base/SOURCES/0724-fs-util-add-new-chase_symlinks-flag-CHASE_OPEN.patch

From c211b650ee5cb9934067dbba40718a4a33063e06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Tardon <dtardon@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 14:44:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs-util: add new chase_symlinks() flag CHASE_OPEN

The new flag returns the O_PATH fd of the final component, which may be
converted into a proper fd by open()ing it again through the
/proc/self/fd/xyz path.

Together with O_SAFE this provides us with a somewhat safe way to open()
files in directories potentially owned by unprivileged code, where we
want to refuse operation if any symlink tricks are played pointing to
privileged files.

(cherry picked from commit 1ed34d75d4f21d2335c5625261954c848d176ae6)

Related: #1663143
---
 Makefile.am          |  1 +
 src/shared/util.c    | 17 +++++++++++++
 src/shared/util.h    |  1 +
 src/test/test-util.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index 995c421b8b..648f54b957 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -1675,6 +1675,7 @@ test_util_SOURCES = \
 	src/test/test-util.c
 
 test_util_LDADD = \
+	libsystemd-internal.la \
 	libsystemd-shared.la
 
 test_path_lookup_SOURCES = \
diff --git a/src/shared/util.c b/src/shared/util.c
index fc4887920f..354d15ff18 100644
--- a/src/shared/util.c
+++ b/src/shared/util.c
@@ -9225,6 +9225,10 @@ int chase_symlinks(const char *path, const char *original_root, unsigned flags,
 
         assert(path);
 
+        /* Either the file may be missing, or we return an fd to the final object, but both make no sense */
+        if ((flags & (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_OPEN)) == (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_OPEN))
+                return -EINVAL;
+
         /* This is a lot like canonicalize_file_name(), but takes an additional "root" parameter, that allows following
          * symlinks relative to a root directory, instead of the root of the host.
          *
@@ -9476,5 +9480,18 @@ int chase_symlinks(const char *path, const char *original_root, unsigned flags,
                 done = NULL;
         }
 
+        if (flags & CHASE_OPEN) {
+                int q;
+
+                /* Return the O_PATH fd we currently are looking to the caller. It can translate it to a proper fd by
+                 * opening /proc/self/fd/xyz. */
+
+                assert(fd >= 0);
+                q = fd;
+                fd = -1;
+
+                return q;
+        }
+
         return exists;
 }
diff --git a/src/shared/util.h b/src/shared/util.h
index fa3e2e3009..d89f0d34a1 100644
--- a/src/shared/util.h
+++ b/src/shared/util.h
@@ -1161,6 +1161,7 @@ enum {
         CHASE_NONEXISTENT = 1U << 1,   /* If set, it's OK if the path doesn't actually exist. */
         CHASE_NO_AUTOFS   = 1U << 2,   /* If set, return -EREMOTE if autofs mount point found */
         CHASE_SAFE        = 1U << 3,   /* If set, return EPERM if we ever traverse from unprivileged to privileged files or directories */
+        CHASE_OPEN        = 1U << 4,   /* If set, return an O_PATH object to the final component */
 };
 
 int chase_symlinks(const char *path_with_prefix, const char *root, unsigned flags, char **ret);
diff --git a/src/test/test-util.c b/src/test/test-util.c
index e5a646ec20..8ef3850e10 100644
--- a/src/test/test-util.c
+++ b/src/test/test-util.c
@@ -1910,11 +1910,45 @@ static void test_acquire_data_fd(void) {
         test_acquire_data_fd_one(ACQUIRE_NO_DEV_NULL|ACQUIRE_NO_MEMFD|ACQUIRE_NO_PIPE|ACQUIRE_NO_TMPFILE);
 }
 
+static int id128_read_fd(int fd, sd_id128_t *ret) {
+        char buf[33];
+        ssize_t k;
+        unsigned j;
+        sd_id128_t t;
+
+        assert_return(fd >= 0, -EINVAL);
+
+        k = loop_read(fd, buf, 33, false);
+        if (k < 0)
+                return (int) k;
+
+        if (k != 33)
+                return -EIO;
+
+        if (buf[32] !='\n')
+                return -EIO;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
+                int a, b;
+
+                a = unhexchar(buf[j*2]);
+                b = unhexchar(buf[j*2+1]);
+
+                if (a < 0 || b < 0)
+                        return -EIO;
+
+                t.bytes[j] = a << 4 | b;
+        }
+
+        *ret = t;
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static void test_chase_symlinks(void) {
         _cleanup_free_ char *result = NULL;
         char temp[] = "/tmp/test-chase.XXXXXX";
         const char *top, *p, *pslash, *q, *qslash;
-        int r;
+        int r, pfd;
 
         assert_se(mkdtemp(temp));
 
@@ -2139,6 +2173,29 @@ static void test_chase_symlinks(void) {
                 assert_se(chase_symlinks(q, NULL, CHASE_SAFE, NULL) >= 0);
         }
 
+        p = strjoina(temp, "/machine-id-test");
+        assert_se(symlink("/usr/../etc/./machine-id", p) >= 0);
+
+        pfd = chase_symlinks(p, NULL, CHASE_OPEN, NULL);
+        if (pfd != -ENOENT) {
+                char procfs[sizeof("/proc/self/fd/") - 1 + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(pfd) + 1];
+                _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+                sd_id128_t a, b;
+
+                assert_se(pfd >= 0);
+
+                xsprintf(procfs, "/proc/self/fd/%i", pfd);
+
+                fd = open(procfs, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
+                assert_se(fd >= 0);
+
+                safe_close(pfd);
+
+                assert_se(id128_read_fd(fd, &a) >= 0);
+                assert_se(sd_id128_get_machine(&b) >= 0);
+                assert_se(sd_id128_equal(a, b));
+        }
+
         assert_se(rm_rf_dangerous(temp, false, true, false) >= 0);
 }