From 8868a04895b27d42d42e364f1a0c0196c1505b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:17:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/9]     Security fix, CVE-2017-14491 DNS heap buffer
 overflow.

    Fix heap overflow in DNS code. This is a potentially serious
    security hole. It allows an attacker who can make DNS
    requests to dnsmasq, and who controls the contents of
    a domain, which is thereby queried, to overflow
    (by 2 bytes) a heap buffer and either crash, or
    even take control of, dnsmasq.
---
 src/dnsmasq.h |  2 +-
 src/dnssec.c  |  2 +-
 src/option.c  |  2 +-
 src/rfc1035.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 src/rfc2131.c |  4 ++--
 src/rfc3315.c |  4 ++--
 src/util.c    |  7 ++++++-
 7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
index 1179492..06e5579 100644
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ u32 rand32(void);
 u64 rand64(void);
 int legal_hostname(char *c);
 char *canonicalise(char *s, int *nomem);
-unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval);
+unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit);
 void *safe_malloc(size_t size);
 void safe_pipe(int *fd, int read_noblock);
 void *whine_malloc(size_t size);
diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
index 3c77c7d..f45c804 100644
--- a/src/dnssec.c
+++ b/src/dnssec.c
@@ -2227,7 +2227,7 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, unsigned char *end, char
 
   p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
 	
-  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
+  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, NULL);
   *p++ = 0;
   PUTSHORT(type, p);
   PUTSHORT(class, p);
diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
index eb78b1a..3469f53 100644
--- a/src/option.c
+++ b/src/option.c
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static int parse_dhcp_opt(char *errstr, char *arg, int flags)
 		    }
 		  
 		  p = newp;
-		  end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom);
+		  end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom, NULL);
 		  *end++ = 0;
 		  len = end - p;
 		  free(dom);
diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
index 24d08c1..78410d6 100644
--- a/src/rfc1035.c
+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
@@ -1049,6 +1049,7 @@ int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bog
   return 0;
 }
 
+
 int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int nameoffset, unsigned char **pp, 
 			unsigned long ttl, int *offset, unsigned short type, unsigned short class, char *format, ...)
 {
@@ -1058,12 +1059,21 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
   unsigned short usval;
   long lval;
   char *sval;
+#define CHECK_LIMIT(size) \
+  if (limit && p + (size) > (unsigned char*)limit) \
+    { \
+      va_end(ap); \
+      goto truncated; \
+    }
 
   if (truncp && *truncp)
     return 0;
- 
+
   va_start(ap, format);   /* make ap point to 1st unamed argument */
-  
+
+  /* nameoffset (1 or 2) + type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + 0 (2) */
+  CHECK_LIMIT(12);
+
   if (nameoffset > 0)
     {
       PUTSHORT(nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
@@ -1072,7 +1082,13 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
     {
       char *name = va_arg(ap, char *);
       if (name)
-	p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
+	p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit);
+        if (!p)
+          {
+            va_end(ap);
+            goto truncated;
+          }
+
       if (nameoffset < 0)
 	{
 	  PUTSHORT(-nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
@@ -1093,6 +1109,7 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
       {
 #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
       case '6':
+        CHECK_LIMIT(IN6ADDRSZ);
 	sval = va_arg(ap, char *); 
 	memcpy(p, sval, IN6ADDRSZ);
 	p += IN6ADDRSZ;
@@ -1100,36 +1117,47 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
 #endif
 	
       case '4':
+        CHECK_LIMIT(INADDRSZ);
 	sval = va_arg(ap, char *); 
 	memcpy(p, sval, INADDRSZ);
 	p += INADDRSZ;
 	break;
 	
       case 'b':
+        CHECK_LIMIT(1);
 	usval = va_arg(ap, int);
 	*p++ = usval;
 	break;
 	
       case 's':
+        CHECK_LIMIT(2);
 	usval = va_arg(ap, int);
 	PUTSHORT(usval, p);
 	break;
 	
       case 'l':
+        CHECK_LIMIT(4);
 	lval = va_arg(ap, long);
 	PUTLONG(lval, p);
 	break;
 	
       case 'd':
-	/* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
-	if (offset)
-	  *offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
-	p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *));
-	*p++ = 0;
+        /* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
+        if (offset)
+          *offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
+        p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *), limit);
+        if (!p)
+          {
+            va_end(ap);
+            goto truncated;
+          }
+        CHECK_LIMIT(1);
+        *p++ = 0;
 	break;
 	
       case 't':
 	usval = va_arg(ap, int);
+        CHECK_LIMIT(usval);
 	sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
 	if (usval != 0)
 	  memcpy(p, sval, usval);
@@ -1141,20 +1169,24 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
 	usval = sval ? strlen(sval) : 0;
 	if (usval > 255)
 	  usval = 255;
+        CHECK_LIMIT(usval + 1);
 	*p++ = (unsigned char)usval;
 	memcpy(p, sval, usval);
 	p += usval;
 	break;
       }
 
+#undef CHECK_LIMIT
   va_end(ap);	/* clean up variable argument pointer */
   
   j = p - sav - 2;
-  PUTSHORT(j, sav);     /* Now, store real RDLength */
+ /* this has already been checked against limit before */
+ PUTSHORT(j, sav);     /* Now, store real RDLength */
   
   /* check for overflow of buffer */
   if (limit && ((unsigned char *)limit - p) < 0)
     {
+truncated:
       if (truncp)
 	*truncp = 1;
       return 0;
diff --git a/src/rfc2131.c b/src/rfc2131.c
index 8b99d4b..75893a6 100644
--- a/src/rfc2131.c
+++ b/src/rfc2131.c
@@ -2420,10 +2420,10 @@ static void do_options(struct dhcp_context *context,
 
 	      if (fqdn_flags & 0x04)
 		{
-		  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname);
+		  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname, NULL);
 		  if (domain)
 		    {
-		      p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain);
+		      p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain, NULL);
 		      *p++ = 0;
 		    }
 		}
diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
index 3f4d69c..73bdee4 100644
--- a/src/rfc3315.c
+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
@@ -1472,10 +1472,10 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct state *state, int do_refresh)
       if ((p = expand(len + 2)))
 	{
 	  *(p++) = state->fqdn_flags;
-	  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname);
+	  p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname, NULL);
 	  if (state->send_domain)
 	    {
-	      p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain);
+	      p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain, NULL);
 	      *p = 0;
 	    }
 	}
diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
index 1a9f228..be9f8a6 100644
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
@@ -218,15 +218,20 @@ char *canonicalise(char *in, int *nomem)
   return ret;
 }
 
-unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval)
+unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit)
 {
   int j;
   
   while (sval && *sval)
     {
+      if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
+        return p;
+
       unsigned char *cp = p++;
       for (j = 0; *sval && (*sval != '.'); sval++, j++)
 	{
+          if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
+            return p;
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 	  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && *sval == NAME_ESCAPE)
 	    *p++ = (*(++sval))-1;
-- 
2.9.5

