base/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert	2015-03-18 13:02:36.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c	2015-03-18 18:22:20.195322489 +0100
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
 
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
 		    && s->session->master_key_length
-		    < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+		    <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
 		c++;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c	2015-03-18 18:30:11.403974038 +0100
@@ -446,9 +446,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
 		return(-1);
 		}
-	i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
-		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
-		(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
 
 	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
 	
@@ -467,21 +464,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 	else
 		ek=5;
 
+	/*
+	 * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
+	 * 1 byte message type
+	 * 3 bytes cipher
+	 * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
+	 * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
+	 * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
+	 * clear key
+	 * encrypted key
+	 * key args
+	 *
+	 * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
+	 * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
+	 * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
+	 * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
+	 * must be zero).
+	 */
+	 if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
+		(is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+		{
+		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+		return -1;
+		}
+	/*
+	 * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
+	 * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
+	 * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
+	 */
+	if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
+		(!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+		{
+		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
+		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+		(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
 	/* bad decrypt */
 #if 1
 	/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
 	 * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
-	if ((i < 0) ||
-		((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-		|| (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
-			(unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
+	if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
+		|| (is_export && i != ek)))
 		{
 		ERR_clear_error();
 		if (is_export)
 			i=ek;
 		else
 			i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear],i) <= 0)
 			return 0;
 		}
 #else
@@ -505,7 +542,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 		}
 #endif
 
-	if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
+	if (is_export)
+		i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
 
 	if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
 		{