base/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8275.patch

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c	2015-01-13 12:23:36.090478923 +0100
@@ -136,11 +136,16 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN
 
 	p= *pp;
 	i= *(p++);
+	if (i > 7)
+		{
+		i=ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT;
+		goto err;
+		}
 	/* We do this to preserve the settings.  If we modify
 	 * the settings, via the _set_bit function, we will recalculate
 	 * on output */
 	ret->flags&= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|0x07); /* clear */
-	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|(i&0x07)); /* set */
+	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|i); /* set */
 
 	if (len-- > 1) /* using one because of the bits left byte */
 		{
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c	2015-01-13 12:23:36.090478923 +0100
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE)   ,"illegal time value"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"integer not ascii format"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG),"integer too large for long"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT),"invalid bit string bits left"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH),"invalid bmpstring length"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT)        ,"invalid digit"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE)    ,"invalid mime type"},
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:11.999013082 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h	2015-01-13 12:23:36.090478923 +0100
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE,
 int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a);
 void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value);
 int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value);
-int            ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b);
+int            ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b);
 
 ASN1_OBJECT *	ASN1_OBJECT_new(void );
 void		ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
@@ -1329,6 +1329,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE			 184
 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT			 185
 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG		 128
+#define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT		 220
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH			 129
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT				 130
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE			 205
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c	2015-01-13 12:43:36.779633480 +0100
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
 
 /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
-int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b)
+int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
 	{
 	int result = -1;
 
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:12.308020070 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.413022445 +0100
@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_A
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 		goto err;
 		}
+
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		goto err;
+		}
 	
 	inl=i2d(data,NULL);
 	buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
@@ -149,6 +155,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it
 		return -1;
 		}
 
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
 	/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c	2015-01-13 12:43:36.780633502 +0100
@@ -142,3 +142,14 @@ void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg,
 	X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md)), param_type, NULL);
 
 	}
+
+int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b)
+	{
+	int rv;
+	rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm);
+	if (rv)
+		return rv;
+	if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter)
+		return 0;
+	return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter);
+	}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.414022468 +0100
@@ -176,13 +176,25 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned
 	     const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
 	{
 	DSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = DSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	DSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.414022468 +0100
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "ecs_locl.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigne
 		const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
  	{
 	ECDSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:12.330020568 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.414022468 +0100
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 
 int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
 	{
+	if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(a->sig_alg, a->cert_info->signature))
+		return 0;
 	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg,
 		a->signature,a->cert_info,r));
 	}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:12.126015954 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h	2015-01-13 12:43:36.780633502 +0100
@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN
 void X509_ALGOR_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, void **ppval,
 						X509_ALGOR *algor);
 void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md);
+int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b);
 
 X509_NAME *X509_NAME_dup(X509_NAME *xn);
 X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);