rsh package update

Signed-off-by: basebuilder_pel7x64builder0 <basebuilder@powerel.org>

SOURCES/0001-rcp-don-t-advance-pointer-returned-from-rcp_basename.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From b86a7a6af20330dbf87264da768a9d317e210dbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 14:10:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rcp: don't advance pointer returned from rcp_basename
+
+---
+ rcp/rcp.c | 9 ++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.basename netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.basename	2015-03-26 14:19:25.771159388 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2015-03-26 14:28:23.233938529 +0100
+@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static void usage(void);
+ static void toremote(const char *targ, int argc, char *argv[]);
+ static void tolocal(int argc, char *argv[]);
+ static void error(const char *fmt, ...);
++static char *rcp_basename(char *path);
+ 
+ int
+ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+@@ -464,11 +465,11 @@ notreg:			(void)close(f);
+ 			error("rcp: %s: not a plain file\n", name);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+-		last = strrchr(name, '/');
++
++		last = rcp_basename(name);
+ 		if (last == 0)
+ 			last = name;
+-		else
+-			last++;
++
+ 		if (pflag) {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Make it compatible with possible future
+@@ -556,8 +557,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+ 	last = rcp_basename(name);
+ 	if (last == 0)
+ 		last = name;
+-	else
+-		last++;
++
+ 	if (pflag) {
+ 		(void)snprintf(path, sizeof(path),
+ 		    "T%ld 0 %ld 0\n", statp->st_mtime, statp->st_atime);

SOURCES/0001-rshd-use-sockaddr_in-for-non-native-IPv6-clients.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From dfc2da58520df75fc1a2506ebc4142085ed2ba1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 15:38:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] rshd: use sockaddr_in for non-native IPv6 clients
+
+When client has IPv4 address but connection was made via AF_INET6
+socket, then convert socket structure representing client back
+to sockaddr_in so we don't confuse pam_rhosts authentication with
+IPv4-mapped IPv6 address.
+---
+ rshd/rshd.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/rshd/rshd.c b/rshd/rshd.c
+index d1ea0e9..e8cdfe2 100644
+--- a/rshd/rshd.c
++++ b/rshd/rshd.c
+@@ -644,6 +644,29 @@ static void network_init(int fd,
+ 		syslog(LOG_ERR, "getpeername: %m");
+ 		_exit(1);
+ 	}
++
++	if (((struct sockaddr_in *) fromp)->sin_family == AF_INET6 &&
++		IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *) fromp)->sin6_addr)) {
++
++		struct addrinfo *res, hints = {};
++		char client_addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = {};
++		char client_port[6] = {};
++
++		inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) fromp)->sin6_addr,
++			client_addr, sizeof(client_addr));
++
++		sprintf(client_port, "%d", ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *) fromp)->sin6_port));
++
++		hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
++		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++		hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST | AI_NUMERICSERV;
++
++		getaddrinfo(client_addr, client_port, &hints, &res);
++
++		memcpy(fromp, res->ai_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
++		freeaddrinfo(res);
++	}
++
+ 	if (keepalive &&
+ 	    setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *)&on,
+ 	    sizeof(on)) < 0)
+-- 
+1.8.1.4
+

SOURCES/0001-rshd-use-upper-bound-for-cmdbuflen.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 4f543ec56d023905ec22e4b6325f834bce4a624a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adam Tkac <atkac@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 May 2014 12:01:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] rshd: use upper bound for cmdbuflen
+
+---
+ rshd/rshd.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/rshd/rshd.c b/rshd/rshd.c
+index 66c5703..487c969 100644
+--- a/rshd/rshd.c
++++ b/rshd/rshd.c
+@@ -430,7 +430,12 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+ 		exit (1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	cmdbuf = malloc (++cmdbuflen);
++	cmdbuflen++;
++	/* Decrease cmdbuflen to reasonable number if it's too high */
++	if ((size_t) cmdbuflen > 131072)
++		cmdbuflen = 131072;
++
++	cmdbuf = malloc (cmdbuflen);
+ 	if (cmdbuf == NULL) {
+ 		syslog (LOG_ERR, "Could not allocate space for cmdbuf");
+ 		exit (1);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

SOURCES/0002-rlogind-use-sockaddr_in-for-non-native-IPv6-client.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 6e0abc319fa8d1f17c4cd1bfa633b9aa10ef5370 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:34:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rlogind: use sockaddr_in for non-native IPv6 client
+
+---
+ rlogind/network.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/rlogind/network.c b/rlogind/network.c
+index 8c2a975..db272fd 100644
+--- a/rlogind/network.c
++++ b/rlogind/network.c
+@@ -204,6 +204,28 @@ network_init(int f, int *hostokp)
+ #endif
+ 	fromp = &from;
+ 
++	if (((struct sockaddr_in *) fromp)->sin_family == AF_INET6 &&
++		IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *) fromp)->sin6_addr)) {
++
++		struct addrinfo *res, hints = {};
++		char client_addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = {};
++		char client_port[6] = {};
++
++		inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) fromp)->sin6_addr,
++			client_addr, sizeof(client_addr));
++
++		sprintf(client_port, "%d", ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *) fromp)->sin6_port));
++
++		hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
++		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++		hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST | AI_NUMERICSERV;
++
++		getaddrinfo(client_addr, client_port, &hints, &res);
++
++		memcpy(fromp, res->ai_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
++		freeaddrinfo(res);
++	}
++
+ 	alarm(60);
+ 	read(f, &c, 1);
+ 
+-- 
+1.8.1.4
+

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.10-stdarg.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.10/rcp/rcp.c	1999-04-18 05:16:49-04	1.1
++++ netkit-rsh-0.10/rcp/rcp.c	1999-04-18 05:40:52-04
+@@ -836,19 +836,33 @@
+ error(const char *fmt, ...)
+ {
+ 	static FILE *fp;
+-	va_list ap;
+-
+-	va_start(ap, fmt);
++	char buf[1000];
+ 
+ 	++errs;
+ 	if (!fp && !(fp = fdopen(rem, "w")))
+ 		return;
+-	fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
+-	vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
++	
++	/* (fmt,...) might need to go to two streams.
++	 *
++	 * In { va_start ; vfprintf ; vfprintf ; va_end }, second
++	 * vfprintf didn't restart (ie: vfprintf affects ap) (glibc)
++	 *
++	 * Is { va_start ; vfprintf ; va_end} * 2 even allowed?
++	 *
++	 * => Dump (fmt,...) to buffer.  */
++	
++	{
++	    va_list ap;
++	    va_start(ap, fmt);
++	    vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap);
++	    buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = 0;
++	    va_end(ap);
++	}
++	
++	fprintf(fp, "%c%s", 0x01, buf);
+ 	fflush(fp);
+-	if (!iamremote)	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ 
+-	va_end(ap);
++	if (!iamremote)	fputs(buf, stderr);
+ }
+ 
+ static void 

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.16-jbj.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rcp/Makefile.jbj	Tue Dec 21 16:32:51 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rcp/Makefile	Tue Dec 21 16:33:16 1999
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: rcp
+-	install -s -o root -m$(SUIDMODE) rcp $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
++	install -s rcp $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
+ 	install -m$(MANMODE) rcp.1 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man1
+ 
+ clean:
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/Makefile.jbj	Tue Dec 21 16:33:57 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/Makefile	Tue Dec 21 16:34:08 1999
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: $(PROG)
+-	install -s -o root -m$(SUIDMODE) $(PROG) $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
++	install -s $(PROG) $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
+ 	install -m $(MANMODE) $(PROG).1 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man1
+ 
+ clean:
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rsh/Makefile.jbj	Tue Dec 21 16:33:28 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rsh/Makefile	Tue Dec 21 16:33:44 1999
+@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: rsh
+-	install -s -o root -m$(SUIDMODE) rsh $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
++	install -s rsh $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
+ 	install -m$(MANMODE) rsh.1 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man1
+ 
+ clean:

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.16-jbj4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rshd/Makefile.jbj4	Fri Jan 28 12:17:42 2000
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rshd/Makefile	Fri Jan 28 12:17:56 2000
+@@ -6,9 +6,8 @@
+ OBJS = rshd.o
+ 
+ ifeq ($(USE_PAM),1)
+-# ?
+-CFLAGS += # -DUSE_PAM
+-LIBS += -ldl # -lpam -lpam_misc
++CFLAGS += -DUSE_PAM
++LIBS += -ldl -lpam -lpam_misc
+ endif
+ 
+ rshd: $(OBJS)

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.16-nokrb.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+diff -uNr netkit-rsh-0.16/rcp/rcp.1 netkit-rsh-0.16/rcp/rcp.1
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rcp/rcp.1	Tue Dec 14 07:52:57 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rcp/rcp.1	Mon May 29 22:52:34 2000
+@@ -41,12 +41,10 @@
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm rcp
+ .Op Fl px
+-.Op Fl k Ar realm
+ .Ar file1 file2
+ .Nm rcp
+ .Op Fl px
+ .Op Fl r
+-.Op Fl k Ar realm
+ .Ar file ...
+ .Ar directory
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+@@ -79,27 +77,6 @@
+ modified by the
+ .Xr umask  2
+ on the destination host is used.
+-.It Fl k
+-The
+-.Fl k
+-option requests
+-.Nm rcp
+-to obtain tickets
+-for the remote host in realm
+-.Ar realm
+-instead of the remote host's realm as determined by
+-.Xr krb_realmofhost  3  .
+-.It Fl x
+-The
+-.Fl x
+-option turns on
+-.Tn DES
+-encryption for all data passed by
+-.Nm rcp .
+-This may impact response time and
+-.Tn CPU
+-utilization, but provides
+-increased security.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ If
+@@ -134,11 +111,6 @@
+ .Nm rcp
+ command appeared in
+ .Bx 4.2 .
+-The version of
+-.Nm rcp
+-described here
+-has been reimplemented with Kerberos in
+-.Bx 4.3 Reno .
+ .Sh BUGS
+ Doesn't detect all cases where the target of a copy might
+ be a file in cases where only a directory should be legal.
+diff -uNr netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/rlogin.1 netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/rlogin.1
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/rlogin.1	Tue Dec 14 07:52:57 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/rlogin.1	Mon May 29 22:51:42 2000
+@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
+ .Ar rlogin
+ .Op Fl 8EKLdx
+ .Op Fl e Ar char
+-.Op Fl k Ar realm
+ .Op Fl l Ar username
+ .Ar host
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+@@ -50,9 +49,7 @@
+ starts a terminal session on a remote host
+ .Ar host  .
+ .Pp
+-.Nm Rlogin
+-first attempts to use the Kerberos authorization mechanism, described below.
+-If the remote host does not supporting Kerberos the standard Berkeley
++The standard Berkeley
+ .Pa rhosts
+ authorization mechanism is used.
+ The options are as follows:
+@@ -71,10 +68,6 @@
+ When used with the
+ .Fl 8
+ option, this provides a completely transparent connection.
+-.It Fl K
+-The
+-.Fl K
+-option turns off all Kerberos authentication.
+ .It Fl L
+ The
+ .Fl L
+@@ -94,25 +87,6 @@
+ ``~'' by default.
+ This specification may be as a literal character, or as an octal
+ value in the form \ennn.
+-.It Fl k
+-The
+-.FL k
+-option requests rlogin to obtain tickets for the remote host
+-in realm
+-.Ar realm
+-instead of the remote host's realm as determined by
+-.Xr krb_realmofhost  3  .
+-.It Fl x
+-The
+-.Fl x
+-option turns on
+-.Tn DES
+-encryption for all data passed via the
+-rlogin session.
+-This may impact response time and
+-.Tn CPU
+-utilization, but provides
+-increased security.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ A line of the form ``<escape char>.'' disconnects from the remote host.
+@@ -129,35 +103,6 @@
+ is transparent.
+ Flow control via ^S/^Q and flushing of input and output on interrupts
+ are handled properly.
+-.Sh KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION
+-Each user may have a private authorization list in the file
+-.Pa .klogin
+-in their home directory.
+-Each line in this file should contain a Kerberos principal name of the
+-form
+-.Ar principal.instance@realm  .
+-If the originating user is authenticated to one of the principals named
+-in
+-.Pa .klogin ,
+-access is granted to the account.
+-The principal
+-.Ar accountname.@localrealm
+-is granted access if
+-there is no
+-.Pa .klogin
+-file.
+-Otherwise a login and password will be prompted for on the remote machine
+-as in
+-.Xr login  1  .
+-To avoid certain security problems, the
+-.Pa .klogin
+-file must be owned by
+-the remote user.
+-.Pp
+-If Kerberos authentication fails, a warning message is printed and the
+-standard Berkeley
+-.Nm rlogin
+-is used instead.
+ .Sh ENVIRONMENT
+ The following environment variable is utilized by
+ .Nm rlogin :
+@@ -167,9 +112,6 @@
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr rsh 1 ,
+-.Xr kerberos 3 ,
+-.Xr krb_sendauth 3 ,
+-.Xr krb_realmofhost 3
+ .Sh HISTORY
+ The
+ .Nm rlogin
+diff -uNr netkit-rsh-0.16/rsh/rsh.1 netkit-rsh-0.16/rsh/rsh.1
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rsh/rsh.1	Tue Dec 14 07:52:58 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rsh/rsh.1	Mon May 29 22:51:29 2000
+@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm rsh
+ .Op Fl Kdnx
+-.Op Fl k Ar realm
+ .Op Fl l Ar username
+ .Ar host
+ .Op command
+@@ -62,10 +61,6 @@
+ normally terminates when the remote command does.
+ The options are as follows:
+ .Bl -tag -width flag
+-.It Fl K
+-The
+-.Fl K
+-option turns off all Kerberos authentication.
+ .It Fl d
+ The
+ .Fl d
+@@ -74,23 +69,11 @@
+ on the
+ .Tn TCP
+ sockets used for communication with the remote host.
+-.It Fl k
+-The
+-.Fl k
+-option causes
+-.Nm rsh
+-to obtain tickets for the remote host in
+-.Ar realm
+-instead of the remote host's realm as determined by
+-.Xr krb_realmofhost  3  .
+ .It Fl l
+ By default, the remote username is the same as the local username.
+ The
+ .Fl l
+ option allows the remote name to be specified.
+-Kerberos authentication is used, and authorization is determined
+-as in
+-.Xr rlogin  1  .
+ .It Fl n
+ The
+ .Fl n
+@@ -99,13 +82,6 @@
+ (see the
+ .Sx BUGS
+ section of this manual page).
+-.It Fl x
+-The
+-.Fl x
+-option turns on
+-.Tn DES
+-encryption for all data exchange.
+-This may introduce a significant delay in response time.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ If no
+@@ -142,9 +118,6 @@
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr rlogin 1 ,
+-.Xr kerberos 3 ,
+-.Xr krb_sendauth 3 ,
+-.Xr krb_realmofhost 3
+ .Sh HISTORY
+ The
+ .Nm rsh

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.16-prompt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rexec/rexec.c.prompt	Mon Feb 28 16:23:33 2000
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rexec/rexec.c	Mon Feb 28 16:49:23 2000
+@@ -164,12 +164,30 @@
+     user_name[strlen(user_name)-1] = '\0'; /* Hopefully fgets always adds
+ 					      a newline. */
+     passwd = getpass("Password: ");
++  } else {
++
++    if ( user_name == NULL )
++      user_name = getenv("REXEC_USER");
++    if ( user_name == NULL ) {
++      uid_t uid = getuid();
++      struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
++      if (!(pw && pw->pw_name)) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "Can't lookup uid %d\n", uid);
++	exit(1);
++      }
++      user_name = strdup(pw->pw_name);
++    }
++    if ( passwd == NULL )
++      passwd = getenv("REXEC_PASS");
++    if ( passwd == NULL )
++       passwd = getpass("Password: ");
+   }
+ 
+-  if ( user_name == NULL )
+-    user_name = getenv("REXEC_USER");
+-  if ( passwd == NULL )
+-    passwd = getenv("REXEC_PASS");
++  if (!(user_name && passwd)) {
++    fprintf(stderr, "Can't use %s without supplying a user and password\n",
++    	progname);
++    exit(1);
++  }
+ 
+   if ( (sock = rexec(&host, port_exec, user_name, passwd, command, 
+ 		     p_to_aux_sock)) < 0 )

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.16-rlogin=rsh.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/rlogin.c.rsh	Fri Mar  3 08:59:37 2000
++++ netkit-rsh-0.16/rlogin/rlogin.c	Fri Mar  3 08:59:45 2000
+@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@
+ 		p = argv[0];
+ 
+ 	if (strcmp(p, "rlogin"))
++	if (strcmp(p, "rsh"))
+ 		host = p;
+ 
+ 	/* handle "rlogin host flags" */

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-arg_max.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.arg_max netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.arg_max	2008-05-09 10:36:44.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2008-05-09 10:36:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -235,7 +235,8 @@ static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation 
+ static void
+ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ {
+-	char cmdbuf[ARG_MAX+1];
++	char *cmdbuf;
++	long cmdbuflen;
+ 	char user[17], pass[17];
+ 	struct passwd *pwd;
+ 	int s = -1;
+@@ -254,6 +255,18 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ #endif
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+ 
++	cmdbuflen = sysconf (_SC_ARG_MAX);
++	if (!(cmdbuflen > 0)) {
++		syslog (LOG_ERR, "sysconf (_SC_ARG_MAX) failed");
++		fatal ("sysconf (_SC_ARG_MAX) failed\n");
++	}
++
++	cmdbuf = malloc (++cmdbuflen);
++	if (cmdbuf == NULL) {
++		syslog (LOG_ERR, "Could not allocate space for cmdbuf");
++		fatal ("Could not allocate space for cmdbuf\n");
++	}
++
+ 	signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+ 	signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ 	signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+@@ -303,7 +316,7 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ 
+ 	getstr(user, sizeof(user), "username too long\n");
+ 	getstr(pass, sizeof(pass), "password too long\n");
+-	getstr(cmdbuf, sizeof(cmdbuf), "command too long\n");
++	getstr(cmdbuf, cmdbuflen, "command too long\n");
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+        #define PAM_BAIL if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ 	       pam_end(pamh, pam_error); exit(1); \
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.arg_max netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.arg_max	2008-05-09 10:36:44.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2008-05-09 10:38:51.000000000 +0200
+@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ static int log_audit(const char *usernam
+ static void
+ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+ {
+-	char cmdbuf[ARG_MAX+1];
++	char *cmdbuf;
++	long cmdbuflen;
+ 	const char *theshell, *shellname;
+ 	char locuser[16], remuser[16];
+ 	struct passwd *pwd;
+@@ -415,6 +416,18 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+         int i;
+ #endif
+ 
++	cmdbuflen = sysconf (_SC_ARG_MAX);
++	if (!(cmdbuflen > 0)) {
++		syslog (LOG_ERR, "sysconf (_SC_ARG_MAX) failed");
++		exit (1);
++	}
++
++	cmdbuf = malloc (++cmdbuflen);
++	if (cmdbuf == NULL) {
++		syslog (LOG_ERR, "Could not allocate space for cmdbuf");
++		exit (1);
++	}
++
+ 	signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+ 	signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ 	signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+@@ -460,7 +473,7 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 
+ 	getstr(remuser, sizeof(remuser), "remuser");
+ 	getstr(locuser, sizeof(locuser), "locuser");
+-	getstr(cmdbuf, sizeof(cmdbuf), "command");
++	getstr(cmdbuf, cmdbuflen, "command");
+ 	if (!strcmp(locuser, "root")) paranoid = 1;
+ 
+ 	hostname = findhostname((struct sockaddr *)fromp, fromlen,

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-audit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/Makefile.audit netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/Makefile
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/Makefile.audit	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/Makefile	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ ifeq ($(USE_PAM),1)
+ CFLAGS += -DUSE_PAM
+ LIBS += -ldl -lpam -lpam_misc
+ endif
++ifeq ($(USE_AUDIT),1)
++CFLAGS += -DUSE_AUDIT
++LIBS += -ldl -laudit
++endif
+ 
+ rshd: $(OBJS)
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.audit netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.audit	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2008-03-25 12:35:37.000000000 +0100
+@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ char rcsid[] = 
+ static pam_handle_t *pamh;
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+ 
++#ifdef USE_AUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#endif /* USE_AUDIT */
++
+ #define	OPTIONS	"aDhlLn"
+ 
+ static int keepalive = 1;
+@@ -224,6 +228,14 @@ static void stderr_parent(int sock, int 
+     exit(0);
+ }
+ 
++#define PAM_SET_ITEM(item,val) \
++    do { \
++	retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, (item), (val)); \
++	if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
++	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_set_item: %s\n", pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
++	    exit (1); \
++	} \
++    } while (0)
+ 
+ static struct passwd *doauth(const char *remuser, 
+ 			     const char *hostname, 
+@@ -243,9 +255,10 @@ static struct passwd *doauth(const char 
+ 	syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_start: %s\n", pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
+ 	exit (1);
+     }
+-    pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, remuser);
+-    pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
+-    pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "rsh");  /* we don't use a tty, so punt */
++
++    PAM_SET_ITEM(PAM_RUSER, remuser);
++    PAM_SET_ITEM(PAM_RHOST, hostname);
++    PAM_SET_ITEM(PAM_TTY, "rsh");  /* we don't use a tty, so punt */
+     
+     retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+     if (retcode == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+@@ -365,6 +378,27 @@ static const char *findhostname(struct s
+ 	return NULL; /* not reachable */
+ }
+ 
++static int log_audit(const char *username, int uid, const char *hostname,
++			int success)
++{
++#ifdef USE_AUDIT
++	int audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) 
++			return 1;
++	} else {
++		int rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
++				NULL, "login", username, uid, hostname, NULL,
++				"rsh", success);
++		close(audit_fd);
++		if (rc <= 0) 
++			return 1;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static void
+ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+ {
+@@ -435,14 +469,21 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 	setpwent();
+ 	pwd = doauth(remuser, hostname, locuser);
+ 	if (pwd == NULL) {
++		if (log_audit(remuser, -1, hostname, 0) > 0) {
++			fail("Error sending audit event.\n", 
++			     remuser, hostname, locuser, cmdbuf);
++		}
+ 		fail("Permission denied.\n", 
+ 		     remuser, hostname, locuser, cmdbuf);
+ 	}
+-
+ 	if (pwd->pw_uid != 0 && !access(_PATH_NOLOGIN, F_OK)) {
+ 		error("Logins currently disabled.\n");
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
++	if (log_audit(NULL, pwd->pw_uid, hostname, 1) > 0) {
++		fail("Error sending audit event.\n", 
++		     remuser, hostname, locuser, cmdbuf);
++	}
+ 
+ 	(void) write(2, "\0", 1);
+ 	sent_null = 1;
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.audit netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.audit	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -312,9 +312,12 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+        PAM_password = pass;
+        pam_error = pam_start("rexec", PAM_username, &PAM_conversation,&pamh);
+        PAM_BAIL;
+-       pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, user);
+-       pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, remote);	       
+-       pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "rexec");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
++       pam_error = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, user);
++       PAM_BAIL;
++       pam_error = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, remote);	       
++       PAM_BAIL;
++       pam_error = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "rexec");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
++       PAM_BAIL;
+        pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+        PAM_BAIL;
+        pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/auth.c.audit netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/auth.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/auth.c.audit	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/auth.c	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -102,6 +102,16 @@ static int attempt_auth(void) {
+     return retval;
+ }
+ 
++#define PAM_SET_ITEM(item,val) \
++    do { \
++	retval = pam_set_item(pamh, (item), (val)); \
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
++	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_set_item: %s\n", pam_strerror(pamh, retval)); \
++	    pam_end(pamh, retval); \
++	    fatal(STDERR_FILENO, "initialization failed", 0); \
++	} \
++    } while (0)
++
+ /*
+  * This function must either die, return -1 on authentication failure,
+  * or return 0 on authentication success. Dying is discouraged.
+@@ -117,17 +127,19 @@ int auth_checkauth(const char *remoteuse
+     retval = pam_start("rlogin", localuser, &conv, &pamh);
+     if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ 	syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_start: %s\n", pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
++        pam_end(pamh, retval);
+ 	fatal(STDERR_FILENO, "initialization failed", 0);
+     }
+ 	
+-    pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, localuser);
+-    pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, remoteuser);
+-    pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, host);
+-    pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "rlogin");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
+-	
++    PAM_SET_ITEM(PAM_USER, localuser);
++    PAM_SET_ITEM(PAM_RUSER, remoteuser);
++    PAM_SET_ITEM(PAM_RHOST, host);
++    PAM_SET_ITEM(PAM_TTY, "rlogin");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
++
+     network_confirm();
+     retval = attempt_auth();
+     if ((retval == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) || (retval == PAM_PERM_DENIED)) {
++	pam_end(pamh, retval);
+ 	syslog(LOG_ERR, "PAM authentication denied for in.rlogind");
+ 	exit(1);
+     } else if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.audit netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.audit	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -357,9 +357,9 @@ static void child(const char *hname, con
+     }
+     termenv[3] = NULL;
+ 
++    auth_finish();
++    closeall();
+     if (authenticated) {
+-	auth_finish();
+-	closeall();
+ 	execle(_PATH_LOGIN, "login", "-p",
+ 	       "-h", hname, "-f", localuser, NULL, termenv);
+     } 
+@@ -368,8 +368,6 @@ static void child(const char *hname, con
+ 	    syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_INFO, "rlogin with an option as a name!");
+ 	    exit(1);
+ 	}
+-	auth_finish();
+-	closeall();
+ 	execle(_PATH_LOGIN, "login", "-p",
+ 	       "-h", hname, localuser, NULL, termenv);
+     }
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/configure.audit netkit-rsh-0.17/configure
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/configure.audit	2000-07-29 20:00:29.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/configure	2008-03-25 12:33:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ while [ x$1 != x ]; do case $1 in
+ Usage: configure [options]
+     --help                Show this message
+     --with-debug          Enable debugging
+-    --without-pam      Disable PAM support
++    --without-pam         Disable PAM support
+     --without-shadow      Disable shadow password support
++    --without-audit       Disable audit support
+     --prefix=path         Prefix for location of files [/usr]
+     --exec-prefix=path    Location for arch-depedent files [prefix]
+     --installroot=root    Top of filesystem tree to install in [/]
+@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ EOF
+ 	--with-c-compiler=*) CC=`echo $1 | sed 's/^[^=]*=//'` ;;
+ 	--without-pam|--disable-pam) WITHOUT_PAM=1;;
+ 	--without-shadow|--disable-shadow) WITHOUT_SHADOW=1;;
++	--without-audit|--disable-audit) WITHOUT_AUDIT=1;;
+ 	*) echo "Unrecognized option: $1"; exit 1;;
+ esac 
+ shift
+@@ -342,6 +344,32 @@ rm -f __conftest*
+ 
+ ##################################################
+ 
++echo -n 'Checking for AUDIT... '
++if [ x$WITHOUT_AUDIT != x ]; then
++    echo disabled
++else
++cat <<EOF >__conftest.c
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <libaudit.h>
++int main() {
++    audit_log_acct_message(1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++    return 0;
++}
++
++EOF
++if (
++      $CC $CFLAGS  __conftest.c -laudit -o __conftest || exit 1
++   ) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
++        echo 'yes'
++        USE_AUDIT=1
++    else
++        echo 'no'
++    fi
++fi
++rm -f __conftest*
++
++##################################################
++
+ echo -n 'Checking for crypt... '
+ cat <<EOF >__conftest.c
+ int main() { crypt("aa", "bb"); }
+@@ -593,5 +621,6 @@ echo 'Generating MCONFIG...'
+     echo "USE_PAM=$USE_PAM"
+     echo "USE_SHADOW=$USE_SHADOW"
+     echo "LIBSHADOW=$LIBSHADOW"
++    echo "USE_AUDIT=$USE_AUDIT"
+ ) > MCONFIG
+ 

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-chdir.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.orig	Sun Jul 23 06:16:24 2000
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	Tue Dec 11 17:45:10 2001
+@@ -388,15 +388,6 @@
+ 		     remuser, hostname, locuser, cmdbuf);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
+-		chdir("/");
+-		/*
+-		 * error("No remote directory.\n");
+-		 * exit(1);
+-		 */
+-	}
+-
+-
+ 	if (pwd->pw_uid != 0 && !access(_PATH_NOLOGIN, F_OK)) {
+ 		error("Logins currently disabled.\n");
+ 		exit(1);
+@@ -456,6 +447,14 @@
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 	environ = envinit;
++
++	if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
++		chdir("/");
++		/*
++		 * error("No remote directory.\n");
++		 * exit(1);
++		 */
++	}
+ 
+ 	strncat(homedir, pwd->pw_dir, sizeof(homedir)-6);
+ 	homedir[sizeof(homedir)-1] = 0;
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.orig	Sun Jul 23 06:16:22 2000
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	Tue Dec 11 18:28:36 2001
+@@ -375,10 +375,6 @@
+ 	/* Log successful attempts. */
+ 	syslog(LOG_INFO, "login from %.128s as %s", remote, user);
+ 
+-	if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
+-		fatal("No remote directory.\n");
+-	}
+-
+ 	write(2, "\0", 1);
+ 	if (port) {
+ 		/* If we have a port, dup STDERR on that port KRH */
+@@ -408,6 +404,10 @@
+ 	if (setuid(pwd->pw_uid)) {
+ 		perror("setuid");
+ 		exit(1);
++	}
++
++	if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
++		fatal("No remote directory.\n");
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	strcat(path, _PATH_DEFPATH);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-checkdir.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.checkdir	2005-01-28 16:20:38.280031064 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2005-01-28 16:25:56.479657368 +0100
+@@ -716,6 +716,10 @@
+ 			size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0');
+ 		if (*cp++ != ' ')
+ 			SCREWUP("size not delimited");
++		if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
++			error("rcp: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
++			exit(1);
++		}
+ 		if (targisdir) {
+ 			static char *namebuf;
+ 			static int cursize;
+@@ -734,6 +738,8 @@
+ 			np = targ;
+ 		exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
+ 		if (buf[0] == 'D') {
++			if (!iamrecursive)
++				SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
+ 			if (exists) {
+ 				if ((stb.st_mode&S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
+ 					errno = ENOTDIR;

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-dns.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.dns netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.dns	2007-09-27 11:05:26.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2007-09-27 11:16:54.000000000 +0200
+@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ static const char *findhostname(struct s
+ 	char remote_hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 	struct addrinfo hints;
+ 	struct addrinfo *res0, *res;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	if (! inet_ntop(fromp->sa_family,
+ 		(( fromp->sa_family == AF_INET6 )
+@@ -305,12 +306,16 @@ static const char *findhostname(struct s
+ 	    exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (getnameinfo(fromp, fromlen, remote_hostname, NI_MAXHOST,
+-		NULL, 0, 0)) {
+-	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH,
+-	    	"Failed to retrieve the hostname information for %s",
+-	    	remote_address);
+-	    exit(1);
++	err = getnameinfo(fromp, fromlen, remote_hostname, NI_MAXHOST,
++		NULL, 0, 0);
++	if (err && (err == EAI_AGAIN) && !check_all)
++		err = getnameinfo (fromp, fromlen, remote_hostname, NI_MAXHOST,
++				   NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
++	if (err) {
++		syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH,
++		       "Failed to retrieve the hostname information for %s",
++		       remote_address);
++		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	errno = ENOMEM; /* malloc (thus strdup) may not set it */
+@@ -586,6 +591,11 @@ static void network_init(int fd,
+ 	error = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)fromp, *fromlenp,
+ 		hostname, sizeof(hostname), portname, sizeof(portname),
+ 		NI_NUMERICSERV);
++	if (error && (error == EAI_AGAIN) && !check_all)
++		error = getnameinfo ((struct sockaddr *)fromp, *fromlenp,
++				     hostname, sizeof(hostname), portname,
++				     sizeof(portname),
++				     NI_NUMERICSERV|NI_NUMERICHOST);
+ 	if (error) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH,
+ 	    	"Failed to retrieve address and port of the connection: %s",
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c.dns netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c.dns	2007-09-27 11:17:07.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c	2007-09-27 11:20:29.000000000 +0200
+@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ find_hostname(struct sockaddr *fromp, so
+ 	error = getnameinfo(fromp, fromlen,
+ 		hname_buf, sizeof(hname_buf), portname, NI_MAXSERV,
+ 		NI_NUMERICSERV);
++	if ((error == EAI_AGAIN) && !check_all)
++		error = getnameinfo(fromp, fromlen,
++				    hname_buf, sizeof(hname_buf), portname, NI_MAXSERV,
++				    NI_NUMERICSERV|NI_NUMERICHOST);
+ 	assert(error == 0);
+ 
+ 	if (check_all || local_domain(hname_buf)) {

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-errno.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.errno	2004-11-17 13:49:13.247815440 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2004-11-17 13:52:56.638854840 +0100
+@@ -613,6 +613,7 @@
+ 	struct stat stb;
+ 	struct timeval tv[2];
+ 	enum { YES, NO, DISPLAYED } wrerr;
++	int werrno = 0;
+ 	BUF *bp;
+ 	off_t i, j, size;
+ 	char ch, *targ;
+@@ -766,6 +767,7 @@
+ 		cp = bp->buf;
+ 		count = 0;
+ 		wrerr = NO;
++		werrno = 0;
+ 		for (i = 0; i < size; i += BUFSIZ) {
+ 			amt = BUFSIZ;
+ 			if (i + amt > size)
+@@ -784,16 +786,20 @@
+ 			} while (amt > 0);
+ 			if (count == bp->cnt) {
+ 				if (wrerr == NO &&
+-				    write(ofd, bp->buf, count) != count)
++				    write(ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
+ 					wrerr = YES;
++					werrno = errno;
++				}
+ 				count = 0;
+ 				cp = bp->buf;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
+-		    write(ofd, bp->buf, count) != count)
++		    write(ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
+ 			wrerr = YES;
+-		if (ftruncate(ofd, size)) {
++			werrno = errno;
++		}
++		if (wrerr == NO && ftruncate(ofd, size)) {
+ 			error("rcp: can't truncate %s: %s\n", np,
+ 			    strerror(errno));
+ 			wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+@@ -810,7 +816,7 @@
+ 		}
+ 		switch(wrerr) {
+ 		case YES:
+-			error("rcp: %s: %s\n", np, strerror(errno));
++			error("rcp: %s: %s\n", np, strerror(werrno));
+ 			break;
+ 		case NO:
+ 			(void)write(rem, "", 1);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-ignchld.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.ignchld	2004-12-06 13:31:23.263630216 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c	2004-12-06 13:31:43.382571672 +0100
+@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
+     ioctl(master, TIOCPKT, &on);
+     signal(SIGCHLD, cleanup);
+     protocol(netfd, master);
+-    signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
++    signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+     cleanup(0);
+ }
+ 
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/rlogin.c.ignchld	2004-12-06 13:30:37.110646536 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/rlogin.c	2004-12-06 13:31:00.224132752 +0100
+@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@
+ stop(char cmdc)
+ {
+ 	mode(0);
+-	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
++	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ 	kill(cmdc == defsusp ? 0 : getpid(), SIGTSTP);
+ 	signal(SIGCHLD, catch_child);
+ 	mode(1);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-ipv6-rexec.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.ipv6-rexec netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.ipv6-rexec	2013-07-15 17:31:07.678365071 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2013-07-15 17:32:17.010346615 +0200
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
+  */
+ 
+ static void fatal(const char *);
+-static void doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp);
++static void doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp);
+ static void getstr(char *buf, int cnt, const char *err);
+ 
+ static const char *remote = NULL;
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static const char *remote = NULL;
+ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+-	struct sockaddr_in from;
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ 	socklen_t fromlen;
+ 
+ 	(void)argc;
+@@ -136,6 +136,29 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON);
+ 
++        /* handle situation when connected peer *doesn't have* native IPv6 address but systemd/xinetd
++         * is listening on AF_INET6 socket on our behalf and fds we are given corresponds to AF_INET6 socket
++         */
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *) &from)->sin6_addr)) {
++		struct addrinfo *res, hints = {};
++		char client_addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = {};
++		char client_port[6] = {};
++
++		inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) &from)->sin6_addr,
++			client_addr, sizeof(client_addr));
++
++		sprintf(client_port, "%d", ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *) &from)->sin6_port));
++
++		hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
++		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++		hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST | AI_NUMERICSERV;
++
++		getaddrinfo(client_addr, client_port, &hints, &res);
++
++		memcpy(&from, res->ai_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
++		freeaddrinfo(res);
++	}
++
+ #ifdef	TCP_WRAPPER
+ 	/* Find out and report the remote host name. */
+ 	/* I don't think this works. -- dholland */
+@@ -146,19 +169,42 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (argc > 1 && argv[1] && strcmp(argv[1], "-D")==0)
+ 	{
+ 		/* use IP in logs -- this is workaround */
+-		remote = strdup(inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr));
++		char remote_addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = {};
++
++		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
++			remote = inet_ntop(AF_INET, &from, remote_addr, INET_ADDRSTRLEN);
++		else
++			remote = inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &from, remote_addr, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
++
++		if (remote) {
++			remote = strdup(remote);
++			if (!remote) {
++				fprintf(stderr, "rexecd: strdup: %s\n", strerror(errno));
++				return 1;
++			}
++		} else {
++			fprintf(stderr, "rexecd: inet_ntop: %s\n", strerror(errno));
++			return 1;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	else
+ 	{
+-		struct hostent *h = gethostbyaddr((const char *)&from.sin_addr,
+-				  sizeof(struct in_addr),
+-				  AF_INET);
+-		if (!h || !h->h_name) {
+-			write(0, "\1Where are you?\n", 16);
++		int r;
++		char remote_hostname[NI_MAXHOST] = {};
++
++		r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *) &from, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), remote_hostname, NI_MAXHOST, NULL, NULL, 0);
++
++		if (r) {
++			fprintf(stderr, "rexecd: getnameinfo: %s\n", gai_strerror(r));
++			return 1;
++		}
++
++		remote = strdup(remote_hostname);
++		if (!remote) {
++			fprintf(stderr, "rexecd: strdup: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ 			return 1;
+ 		}
+-		/* Be advised that this may be utter nonsense. */
+-		remote = strdup(h->h_name);
++
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 	syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %.128s", remote);
+@@ -233,7 +279,7 @@ static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation
+ 
+ 
+ static void
+-doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
++doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp)
+ {
+ 	char *cmdbuf;
+ 	long cmdbuflen;
+@@ -298,7 +344,7 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+  We must connect back to the client here if a port was provided. KRH
+ */
+ 	if (port != 0) {
+-		s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++		s = socket(fromp->ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ 		if (s < 0)
+ 			exit(1);
+ 
+@@ -308,7 +354,12 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ 			exit(1);
+ #endif
+ 		alarm(60);
+-		fromp->sin_port = htons(port);
++
++		if (fromp->ss_family == AF_INET)
++			((struct sockaddr_in *) fromp)->sin_port = htons(port);
++		else
++			((struct sockaddr_in6 *) fromp)->sin6_port = htons(port);
++
+ 		if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)fromp, sizeof (*fromp)) < 0)
+ 			exit(1);
+ 		alarm(0);
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.ipv6-rexec netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.ipv6-rexec	2013-07-15 17:31:07.686365068 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c	2013-07-15 17:31:07.698365065 +0200
+@@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+     exit(1);
+   }
+ 
+-  if ( (sock = rexec(&host, port_exec, user_name, passwd, command, 
+-		     p_to_aux_sock)) < 0 )
++  if ( (sock = rexec_af(&host, port_exec, user_name, passwd, command, 
++		     p_to_aux_sock, AF_UNSPEC)) < 0 )
+   {
+     fprintf(stderr,"%s: Error in rexec system call,\n",argv[0]);
+     fprintf(stderr,"%s: (The following system error may itself be in error)\n",argv[0]);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,451 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.ipv6 netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.ipv6	2008-10-03 12:44:22.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2008-10-03 12:44:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -262,9 +262,9 @@ toremote(const char *targ, int argc, cha
+ 					nospace();
+ 				(void)snprintf(bp, len, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ);
+ 				host = thost;
+-					rem = rcmd(&host, port, pwd->pw_name,
++					rem = rcmd_af(&host, port, pwd->pw_name,
+ 					    tuser ? tuser : pwd->pw_name,
+-					    bp, 0);
++					    bp, 0, AF_UNSPEC);
+ 				if (rem < 0)
+ 					exit(1);
+ #ifdef IP_TOS
+@@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ tolocal(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 		if (!(bp = malloc(len)))
+ 			nospace();
+ 		(void)snprintf(bp, len, "%s -f %s", cmd, src);
+-			rem = rcmd(&host, port, pwd->pw_name, suser, bp, 0);
++			rem = rcmd_af(&host, port, pwd->pw_name, suser, bp, 0,
++				AF_UNSPEC);
+ 		(void)free(bp);
+ 		if (rem < 0) {
+ 			++errs;
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c.ipv6 netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c.ipv6	1999-12-12 16:15:40.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/network.c	2008-10-03 12:44:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -88,47 +88,78 @@ local_domain(const char *h)
+ 	return(0);
+ }
+ 
++static int
++soaddr_eq_ip(const struct sockaddr *s1, const struct sockaddr *s2)
++{
++	if (s1->sa_family != s2->sa_family)
++		return 0;
++	if (s2->sa_family == AF_INET6)
++		return (memcmp(
++			(const void*)(
++				&((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)s1)->sin6_addr
++				),
++			(const void*)(
++				&((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)s2)->sin6_addr
++				),
++			sizeof(struct in6_addr))
++				== 0);
++	else
++		return (memcmp(
++			(const void*)(
++				&((const struct sockaddr_in *)s1)->sin_addr
++				),
++			(const void*)(
++				&((const struct sockaddr_in *)s2)->sin_addr
++				),
++			sizeof(struct in_addr))
++				== 0);
++}
+ 
+ static char *
+-find_hostname(const struct sockaddr_in *fromp, int *hostokp)
++find_hostname(struct sockaddr *fromp, socklen_t fromlen,
++	char *portname, int *hostokp)
+ {
+-	struct hostent *hop;
++	int error;
+ 	char *hname;
++	char hname_buf[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 	int hostok = 0;
+ 
+-	hop = gethostbyaddr((const char *)&fromp->sin_addr, 
+-			    sizeof(struct in_addr), fromp->sin_family);
+-	if (hop == NULL) {
+-		hname = strdup(inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr));
+-		hostok = 1;
+-	} 
+-	else if (check_all || local_domain(hop->h_name)) {
++	error = getnameinfo(fromp, fromlen,
++		hname_buf, sizeof(hname_buf), portname, NI_MAXSERV,
++		NI_NUMERICSERV);
++	assert(error == 0);
++
++	if (check_all || local_domain(hname_buf)) {
+ 		/*
+-		 * If name returned by gethostbyaddr is in our domain,
++		 * If name returned is in our domain,
+ 		 * attempt to verify that we haven't been fooled by someone
+ 		 * in a remote net; look up the name and check that this
+ 		 * address corresponds to the name.
+ 		 */
+-		hname = strdup(hop->h_name);
+-		hop = gethostbyname(hname);
+-		if (hop) {
+-		    for (; hop->h_addr_list[0]; hop->h_addr_list++) {
+-			if (!memcmp(hop->h_addr_list[0], &fromp->sin_addr,
+-				    sizeof(fromp->sin_addr))) {
++		struct addrinfo hints;
++		struct addrinfo *res0, *res;
++
++		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++		hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++		error = getaddrinfo(hname_buf, NULL, &hints, &res);
++		assert(error == 0);
++
++		res0 = res;
++		while (res) {
++			if (soaddr_eq_ip(fromp, res->ai_addr)) {
+ 				hostok = 1;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+-		    }
+-		    /* not clear if this is worthwhile */
+-		    free(hname);
+-		    hname = strdup(hop->h_name);
++			res = res->ai_next;
+ 		}
++		freeaddrinfo(res0);
+ 	} 
+ 	else {
+-		hname = strdup(hop->h_name);
+ 		hostok = 1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	hname = strdup(hname_buf);
++
+ 	/* 
+ 	 * Actually it might be null if we're out of memory, but
+ 	 * where do we go then? We'd have to bail anyhow.
+@@ -145,14 +176,14 @@ find_hostname(const struct sockaddr_in *
+ char * 
+ network_init(int f, int *hostokp)
+ {
+-	struct sockaddr_in from, *fromp;
++	struct sockaddr_storage from, *fromp;
+ 	socklen_t fromlen;
+ 	int on = 1;
+ 	char c;
+ 	char *hname;
++	char portname[NI_MAXSERV];
+ 	int port;
+ 
+-	from.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ 	fromlen = sizeof (from);
+ 	if (getpeername(f, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ 		syslog(LOG_ERR,"Can't get peer name of remote host: %m");
+@@ -177,13 +208,19 @@ network_init(int f, int *hostokp)
+ 
+ 	alarm(0);
+ 
+-	hname = find_hostname(fromp, hostokp);
++	hname = find_hostname((struct sockaddr *)fromp, fromlen,
++		portname, hostokp);
++	assert(hname != NULL);
+ 
+-	port = ntohs(fromp->sin_port);
+-	if (fromp->sin_family != AF_INET ||
++	port = atoi(portname);
++	if (! port) {
++	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "Unknown port %s", portname);
++	    fatal(f, "Permission denied", 0);
++	}
++	if ((fromp->ss_family != AF_INET && fromp->ss_family != AF_INET6) ||
+ 	    port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || port < IPPORT_RESERVED/2) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "Connection from %s on illegal port",
+-		   inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr));
++	    	portname);
+ 	    fatal(f, "Permission denied", 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/rlogin.c.ipv6 netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/rlogin.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/rlogin.c.ipv6	2008-10-03 12:44:22.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/rlogin.c	2008-10-03 12:44:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	/* will use SIGUSR1 for window size hack, so hold it off */
+ 	omask = sigblock(sigmask(SIGURG) | sigmask(SIGUSR1));
+ 
+-	rem = rcmd(&host, sp->s_port, pw->pw_name, user, term, 0);
++	rem = rcmd_af(&host, sp->s_port, pw->pw_name, user, term, 0, AF_UNSPEC);
+ 
+ 	if (rem < 0) exit(1);
+ 
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.ipv6 netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.ipv6	2008-10-03 12:44:22.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2008-10-03 12:53:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ char	*envinit[] =
+ extern	char	**environ;
+ 
+ static void error(const char *fmt, ...);
+-static void doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp);
++static void doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, socklen_t fromlen);
+ static void getstr(char *buf, int cnt, const char *err);
+ 
+ extern int _check_rhosts_file;
+@@ -284,19 +284,37 @@ static struct passwd *doauth(const char 
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-static const char *findhostname(struct sockaddr_in *fromp,
++static const char *findhostname(struct sockaddr *fromp,
++				socklen_t fromlen,
+ 				const char *remuser, const char *locuser,
+ 				const char *cmdbuf) 
+ {
+-	struct hostent *hp;
+ 	const char *hostname;
++	char remote_address[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
++	char remote_hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
++	struct addrinfo hints;
++	struct addrinfo *res0, *res;
++
++	if (! inet_ntop(fromp->sa_family,
++		(( fromp->sa_family == AF_INET6 )
++		? ( &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)fromp)->sin6_addr )
++		: ( &((struct sockaddr_in *)fromp)->sin_addr )),
++		remote_address, sizeof(remote_address))) {
++	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH,
++	    	"Failed to retrieve the socket remote address");
++	    exit(1);
++	}
+ 
+-	hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&fromp->sin_addr, sizeof (struct in_addr),
+-			   fromp->sin_family);
++	if (getnameinfo(fromp, fromlen, remote_hostname, NI_MAXHOST,
++		NULL, 0, 0)) {
++	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH,
++	    	"Failed to retrieve the hostname information for %s",
++	    	remote_address);
++	    exit(1);
++	}
+ 
+ 	errno = ENOMEM; /* malloc (thus strdup) may not set it */
+-	if (hp) hostname = strdup(hp->h_name);
+-	else hostname = strdup(inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr));
++	hostname = strdup(remote_hostname);
+ 
+ 	if (hostname==NULL) {
+ 	    /* out of memory? */
+@@ -307,31 +325,43 @@ static const char *findhostname(struct s
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Attempt to confirm the DNS. 
+ 	 */
+-#ifdef	RES_DNSRCH
+-	_res.options &= ~RES_DNSRCH;
+-#endif
+-	hp = gethostbyname(hostname);
+-	if (hp == NULL) {
+-	    syslog(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't look up address for %s", hostname);
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
++	if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &res)) {
++	    syslog(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't look up address for %s/%s",
++		   hostname, remote_address);
+ 	    fail("Couldn't get address for your host (%s)\n", 
+-		 remuser, inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr), locuser, cmdbuf);
+-	} 
+-	while (hp->h_addr_list[0] != NULL) {
+-	    if (!memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[0], &fromp->sin_addr,
+-			sizeof(fromp->sin_addr))) {
+-		return hostname;
++		 remuser, hostname, locuser, cmdbuf);
++	}
++
++	res0 = res;
++	while (res) {
++	    struct sockaddr *sa;
++	    char res_address[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
++	    sa = res->ai_addr;
++
++	    if (inet_ntop(sa->sa_family,
++		(( sa->sa_family == AF_INET6 )
++		? ( &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr )
++		: ( &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr )),
++		res_address, sizeof(res_address))
++		&& strcmp(remote_address, res_address) == 0) {
++		    freeaddrinfo(res0);
++		    return hostname;
+ 	    }
+-	    hp->h_addr_list++;
++	    res = res->ai_next;
+ 	}
++	freeaddrinfo(res0);
++
+ 	syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "Host addr %s not listed for host %s",
+-	       inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr), hp->h_name);
++	       remote_address, hostname);
+ 	fail("Host address mismatch for %s\n", 
+-	     remuser, inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr), locuser, cmdbuf);
++	     remuser, hostname, locuser, cmdbuf);
+ 	return NULL; /* not reachable */
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
++doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+ {
+ 	char cmdbuf[ARG_MAX+1];
+ 	const char *theshell, *shellname;
+@@ -351,8 +381,12 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ 	alarm(0);
+ 
+ 	if (port != 0) {
++		struct sockaddr_storage second_connect;
+ 		int lport = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
+-		sock = rresvport(&lport);
++
++		memcpy((void *)&second_connect, (void *)fromp, fromlen);
++		sock = rresvport_af(&lport,
++			((struct sockaddr *)&second_connect)->sa_family);
+ 		if (sock < 0) {
+ 		    syslog(LOG_ERR, "can't get stderr port: %m");
+ 		    exit(1);
+@@ -361,10 +395,15 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ 		    syslog(LOG_ERR, "2nd port not reserved\n");
+ 		    exit(1);
+ 		}
+-		fromp->sin_port = htons(port);
+-		if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)fromp,
+-			    sizeof(*fromp)) < 0) {
+-		    syslog(LOG_INFO, "connect second port: %m");
++		if (((struct sockaddr *)&second_connect)->sa_family == AF_INET6)
++		    ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&second_connect)->sin6_port
++		    						= htons(port);
++		else
++		    ((struct sockaddr_in *)&second_connect)->sin_port
++		    						= htons(port);
++		if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&second_connect,
++			fromlen) < 0) {
++		    syslog(LOG_INFO, "connect second port %d: %m", port);
+ 		    exit(1);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+@@ -381,7 +420,8 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ 	getstr(cmdbuf, sizeof(cmdbuf), "command");
+ 	if (!strcmp(locuser, "root")) paranoid = 1;
+ 
+-	hostname = findhostname(fromp, remuser, locuser, cmdbuf);
++	hostname = findhostname((struct sockaddr *)fromp, fromlen,
++		remuser, locuser, cmdbuf);
+ 
+ 	setpwent();
+ 	pwd = doauth(remuser, hostname, locuser);
+@@ -496,15 +536,19 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+-static void network_init(int fd, struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
++static void network_init(int fd,
++	struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, socklen_t *fromlenp)
+ {
+ 	struct linger linger;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
++	char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
++	char portname[NI_MAXSERV];
++	sa_family_t family;
++
++	int error;
+ 	int on=1;
+ 	int port;
+ 
+-	fromlen = sizeof(*fromp);
+-	if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr *) fromp, &fromlen) < 0) {
++	if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr *)fromp, fromlenp) < 0) {
+ 		syslog(LOG_ERR, "getpeername: %m");
+ 		_exit(1);
+ 	}
+@@ -518,9 +562,20 @@ static void network_init(int fd, struct 
+ 	    sizeof (linger)) < 0)
+ 		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (SO_LINGER): %m");
+ 
+-	if (fromp->sin_family != AF_INET) {
++	family = ((struct sockaddr *)fromp)->sa_family;
++	if (family != AF_INET && family != AF_INET6) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "malformed \"from\" address (af %d)\n",
+-		   fromp->sin_family);
++	    	family);
++	    exit(1);
++	}
++
++	error = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)fromp, *fromlenp,
++		hostname, sizeof(hostname), portname, sizeof(portname),
++		NI_NUMERICSERV);
++	if (error) {
++	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH,
++	    	"Failed to retrieve address and port of the connection: %s",
++		gai_strerror(error));
+ 	    exit(1);
+ 	}
+ #ifdef IP_OPTIONS
+@@ -550,7 +605,7 @@ static void network_init(int fd, struct 
+ 		syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ 		       "Connection received from %s using IP options"
+ 		       " (ignored): %s",
+-		       inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr), lbuf);
++		       hostname, lbuf);
+ 
+ 		if (setsockopt(0, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, NULL, optsize) != 0) {
+ 			syslog(LOG_ERR, "setsockopt IP_OPTIONS NULL: %m");
+@@ -563,10 +618,15 @@ static void network_init(int fd, struct 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Check originating port for validity.
+ 	 */
+-	port = ntohs(fromp->sin_port);
++	port = atoi(portname);
++	if (! port) {
++	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH, "Unknown port %s", portname);
++	    exit(1);
++	}
+ 	if (port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || port < IPPORT_RESERVED/2) {
+-	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH, "Connection from %s on illegal port",
+-		   inet_ntoa(fromp->sin_addr));
++	    syslog(LOG_NOTICE|LOG_AUTH,
++	    	"Connection from %s from illegal port %s",
++		   hostname, portname);
+ 	    exit(1);
+ 	}
+ }
+@@ -575,7 +635,8 @@ int
+ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ 	int ch;
+-	struct sockaddr_in from;
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
+ 	_check_rhosts_file=1;
+ 
+ 	openlog("rshd", LOG_PID | LOG_ODELAY, LOG_DAEMON);
+@@ -618,8 +679,9 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+                                "pam_rhosts_auth in /etc/pam.conf");
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+ 
+-	network_init(0, &from);
+-	doit(&from);
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	network_init(0, &from, &fromlen);
++	doit(&from, fromlen);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rsh/rsh.c.ipv6 netkit-rsh-0.17/rsh/rsh.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rsh/rsh.c.ipv6	2000-07-23 06:16:24.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rsh/rsh.c	2008-10-03 12:44:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	rem = rcmd(&host, sp->s_port, pw->pw_name, user, args, &rfd2);
++	rem = rcmd_af(&host, sp->s_port, pw->pw_name, user, args, &rfd2,
++		AF_UNSPEC);
+ 
+ 	if (rem < 0)
+ 		exit(1);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-lfs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.bigfile	2003-01-17 16:06:44.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2003-01-17 16:08:48.000000000 +0200
+@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+-		    "C%04o %ld %s\n", stb.st_mode&07777, stb.st_size, last);
++		    "C%04o %lld %s\n", stb.st_mode&07777, (long long)(stb.st_size), last);
+ 		(void)write(rem, buf, (int)strlen(buf));
+ 		if (response() < 0) {
+ 			(void)close(f);
+@@ -614,11 +614,11 @@
+ 	struct timeval tv[2];
+ 	enum { YES, NO, DISPLAYED } wrerr;
+ 	BUF *bp;
+-	off_t i, j;
++	off_t i, j, size;
+ 	char ch, *targ;
+ 	const char *why;
+ 	int amt, count, exists, first, mask, mode;
+-	int ofd, setimes, size, targisdir;
++	int ofd, setimes, targisdir;
+ 	char *np, *vect[1], buf[BUFSIZ];
+ 
+ #define	atime	tv[0]

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-longname.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.longname netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.longname	2008-03-27 16:12:22.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2008-03-27 16:41:46.000000000 +0100
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void
+ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ {
+ 	char cmdbuf[ARG_MAX+1];
+-	char user[16], pass[16];
++	char user[17], pass[17];
+ 	struct passwd *pwd;
+ 	int s = -1;
+ 	u_short port;
+@@ -468,10 +468,10 @@ getstr(char *buf, int cnt, const char *e
+ 	do {
+ 		if (read(0, &c, 1) != 1)
+ 			exit(1);
+-		*buf++ = c;
+-		if (--cnt <= 0) {
++		if (--cnt < 0) {
+ 			fatal(err);
+ 		}
++		*buf++ = c;
+ 	} while (c != 0);
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-nohost.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.8.nohost	2004-12-03 15:20:17.436174216 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.8	2004-12-03 15:39:39.972441840 +0100
+@@ -40,6 +40,16 @@
+ .Nd remote execution server
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm rexecd
++[
++\fB\-D\fP
++]
++.Sh OPTIONS
++.Nm Rexec
++accepts one option:
++.Pp
++.Bl -tag -width Ds
++.It Sy -D
++Disable reverse DNS look up and in the log will be used client IP addresses.
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm Rexecd
+ is the server for the 
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.nohost	2004-12-03 15:09:37.163510456 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2004-12-03 15:20:04.832090328 +0100
+@@ -82,7 +82,9 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <paths.h>
+ #include <grp.h>
+-
++#include <arpa/inet.h>
++  
++  
+ #ifdef USE_SHADOW
+ #include <shadow.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -141,16 +143,22 @@
+ 		refuse(&from_host);
+ 	remote = hosts_info(&from_host);
+ #else
++	if (argc > 1 && argv[1] && strcmp(argv[1], "-D")==0)
+ 	{
+-	struct hostent *h = gethostbyaddr((const char *)&from.sin_addr,
+-					  sizeof(struct in_addr),
+-					  AF_INET);
+-	if (!h || !h->h_name) {
+-		write(0, "\1Where are you?\n", 16);
+-		return 1;
++		/* use IP in logs -- this is workaround */
++		remote = strdup(inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr));
+ 	}
+-	/* Be advised that this may be utter nonsense. */
+-	remote = strdup(h->h_name);
++	else
++	{
++		struct hostent *h = gethostbyaddr((const char *)&from.sin_addr,
++				  sizeof(struct in_addr),
++				  AF_INET);
++		if (!h || !h->h_name) {
++			write(0, "\1Where are you?\n", 16);
++			return 1;
++		}
++		/* Be advised that this may be utter nonsense. */
++		remote = strdup(h->h_name);
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 	syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %.128s", remote);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-nohostcheck-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.nohostcheck-compat netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.nohostcheck-compat	2007-10-03 13:06:08.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2007-10-03 13:07:15.000000000 +0200
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ char rcsid[] = 
+ static pam_handle_t *pamh;
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+ 
+-#define	OPTIONS	"ahlLn"
++#define	OPTIONS	"aDhlLn"
+ 
+ static int keepalive = 1;
+ static int check_all = 0;
+@@ -658,6 +658,9 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 			check_all = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 
++		case 'D':
++			break;
++
+ 		case 'h':
+ 			allow_root_rhosts = 1;
+ 			break;
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.nohostcheck-compat netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.nohostcheck-compat	2007-10-03 13:06:08.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c	2007-10-03 13:06:45.000000000 +0200
+@@ -450,9 +450,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+     openlog("rlogind", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTH);
+ 
+     opterr = 0;
+-    while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "ahLln")) != EOF) {
++    while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "aDhLln")) != EOF) {
+ 	switch (ch) {
+ 	    case 'a': check_all = 1; break;
++	    case 'D': break;
+ 	    case 'h': allow_root_rhosts = 1; break;
+ 	    case 'L': deny_all_rhosts_hequiv = 1; break;
+ 	    case 'l': use_rhosts = 0; break;

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-conv.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.pam-conv	2005-10-13 18:42:54.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2005-10-13 18:45:30.000000000 +0200
+@@ -178,47 +178,51 @@
+ static char *PAM_username;
+ static char *PAM_password;
+ 
+-static int PAM_conv (int num_msg,
+-		     const struct pam_message **msg,
+-		     struct pam_response **resp,
+-		     void *appdata_ptr) {
+-  int count = 0, replies = 0;
+-  struct pam_response *reply = NULL;
+-  int size = sizeof(struct pam_response);
+-
+-  #define GET_MEM if (reply) realloc(reply, size); else reply = malloc(size); \
+-  if (!reply) return PAM_CONV_ERR; \
+-  size += sizeof(struct pam_response)
+-  #define COPY_STRING(s) (s) ? strdup(s) : NULL
+-
+-  for (count = 0; count < num_msg; count++) {
+-    GET_MEM;
+-    switch (msg[count]->msg_style) {
+-      case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+-	reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-	reply[replies++].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_username);
+-	  /* PAM frees resp */
+-	break;
+-      case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+-	reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-	reply[replies++].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_password);
+-	  /* PAM frees resp */
+-	break;
+-      case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+-	reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-	reply[replies++].resp = NULL;
+-	/* ignore it... */
+-	break;
+-      case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+-	reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-	reply[replies++].resp = NULL;
+-	/* Must be an error of some sort... */
+-      default:
+-	return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+-    }
+-  }
+-  if (reply) *resp = reply;
+-  return PAM_SUCCESS;
++static int
++PAM_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, 
++		struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr)
++{
++	struct pam_response *pr;
++	const struct pam_message *pm;
++	int n;
++
++	if ((*response = malloc(num_msg * sizeof(struct pam_response))) == NULL)
++		return(PAM_CONV_ERR);
++	memset(*response, 0, num_msg * sizeof(struct pam_response));
++
++	for (pr = *response, pm = *msg, n = num_msg; n--; pr++, pm++) 
++	{
++		switch (pm->msg_style) {
++		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
++			/* XXX: why not pam_set_item(PAM_RUSER) ? */
++			pr->resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
++			pr->resp = PAM_username ? strdup(PAM_username) : NULL;
++			/* PAM frees resp */
++			break;
++		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
++			pr->resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
++			pr->resp = PAM_password ? strdup(PAM_password) : NULL;
++			/* PAM frees resp */
++			break;
++		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
++		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
++			/* ignore it... */
++			pr->resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
++			pr->resp = NULL;
++			break;
++		default:
++			/* Zero and free allocated memory and return an error. */
++			for (pr = *response, n = num_msg; n--; pr++) 
++			{
++				if (pr->resp)
++					free(pr->resp);
++			}
++			free(*response);
++			*response = NULL;
++			return(PAM_CONV_ERR);
++		}
++	}
++	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ 
+ static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = {

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-nologin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rlogind/auth.c.orig	Tue Mar 19 11:46:29 2002
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rlogind/auth.c	Wed Apr 17 16:35:43 2002
+@@ -127,7 +127,10 @@
+ 	
+     network_confirm();
+     retval = attempt_auth();
+-    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++    if ((retval == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) || (retval == PAM_PERM_DENIED)) {
++	syslog(LOG_ERR, "PAM authentication denied for in.rlogind");
++	exit(1);
++    } else if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ 	syslog(LOG_ERR, "PAM authentication failed for in.rlogind");
+ 	return -1;
+     }

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-rhost.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.pam-rhost	2005-11-28 15:24:14.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2005-11-28 15:27:08.000000000 +0100
+@@ -312,7 +312,9 @@
+        PAM_password = pass;
+        pam_error = pam_start("rexec", PAM_username, &PAM_conversation,&pamh);
+        PAM_BAIL;
+-       (void) pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "rexec");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
++       pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, user);
++       pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, remote);	       
++       pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "rexec");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
+        pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+        PAM_BAIL;
+        pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-sess.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c.pam-sess	2004-11-17 10:58:27.894345912 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2004-11-17 10:58:44.794776656 +0100
+@@ -307,6 +307,9 @@
+        PAM_BAIL;
+        pam_error = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+        PAM_BAIL;
++       pam_error = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
++       PAM_BAIL;
++       pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
+        pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+        /* If this point is reached, the user has been authenticated. */
+        setpwent();

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+diff --git a/rcp/rcp.c b/rcp/rcp.c
+index 897185f..635dd49 100644
+--- a/rcp/rcp.c
++++ b/rcp/rcp.c
+@@ -721,6 +721,12 @@ sink(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 			(void)write(rem, "", 1);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if(*cp == 'W') {
++			while (*cp != '\0')
++				cp++;
++
++			continue;
++		}
+ 		if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-pam_env.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.pam_env netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.pam_env	2009-03-30 13:20:36.730136943 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2009-03-30 13:26:17.202136832 +0200
+@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ char	remotehost[50] = "REMOTEHOST=";
+ char	*envinit[] =
+ 	    {homedir, shell, path, username, remoteuser, remotehost, 0};
+ extern	char	**environ;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static char** env;
++#endif
+ 
+ static void error(const char *fmt, ...);
+ static void doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, socklen_t fromlen);
+@@ -371,6 +374,9 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 	const char *hostname;
+ 	u_short port;
+ 	int pv[2], pid, ifd;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++        int i;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+ 	signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+@@ -518,6 +524,12 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 	shellname = strrchr(theshell, '/');
+ 	if (shellname) shellname++;
+ 	else shellname = theshell;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
++	if (NULL != env)
++		for(i = 0; env[i]; i++)
++			putenv(env[i]);
++#endif
+ 
+ 	endpwent();
+ 	if (paranoid) {

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412-jbj5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rlogind/auth.c.jbj5	Sun Jun 18 11:18:37 2000
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rlogind/auth.c	Sun Jun 18 11:21:37 2000
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include "rlogind.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
++#include <grp.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * Modifications for Linux-PAM: Al Longyear <longyear@netcom.com>
+@@ -158,18 +159,14 @@
+     pwd = getpwnam(localuser);
+     if (pwd==NULL) {
+         syslog(LOG_ERR, "user returned by PAM does not exist\n");
+-	/* don't print this - it tells people which accounts exist */
+-	/*fprintf(stderr, "rlogind: internal error\n");*/
+ 	return -1;
+     }
+     if (setgid(pwd->pw_gid) != 0) {
+         syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot assume gid for user returned by PAM\n");
+-	fprintf(stderr, "rlogind: internal error\n");
+ 	return -1;
+     }
+     if (initgroups(localuser, pwd->pw_gid) != 0) {
+         syslog(LOG_ERR, "initgroups failed for user returned by PAM\n");
+-	fprintf(stderr, "rlogind: internal error\n");
+ 	return -1;
+     }
+     retval = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rcp-largefile.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.largefile	2005-11-24 10:38:12.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2005-11-24 10:40:28.000000000 +0100
+@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+-		    "C%04o %lld %s\n", stb.st_mode&07777, (long long)(stb.st_size), last);
++		    "C%04o %llu %s\n", stb.st_mode&07777, (unsigned long long)(stb.st_size), last);
+ 		(void)write(rem, buf, (int)strlen(buf));
+ 		if (response() < 0) {
+ 			(void)close(f);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-remote-close.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/rshd/rshd.c b/rshd/rshd.c
+index 546b908..9b0024e 100644
+--- a/rshd/rshd.c
++++ b/rshd/rshd.c
+@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ static void stderr_parent(int sock, int pype, int pid) {
+ 	    if (cc <= 0) {
+ 		shutdown(sock, 2);
+ 		FD_CLR(pype, &readfrom);
++		close(sock);
+ 		guys--;
+ 	    } 
+ 	    else write(sock, buf, cc);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec-cmdbuflen.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2017-10-17 10:50:49.508905643 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/rexecd.c	2017-10-17 11:47:32.563051760 +0200
+@@ -261,7 +261,14 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_in *fromp)
+ 		fatal ("sysconf (_SC_ARG_MAX) failed\n");
+ 	}
+ 
+-	cmdbuf = malloc (++cmdbuflen);
++	cmdbuflen++;
++	/* Decrease cmdbuflen to reasonable number if it's too high */
++	if ((size_t) cmdbuflen > 131072) {
++		cmdbuflen = 131072;
++		syslog (LOG_INFO, "Decreasing cmdbuflen because it was too high (>131072 bytes)");
++	}
++
++	cmdbuf = malloc (cmdbuflen);
+ 	if (cmdbuf == NULL) {
+ 		syslog (LOG_ERR, "Could not allocate space for cmdbuf");
+ 		fatal ("Could not allocate space for cmdbuf\n");
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2017-10-17 11:26:15.192221595 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2017-10-17 11:47:26.065986220 +0200
+@@ -433,8 +433,10 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 
+ 	cmdbuflen++;
+ 	/* Decrease cmdbuflen to reasonable number if it's too high */
+-	if ((size_t) cmdbuflen > 131072)
++	if ((size_t) cmdbuflen > 131072) {
+ 		cmdbuflen = 131072;
++		syslog (LOG_INFO, "Decreasing cmdbuflen because it was too high (>131072 bytes)");		
++	}
+ 
+ 	cmdbuf = malloc (cmdbuflen);
+ 	if (cmdbuf == NULL) {

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec-netrc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/ruserpass.c.netrc	2004-10-14 12:02:04.000000000 -0500
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/ruserpass.c	2004-10-14 12:14:14.000000000 -0500
+@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 1985 Regents of the University of California.
++ * All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
++ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
++ *	This product includes software developed by the University of
++ *	California, Berkeley and its contributors.
++ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
++ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
++ *    without specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
++ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
++ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
++ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
++ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
++ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
++ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
++ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
++ * SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * from: @(#)ruserpass.c	5.3 (Berkeley) 3/1/91
++ */
++char ruserpass_rcsid[] = 
++  "$Id: ruserpass.c,v 1.9 1999/10/02 19:12:33 dholland Exp $";
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <utmp.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/param.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++
++static FILE *cfile;
++static int token(void);
++
++#define MACBUF_LEN 4096
++
++#define	DEFAULT	1
++#define	LOGIN	2
++#define	PASSWD	3
++#define	ACCOUNT 4
++#define MACDEF  5
++#define	ID	10
++#define	MACH	11
++
++static char tokval[100];
++
++static struct toktab {
++	const char *tokstr;
++	int tval;
++} toktab[]= {
++	{ "default",	DEFAULT },
++	{ "login",	LOGIN },
++	{ "password",	PASSWD },
++	{ "passwd",	PASSWD },
++	{ "account",	ACCOUNT },
++	{ "machine",	MACH },
++	{ "macdef",	MACDEF },
++	{ NULL,		0 }
++};
++
++int
++xruserpass(const char *host, char **aname, char **apass)
++{
++	const char *hdir;
++	char buf[BUFSIZ], *tmp;
++	char myname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
++	const char *mydomain;
++	int t, usedefault = 0;
++	struct stat stb;
++
++	hdir = getenv("HOME");
++	if (hdir == NULL)
++		hdir = ".";
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/.netrc", hdir);
++	cfile = fopen(buf, "r");
++	if (cfile == NULL) {
++		if (errno != ENOENT)
++			perror(buf);
++		return(0);
++	}
++	if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) < 0)
++		myname[0] = '\0';
++	if ((mydomain = strchr(myname, '.')) == NULL)
++		mydomain = "";
++next:
++	while ((t = token())) switch(t) {
++
++	case DEFAULT:
++		usedefault = 1;
++		/* FALL THROUGH */
++
++	case MACH:
++		if (!usedefault) {
++			if (token() != ID)
++				continue;
++			/*
++			 * Allow match of incompletely-specified host in 
++			 * local domain.
++			 */
++			if (strcasecmp(host, tokval) == 0)
++				goto match;
++			if ((tmp = index(host, '.')) != NULL &&
++			    strcasecmp(tmp, mydomain) == 0 &&
++			    strncasecmp(host, tokval, tmp - host) == 0 &&
++			    tokval[tmp - host] == '\0')
++				goto match;
++			continue;
++		}
++	match:
++		while ((t = token()) && t != MACH && t != DEFAULT) switch(t) {
++
++		case LOGIN:
++			if (token()) {
++				if (*aname == 0) { 
++					*aname = malloc((unsigned) strlen(tokval) + 1);
++					(void) strcpy(*aname, tokval);
++				} else {
++					if (strcmp(*aname, tokval))
++						goto next;
++				}
++			}
++			break;
++		case PASSWD:
++			if (*aname==NULL) {
++	fprintf(stderr, "Error: `password' must follow `login' in .netrc\n");
++				goto bad;
++			}
++			if (strcmp(*aname, "anonymous") &&
++			    fstat(fileno(cfile), &stb) >= 0 &&
++			    (stb.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
++	fprintf(stderr, "Error - .netrc file not correct permissions.\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "Remove password or correct mode (should be 600).\n");
++				goto bad;
++			}
++			if (token() && *apass == 0) {
++				*apass = malloc((unsigned) strlen(tokval) + 1);
++				(void) strcpy(*apass, tokval);
++			}
++			break;
++		case ACCOUNT:
++			break;
++		case MACDEF:
++			break;
++		default:
++	fprintf(stderr, "Unknown .netrc keyword %s\n", tokval);
++			break;
++		}
++		goto done;
++	}
++done:
++	(void) fclose(cfile);
++	return(0);
++bad:
++	(void) fclose(cfile);
++	return(-1);
++}
++
++static 
++int
++token(void)
++{
++	char *cp;
++	int c;
++	struct toktab *t;
++
++	if (feof(cfile))
++		return (0);
++	while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF &&
++	    (c == '\n' || c == '\t' || c == ' ' || c == ','))
++		continue;
++	if (c == EOF)
++		return (0);
++	cp = tokval;
++	if (c == '"') {
++		while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF && c != '"') {
++			if (c == '\\')
++				c = getc(cfile);
++			*cp++ = c;
++		}
++	} else {
++		*cp++ = c;
++		while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF
++		    && c != '\n' && c != '\t' && c != ' ' && c != ',') {
++			if (c == '\\')
++				c = getc(cfile);
++			*cp++ = c;
++		}
++	}
++	*cp = 0;
++	if (tokval[0] == 0)
++		return (0);
++	for (t = toktab; t->tokstr; t++)
++		if (!strcmp(t->tokstr, tokval))
++			return (t->tval);
++	return (ID);
++}
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.netrc	2004-10-14 12:02:04.000000000 -0500
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c	2004-10-14 12:16:46.000000000 -0500
+@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@
+ void echo_sig(int sig);
+ void safe_write_error(const char *message);
+ 
++int xruserpass(const char *host, char **aname, char **apass);
++
+ /* These need to be global for signal passing. */
+ int aux_sock=-1; /* Socket for auxiliary channel. */
+ int extra_error = 1; /* Setup special channel for standard error? */
+@@ -165,7 +167,10 @@
+ 					      a newline. */
+     passwd = getpass("Password: ");
+   } else {
+-
++    if (xruserpass(host, &user_name, &passwd) < 0) {
++	user_name = NULL;
++	passwd = NULL;
++    }
+     if ( user_name == NULL )
+       user_name = getenv("REXEC_USER");
+     if ( user_name == NULL ) {
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/Makefile.netrc	2004-10-14 12:15:30.000000000 -0500
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/Makefile	2004-10-14 12:03:37.000000000 -0500
+@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
+ 
+ all: rexec
+ 
+-rexec: rexec.c
++rexec: rexec.o ruserpass.o
+ 
+ rexec.1:
+ 

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec-sig.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.rexec-sig	2004-11-17 16:51:37.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c	2004-11-17 17:17:12.844628352 +0100
+@@ -434,10 +434,10 @@
+     break;
+   default:
+     if ( sigaction(sig, NULL, &action) < 0 )
+-    {
+-      perror(progname);
+-      exit(1);
+-    }
++	    /* in the signal(7) you can found "...except SIGKILL and SIGSTOP",
++	     * but we detect problems with more signals...
++	     */
++	    return;
+     if ( action.sa_handler != SIG_IGN )
+     {
+       action.sa_handler = handler;

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.10/rexecd/rexecd.8.rexec	Mon Jul 15 03:53:47 1996
++++ netkit-rsh-0.10/rexecd/rexecd.8	Fri Jul 30 19:13:15 1999
+@@ -68,8 +68,9 @@
+ it is interpreted as the port number of a secondary
+ stream to be used for the 
+ .Em stderr .
+-A second connection is then created to the specified
+-port on the client's machine.
++A second connection will be created to the specified
++port on the client's machine after receiving and authenticating
++the user, password, and command from the client.
+ .It
+ A NUL terminated user name of at most 16 characters
+ is retrieved on the initial socket.
+--- netkit-rsh-0.10/rexec/Makefile.rexec	Thu Jul 29 23:32:28 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.10/rexec/Makefile	Fri Jul 30 19:14:15 1999
+@@ -1,30 +1,23 @@
+ 
+ SHELL = /bin/sh
+ 
+-BINDIR = /usr/local/bin
+-MANDIR = /usr/local/man/man1
++include ../MCONFIG
++include ../MRULES
+ 
+ # Uncomment this line if you get link errors under Solaris
+ #LDLIBS=-lsocket -lnsl
+ 
+ .PHONY: all
+ 
+-all: rexec install
++all: rexec
+ 
+ rexec: rexec.c
+ 
+ rexec.1:
+ 
++clean:
++	rm -f *.o rexec
++
+ install: rexec rexec.1
+-	@ echo "Installation:  Press enter for defaults."; \
+-	echo -n "Enter the location to install executable "; \
+-	echo -n " (default: $(BINDIR)): "; \
+-	read bindir; \
+-	bindir=$${bindir:-$(BINDIR)}; \
+-	echo -n "Enter the manpage location (default $(MANDIR)): ";\
+-	read mandir; \
+-	mandir=$${mandir:-$(MANDIR)}; \
+-	cp rexec $$bindir; \
+-	chmod a+rx $${bindir}/rexec; \
+-	cp rexec.1 $$mandir; \
+-	chmod a+r $${mandir}/rexec.1
++	install -m 0755 rexec $(INSTALLROOT)/$(BINDIR)/rexec
++	install -m 0644 rexec.1 $(INSTALLROOT)/$(MANDIR)/man1/rexec.1

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh448904.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.rh448904 netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.rh448904	2008-10-03 13:52:58.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2008-10-03 13:55:54.000000000 +0200
+@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ static int log_audit(const char *usernam
+ 			int success)
+ {
+ #ifdef USE_AUDIT
++	int err;
+ 	int audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ 		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+@@ -391,8 +392,13 @@ static int log_audit(const char *usernam
+ 		int rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+ 				NULL, "login", username, uid, hostname, NULL,
+ 				"rsh", success);
++		err = errno;
+ 		close(audit_fd);
+-		if (rc <= 0) 
++		/*
++		 * ECONNREFUSED is returned when kernel is compiled without
++		 * audit support
++		 */
++		if (rc <= 0 && err != ECONNREFUSED) 
+ 			return 1;
+ 	}
+ #endif

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh461903.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.closeerr netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.closeerr	2008-09-10 12:07:43.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2008-09-10 12:30:57.000000000 +0200
+@@ -810,7 +810,11 @@ bad:			error("rcp: %s: %s\n", np, strerr
+ 			    strerror(errno));
+ 			wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ 		}
+-		(void)close(ofd);
++		if (close(ofd) != 0) {
++			error("rcp: error closing %s: %s\n", np,
++				strerror(errno));
++			wrerr = DISPLAYED;
++		}
+ 		(void)response();
+ 		if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
+ 			setimes = 0;
+

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh473492.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.patch netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.patch	2010-01-05 15:24:44.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c	2010-01-05 16:06:55.927098704 +0100
+@@ -300,14 +300,29 @@ void parse_options(char *argv[], int arg
+     {
+     case 'l':
+       if (optarg != NULL)
+-	*user_name=strcpy((char *)malloc((strlen(optarg)+1)*sizeof(char)),optarg);
++      {
++        *user_name = malloc((strlen(optarg)+1)*sizeof(char));
++        if(*user_name == NULL)
++        {
++          fprintf(stderr, "%s: can't allocate memory!\n", argv[0]);
++          exit(1);
++        }
++        strcpy(*user_name,optarg);
++      }
+       break;
+     case 'p':
+       if ( optarg!= NULL )
+       {
+         int passlen = strlen(optarg);
+ 
+-	*passwd=strcpy((char *)malloc((passlen+1)*sizeof(char)),optarg);
++	*passwd = malloc((char *)malloc((passlen+1)*sizeof(char)));
++        if(*passwd == NULL)
++        {
++          fprintf(stderr, "%s: can't allocate memory!\n", argv[0]);
++          exit(1);
++        }
++        strcpy(*passwd,optarg);
++	
+         for (ind = 0; ind < passlen; ++ind)
+           optarg[ind] = '\0';
+       }
+@@ -356,6 +371,12 @@ void parse_options(char *argv[], int arg
+   for ( ind = optind; ind < argc; ++ind)
+     len += strlen(argv[ind])+1;
+   *command = (char *) malloc((len+1)*sizeof(char));
++  if ( *command == NULL )
++  {
++    fprintf(stderr, "%s: can't allocate memory!\n", argv[0]);
++    exit(1);
++  }
++  
+   **command = '\0';
+   for ( ind = optind; ind < argc; ++ind) {
+     if ( ind > optind ) {
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.patch netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.patch	2010-01-05 15:24:44.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2010-01-05 15:46:39.718973390 +0100
+@@ -562,7 +562,11 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 	environ = envinit;
+ 
+ 	if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
+-		chdir("/");
++		if(chdir("/") < 0)
++		{
++			error("No remote directory and can't chdir to root.\n");
++			exit(1);
++		}
+ 		/*
+ 		 * error("No remote directory.\n");
+ 		 * exit(1);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh650119.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.rh650119 netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c.rh650119	2010-11-08 13:14:20.946845218 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexec/rexec.c	2010-11-08 13:14:36.126838888 +0100
+@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ void parse_options(char *argv[], int arg
+       {
+         int passlen = strlen(optarg);
+ 
+-	*passwd = malloc((char *)malloc((passlen+1)*sizeof(char)));
++	*passwd = (char *)malloc((passlen+1)*sizeof(char));
+         if(*passwd == NULL)
+         {
+           fprintf(stderr, "%s: can't allocate memory!\n", argv[0]);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh710987.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.rh710987 netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.rh710987	2011-10-26 17:49:22.559772285 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2011-10-26 17:49:29.229771822 +0200
+@@ -487,7 +487,6 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 	hostname = findhostname((struct sockaddr *)fromp, fromlen,
+ 		remuser, locuser, cmdbuf);
+ 
+-	setpwent();
+ 	pwd = doauth(remuser, hostname, locuser);
+ 	if (pwd == NULL) {
+ 		if (log_audit(remuser, -1, hostname, 0) > 0) {
+@@ -600,7 +599,6 @@ doit(struct sockaddr_storage *fromp, soc
+ 			putenv(env[i]);
+ #endif
+ 
+-	endpwent();
+ 	if (paranoid) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_INFO|LOG_AUTH, "%s@%s as %s: cmd='%s'",
+ 		   remuser, hostname, locuser, cmdbuf);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh784467.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.rh784467 netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c.rh784467	2012-01-31 15:47:57.996697245 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/rcp.c	2012-01-31 17:11:23.489578305 +0100
+@@ -511,6 +511,37 @@ notreg:			(void)close(f);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++static char *
++rcp_basename(char *path)
++{
++	char *bname;
++
++	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0')
++		return NULL;
++
++retry:
++	/* Note this is GNU basename */
++	bname = basename(path);
++	if (*bname == '\0') {
++		/* path ends with '/', strip them all */
++		char *end = path + strlen(path) - 1;
++		while (path <= end && *end == '/') {
++			*end = '\0';
++			end--;
++		}
++
++		if (end < path) {
++			/* The path consists only from '/' chars */
++			*path = '/';
++			return path;
++		} else {
++			/* We removed all trailing '/' characters */
++			goto retry;
++		}
++	} else
++		return bname;
++}
++
+ static void
+ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+ {
+@@ -522,7 +553,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+ 		error("rcp: %s: %s\n", name, strerror(errno));
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	last = strrchr(name, '/');
++	last = rcp_basename(name);
+ 	if (last == 0)
+ 		last = name;
+ 	else

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh896583.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--- rshd/rshd.c.orig	2013-01-17 14:33:14.694727753 +0000
++++ rshd/rshd.c	2013-01-17 14:43:53.302906217 +0000
+@@ -531,6 +531,19 @@
+ 		close(pv[0]);
+ 		dup2(pv[1], 2);
+ 		close(pv[1]);
++	} else {
++		pid = fork();
++		if (pid == -1)  {
++			error("Can't fork; try again.\n");
++			exit(1);
++		}
++		if (pid) {
++			waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
++			pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
++			pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++			exit(0);
++		}
++		setpgrp();
+ 	}
+ 	theshell = pwd->pw_shell;
+ 	if (!theshell || !*theshell) {

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rh947213.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+diff -up netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.rh947213 netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.rh947213	2013-04-11 14:18:47.481715853 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c	2013-04-11 14:32:50.807780164 +0200
+@@ -67,12 +67,13 @@ char rcsid[] =
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <pty.h>
++#include <utmp.h>
+ 
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "logwtmp.h"
+ #include "rlogind.h"
+ 
+-pid_t forkpty(int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
+ int logout(const char *);
+ 
+ #ifndef TIOCPKT_WINDOW
+@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ static void getstr(char *buf, int cnt, c
+ }
+ 
+ static void doit(int netfd) {
+-    int master, pid, on = 1;
++    int master, slave, r, pid, on = 1;
+     int authenticated = 0;
+     char *hname;
+     int hostok;
+@@ -421,12 +422,34 @@ static void doit(int netfd) {
+ 	write(netfd, "rlogind: Host address mismatch.\r\n", 33);
+     }
+ 
+-    pid = forkpty(&master, line, NULL, &win);
+-    if (pid < 0) {
++    /*  We can no longer call forkpty here (a convenience routine that combines
++        openpty, fork, and login_tty) because, with forkpty, the slave end of
++        the pty is open only in the child process. The child process execs
++        /bin/login which now closes all open file descriptors before doing a
++        vhangup (see lkml.org/lkml/2012/6/5/145), and this resets packet mode
++        on the pty, undoing the effect of the ioctl(master, TIOCPKT, &on) call
++        made by the parent.
++
++        Instead, we call openpty, fork, and login_tty individually, so that we
++        can keep a file descriptor to the slave open in the parent process,
++        thereby retaining packet mode even when the child closes file descriptors
++        to call vhangup. */
++    r = openpty(&master, &slave, line, NULL, &win);
++    if (r < 0) {
+ 	if (errno == ENOENT) fatal(netfd, "Out of ptys", 0);
+-	fatal(netfd, "Forkpty", 1);
++	fatal(netfd, "Openpty", 1);
++    }
++
++    signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
++
++    pid = fork();
++    if (pid < 0) {
++        fatal(netfd, "Fork", 1);
+     }
++
+     if (pid == 0) {
++	close(master);
++	login_tty(slave);
+ 	/* netfd should always be 0, but... */ 
+ 	if (netfd > 2) close(netfd);
+ 	child(hname, termtype, lusername, authenticated, rusername);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-rlogin-linefeed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/sockconv.c.linefeed	1999-10-02 23:50:52.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/sockconv.c	2006-07-17 14:30:50.000000000 +0200
+@@ -86,6 +86,35 @@
+   return (text);
+ }
+ 
++/* conver \n to \r\n and also terminate string by \r\n */
++static void my_fputs(char *str, FILE *out)
++{
++	char *p = str, *last = str;
++
++	while(p && *p) { 
++		if ((p=strchr(p, '\n')) && (p==str || *(p-1)!='\r')) {
++			/* convert \n to \n\r  */
++			fwrite((const void *) last, 1, p-last, out);
++			fputs("\r\n", out);
++			p++;
++			last = p;
++		}
++		else if (p && *(p+1))
++			/* \r\n already in strimg, continue... */
++			p++;
++		else {
++			/* write the rest of string */
++			int len = strlen(str);
++
++			fwrite((const void *) last, 1, len-(last-str), out);
++			if (*(str+(len-1)) != '\n')
++				fputs("\r\n", out);	/* terminate output */
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++}
++
++
+ static void drop_reply(struct pam_response *reply, int replies)
+ {
+   int i;
+@@ -126,16 +155,15 @@
+       }
+       break;
+     case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+-      fprintf(stderr,"%s\n",msgm[replies]->msg);
++      my_fputs(msgm[replies]->msg, stderr);
+       string = NULL;
+-      
+       break;
+     case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+-      fprintf(stderr,"%s\n",msgm[replies]->msg);
++      my_fputs(msgm[replies]->msg, stderr);
+       string = NULL;
+       break;
+     default:
+-      fprintf(stderr, "erroneous conversation (%d)\n"
++      fprintf(stderr, "erroneous conversation (%d)\r\n"
+ 	      ,msgm[replies]->msg_style);
+       drop_reply(reply,replies);
+       return (PAM_CONV_ERR);

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-sectty.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rexecd/rexecd.c.sectty	Sat Oct  2 17:50:52 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rexecd/rexecd.c	Mon Feb  5 16:42:29 2001
+@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@
+        PAM_password = pass;
+        pam_error = pam_start("rexec", PAM_username, &PAM_conversation,&pamh);
+        PAM_BAIL;
++       (void) pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "rexec");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
+        pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+        PAM_BAIL;
+        pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rlogind/auth.c.sectty	Mon Feb  5 16:43:46 2001
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rlogind/auth.c	Mon Feb  5 16:44:28 2001
+@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
+     pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, localuser);
+     pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, remoteuser);
+     pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, host);
+-    pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "tty");   /* ? */
++    pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "rlogin");   /* we don't have a tty yet! */
+ 	
+     network_confirm();
+     retval = attempt_auth();
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rshd/rshd.c.sectty	Mon Feb  5 16:43:52 2001
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412/rshd/rshd.c	Mon Feb  5 16:44:42 2001
+@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
+     }
+     pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, remuser);
+     pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
+-    pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "tty");
++    pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, "rsh");  /* we don't use a tty, so punt */
+     
+     retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+     if (retcode == PAM_SUCCESS) {

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-strip.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/Makefile.strip	Wed Jun 19 16:47:42 2002
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rcp/Makefile	Wed Jun 19 17:01:11 2002
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: rcp
+-	install -s rcp $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
++	install rcp $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
+ 	install -m$(MANMODE) rcp.1 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man1
+ 
+ clean:
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/Makefile.strip	Sun Dec 12 19:05:00 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rexecd/Makefile	Wed Jun 19 17:01:41 2002
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: rexecd
+-	install -s -m$(DAEMONMODE) rexecd $(INSTALLROOT)$(SBINDIR)/in.rexecd
++	install -m$(DAEMONMODE) rexecd $(INSTALLROOT)$(SBINDIR)/in.rexecd
+ 	install -m$(MANMODE) rexecd.8 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man8/in.rexecd.8
+ 	ln -sf in.rexecd.8 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man8/rexecd.8
+ ifeq ($(USE_PAM),1)
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/Makefile.strip	Wed Jun 19 16:47:42 2002
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogin/Makefile	Wed Jun 19 17:02:06 2002
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: $(PROG)
+-	install -s $(PROG) $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
++	install $(PROG) $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
+ 	install -m $(MANMODE) $(PROG).1 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man1
+ 
+ clean:
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/Makefile.strip	Sun Dec 12 19:05:01 1999
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/Makefile	Wed Jun 19 17:02:26 2002
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ auth.o network.o: rlogind.h
+ 
+ install: rlogind
+-	install -s -m$(DAEMONMODE) rlogind $(INSTALLROOT)$(SBINDIR)/in.rlogind
++	install -m$(DAEMONMODE) rlogind $(INSTALLROOT)$(SBINDIR)/in.rlogind
+ 	install -m$(MANMODE) rlogind.8 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man8/in.rlogind.8
+ 	ln -sf in.rlogind.8 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man8/rlogind.8
+ 
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rsh/Makefile.strip	Wed Jun 19 16:47:42 2002
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rsh/Makefile	Wed Jun 19 17:02:45 2002
+@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: rsh
+-	install -s rsh $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
++	install rsh $(INSTALLROOT)$(BINDIR)
+ 	install -m$(MANMODE) rsh.1 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man1
+ 
+ clean:
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/Makefile.strip	Wed Jun 19 16:47:42 2002
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/Makefile	Wed Jun 19 17:02:59 2002
+@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
+ 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
+ 
+ install: rshd
+-	install -s -m$(DAEMONMODE) rshd $(INSTALLROOT)$(SBINDIR)/in.rshd
++	install -m$(DAEMONMODE) rshd $(INSTALLROOT)$(SBINDIR)/in.rshd
+ 	install -m$(MANMODE) rshd.8 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man8/in.rshd.8
+ 	ln -sf in.rshd.8 $(INSTALLROOT)$(MANDIR)/man8/rshd.8
+ 

SOURCES/netkit-rsh-0.17-userandhost.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c.userandhost	2000-07-23 05:07:58.000000000 +0200
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rlogind/rlogind.c	2003-01-17 17:31:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -333,9 +333,10 @@
+ 
+ 
+ static void child(const char *hname, const char *termtype,
+-		  const char *localuser, int authenticated)
++		  const char *localuser, int authenticated,
++		  const char *rusername)
+ {
+-    char *termenv[2];
++    char *termenv[4];
+ 
+     setup_term(0, termtype);
+ 
+@@ -344,7 +345,17 @@
+ 	strcpy(termenv[0], "TERM=");
+ 	strcat(termenv[0], termtype);
+     }
+-    termenv[1] = NULL;
++    termenv[1] = malloc(strlen(rusername)+12);
++    if (termenv[1]) {   /* shouldn't ever fail, mind you */
++	strcpy(termenv[1], "REMOTEUSER=");
++	strcat(termenv[1], rusername);
++    }
++    termenv[2] = malloc(strlen(hname)+12);
++    if (termenv[2]) {   /* shouldn't ever fail, mind you */
++	strcpy(termenv[2], "REMOTEHOST=");
++	strcat(termenv[2], hname);
++    }
++    termenv[3] = NULL;
+ 
+     if (authenticated) {
+ 	auth_finish();
+@@ -420,7 +431,7 @@
+     if (pid == 0) {
+ 	/* netfd should always be 0, but... */ 
+ 	if (netfd > 2) close(netfd);
+-	child(hname, termtype, lusername, authenticated);
++	child(hname, termtype, lusername, authenticated, rusername);
+     }
+     on = 1;
+     ioctl(netfd, FIONBIO, &on);
+--- netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c.userandhost	2003-01-17 17:25:22.000000000 +0100
++++ netkit-rsh-0.17/rshd/rshd.c	2003-01-17 17:25:22.000000000 +0100
+@@ -102,8 +102,10 @@
+ char	homedir[64] = "HOME=";
+ char	shell[64] = "SHELL=";
+ char	path[100] = "PATH=";
++char	remoteuser[20] = "REMOTEUSER=";
++char	remotehost[50] = "REMOTEHOST=";
+ char	*envinit[] =
+-	    {homedir, shell, path, username, 0};
++	    {homedir, shell, path, username, remoteuser, remotehost, 0};
+ extern	char	**environ;
+ 
+ static void error(const char *fmt, ...);
+@@ -460,6 +462,12 @@
+ 	strncat(homedir, pwd->pw_dir, sizeof(homedir)-6);
+ 	homedir[sizeof(homedir)-1] = 0;
+ 
++	strncat(remoteuser, remuser, sizeof(remoteuser)-12);
++	remoteuser[sizeof(remoteuser)-1] = 0;
++
++	strncat(remotehost, hostname, sizeof(remotehost)-12);
++	remotehost[sizeof(remotehost)-1] = 0;
++
+ 	strcat(path, _PATH_DEFPATH);
+ 
+ 	strncat(shell, theshell, sizeof(shell)-7);

SOURCES/rexec.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+# For root login to succeed here with pam_securetty, "rexec" must be
+# listed in /etc/securetty.
+auth       required     pam_nologin.so
+auth       required     pam_securetty.so
+auth       required     pam_env.so
+auth       include      password-auth
+account    include      password-auth
+session	   optional     pam_keyinit.so    force revoke
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+session    include      password-auth

SOURCES/rexec.socket

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Remote Execution Facilities Activation Socket
+
+[Socket]
+ListenStream=512
+Accept=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sockets.target

SOURCES/rexec@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Remote Execution Facilities Server
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/in.rexecd
+StandardInput=socket
+IgnoreSIGPIPE=no

SOURCES/rlogin.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+# For root login to succeed here with pam_securetty, "rlogin" must be
+# listed in /etc/securetty.
+auth       required     pam_nologin.so
+auth       required     pam_securetty.so
+auth       required     pam_env.so
+auth       sufficient   pam_rhosts.so
+auth       include      password-auth
+account    include      password-auth
+password   include      password-auth
+session	   optional     pam_keyinit.so    force revoke
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+session    include      password-auth

SOURCES/rlogin.socket

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Remote Login Facilities Activation Socket
+IgnoreOnIsolate=true
+
+[Socket]
+ListenStream=513
+Accept=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sockets.target

SOURCES/rlogin@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Remote Login Facilities Server
+After=local-fs.target
+IgnoreOnIsolate=true
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/in.rlogind
+StandardInput=socket
+IgnoreSIGPIPE=no

SOURCES/rsh.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+# For root login to succeed here with pam_securetty, "rsh" must be
+# listed in /etc/securetty.
+auth       required     pam_nologin.so
+auth       required     pam_securetty.so
+auth       required     pam_env.so
+auth       required     pam_rhosts.so
+account    include      password-auth
+session	   optional     pam_keyinit.so    force revoke
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+session    include      password-auth

SOURCES/rsh.socket

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Remote Shell Facilities Activation Socket
+
+[Socket]
+ListenStream=514
+Accept=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sockets.target

SOURCES/rsh@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Remote Shell Facilities Server
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/in.rshd
+StandardInput=socket
+IgnoreSIGPIPE=no

SPECS/rsh.spec

@@ -0,0 +1,660 @@
+%global _hardened_build 1
+
+Summary: Clients for remote access commands (rsh, rlogin, rcp)
+Name: rsh
+Version: 0.17
+Release: 79%{?dist}
+License: BSD
+Group: Applications/Internet
+
+BuildRequires: perl, ncurses-devel, pam-devel, audit-libs-devel, systemd
+
+URL: ftp://ftp.uk.linux.org/pub/linux/Networking/netkit
+Source0: ftp://ftp.uk.linux.org/pub/linux/Networking/netkit/netkit-rsh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source1: rexec.pam
+Source2: rlogin.pam
+Source3: rsh.pam
+# Source is no longer publicly available.
+Source4: rexec-1.5.tar.gz
+Source5: rsh@.service
+Source6: rsh.socket
+Source7: rlogin@.service
+Source8: rlogin.socket
+Source9: rexec@.service
+Source10: rexec.socket
+
+Patch1: netkit-rsh-0.17-sectty.patch
+# Make rexec installation process working
+Patch2: netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec.patch
+Patch3: netkit-rsh-0.10-stdarg.patch
+# Improve installation process
+Patch4: netkit-rsh-0.16-jbj.patch
+# Link rshd against libpam
+Patch8: netkit-rsh-0.16-jbj4.patch
+Patch9: netkit-rsh-0.16-prompt.patch
+Patch10: netkit-rsh-0.16-rlogin=rsh.patch
+# Improve documentation
+Patch11: netkit-rsh-0.16-nokrb.patch
+# Remove spurious double-reporting of errors
+Patch12: netkit-rsh-0.17-pre20000412-jbj5.patch
+# RH #42880
+Patch13: netkit-rsh-0.17-userandhost.patch
+# Don't strip binaries during installation
+Patch14: netkit-rsh-0.17-strip.patch
+# RH #67362
+Patch15: netkit-rsh-0.17-lfs.patch
+# RH #57392
+Patch16: netkit-rsh-0.17-chdir.patch
+# RH #63806
+Patch17: netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-nologin.patch
+# RH #135643
+Patch19: netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec-netrc.patch
+# RH #68590
+Patch20: netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-sess.patch
+# RH #67361
+Patch21: netkit-rsh-0.17-errno.patch
+# RH #118630
+Patch22: netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec-sig.patch
+# RH #135827
+Patch23: netkit-rsh-0.17-nohost.patch
+# RH #122315
+Patch24: netkit-rsh-0.17-ignchld.patch
+# RH #146464
+Patch25: netkit-rsh-0.17-checkdir.patch
+Patch26: netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-conv.patch
+# RH #174045
+Patch27: netkit-rsh-0.17-rcp-largefile.patch
+# RH #174146
+Patch28: netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-rhost.patch
+# RH #178916
+Patch29: netkit-rsh-0.17-rlogin-linefeed.patch
+Patch30: netkit-rsh-0.17-ipv6.patch
+Patch31: netkit-rsh-0.17-pam_env.patch
+Patch33: netkit-rsh-0.17-dns.patch
+Patch34: netkit-rsh-0.17-nohostcheck-compat.patch
+# RH #448904
+Patch35: netkit-rsh-0.17-audit.patch
+Patch36: netkit-rsh-0.17-longname.patch
+# RH #440867
+Patch37: netkit-rsh-0.17-arg_max.patch
+Patch38: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh448904.patch
+Patch39: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh461903.patch
+Patch40: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh473492.patch
+Patch41: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh650119.patch
+Patch42: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh710987.patch
+Patch43: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh784467.patch
+Patch44: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh896583.patch
+Patch45: netkit-rsh-0.17-rh947213.patch
+Patch46: 0001-rshd-use-sockaddr_in-for-non-native-IPv6-clients.patch
+Patch47: 0002-rlogind-use-sockaddr_in-for-non-native-IPv6-client.patch
+Patch48: netkit-rsh-0.17-ipv6-rexec.patch
+Patch49: 0001-rshd-use-upper-bound-for-cmdbuflen.patch
+Patch50: 0001-rcp-don-t-advance-pointer-returned-from-rcp_basename.patch
+Patch51: netkit-rsh-0.17-pam-warning.patch
+Patch52: netkit-rsh-0.17-rexec-cmdbuflen.patch
+Patch53: netkit-rsh-0.17-remote-close.patch
+
+%description
+The rsh package contains a set of programs which allow users to run
+commands on remote machines, login to other machines and copy files
+between machines (rsh, rlogin and rcp).  All three of these commands
+use rhosts style authentication.  This package contains the clients
+needed for all of these services.
+The rsh package should be installed to enable remote access to other
+machines
+
+%package server
+Summary: Servers for remote access commands (rsh, rlogin, rcp)
+Group: System Environment/Daemons
+Requires: pam, /etc/pam.d/system-auth
+Requires(post): systemd
+Requires(preun): systemd
+Requires(postun): systemd
+
+%description server
+The rsh-server package contains a set of programs which allow users
+to run commands on remote machines, login to other machines and copy
+files between machines (rsh, rlogin and rcp).  All three of these
+commands use rhosts style authentication.  This package contains the
+servers needed for all of these services.  It also contains a server
+for rexec, an alternate method of executing remote commands.
+All of these servers are run by systemd and configured using
+systemd units and PAM.
+
+The rsh-server package should be installed to enable remote access
+from other machines
+
+%prep
+%setup -q -n netkit-rsh-%{version} -a 4
+%patch1 -p1 -b .sectty
+%patch2 -p1 -b .rexec
+%patch3 -p1 -b .stdarg
+%patch4 -p1 -b .jbj
+%patch8 -p1 -b .jbj4
+%patch9 -p1 -b .prompt
+%patch10 -p1 -b .rsh
+%patch11 -p1 -b .rsh.nokrb
+%patch12 -p1 -b .jbj5
+%patch13 -p1 -b .userandhost
+%patch14 -p1 -b .strip
+%patch15 -p1 -b .lfs
+%patch16 -p1 -b .chdir
+%patch17 -p1 -b .pam-nologin
+%patch19 -p1 -b .rexec-netrc
+%patch20 -p1 -b .pam-sess
+%patch21 -p1 -b .errno
+%patch22 -p1 -b .rexec-sig
+%patch23 -p1 -b .nohost
+%patch24 -p1 -b .ignchld
+%patch25 -p1 -b .checkdir
+%patch26 -p1 -b .pam-conv
+%patch27 -p1 -b .largefile
+%patch28 -p1 -b .pam-rhost
+%patch29 -p1 -b .linefeed
+%patch30 -p1 -b .ipv6
+%patch31 -p1 -b .pam_env
+%patch33 -p1 -b .dns
+%patch34 -p1 -b .compat
+%patch35 -p1 -b .audit
+%patch36 -p1 -b .longname
+%patch37 -p1 -b .arg_max
+%patch38 -p1 -b .rh448904
+%patch39 -p1 -b .rh461903
+%patch40 -p1 -b .rh473492
+%patch41 -p1 -b .rh650119
+%patch42 -p1 -b .rh710987
+%patch43 -p1 -b .rh784467
+%patch44 -b .rh896583
+%patch45 -p1 -b .rh947213
+%patch46 -p1
+%patch47 -p1
+%patch48 -p1 -b .ipv6-rexec
+%patch49 -p1 -b .cmdbuflen
+%patch50 -p1 -b .basename
+%patch51 -p1 -b .pam-warning
+%patch52 -p1 -b .rexec-cmdbuflen
+%patch53 -p1 -b .remote-close
+
+# No, I don't know what this is doing in the tarball.
+rm -f rexec/rexec
+
+%build
+sh configure --with-c-compiler=gcc
+export RPM_OPT_FLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fno-strict-aliasing"
+%ifarch s390 s390x
+%{__perl} -pi -e '
+    s,^CC=.*$,CC=cc,;
+    s,-O2,\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -fPIC -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -D_GNU_SOURCE,;
+    s,^LDFLAGS=,LDFLAGS=-z now -pie,;
+    s,^BINDIR=.*$,BINDIR=%{_bindir},;
+    s,^MANDIR=.*$,MANDIR=%{_mandir},;
+    s,^SBINDIR=.*$,SBINDIR=%{_sbindir},;
+    ' MCONFIG
+%else
+%{__perl} -pi -e '
+    s,^CC=.*$,CC=cc,;
+    s,-O2,\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -fpic -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -D_GNU_SOURCE,;
+    s,^LDFLAGS=,LDFLAGS=-z now -pie,;
+    s,^BINDIR=.*$,BINDIR=%{_bindir},;
+    s,^MANDIR=.*$,MANDIR=%{_mandir},;
+    s,^SBINDIR=.*$,SBINDIR=%{_sbindir},;
+    ' MCONFIG
+%endif
+make %{?_smp_mflags}
+
+%install
+mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_bindir}
+mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}
+mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man{1,5,8}
+mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d
+
+make INSTALLROOT=%{buildroot} BINDIR=%{_bindir} MANDIR=%{_mandir} install
+
+install -m 644 %SOURCE1 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/rexec
+install -m 644 %SOURCE2 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/rlogin
+install -m 644 %SOURCE3 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/rsh
+
+mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}
+install -m644 %SOURCE5 %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/rsh@.service
+install -m644 %SOURCE6 %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/rsh.socket
+install -m644 %SOURCE7 %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/rlogin@.service
+install -m644 %SOURCE8 %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/rlogin.socket
+install -m644 %SOURCE9 %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/rexec@.service
+install -m644 %SOURCE10 %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/rexec.socket
+
+%post server
+%systemd_post rsh.socket
+%systemd_post rlogin.socket
+%systemd_post rexec.socket
+
+%preun server
+%systemd_preun rsh.socket
+%systemd_preun rlogin.socket
+%systemd_preun rexec.socket
+
+%postun server
+%systemd_postun_with_restart rsh.socket
+%systemd_postun_with_restart rlogin.socket
+%systemd_postun_with_restart rexec.socket
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root,-)
+%doc README BUGS
+%attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_net_bind_service=pe) %{_bindir}/rcp
+%{_bindir}/rexec
+%attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_net_bind_service=pe) %{_bindir}/rlogin
+%attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_net_bind_service=pe) %{_bindir}/rsh
+%{_mandir}/man1/*.1*
+
+%files server
+%defattr(-,root,root,-)
+%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/rsh
+%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/rlogin
+%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/rexec
+%{_sbindir}/in.rexecd
+%{_sbindir}/in.rlogind
+%{_sbindir}/in.rshd
+%{_unitdir}/*
+%{_mandir}/man8/*.8*
+
+%changelog
+* Sat Apr 28 2018 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 0.17-79
+- Related: #1477207 - service and socket file directives should be under [Unit]
+
+* Wed Apr 18 2018 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 0.17-78
+- Resolves: #1502657 - Copying remote file to local dir fails with "rcp: protocol screwup: expected control record"
+- Resolves: #1338037 - rsh/rlogin sessions ignore SIGPIPE due to systemd
+- Resolves: #1477207 - rlogin killed when changing run level
+- Resolves: #1503112 - rexecd Could not allocate space for cmdbuf
+- Resolves: #1505226 - have a proposed patch for rsh-0.17-76.el7_1.1
+
+* Thu Mar 26 2015 Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com> - 0.17-77
+- don't truncate first character of dirname when doing recursive copy (#1129483)
+
+* Mon Aug 18 2014 Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com> - 0.17-76
+- disable strict aliasing optimizations (#1095306)
+- use upper bound for cmdbuflen (#1093749)
+
+* Fri Jan 24 2014 Daniel Mach <dmach@redhat.com> - 0.17-75
+- Mass rebuild 2014-01-24
+
+* Fri Dec 27 2013 Daniel Mach <dmach@redhat.com> - 0.17-74
+- Mass rebuild 2013-12-27
+
+* Mon Jul 15 2013 Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com> - 0.17-73
+- add IPv6 support to rexec and rexecd
+- enable hardened build
+- fix dates in changelog
+
+* Wed Jun 26 2013 Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com> - 0.17-72
+- unit files must not be marked as config files
+- fix handling of non-native IPv6 connections via AF_INET6 socket
+
+* Thu Apr 11 2013 Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com> - 0.17-71
+- resolves: RHBZ #737244 #896583 #947213
+- migrate from xinetd to systemd configuration
+- close pam session correctly when client does not ask for separate error channel
+- fix pty handling which was broken by changes in /bin/login
+
+* Thu Feb 14 2013 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 0.17-70
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_19_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jul 21 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 0.17-69
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_18_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jan 31 2012 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> - 0.17-68
+- rcp: handle copying of directories with ending slash well (#784467)
+
+* Sat Jan 14 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 0.17-67
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_17_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Oct 26 2011 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> - 0.17-66
+- remove unneeded setpwent/endpwent calls
+
+* Wed Feb 09 2011 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 0.17-65
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_15_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Nov 08 2010 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> - 0.17-64
+- fix typo in rexec.c (#650119)
+
+* Mon Nov 08 2010 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> - 0.17-63
+- use filesystem-based capabilities instead of SUID (#646489)
+
+* Tue Jan 5 2010 Jan Gorig  <jgorig redhat com> - 0.17-62
+- add check for return values (#473492)
+
+* Thu Dec 17 2009 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> - 0.17-61
+- include README and BUGS files as documentation (#226379)
+
+* Tue Dec 15 2009 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> - 0.17-60
+- more merge review related fixes (#226379)
+
+* Mon Nov 30 2009 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> - 0.17-59
+- merge review related fixes (#226379)
+- remove unused patches
+  - netkit-rsh-0.16-pamfix.patch
+  - netkit-rsh-0.16-jbj2.patch
+  - netkit-rsh-0.16-jbj3.patch
+
+* Wed Sep 16 2009 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 0.17-58
+- use password-auth common PAM configuration instead of system-auth
+
+* Fri Aug 21 2009 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 0.17-57
+- rebuilt with new audit
+
+* Tue Aug 11 2009 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-56
+- remove URL from rexec source, it is no longer publicly available
+
+* Sun Jul 26 2009 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 0.17-55
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_12_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Mar 30 2009 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-54
+- improve pam_env patch
+
+* Thu Mar 26 2009 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-53
+- check return value from close to catch errors on NFS filesystems (#461903)
+
+* Wed Feb 25 2009 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 0.17-52
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_11_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Oct 03 2008 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-51
+- updated ipv6 patch due rpm 4.6 (#465053)
+- make in.rshd working on kernels without audit support (#448904)
+
+* Fri May 09 2008 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-50
+- fixed typos in arg_max and audit patches (#445606)
+- use pam_rhosts, not pam_rhosts_auth (#445606)
+
+* Mon Apr 14 2008 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-49
+- use sysconf for ARG_MAX value (#440867)
+
+* Thu Mar 27 2008 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-48
+- in.rexecd username limit was 14 characters, not 16
+
+* Tue Mar 25 2008 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-47
+- fixed NULL pointer dereference (#437815)
+- cleanup in audit patch
+
+* Thu Feb 14 2008 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-46
+- rebuild with gcc4.3
+- build with -D_GNU_SOURCE
+
+* Sat Oct 20 2007 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 0.17-45
+- update for audit
+
+* Tue Oct 16 2007 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-44
+- added -D option for compatibility with F8 test releases
+- fixed rsh-server description
+
+* Thu Sep 27 2007 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-43
+- removed -D option from rshd and rlogind (we have -a option when
+  we need force reverse DNS lookup)
+- patches netkit-rsh-0.17-nodns.patch and netkit-rsh-0.17-nohostcheck.patch
+  are substituted by netkit-rsh-0.17-dns.patch
+
+* Wed Aug 22 2007 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-42
+- rebuild (BuildID feature)
+
+* Thu Jul 26 2007 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-41
+- improved nodns patch (in.rshd also has -D option now)
+
+* Tue Apr 10 2007 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-40
+- improved -D option to rlogind - when name won't be resolved rlogind uses IP address
+- added smp_mflags to make
+
+* Mon Jan 22 2007 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-39
+- rebased on ncurses instead of libtermcap
+
+* Tue Dec 05 2006 Adam Tkac <atkac redhat com> 0.17-38
+- rsh now load pan_env module correctly
+
+* Tue Oct 24 2006 Adam Tkac <atkac@redhat.com> 0.17-37
+- added xinetd dependency to rsh-server
+
+* Wed Oct  4 2006 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-36
+- fix #209277 - rsh-server not linked to PAM (missing BuildRequires)
+
+* Mon Jul 17 2006 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-35
+- added support for IPv6 (patch by Jan Pazdziora)
+- fix #198632 - add keyinit instructions to the rsh, rlogin and rexec PAM scripts
+  (patch by David Howells)
+- fix #191390 - improve linefeed patch
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 0.17-34.2
+- rebuild
+
+* Fri Feb 10 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 0.17-34.1
+- bump again for double-long bug on ppc(64)
+
+* Thu Feb  9 2006 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-34
+- fix #178916 - Line feeds when password needs changing with rlogin
+
+* Tue Feb 07 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> 0.17-33.2
+- rebuilt for new gcc4.1 snapshot and glibc changes
+
+* Fri Dec 09 2005 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> 0.17-33.1
+- rebuilt
+
+* Mon Nov 28 2005 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-33
+- fix #174146 - pam_access.so does not work with rexecd
+
+* Thu Nov 24 2005 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-32
+- fix #174045 - rcp outputs negative file size when over 2GB
+
+* Thu Oct 13 2005 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-31
+- rewrite rexecd PAM_conversation()
+
+* Thu Oct 13 2005 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-30
+- replace pam_stack with "include"
+
+* Sat Mar  5 2005 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-29
+- rebuilt
+
+* Thu Feb  3 2005 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-28
+- malicious rcp server can cause rcp to write to arbitrary files (like scp CAN-2004-0175) (#146464)
+
+* Mon Dec  6 2004 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-27
+- removed BSD stuff "signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN)". It's unsupported by POSIX/linux. (#122315)
+
+* Sat Dec  4 2004 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-26
+- "-D" option turns off reverse DNS in rexecd (#135827)
+
+* Wed Nov 17 2004 Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> 0.17-25
+- rexecd uses PAM session now (#68590)
+- fixed errno usage in rcp (#67361)
+- fixed rexec fails with "Invalid Argument" (#118630)
+
+* Mon Oct 18 2004 Radek Vokal <rvokal@redhat.com> 0.17-24
+- The username and password for ~/.netrc are used (#135643)
+
+* Tue Jun 15 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed May 12 2004 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-22
+- Added all other tools to list of PIE enabled apps.
+
+* Fri Feb 13 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Thu Feb  5 2004 Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com> 0.17-20
+- in.rexecd, in.rlogind and in.rshd are pie, now
+
+* Tue Oct 21 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-19
+- Included updated patch from #105733.
+
+* Thu Oct 02 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-18
+- Fixed YAT (#79391).
+- Included feature request #105733 (-D option).
+
+* Fri Jun 27 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-17.1
+- rebuilt
+
+* Thu Jun 26 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-17
+- Included chdir patch (#57392).
+- Included pam-nologin patch (#63806).
+
+* Tue Jun 17 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-16
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed Jun 04 2003 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com> 0.17-15
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue May 06 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com>
+- Fixed manpages (#7168).
+
+* Wed Jan 22 2003 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Fri Jan 17 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-13
+- Added LFS support (#67362).
+- Fixed user and host patch (#80822).
+
+* Tue Jan 14 2003 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-12
+- Fixed bug #79391 (typo in description).
+
+* Mon Nov 11 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 0.17-11
+- remove directory names from PAM configuration files, allowing them to be used
+  for all arches on multilib systems
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2002 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- automated rebuild
+
+* Wed Jun 19 2002 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 0.17-9
+- Don't forcibly strip binaries
+
+* Thu May 23 2002 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- automated rebuild
+
+* Wed Jan 30 2002 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com>
+- Bumped version for rebuild
+- Added the remote user and host addition (RFE #42880)
+
+* Tue Jul 24 2001 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com>
+- Fixed really missing BuildPrereq: libtermcap-devel (#49577)
+- Fixed security problem with rexec.pam (#49181)
+
+* Fri Jun 22 2001 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com>
+- Update to latest stable version 0.17
+- Removed unneeded glib22 patch
+
+* Mon Apr 30 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- tag xinetd config files as config files
+
+* Wed Apr  4 2001 Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
+- don't let configure to guess compiler, it can pick up egcs
+
+* Mon Feb  5 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- securetty is screwy because rsh doesn't allocate one and rlogin does auth
+  before it has a tty, so change the hard-coded TTYs used from "tty" for all
+  to "rsh" or "rlogin" or "rexec"
+
+* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- fix PAM config files to always honor nologin and securetty, to use rhosts,
+  and to fall back to password auth only for rlogin and rexec (#17183)
+- add references to pam_env to the PAM configs as well (#16170)
+- disable rlogin and rsh by default
+
+* Mon Oct 02 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- fix typo in the rexec xinetd configuration file (#18107)
+
+* Fri Jul 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- fix typo in the rlogin PAM config file
+- continue the tradition of messed-up release numbers
+
+* Tue Jul 18 2000 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com>
+- add description & default to xinetd file
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2000 Prospector <bugzilla@redhat.com>
+- automatic rebuild
+
+* Sun Jun 18 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- FHS packaging.
+- update to 0.17.
+
+* Thu Jun  1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- modify PAM setup to use system-auth
+
+* Mon May 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- expunge all mentions of kerberos authentication or DES encryption using
+  kerberos from the man pages
+
+* Thu May 25 2000 Trond Eivind Glomsrod <teg@redhat.com>
+- switched to xinetd
+
+* Tue Mar  7 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- rebuild for sparc baud rates > 38400.
+
+* Sat Mar 04 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- make rlogin still work correctly when argv[0] = "rsh"
+
+* Mon Feb 28 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- workaround (by explicitly prompting for password) #4328 and #9715.
+
+* Wed Feb  9 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- mark pam config files as %%config.
+
+* Fri Feb  4 2000 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com>
+- handle compressed manpages
+
+* Wed Feb 02 2000 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- fix description
+
+* Sun Jan 30 2000 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com>
+- remove bogus rexec binary when building; it causes weirdness
+
+* Fri Jan 28 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- Make sure that rshd is compiled with -DUSE_PAM.
+
+* Mon Jan 10 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- Fix bug in rshd (hangs forever with zombie offspring) (#8313).
+
+* Wed Jan  5 2000 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- fix the PAM fix yet again (#8133).
+
+* Tue Jan  4 2000 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com>
+- split client and server
+
+* Tue Dec 21 1999 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- update to 0.16.
+- dup setuid bits into files list.
+
+* Fri Jul 30 1999 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- update to rexec-1.5 client (#4262)
+
+* Wed May 19 1999 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- fix broken rexec protocol in in.rexecd (#2318).
+
+* Tue May  4 1999 Justin Vallon <vallon@mindspring.com>
+- rcp with error was tricked by stdarg side effect (#2300)
+
+* Thu Apr 15 1999 Michael K. Johnson <johnsonm@redhat.com>
+- rlogin pam file was missing comment magic
+
+* Tue Apr 06 1999 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com>
+- strip rexec
+
+* Fri Mar 26 1999 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- rexec needs pam_set_item() (#60).
+- clarify protocol in rexecd.8.
+- add rexec client from contrib.
+
+* Sun Mar 21 1999 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- auto rebuild in the new build environment (release 22)
+
+* Mon Mar 15 1999 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- compile for 6.0.
+
+* Fri Apr 24 1998 Prospector System <bugs@redhat.com>
+- translations modified for de, fr, tr
+
+* Tue Apr 14 1998 Erik Troan <ewt@redhat.com>
+- built against new ncurses
+
+* Sun Apr  5 1998 Marcelo F. Vianna <m-vianna@usa.net>
+- Packaged for RH5.0 (Hurricane)
+
+* Tue Oct 14 1997 Michael K. Johnson <johnsonm@redhat.com>
+- new pam conventions
+
+* Tue Jul 15 1997 Erik Troan <ewt@redhat.com>
+- initial build