SERVER_MAC), &o->macs) != 0 ||
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS
++	        : KEX_SERVER_KEX), &o->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
+ 	    &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
+ 	    &o->hostbased_key_types) != 0 ||
+-	    kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->pubkey_key_types) != 0)
++	    kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), &o->pubkey_key_types) != 0)
+ 		fatal("kex_assemble_names failed");
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2390,8 +2396,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	/* string arguments */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
++	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : FIPS_mode()
++		? KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
++	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : FIPS_mode()
++		? KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner == NULL ? "none" : o->banner);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+@@ -2406,14 +2414,17 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
+-	    o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
++	dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms :
++		FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ?
+-	    o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
++	    o->hostbased_key_types : (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ?
+-	    o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
++	    o->hostkeyalgorithms : (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
+-	    o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
++	    o->pubkey_key_types : (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++	        : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c.fips	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.185347438 +0100
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -530,6 +532,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
++        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
++		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)){
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++			else
++				logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++	}
+ 
+ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+@@ -609,6 +619,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	    "ACD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (opt) {
+ 		case '1':
++			if (FIPS_mode()) {
++				fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
++			}
+ 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+ 			break;
+ 		case '2':
+@@ -964,7 +977,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1175,6 +1187,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	if (options.user == NULL)
+ 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ 
+@@ -1263,6 +1279,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
++		if (options.protocol == 0)
++			fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+ 	if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ 	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.162347461 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.186347437 +0100
+@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -117,7 +119,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
+ 		load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
+ 
+-	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
++	oavail = avail = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
++	    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
+ 	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
+ 	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
+ 	last = xmalloc(maxlen);
+@@ -172,21 +175,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
+-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+-		orig = options.kex_algorithms;
+-
+-		if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+-			gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
+-		else
+-			gss_host = host;
+-
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++			orig = options.kex_algorithms;
++
++			if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++				gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++			else
++				gss_host = host;
++
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++			if (gss) {
++				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++				xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
++				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+@@ -204,14 +212,16 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
+-		if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
++		if (kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG
++		    : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
+ 		    &options.hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
+ 			fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Enforce default */
+-		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
++		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
++		    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
+ 		/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.178347445 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-09 14:53:47.186347437 +0100
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -77,6 +78,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1471,6 +1474,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 
++        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
++		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
++			openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
++			if (FIPS_mode()) {
++				syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++				cleanup_exit(255);
++			}
++			else
++				syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++			closelog();
++		}
+ 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ 	saved_argc = ac;
+ 	rexec_argc = ac;
+@@ -1619,7 +1634,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	else
+ 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+ 
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#if 0 /* FIPS */
+ 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1928,6 +1943,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	   unmounted if desired. */
+ 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+@@ -2282,10 +2301,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ 		orig = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (options.gss_keyex)
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+-	else
+-		gss = NULL;
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.fips	2017-02-09 14:53:47.179347444 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c	2017-02-09 14:58:02.117094971 +0100
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ /* openssh private key file format */
+ #define MARK_BEGIN		"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+@@ -1555,6 +1557,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+ 	}
+ 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+ 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -3921,8 +3925,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struc
+ 	switch (type) {
+ #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ 	case KEY_RSA1:
+-		return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase,
+-		    keyp, commentp);
++		if (! FIPS_mode())
++			return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase,
++			    keyp, commentp);
++		error("%s: cannot parse rsa1 key in FIPS mode", __func__);
++		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+@@ -3961,8 +3968,9 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct ssh
+ #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ 	/* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
+ 	if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
+-		return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1,
+-		    passphrase, keyp, commentp);
++		if (!FIPS_mode())
++			return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1,
++			    passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+ 	}
+ #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ 	return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2017-05-22 13:50:06.731776762 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c	2017-05-22 13:50:11.843773909 +0200
+@@ -215,6 +215,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ 	    OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
+ 	if (*bitsp > maxbits)
+ 		fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
+ 		fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
+ 	else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 1024)

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gss-strict-acceptor.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 13bd2e2d622d01dc85d22b94520a5b243d006049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2017 03:45:41 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+sshd_config is documented to set
+GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes by default, so actually make it do this.
+bz#2637 ok dtucker
+
+Upstream-ID: 99ef8ac51f17f0f7aec166cb2e34228d4d72a665
+---
+ servconf.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 795ddbab7..c9105a592 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+-		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
++		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ 		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.417893132 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c	2017-02-09 10:46:50.448893107 +0100
+@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
+  */
+ 
+ char *
+-ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client,
++    const char *kex) {
+ 	gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+ 	OM_uint32 min_status;
+ 
+@@ -85,12 +86,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+ 	return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+-	    host, client));
++	    host, client, kex));
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+-    const char *host, const char *client) {
++    const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) {
+ 	Buffer buf;
+ 	size_t i;
+ 	int oidpos, enclen;
+@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 	char deroid[2];
+ 	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX md;
++	char *s, *cp, *p;
+ 
+ 	if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+ 		for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+@@ -112,6 +114,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 	buffer_init(&buf);
+ 
+ 	oidpos = 0;
++	s = cp = strdup(kex);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+ 		    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+@@ -130,26 +133,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
+ 			    encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+ 
+-			if (oidpos != 0)
+-				buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+-
+-			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+-			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+-			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+-			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+-			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
+-			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+-			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+-			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+-			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+-			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+-			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
++				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
++				if (buffer_len(&buf) != 0)
++					buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++				buffer_append(&buf, p,
++				    strlen(p));
++				buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++			}
+ 
+ 			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+ 			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+ 			oidpos++;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	free(s);
+ 	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+ 	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.449893106 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c	2017-02-09 10:55:12.189422901 +0100
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
+ 	if (supported_oids == NULL)
+ 		ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+ 	return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
+-	    &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
++	    &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL, options.gss_kex_algorithms));
+ }
+ 
+ /* Unprivileged */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.449893106 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c	2017-02-09 10:55:44.008393539 +0100
+@@ -248,6 +248,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
++int
++gss_kex_names_valid(const char *names)
++{
++	char *s, *cp, *p;
++
++	if (names == NULL || *names == '\0')
++		return 0;
++	s = cp = strdup(names);
++	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
++	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
++		if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0
++		  || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
++			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			free(s);
++			return 0;
++		}
++	}
++	debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names);
++	free(s);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
+ int
+ kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/kex.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.452893104 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.h	2017-02-09 11:02:35.313012903 +0100
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ struct kex {
+ char	*kex_alg_list(char);
+ char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
+ int	 kex_assemble_names(const char *, char **);
++int	 gss_kex_names_valid(const char *);
+ 
+ int	 kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **);
+ int	 kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.420893129 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c	2017-02-09 10:56:06.759372540 +0100
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ /* Format of the configuration file:
+ 
+@@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ 	oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+-	oGssServerIdentity, 
++	oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+ 	{ "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
+ 	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -996,6 +999,18 @@ parse_time:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssKexAlgorithms:
++		arg = strdelim(&s);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum);
++		if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
++			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++		if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++			options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1813,6 +1828,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+ 	options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
++	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1964,6 +1980,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+ 		options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
++#endif
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.420893129 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h	2017-02-09 10:46:50.450893106 +0100
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	gss_renewal_rekey;	/* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+ 	char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+ 	char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
++	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.446893109 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 10:57:15.784309297 +0100
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+ static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
++	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -280,6 +281,10 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ 		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
++#endif
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -422,7 +425,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+-	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sGssKexAlgorithms, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ 	sHostCertificate,
+@@ -501,6 +504,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -508,6 +512,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1249,6 +1254,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssKexAlgorithms:
++		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum);
++		if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
++			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
++			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++		if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++			options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2304,6 +2321,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
++	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.450893106 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-09 10:57:33.717292870 +0100
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ 	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ 	int 	gss_store_rekey;
++	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.443893111 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1	2017-02-09 10:46:50.451893105 +0100
+@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ For full details of the options listed b
+ .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ .It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+ .It GSSAPITrustDns
++.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+ .It HashKnownHosts
+ .It Host
+ .It HostbasedAuthentication
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.452893104 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5	2017-02-09 11:00:39.053122745 +0100
+@@ -782,6 +782,18 @@ the name of the host being connected to.
+ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
++key exchange. Possible values are
++.Bd -literal -offset 3n
++gss-gex-sha1-,
++gss-group1-sha1-,
++gss-group14-sha1-
++.Ed
++.Pp
++The default is
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.451893105 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c	2017-02-09 10:58:08.533260973 +0100
+@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 		else
+ 			gss_host = host;
+ 
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ 		if (gss) {
+ 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ 			xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.452893104 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-09 11:01:55.141050861 +0100
+@@ -666,6 +666,18 @@ Controls whether the user's GSSAPI crede
+ successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
+ or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
++key exchange. Possible values are
++.Bd -literal -offset 3n
++gss-gex-sha1-,
++gss-group1-sha1-,
++gss-group14-sha1-
++.Ed
++.Pp
++The default is
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a comma-separated pattern list.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg	2017-02-09 10:46:50.425893125 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h	2017-02-09 10:46:50.451893105 +0100
+@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ #define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID				"gss-group14-sha1-"
+ #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID				"gss-gex-sha1-"
+ 
++#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
++	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID
++
+ typedef struct {
+ 	char *filename;
+ 	char *envvar;
+@@ -147,9 +152,9 @@ int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssct
+ /* In the server */
+ typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
+     const char *);
+-char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+-    const char *);
++    const char *, const char *);
+ gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+ int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
+     const char *);

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kdf-cavs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
++SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
+ ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
++ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
+ 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
++ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
++ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
++ *    written permission.
++ *
++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
++ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
++ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
++ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
++ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
++ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
++ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
++ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
++ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
++ * DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++
++static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
++{
++	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 48);
++	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 55);
++	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 87);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert hex representation into binary string
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin output buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
++ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
++ */
++static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
++		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
++ * and convert hex into bin
++ *
++ * Caller must free bin
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
++ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
++ *
++ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
++ */
++static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
++{
++	unsigned char *out = NULL;
++	size_t outlen = 0;
++
++	if (!hexlen)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
++
++	out = calloc(1, outlen);
++	if (!out)
++		return -errno;
++
++	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
++	*bin = out;
++	*binlen = outlen;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
++static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
++static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
++{
++	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
++		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
++	return 'X';
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert binary string into hex representation
++ * @bin input buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of bin
++ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
++ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
++ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
++ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
++ */
++static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
++		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
++		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
++	}
++}
++
++struct kdf_cavs {
++	unsigned char *K;
++	size_t Klen;
++	unsigned char *H;
++	size_t Hlen;
++	unsigned char *session_id;
++	size_t session_id_len;
++
++	unsigned int iv_len;
++	unsigned int ek_len;
++	unsigned int ik_len;
++};
++
++static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
++{
++	int ret = 0;
++	struct kex kex;
++	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
++	int mode = 0;
++	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
++	struct newkeys *stockeys;
++	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
++
++#define HEXOUTLEN 500
++	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
++
++	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
++
++	Kbn = BN_new();
++	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
++	if (!Kbn) {
++		printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n");
++		ret = 1;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
++	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
++
++	/* setup kex */
++
++	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
++	switch (test->ik_len) {
++		case 20:
++			kex.hash_alg = 2;
++			break;
++		case 32:
++			kex.hash_alg = 3;
++			break;
++		case 48:
++			kex.hash_alg = 4;
++			break;
++		case 64:
++			kex.hash_alg = 5;
++			break;
++		default:
++			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* implement choose_enc */
++	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
++		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
++		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
++			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
++	}
++
++	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
++	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
++
++	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
++	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
++	kex.server = 1;
++
++	/* do it */
++	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
++		printf("Allocation error\n");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ssh->kex = &kex;
++	kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn);
++
++	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
++	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
++
++	/* get data */
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++out:
++	if (Kbn)
++		BN_free(Kbn);
++	if (kex.newkeys[0])
++		free(kex.newkeys[0]);
++	if (kex.newkeys[1])
++		free(kex.newkeys[1]);
++	if (ssh)
++		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++static void usage(void)
++{
++	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test command example:
++ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
++ *
++ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
++ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
++ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
++ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
++ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
++ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
++ */
++int main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++	struct kdf_cavs test;
++	int ret = 1;
++	int opt = 0;
++
++	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
++	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
++	{
++		size_t len = 0;
++		switch(opt)
++		{
++			/*
++			 * CAVS K is MPINT
++			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
++			 * following transformations already happened):
++			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
++			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
++			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
++			 */
++			case 'K':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'H':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 's':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.session_id,
++						    &test.session_id_len);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'i':
++				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'e':
++				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'm':
++				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			default:
++				usage();
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
++
++	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
++
++out:
++	if (test.session_id)
++		free(test.session_id);
++	if (test.K)
++		free(test.K);
++	if (test.H)
++		free(test.H);
++	return ret;
++
++}
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++#!/usr/bin/env perl
++#
++# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
++#
++# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++#
++# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++#
++# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
++# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++#
++#                            NO WARRANTY
++#
++#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
++#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
++#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
++#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
++#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
++#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
++#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
++#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
++#
++#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
++#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
++#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
++#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
++#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
++#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
++#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
++#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
++#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
++#
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++use IPC::Open2;
++
++# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
++# STDOUT
++# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
++# rest: program and args
++# returns: STDOUT of program as string
++sub pipe_through_program($@) {
++	my $in = shift;
++	my @args = @_;
++
++	my ($CO, $CI);
++	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
++
++	my $out = "";
++	my $len = length($in);
++	my $first = 1;
++	while (1) {
++		my $rin = "";
++		my $win = "";
++		# Output of prog is FD that we read
++		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
++		# Input of prog is FD that we write
++		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
++		# that is to be written to the app
++		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
++			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
++			$first=0;
++		}
++		# Let us wait for 100ms
++		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
++		if ( $wout ) {
++			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
++			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
++			$len -= $written;
++			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
++			if ($len <= 0) {
++				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
++			}
++		}
++		if ( $rout ) {
++			my $tmp_out = "";
++			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
++			$out .= $tmp_out;
++			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
++		}
++	}
++	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
++	waitpid $pid, 0;
++
++	return $out;
++}
++
++# Parser of CAVS test vector file
++# $1: Test vector file
++# $2: Output file for test results
++# return: nothing
++sub parse($$) {
++	my $infile = shift;
++	my $outfile = shift;
++
++	my $out = "";
++
++	my $K = "";
++	my $H = "";
++	my $session_id = "";
++	my $ivlen = 0;
++	my $eklen = "";
++	my $iklen = "";
++
++	open(IN, "<$infile");
++	while(<IN>) {
++
++		my $line = $_;
++		chomp($line);
++		$line =~ s/\r//;
++
++		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
++			$iklen = 20;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
++			$iklen = 32;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
++			$iklen = 48;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
++			$iklen = 64;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++			$ivlen = $1;
++			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++			$eklen = $1;
++			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$K = $1;
++			$K = substr($K, 8);
++			$K = "00" . $K;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$H = $1;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$session_id = $1;
++		}
++		$out .= $line . "\n";
++
++		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
++		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
++			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
++
++			$K = "";
++			$H = "";
++			$session_id = "";
++		}
++	}
++	close IN;
++	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
++	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
++	print OUT $out;
++	close OUT;
++}
++
++############################################################
++#
++# let us pretend to be C :-)
++sub main() {
++
++	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
++	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
++
++	my $outfile = $infile;
++	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
++	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
++	$outfile .= ".rsp";
++	if (-f $outfile) {
++		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
++			unless unlink($outfile);
++	}
++	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
++
++	# Do the job
++	parse($infile, $outfile);
++}
++
++###########################################
++# Call it
++main();
++1;

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2017-02-09 09:20:00.958084311 +0100
+@@ -54,6 +54,21 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
++int
++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
++                 int k5login_exists)
++{
++	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
++		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
++	else {
++		char kuser[65];
++
++		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
++			return 0;
++		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
++	}
++}
++
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -157,8 +172,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
++	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
++	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
++	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
+ 		problem = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2017-02-09 09:20:00.955084317 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2017-02-09 09:20:00.958084311 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+     int);
+ 
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+ 
+@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+  */
+ 
++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
++ *
++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
++ *
++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
++ * not.
++ *
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
++ * given environment.
++ *
++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
++ * access control behavior:
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
++ * restrictions mentioned above.
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
++ *
++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
++ *
++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
++ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
++ *
++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
++ * during upgrade:
++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
++ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
++ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
++ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
++ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
++ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
++
+ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
++			&& k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+@@ -171,9 +270,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+-		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+-		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+-		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
++                                        k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+ 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		int saved_errno = errno;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2017-02-09 09:20:00.951084326 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 09:21:29.802896034 +0100
+@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
++	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ }
+@@ -334,6 +335,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+ 	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
+ 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
++	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
++		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+ 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -478,11 +481,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		*activep = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
++		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 
+@@ -2308,6 +2318,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2017-02-09 09:20:00.951084326 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-09 09:20:00.959084309 +0100
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	int	num_permitted_opens;
+ 
++	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	char   *chroot_directory;
+ 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2017-02-09 09:20:00.959084309 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-09 09:22:33.517761012 +0100
+@@ -846,6 +846,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
++The default is
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -1074,6 +1078,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm IPQoS ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+ .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2017-02-09 09:20:00.953084322 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-09 09:20:00.959084309 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-algorithms.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.legacy openssh-7.4p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.legacy	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/dh.h	2017-03-02 17:00:37.640695985 +0100
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+  * Max value from RFC4419.
+  * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+  */
+-#define DH_GRP_MIN	2048
++#define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+ 
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/moduli.legacy openssh-7.4p1/moduli
+--- openssh-7.4p1/moduli.legacy	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/moduli	2017-03-02 17:00:37.642695983 +0100
+@@ -1,5 +1,83 @@
+ #    $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.18 2016/08/11 01:42:11 dtucker Exp $
+ # Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
++20150520233853 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2AC62AF
++20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2BCC50F
++20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2C241F3
++20150520233855 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2DDF347
++20150520233856 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2E3FDBB
++20150520233857 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3006603
++20150520233858 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA31D9C37
++20150520233859 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA333355B
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++20150522030150 2 6 100 1535 2 F4EE15F22E5F49997A027769656DF0240598C9470C7D67A7D7DA2777883C1C243A6F3D04E1CFA6A0350B165ECABE89A684C11ABB7E5B93B54FD6EAC85BBA9F23C6306E485BB9AC5515ABC739CE9B1A79F7DEF6D00B643856DB903E23E7F985EDCAFF867FE15498E7EF6A91057DE337A9AAEDE941C934E65243AC7888A33C78FB2490BBA2BA06F18ECC51DE9AA54BADD061CC5BE1EA060CC3217CA11E26772BD088898D2882CB49A9FF40168E49AE6A90EE1F61132E1B6E4E7F99797DB11127F3
++20150522030159 2 6 100 1535 2 F4EE15F22E5F49997A027769656DF0240598C9470C7D67A7D7DA2777883C1C243A6F3D04E1CFA6A0350B165ECABE89A684C11ABB7E5B93B54FD6EAC85BBA9F23C6306E485BB9AC5515ABC739CE9B1A79F7DEF6D00B643856DB903E23E7F985EDCAFF867FE15498E7EF6A91057DE337A9AAEDE941C934E65243AC7888A33C78FB2490BBA2BA06F18ECC51DE9AA54BADD061CC5BE1EA060CC3217CA11E26772BD088898D2882CB49A9FF40168E49AE6A90EE1F61132E1B6E4E7F99797DB15B8BDB
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
+ 20160301052612 2 6 100 2047 5 DA57B18976E9C55CEAC3BFFF70419A1550258EA7359400BD4FAC8F4203B73E0BC54D62C0A2D9AA9B543FACA0290514EA426DE6FEF897CB858243511DCE5170420C799D888DCFDC4502FF49B66F34E75C00E98A55408A791FF5CFEA7C288F8E6664226A6A90BE237D2E40C207B5AD0CAEDFDA4946E63AEA351A09EF462515FED4098694241CD07E2CB7727B39B8B1B9467D72DFB908D8169F5DB3CD5A6BEBE1344C585A882508B760402E86EB9B5548A7B98635ECFCDC02FF62B29C53847142FC598ADC66F622F6E9F73BDF02B3D795C0DF23D00E5A3A7748F3E1D5B06F46D4568CE3F4CC57E67D4C36DF5C12800620698C727CC5F5BCACF3B7E17E37D1B7A3EF
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.legacy openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.legacy	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h	2017-03-02 17:05:12.353352522 +0100
+@@ -96,34 +96,40 @@
+ 	KEX_SHA2_METHODS
+ 
+ #define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ 	KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
+-	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+ 	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ 	KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
+-	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+ 
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
+ 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ 	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
+-	"ssh-rsa"
++	"ssh-rsa," \
++	"ssh-dss"
+ 
+ /* the actual algorithms */
+ 
+-#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
++#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
+-	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+-
+-#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \
++	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES "," \
+ 	"aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc"
+ 
++#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT "," \
++	"blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,3des-cbc"
++
+ #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
+ 	"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
+ 	"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.legacy openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.legacy	2017-03-02 17:00:37.620696010 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5	2017-03-02 17:00:37.642695983 +0100
+@@ -833,8 +833,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The
+@@ -856,8 +857,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
+@@ -1075,7 +1077,8 @@ curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libs
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
++diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
++diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+@@ -1313,8 +1316,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dsa
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.legacy openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.legacy	2017-03-02 17:00:37.636695990 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-03-02 17:04:17.528421067 +0100
+@@ -481,7 +481,9 @@ The default is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+ aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
++aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
++aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,
++blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,3des-cbc
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+@@ -707,8 +709,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+@@ -785,8 +788,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+@@ -926,7 +930,8 @@ The default is:
+ curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
++diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
++diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+@@ -1040,7 +1045,8 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@ope
+ hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+ umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
++hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1,
++hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+@@ -1344,8 +1350,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1	2017-02-09 09:23:25.366651136 +0100
+@@ -185,6 +185,19 @@ should prove enlightening (N.B. the mode
+ .Fl W
+ option, rather than
+ .Xr nc 1 ) .
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
++environment variable is set, the
++.Nm
++is run in a legacy mode. In this mode, the 
++.Nm
++doesn't check an existence of a private key and doesn't do remote checks
++of the remote server versions or if public keys are already installed.
++.El
+ .Sh "SEE ALSO"
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id	2017-02-09 09:23:25.366651136 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2017-02-09 09:33:07.896518169 +0100
+@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L
+   GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
+ fi
+ 
++# legacy environment variable implies forced copy
++[ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] && FORCED=1
++
+ while test "$#" -gt 0
+ do
+   [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2017-02-09 09:51:07.571909000 +0100
+@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+ void
+ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+ {
++	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
++}
++
++void
++log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_handler = NULL;
+-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	if (reset_handler) {
++		log_handler = NULL;
++		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ 	if (on_stderr)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2017-02-09 09:51:07.571909000 +0100
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+ 
+ void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ void     log_change_level(LogLevel);
+ int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
+ void     log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2017-02-09 09:51:07.554909017 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2017-02-09 10:05:21.067174230 +0100
+@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
++
+ 	authctxt = _authctxt;
+ 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ 
+@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
++
+ 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ 		    __func__, level);
+-	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ 	free(msg);
+@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+ 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+ 
++	mon->m_state = "";
++
+ 	return mon;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
+ {
+-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
++	char *dev_log_path;
++	int do_logfds = 0;
++
++	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
++		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
++
++		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			do_logfds = 1;
++		}
++		free(dev_log_path);
++	}
++	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2017-02-09 09:51:07.571909000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2017-02-09 10:05:49.792146561 +0100
+@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
+ 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
+ 	pid_t			 m_pid;
++	char		*m_state;
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
+ 
+ struct Authctxt;
+ void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2017-02-09 09:51:07.570909002 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2017-02-09 10:08:16.241005497 +0100
+@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+ 
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
++static int have_dev_log = 1;
+ 
+ /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+@@ -365,8 +366,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+ 		is_child = 1;
+ 
+ 		/* Child.  Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
+-		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+-		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
++		log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
++		    options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+@@ -523,8 +524,8 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 		close(ptymaster);
+ 
+ 		/* Child.  Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
+-		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+-		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
++		log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
++		    options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
+ 		/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ptyfd);
+ 
+@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	int ret;
+ 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ 	char session_type[1024];
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
+ 
+ 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ 		original_command = command;
+@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++		have_dev_log = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+@@ -1490,14 +1496,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	 * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed later.
+ 	 */
+ 	endpwent();
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+-	 * descriptors open.
+-	 */
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1633,8 +1631,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 			exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+-
+ 	do_rc_files(s, shell);
+ 
+ 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+@@ -1658,9 +1654,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
++		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
++	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
++	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
++	 * descriptors open.
++	 */
++	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
++
+ 	fflush(NULL);
+ 
+ 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2017-02-09 09:51:07.572908999 +0100
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+ 
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2017-02-09 09:51:07.572908999 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2017-02-09 10:09:39.662925141 +0100
+@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
+ {
+ 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 
+ 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2017-02-09 09:51:07.572908999 +0100
+@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2017-02-09 09:51:07.557909015 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-09 09:51:07.573908998 +0100
+@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* New socket pair */
+-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
++	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
+ 
+ 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+@@ -660,6 +660,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
++	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
++	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
++
++	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
++		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-newline-banner.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.newline-banner openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.newline-banner	2017-02-17 14:00:47.237168594 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-17 14:02:10.933096707 +0100
+@@ -369,15 +369,15 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh
+ {
+ 	u_int i;
+ 	int remote_major, remote_minor;
+-	char *s, *newline = "\n";
++	char *s;
+ 	char buf[256];			/* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
+ 	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+ 
+-	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
++	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+ 	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
+ 	    (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+ 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+-	    options.version_addendum, newline);
++	    options.version_addendum);
+ 
+ 	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
+ 	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-permit-root-login.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.permit-root openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.permit-root	2017-02-10 10:27:18.109487568 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-10 10:28:12.385776132 +0100
+@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+ 		options->login_grace_time = 120;
+ 	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+-		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
++		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
+ 	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+ 		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+ 	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.permit-root openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.permit-root	2017-02-10 10:28:24.174605582 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-10 10:28:42.254344023 +0100
+@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ The argument must be
+ or
+ .Cm no .
+ The default is
+-.Cm prohibit-password .
++.Cm yes .
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm prohibit-password
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.permit-root openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.permit-root	2017-02-10 10:26:52.256797645 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-10 10:26:52.276797405 +0100
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+ # Authentication:
+ 
+ #LoginGraceTime 2m
+-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
++#PermitRootLogin yes
+ #StrictModes yes
+ #MaxAuthTries 6
+ #MaxSessions 10

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-pkcs11-whitelist.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1.pkcs11-whitelist openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1.pkcs11-whitelist	2017-01-03 10:41:01.916331710 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1	2017-01-03 10:40:06.549366029 +0100
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ that may be added using the
+ option to
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 .
+ The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
+-.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
++.Dq /usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/* .
+ PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-whitelist openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-whitelist	2017-01-03 10:41:09.324327118 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2017-01-03 10:40:21.212356939 +0100
+@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
+-# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
++# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
+ #endif
+ 
+ typedef enum {

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-rekeying-timeouts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index b5eb3440..1535eeb2 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -225,9 +225,10 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out,
+ 		uint64_t keepalive_ms =
+ 		    (uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
+ 
+-		client_alive_scheduled = 1;
+-		if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms)
++		if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms) {
+ 			max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
++			client_alive_scheduled = 1;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ #if 0
+

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char *role = NULL;
++#endif
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+@@ -226,6 +229,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -251,8 +259,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
++		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
++		}
+ 		userauth_banner();
+ 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ 			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
++	char *micuser;
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	u_int len;
+@@ -267,7 +268,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ 	mic.length = len;
+ 
+-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
++		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
++	else
++#endif
++		micuser = authctxt->user;
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 
+ 	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+@@ -279,6 +286,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&b);
++	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
++		free(micuser);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -121,7 +121,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ 	/* reconstruct packet */
+ 	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role) {
++		buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
++		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
++		buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
++		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
++	} else 
++#endif
++		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -151,9 +151,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+ 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
++		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+-		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
++		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
++		    authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
++		    authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : "");
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
+ 		free(userstyle);
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.h	2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char		*role;
++#endif
+ 	void		*kbdintctxt;
+ 	char		*info;		/* Extra info for next auth_log */
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h	2017-02-08 14:09:09.711273302 +0100
+@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(void);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/misc.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/misc.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/misc.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -432,6 +432,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
++	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -447,6 +448,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp);
+ 		if (*cp == '/')
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (start) {
++		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
++			if (*cp == '/')
++				return (0);
++			if (*cp != '.')
++				start = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2017-02-08 14:18:13.289928913 +0100
+@@ -127,6 +127,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
++#endif
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -202,6 +205,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
++#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -769,6 +775,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m
+ 
+ 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
++#endif
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -810,6 +819,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int
++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
++
++	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	debug3("%s: role=%s",
++	    __func__, authctxt->role);
++
++	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
++		free(authctxt->role);
++		authctxt->role = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return (0);
++}
++#endif
++
+ int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+@@ -1208,7 +1236,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	u_char *p;
+-	char *userstyle, *cp;
++	char *userstyle, *r, *cp;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1234,6 +1262,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	cp = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
++	if ((r = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
++		*r = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+@@ -1269,7 +1299,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+     char *chost)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+-	char *p, *userstyle;
++	char *p, *r, *userstyle;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1286,6 +1316,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
++	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
++		*r = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
++#endif
++
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -345,6 +345,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ 
++/* Inform the privileged process about role */
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void
++mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls       2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h        2016-12-23 12:19:58.588459376 +0100
+@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
++#endif
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index 6ecfb93..b912dbe 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
+ 
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -101,37 +101,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/flask.h>
++#include <selinux/context.h>
++#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
++#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
++
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++
++/* Send audit message */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
++		       security_context_t selected_context)
++{
++	int rc=0;
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++	char *msg = NULL;
++	int audit_fd = audit_open();
++	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
++	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
++	rc = -1;
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
++		return rc;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating default context.");
++		default_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating selected context.");
++		selected_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
++		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
++		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
++		error("Error allocating memory.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
++				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
++		error("Error sending audit message.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	rc = 0;
++      out:
++	free(msg);
++	freecon(default_raw);
++	freecon(selected_raw);
++	close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++	return rc;
++}
++
++static int
++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
++{
++	struct av_decision avd;
++	int retval;
++	unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
++
++	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
++	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
++	security_context_t *sc) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
++	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
++	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
++#endif
++		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++			*sc = NULL;
++			return -1;
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	}
++#endif
++	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++		context_t con;
++		char *type=NULL;
++		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
++			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
++				role);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_role_set(con, role);
++		context_type_set(con, type);
++		freecon(*sc);
++		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++		context_free(con);
++		if (!*sc)
++			return -1;
++	}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
++		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
++		context_t con;
++		security_context_t obtained_raw;
++		security_context_t requested_raw;
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_range_set(con, lvl);
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
++			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
++		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
++			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
++			freecon(requested_raw);
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			freecon(*sc);
++			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++			context_free(con);
++			return -1;
++		}
++		freecon(requested_raw);
++		freecon(obtained_raw);
++		context_free(con);
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++      out:
++	freecon(*sc);
++	*sc = NULL;
++	return -1;
++}
++
++static void
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++{
++	*role = NULL;
++	*level = NULL;
++	if (the_authctxt) {
++		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
++			char *slash;
++			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
++			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
++				*slash = '\0';
++				*level = slash + 1;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++}
++
++/* Return the default security context for the given username */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++{
++	char *sename, *lvl;
++	char *role;
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	int r = 0;
++	context_t con = NULL;
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
++		sename = NULL;
++		lvl = NULL;
++	}
++#else
++	sename = pwname;
++	lvl = "";
++#endif
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
++#else
++		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
++#endif
++	}
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
++		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
++
++			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
++				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
++
++			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
++				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
++			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
++			freecon(sshdsc);
++			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
++			    /* we actually don't change level */
++			    reqlvl = "";
++
++			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++
++		}
++
++		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
++			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
++
++			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
++				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
++						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				}
++				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
++				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
++					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				} else {
++					r = -1;
++					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				}
++				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
++					freecon(default_level_sc);
++			}
++		} else {
++			*user_sc = *default_sc;
++		}
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++	}
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	free(sename);
++	free(lvl);
++#endif
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++	if (con)
++		context_free(con);
++
++	return (r);
++}
++
++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	char *role;
++	char *use_current;
++	int rv;
++
++	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++
++	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		use_current = "1";
++	} else {
++		use_current = "";
++		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++	}
++
++	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++
++	return rv;
++}
++
++/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
++void
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++{
++	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (options.use_pam) {
++		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++			switch (security_getenforce()) {
++			case -1:
++				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			case 0:
++				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++				    __func__);
++			break;
++			default:
++				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
++				    __func__);
++			}
++		}
++		return;
++	}
++
++	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	if (r >= 0) {
++		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
++		if (r < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
++		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
++		user_ctx = default_ctx;
++	}
++	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
++		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
++		   a failure */
++		sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
++	}
++	if (r < 0) {
++		switch (security_getenforce()) {
++		case -1:
++			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++		case 0:
++			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++			    __func__);
++			break;
++		default:
++			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++			    __func__);
++		}
++	}
++	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
++		freecon(user_ctx);
++	if (default_ctx != NULL)
++		freecon(default_ctx);
++
++	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++}
++
++#endif
++#endif
++
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/platform.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/platform.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.role-mls	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-08 14:08:30.273308184 +0100
+@@ -2053,6 +2053,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-rsa1-segfault.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1551,6 +1551,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			continue;
+ 		key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
+ 		pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
++
++		if ((pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type == KEY_RSA1) ||
++		    (key != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA1)) {
++			verbose("Ignoring RSA1 key %s",
++			    options.host_key_files[i]);
++			key_free(key);
++			key_free(pubkey);
++			continue;
++		}
+ 		if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
+ 			pubkey = key_demote(key);
+ 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ibmca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+From 5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 13:15:18 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] support ioctls for ICA crypto card on Linux/s390
+
+Based on patch from Eduardo Barretto; ok dtucker@
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index af5525a..6ceee33 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -223,6 +223,12 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+ 	SC_DENY(socketcall, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
++	/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
++#endif /* defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) */
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+
+From 9e96b41682aed793fadbea5ccd472f862179fb02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 12:24:47 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg inspection
+
+Syscall arguments are passed via an array of 64-bit values in struct
+seccomp_data, but we were only inspecting the bottom 32 bits and not
+even those correctly for BE systems.
+
+Fortunately, the only case argument inspection was used was in the
+socketcall filtering so using this for sandbox escape seems
+impossible.
+
+ok dtucker
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 2e1ed2c..af5525a 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -73,6 +73,16 @@
+ # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
+ #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+ 
++#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
++# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  0
++# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
++#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
++# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
++# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  0
++#else
++#error "Unknown endianness"
++#endif
++
+ /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
+ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+@@ -81,11 +91,17 @@
+ 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+ #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
+-	/* load first syscall argument */ \
++	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 6), \
++	/* load and test first syscall argument, low word */ \
++	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
++	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
++	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
++	    ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
++	/* load and test first syscall argument, high word */ \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+-	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
+-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
++	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
++	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
++	    (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+ 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+ 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+
+From 58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 12:43:02 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Missing header on Linux/s390
+
+Patch from Jakub Jelen
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index a8d472a..2831e9d 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@
+ #include <elf.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
++#ifdef __s390__
++#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+
+getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
+crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
+Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(geteuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+ #endif
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index e86aa2c..98062f1 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
++	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
++	SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+ #endif /* defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) */
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+--
+1.9.1
+
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+ #endif
+@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+ #endif
+--
+1.9.1

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ppc64le.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-04-21 13:30:49.692650798 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-04-21 13:30:52.259647579 +0200
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
++	SC_DENY(socketcall, EACCES),
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sha2-signatures.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.sha2 openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.sha2	2017-02-17 18:15:53.589835864 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c	2017-02-17 18:17:20.404781663 +0100
+@@ -379,21 +379,14 @@ static int
+ kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+-	char *algs;
+ 
+-	if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+-		goto out;
+-	/* success */
+-	r = 0;
+- out:
+-	free(algs);
+-	return r;
++		return r;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ int

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.fingerprint	2016-12-23 15:38:50.520432387 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c	2016-12-23 15:38:50.564432394 +0100
+@@ -2279,7 +2279,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_updat
+ 		if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ 		do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+@@ -2287,7 +2287,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_updat
+ 	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+ 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ 		do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+@@ -2330,7 +2330,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_updat
+ 	    (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0],
+ 	    ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys,
+ 	    options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+-	    options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0)
++	    options.fingerprint_hash[0])) != 0)
+ 		error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s",
+ 		    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+@@ -2443,7 +2443,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
+ 			error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 		debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), fp);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fingerprint	2016-12-23 15:38:50.559432393 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c	2016-12-23 15:38:50.565432394 +0100
+@@ -1668,16 +1668,18 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 		goto parse_string;
+ 
+ 	case oFingerprintHash:
+-		intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
+-		arg = strdelim(&s);
+-		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+-			    filename, linenum);
+-		if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
+-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg);
+-		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+-			*intptr = value;
++		if (*activep && options->num_fingerprint_hash == 0)
++			while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
++				value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg);
++				if (value == -1)
++					fatal("%s line %d: unknown fingerprints algorithm specs: %s.",
++						filename, linenum, arg);
++				if (options->num_fingerprint_hash >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
++					fatal("%s line %d: too many fingerprints algorithm specs.",
++						filename, linenum);
++				options->fingerprint_hash[
++					options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = value;
++			}
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case oUpdateHostkeys:
+@@ -1905,7 +1907,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
+ 	options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
+ 	options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
+-	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
++	options->num_fingerprint_hash = 0;
+ 	options->update_hostkeys = -1;
+ 	options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
+ 	options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
+@@ -2102,8 +2104,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+ 	if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+ 		options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+-	if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+-		options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
++	if (options->num_fingerprint_hash == 0) {
++		options->fingerprint_hash[options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
++		options->fingerprint_hash[options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = (FIPS_mode() ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : SSH_DIGEST_MD5);
++	}
+ 	if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
+ 		options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+ 	if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
+@@ -2489,6 +2493,17 @@ dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int co
+ }
+ 
+ static void
++dump_cfg_fmtarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, int *vals)
++{
++	u_int i;
++
++	printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
++	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
++		printf(" %s", fmt_intarg(code, vals[i]));
++	printf("\n");
++}
++
++static void
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+ {
+ 	u_int i;
+@@ -2564,7 +2579,6 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
+-	dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
+@@ -2634,6 +2648,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
++	dump_cfg_fmtarray(oFingerprintHash, o->num_fingerprint_hash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 
+ 	/* Special cases */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.fingerprint	2016-12-23 15:38:50.559432393 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h	2016-12-23 15:38:50.565432394 +0100
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #define MAX_SEND_ENV		256
+ #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES	32
+ #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS	32
++#define MAX_SSH_DIGESTS	8
+ #define PATH_MAX_SUN		(sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
+ 
+ struct allowed_cname {
+@@ -162,7 +163,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	char	*revoked_host_keys;
+ 
+-	int	 fingerprint_hash;
++	int num_fingerprint_hash;
++	int 	fingerprint_hash[MAX_SSH_DIGESTS];
+ 
+ 	int	 update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.fingerprint	2016-12-23 15:38:50.565432394 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5	2016-12-23 15:40:03.754444166 +0100
+@@ -652,12 +652,13 @@ or
+ .Cm no
+ (the default).
+ .It Cm FingerprintHash
+-Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
++Specifies the hash algorithms used when displaying key fingerprints.
+ Valid options are:
+ .Cm md5
+ and
+-.Cm sha256
+-(the default).
++.Cm sha256 .
++The default is
++.Cm "sha256 md5".
+ .It Cm ForwardAgent
+ Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
+ will be forwarded to the remote machine.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint	2016-12-23 15:38:50.561432394 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c	2016-12-23 15:38:50.566432394 +0100
+@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 		goto done;
+ 	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
+ 	int matched, ret = -1, have_sig = 1;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, key_type(id->key), fp);
+@@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ 		goto out;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c	2016-12-23 15:38:50.566432394 +0100
+@@ -922,9 +922,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+ 			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++			    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 			ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++			    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ 				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ 			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
+@@ -966,12 +966,6 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 			else
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ 			/* The default */
+-			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+-			ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-			if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+-				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ 			msg2[0] = '\0';
+ 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
+@@ -985,16 +979,28 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 			}
+ 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+-			    "established%s\n"
+-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
++			    "established%s\n", host, ip, msg1);
++			for (i = 0; i < (u_int) options.num_fingerprint_hash; i++) {
++				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
++				    options.fingerprint_hash[i], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++				ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
++				    options.fingerprint_hash[i], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++				if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
++					fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
++				len = strlen(msg);
++				snprintf(msg+len, sizeof(msg)-len,
++				    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s",
++				    type, fp,
++				    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
++				    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
++				    msg2);
++				free(ra);
++				free(fp);
++			}
++			len = strlen(msg);
++			snprintf(msg+len, sizeof(msg)-len,
+ 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+-			    "(yes/no)? ",
+-			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+-			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+-			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+-			    msg2);
+-			free(ra);
+-			free(fp);
++			    "(yes/no)? ");
+ 			if (!confirm(msg))
+ 				goto fail;
+ 			hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
+@@ -1244,7 +1250,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
+ 	struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
++	    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		r = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1252,7 +1258,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
+ 
+ 	if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
+ 		if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ 			error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s",
+ 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 			r = -1;
+@@ -1432,9 +1438,9 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
+ 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ 			continue;
+ 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 		ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+@@ -1457,7 +1463,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 	if (fp == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c.fingerprint	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c	2016-12-23 15:38:50.566432394 +0100
+@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (!found) {
+-		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname);
+ 		fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s",

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-usedns-yes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+Revert 3cd5103c1e1aaa59bd66f7f52f6ebbcd5deb12f9
+
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 475076bf2..318546290 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	if (options->max_sessions == -1)
+ 		options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
+ 	if (options->use_dns == -1)
+-		options->use_dns = 0;
++		options->use_dns = 1;
+ 	if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
+ 		options->client_alive_interval = 0;
+ 	if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index e9045bc4d..c9042ac3c 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Default for new installations.
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
+ #ShowPatchLevel no
+-#UseDNS no
++#UseDNS yes
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10:30:100
+ #PermitTunnel no
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 4fd93d68e..cf57c609f 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1379,10 +1379,12 @@ should look up the remote host name and check that
+ should look up the remote host name, and to check that
+ the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
+ very same IP address.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm no
+-(the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in
++then only addresses and not host names may be used in
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ .Cm from
+ and

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-winscp-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+commit 2985d4062ebf4204bbd373456a810d558698f9f5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 25 09:22:25 2017 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Make WinSCP patterns for SSH_OLD_DHGEX more specific to
+    exclude WinSCP 5.10.x and up.  bz#2748, from martin at winscp.net, ok djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 6fd7c32e99af3952db007aa180e73142ddbc741a
+
+diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
+index 156a5ea8..d82135e2 100644
+--- a/compat.c
++++ b/compat.c
+@@ -177,9 +177,12 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+ 		  "TTSSH/2.72*",	SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
+ 		{ "WinSCP_release_4*,"
+ 		  "WinSCP_release_5.0*,"
+-		  "WinSCP_release_5.1*,"
+-		  "WinSCP_release_5.5*,"
+-		  "WinSCP_release_5.6*,"
++		  "WinSCP_release_5.1,"
++		  "WinSCP_release_5.1.*,"
++		  "WinSCP_release_5.5,"
++		  "WinSCP_release_5.5.*,"
++		  "WinSCP_release_5.6,"
++		  "WinSCP_release_5.6.*,"
+ 		  "WinSCP_release_5.7,"
+ 		  "WinSCP_release_5.7.1,"
+ 		  "WinSCP_release_5.7.2,"

SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sftp-empty-files.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 4d827f0d75a53d3952288ab882efbddea7ffadfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 00:24:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode;
+reported by Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
+
+Upstream-ID: 5d9c8f2fa8511d4ecf95322994ffe73e9283899b
+---
+ sftp-server.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 3619cdfc0..df0fb5068 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.110 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.111 2017/04/04 00:24:56 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+@@ -691,8 +691,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+-	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
+-	    (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
++	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
++	    (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
+ 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+ 		status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ 	} else {
+

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+authfd.c
+authfd.h
+atomicio.c
+atomicio.h
+bufaux.c
+bufbn.c
+buffer.h
+buffer.c
+cleanup.c
+cipher.h
+compat.h
+defines.h
+entropy.c
+entropy.h
+fatal.c
+includes.h
+kex.h
+key.c
+key.h
+log.c
+log.h
+match.h
+misc.c
+misc.h
+pathnames.h
+platform.h
+rsa.h
+ssh-dss.c
+ssh-rsa.c
+ssh.h
+ssh2.h
+uidswap.c
+uidswap.h
+uuencode.c
+uuencode.h
+xmalloc.c
+xmalloc.h

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-agent_structure.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-agent	2017-02-14 10:19:16.466070259 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c	2017-02-14 10:26:10.062866980 +0100
+@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
+                 case EOF:
+                 case '\0':
+                     if (len > 0) { 
+-                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+-                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
++                        argv = xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
++                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
+                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
+                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
+                         len = 0;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-02-14 10:19:12.225071868 +0100
+@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
+ typedef struct identity Identity;
+ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++       int     fd;
++       Buffer  identities;
++       int     howmany;
++}      AuthenticationConnection;
++
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-02-14 10:19:12.224071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -52,12 +52,15 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+ #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+ 
++#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
++
+ static char *
+ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+     if (count == 0)
+         return NULL;
+    
+-    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
++    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
+         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
+@@ -80,12 +83,12 @@ void
+ agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+     size_t i;
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
++    buffer_init(buf);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
++    buffer_put_int(buf, count);
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
++        buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
+     }
+ }
+ 
+@@ -109,17 +112,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     char * retc;
+     int32_t reti;
+ 
+-    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++    rnd = arc4random();
+     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
+     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
+         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
+     }
+ 
+-    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
++    cookie = xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+-            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++            rnd = arc4random();
+         }
+         cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     }
+     else {
+         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++        buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
+     }
+     
+     /*
+@@ -151,35 +154,35 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
+     time(&ts);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
++    buffer_init(session_id2);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
++    buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
++    /* debug3("cookie: %s", tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
++    buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
++    /* debug3("user: %s", user); */
++    buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
++    /* debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
++    buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
++    /* debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
++    buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
++    /* debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
+     if(retc)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
++        buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
+     else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
++        buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
++    /* debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
++    buffer_put_string(session_id2, sshbuf_ptr(&action_agentbuf), sshbuf_len(&action_agentbuf));
+     if (free_logbuf) { 
+         free(action_logbuf);
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
++        buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
++    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+     if(reti >= 0)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
++        buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
+     else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
++        buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
++    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
++    buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
+ 
+     free(cookie);
+     return;
+@@ -288,39 +291,47 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ {
+     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
+     Identity *id;
+-    Key *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+-    char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
++    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
++    int r;
++    unsigned int i;
+ 
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+-        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
++        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
++		if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, 2,
++		    &idlist)) != 0) {
++			if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
++				fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
++				    "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
++		} else {
++		for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
+         {
+-            if(key != NULL) {
+-                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+-                id->key = key;
+-                id->filename = comment;
++            if(idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
++                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
++                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
++                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
+                 id->ac = ac;
+                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                free(id->filename);
+-                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
+                 free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+             }
+         }
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
+-        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++        buffer_free(&session_id2);
++        ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
++        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
++        free(ac);
++        }
+     }
+     else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
++        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+     }
+     /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
+     EVP_cleanup();
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-agent	2017-02-14 10:19:12.223071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+  * a patch 8-)
+  */
+ #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
+-    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
++    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
+ #endif
+ 
+     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
+@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
++    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
++    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
+ 
+     if(ruser_ptr) {
+         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
+         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
+             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
++            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
+         } else
+ #endif
+         {
+             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
++                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ 
+     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
+     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          */
+         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -187,19 +187,19 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+      */
+ 
+     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ 
+         /*
+          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
+          */
+         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+         } else {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+         }
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
++        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
+     }
+ 
+ cleanexit:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -117,12 +117,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+         } else {
+             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
+             if(!slash_ptr)
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal
++                fatal
+                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+ 
+             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
++                fatal("Username too long");
+ 
+             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+         }
+         authorized_keys_file =
+-            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
++            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
+                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
+                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
++        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
+                                                               percent_expand
+                                                               later, we'd step
+                                                               on this, so free
+@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
+ #endif
+     authorized_keys_file =
+-        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
++        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
+                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
+                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-agent	2017-02-14 10:19:12.224071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
++#include "digest.h"
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+ 
+@@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+     char *fp;
+ 
+     found_key = 0;
+-    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
++    found = key_new(key->type);
+ 
+     while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
+@@ -78,11 +80,11 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++        if(key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+             int quoted = 0;
+ 
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
++            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+             /* key_options = cp; */
+             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+@@ -92,26 +94,26 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+             }
+             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+-            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
++            if(key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
+                 continue;
+             }
+         }
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
++        if(key_equal(found, key)) {
+             found_key = 1;
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
++            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+                                   linenum);
+-            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+-                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
++            fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
++                                  key_type(found), fp);
+             free(fp);
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
++    key_free(found);
+     if(!found_key)
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
++        verbose("key not found");
+     return found_key;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -128,11 +130,11 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+     char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ 
+     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
++    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
+ 
+     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
+     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
++        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -144,7 +146,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ 
+     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+         fclose(f);
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
++        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -187,44 +189,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+     else {
+         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
+         if(pw == NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
++            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
+                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror
++        error
+             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
+        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
++        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
+     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
++    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
+                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
+ 
+     /* 
+      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+      * run cleanup_exit() code.
+      */
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+ 
+     switch ((pid = fork())) {
+     case -1:                                              /* error */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         close(p[1]);
+         return 0;
+@@ -234,13 +236,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
+         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
++            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
+            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+ #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+@@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
++            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -258,7 +260,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
++            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -270,18 +272,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
+            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         _exit(127);
+     default:                                              /* parent */
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     close(p[1]);
+     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         /* Don't leave zombie child */
+         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+@@ -292,22 +294,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+         if(errno != EINTR) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
++            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             goto out;
+         }
+     }
+     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+         goto out;
+     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     found_key = ok;
+   out:
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+     return found_key;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c	2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 	int comparehome = 0;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
++    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
+ 
+ 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+-		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
++		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ 
+-		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
++		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 
+ 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+-			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
++			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ 			    buf);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-02-14 10:19:12.224071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
++
+ /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
+ extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
+  */
+@@ -58,40 +60,41 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+     Buffer          b = { 0 };
+     char           *pkalg = NULL;
+     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+-    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
++    u_int           blen = 0;
++    size_t          slen = 0;
+     int             authenticated = 0;
+ 
+     pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
+ 
++    /* construct packet to sign and test */
++    buffer_init(&b);
++
+     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
+     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
++    if(key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+-    /* construct packet to sign and test */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
+-
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
++    buffer_put_string(&b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2));
++    buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
++    buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
++    buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
++    buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
++    buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
++    buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
++    buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ 
+-    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
++    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
++    if(key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+         authenticated = 1;
+ 
+   user_auth_clean_exit:
+     /* if(&b != NULL) */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
++    buffer_free(&b);
+     if(sig != NULL)
+         free(sig);
+     if(pkblob != NULL)