You can not select more than 25 topics
Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
1116 lines
29 KiB
1116 lines
29 KiB
#include "git-compat-util.h" |
|
#include "commit.h" |
|
#include "config.h" |
|
#include "date.h" |
|
#include "gettext.h" |
|
#include "run-command.h" |
|
#include "strbuf.h" |
|
#include "dir.h" |
|
#include "ident.h" |
|
#include "gpg-interface.h" |
|
#include "path.h" |
|
#include "sigchain.h" |
|
#include "tempfile.h" |
|
#include "alias.h" |
|
#include "wrapper.h" |
|
|
|
static int git_gpg_config(const char *, const char *, void *); |
|
|
|
static void gpg_interface_lazy_init(void) |
|
{ |
|
static int done; |
|
|
|
if (done) |
|
return; |
|
done = 1; |
|
git_config(git_gpg_config, NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static char *configured_signing_key; |
|
static const char *ssh_default_key_command, *ssh_allowed_signers, *ssh_revocation_file; |
|
static enum signature_trust_level configured_min_trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; |
|
|
|
struct gpg_format { |
|
const char *name; |
|
const char *program; |
|
const char **verify_args; |
|
const char **sigs; |
|
int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc, |
|
struct gpg_format *fmt, |
|
const char *signature, |
|
size_t signature_size); |
|
int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, |
|
const char *signing_key); |
|
const char *(*get_default_key)(void); |
|
const char *(*get_key_id)(void); |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static const char *openpgp_verify_args[] = { |
|
"--keyid-format=long", |
|
NULL |
|
}; |
|
static const char *openpgp_sigs[] = { |
|
"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----", |
|
"-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----", |
|
NULL |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static const char *x509_verify_args[] = { |
|
NULL |
|
}; |
|
static const char *x509_sigs[] = { |
|
"-----BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE-----", |
|
NULL |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static const char *ssh_verify_args[] = { NULL }; |
|
static const char *ssh_sigs[] = { |
|
"-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----", |
|
NULL |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, |
|
struct gpg_format *fmt, |
|
const char *signature, |
|
size_t signature_size); |
|
static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, |
|
struct gpg_format *fmt, |
|
const char *signature, |
|
size_t signature_size); |
|
static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, |
|
const char *signing_key); |
|
static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, |
|
const char *signing_key); |
|
|
|
static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void); |
|
|
|
static const char *get_ssh_key_id(void); |
|
|
|
static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { |
|
{ |
|
.name = "openpgp", |
|
.program = "gpg", |
|
.verify_args = openpgp_verify_args, |
|
.sigs = openpgp_sigs, |
|
.verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, |
|
.sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, |
|
.get_default_key = NULL, |
|
.get_key_id = NULL, |
|
}, |
|
{ |
|
.name = "x509", |
|
.program = "gpgsm", |
|
.verify_args = x509_verify_args, |
|
.sigs = x509_sigs, |
|
.verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, |
|
.sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, |
|
.get_default_key = NULL, |
|
.get_key_id = NULL, |
|
}, |
|
{ |
|
.name = "ssh", |
|
.program = "ssh-keygen", |
|
.verify_args = ssh_verify_args, |
|
.sigs = ssh_sigs, |
|
.verify_signed_buffer = verify_ssh_signed_buffer, |
|
.sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh, |
|
.get_default_key = get_default_ssh_signing_key, |
|
.get_key_id = get_ssh_key_id, |
|
}, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static struct gpg_format *use_format = &gpg_format[0]; |
|
|
|
static struct gpg_format *get_format_by_name(const char *str) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gpg_format); i++) |
|
if (!strcmp(gpg_format[i].name, str)) |
|
return gpg_format + i; |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static struct gpg_format *get_format_by_sig(const char *sig) |
|
{ |
|
int i, j; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gpg_format); i++) |
|
for (j = 0; gpg_format[i].sigs[j]; j++) |
|
if (starts_with(sig, gpg_format[i].sigs[j])) |
|
return gpg_format + i; |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void signature_check_clear(struct signature_check *sigc) |
|
{ |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->payload); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->output); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->gpg_status); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->signer); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->key); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->fingerprint); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->primary_key_fingerprint); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* An exclusive status -- only one of them can appear in output */ |
|
#define GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE (1<<0) |
|
/* The status includes key identifier */ |
|
#define GPG_STATUS_KEYID (1<<1) |
|
/* The status includes user identifier */ |
|
#define GPG_STATUS_UID (1<<2) |
|
/* The status includes key fingerprints */ |
|
#define GPG_STATUS_FINGERPRINT (1<<3) |
|
/* The status includes trust level */ |
|
#define GPG_STATUS_TRUST_LEVEL (1<<4) |
|
|
|
/* Short-hand for standard exclusive *SIG status with keyid & UID */ |
|
#define GPG_STATUS_STDSIG (GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE|GPG_STATUS_KEYID|GPG_STATUS_UID) |
|
|
|
static struct { |
|
char result; |
|
const char *check; |
|
unsigned int flags; |
|
} sigcheck_gpg_status[] = { |
|
{ 'G', "GOODSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG }, |
|
{ 'B', "BADSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG }, |
|
{ 'E', "ERRSIG ", GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE|GPG_STATUS_KEYID }, |
|
{ 'X', "EXPSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG }, |
|
{ 'Y', "EXPKEYSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG }, |
|
{ 'R', "REVKEYSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG }, |
|
{ 0, "VALIDSIG ", GPG_STATUS_FINGERPRINT }, |
|
{ 0, "TRUST_", GPG_STATUS_TRUST_LEVEL }, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
/* Keep the order same as enum signature_trust_level */ |
|
static struct sigcheck_gpg_trust_level { |
|
const char *key; |
|
const char *display_key; |
|
enum signature_trust_level value; |
|
} sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[] = { |
|
{ "UNDEFINED", "undefined", TRUST_UNDEFINED }, |
|
{ "NEVER", "never", TRUST_NEVER }, |
|
{ "MARGINAL", "marginal", TRUST_MARGINAL }, |
|
{ "FULLY", "fully", TRUST_FULLY }, |
|
{ "ULTIMATE", "ultimate", TRUST_ULTIMATE }, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static void replace_cstring(char **field, const char *line, const char *next) |
|
{ |
|
free(*field); |
|
|
|
if (line && next) |
|
*field = xmemdupz(line, next - line); |
|
else |
|
*field = NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int parse_gpg_trust_level(const char *level, |
|
enum signature_trust_level *res) |
|
{ |
|
size_t i; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sigcheck_gpg_trust_level); i++) { |
|
if (!strcmp(sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[i].key, level)) { |
|
*res = sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[i].value; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc) |
|
{ |
|
const char *buf = sigc->gpg_status; |
|
const char *line, *next; |
|
int i, j; |
|
int seen_exclusive_status = 0; |
|
|
|
/* Iterate over all lines */ |
|
for (line = buf; *line; line = strchrnul(line+1, '\n')) { |
|
while (*line == '\n') |
|
line++; |
|
if (!*line) |
|
break; |
|
|
|
/* Skip lines that don't start with GNUPG status */ |
|
if (!skip_prefix(line, "[GNUPG:] ", &line)) |
|
continue; |
|
|
|
/* Iterate over all search strings */ |
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sigcheck_gpg_status); i++) { |
|
if (skip_prefix(line, sigcheck_gpg_status[i].check, &line)) { |
|
/* |
|
* GOODSIG, BADSIG etc. can occur only once for |
|
* each signature. Therefore, if we had more |
|
* than one then we're dealing with multiple |
|
* signatures. We don't support them |
|
* currently, and they're rather hard to |
|
* create, so something is likely fishy and we |
|
* should reject them altogether. |
|
*/ |
|
if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE) { |
|
if (seen_exclusive_status++) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].result) |
|
sigc->result = sigcheck_gpg_status[i].result; |
|
/* Do we have key information? */ |
|
if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_KEYID) { |
|
next = strchrnul(line, ' '); |
|
replace_cstring(&sigc->key, line, next); |
|
/* Do we have signer information? */ |
|
if (*next && (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_UID)) { |
|
line = next + 1; |
|
next = strchrnul(line, '\n'); |
|
replace_cstring(&sigc->signer, line, next); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Do we have trust level? */ |
|
if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_TRUST_LEVEL) { |
|
/* |
|
* GPG v1 and v2 differs in how the |
|
* TRUST_ lines are written. Some |
|
* trust lines contain no additional |
|
* space-separated information for v1. |
|
*/ |
|
size_t trust_size = strcspn(line, " \n"); |
|
char *trust = xmemdupz(line, trust_size); |
|
|
|
if (parse_gpg_trust_level(trust, &sigc->trust_level)) { |
|
free(trust); |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
free(trust); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Do we have fingerprint? */ |
|
if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_FINGERPRINT) { |
|
const char *limit; |
|
char **field; |
|
|
|
next = strchrnul(line, ' '); |
|
replace_cstring(&sigc->fingerprint, line, next); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Skip interim fields. The search is |
|
* limited to the same line since only |
|
* OpenPGP signatures has a field with |
|
* the primary fingerprint. |
|
*/ |
|
limit = strchrnul(line, '\n'); |
|
for (j = 9; j > 0; j--) { |
|
if (!*next || limit <= next) |
|
break; |
|
line = next + 1; |
|
next = strchrnul(line, ' '); |
|
} |
|
|
|
field = &sigc->primary_key_fingerprint; |
|
if (!j) { |
|
next = strchrnul(line, '\n'); |
|
replace_cstring(field, line, next); |
|
} else { |
|
replace_cstring(field, NULL, NULL); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return; |
|
|
|
error: |
|
sigc->result = 'E'; |
|
/* Clear partial data to avoid confusion */ |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->primary_key_fingerprint); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->fingerprint); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->signer); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->key); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, |
|
struct gpg_format *fmt, |
|
const char *signature, |
|
size_t signature_size) |
|
{ |
|
struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; |
|
struct tempfile *temp; |
|
int ret; |
|
struct strbuf gpg_stdout = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct strbuf gpg_stderr = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
|
|
temp = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX"); |
|
if (!temp) |
|
return error_errno(_("could not create temporary file")); |
|
if (write_in_full(temp->fd, signature, signature_size) < 0 || |
|
close_tempfile_gently(temp) < 0) { |
|
error_errno(_("failed writing detached signature to '%s'"), |
|
temp->filename.buf); |
|
delete_tempfile(&temp); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
strvec_push(&gpg.args, fmt->program); |
|
strvec_pushv(&gpg.args, fmt->verify_args); |
|
strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, |
|
"--status-fd=1", |
|
"--verify", temp->filename.buf, "-", |
|
NULL); |
|
|
|
sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&gpg, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, &gpg_stdout, 0, |
|
&gpg_stderr, 0); |
|
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); |
|
|
|
delete_tempfile(&temp); |
|
|
|
ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG "); |
|
sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL); |
|
sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL); |
|
|
|
parse_gpg_output(sigc); |
|
|
|
strbuf_release(&gpg_stdout); |
|
strbuf_release(&gpg_stderr); |
|
|
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc) |
|
{ |
|
const char *line, *principal, *search; |
|
char *to_free; |
|
char *key = NULL; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* ssh-keygen output should be: |
|
* Good "git" signature for PRINCIPAL with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT |
|
* |
|
* or for valid but unknown keys: |
|
* Good "git" signature with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT |
|
* |
|
* Note that "PRINCIPAL" can contain whitespace, "RSA" and |
|
* "SHA256" part could be a different token that names of |
|
* the algorithms used, and "FINGERPRINT" is a hexadecimal |
|
* string. By finding the last occurence of " with ", we can |
|
* reliably parse out the PRINCIPAL. |
|
*/ |
|
sigc->result = 'B'; |
|
sigc->trust_level = TRUST_NEVER; |
|
|
|
line = to_free = xmemdupz(sigc->output, strcspn(sigc->output, "\n")); |
|
|
|
if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature for ", &line)) { |
|
/* Search for the last "with" to get the full principal */ |
|
principal = line; |
|
do { |
|
search = strstr(line, " with "); |
|
if (search) |
|
line = search + 1; |
|
} while (search != NULL); |
|
if (line == principal) |
|
goto cleanup; |
|
|
|
/* Valid signature and known principal */ |
|
sigc->result = 'G'; |
|
sigc->trust_level = TRUST_FULLY; |
|
sigc->signer = xmemdupz(principal, line - principal - 1); |
|
} else if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature with ", &line)) { |
|
/* Valid signature, but key unknown */ |
|
sigc->result = 'G'; |
|
sigc->trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; |
|
} else { |
|
goto cleanup; |
|
} |
|
|
|
key = strstr(line, "key "); |
|
if (key) { |
|
sigc->fingerprint = xstrdup(strstr(line, "key ") + 4); |
|
sigc->key = xstrdup(sigc->fingerprint); |
|
} else { |
|
/* |
|
* Output did not match what we expected |
|
* Treat the signature as bad |
|
*/ |
|
sigc->result = 'B'; |
|
} |
|
|
|
cleanup: |
|
free(to_free); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, |
|
struct gpg_format *fmt, |
|
const char *signature, |
|
size_t signature_size) |
|
{ |
|
struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; |
|
struct tempfile *buffer_file; |
|
int ret = -1; |
|
const char *line; |
|
char *principal; |
|
struct strbuf ssh_principals_out = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct strbuf verify_time = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
const struct date_mode verify_date_mode = { |
|
.type = DATE_STRFTIME, |
|
.strftime_fmt = "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", |
|
/* SSH signing key validity has no timezone information - Use the local timezone */ |
|
.local = 1, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
if (!ssh_allowed_signers) { |
|
error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification")); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
buffer_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX"); |
|
if (!buffer_file) |
|
return error_errno(_("could not create temporary file")); |
|
if (write_in_full(buffer_file->fd, signature, signature_size) < 0 || |
|
close_tempfile_gently(buffer_file) < 0) { |
|
error_errno(_("failed writing detached signature to '%s'"), |
|
buffer_file->filename.buf); |
|
delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (sigc->payload_timestamp) |
|
strbuf_addf(&verify_time, "-Overify-time=%s", |
|
show_date(sigc->payload_timestamp, 0, &verify_date_mode)); |
|
|
|
/* Find the principal from the signers */ |
|
strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program, |
|
"-Y", "find-principals", |
|
"-f", ssh_allowed_signers, |
|
"-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, |
|
verify_time.buf, |
|
NULL); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0, |
|
&ssh_principals_err, 0); |
|
if (ret && strstr(ssh_principals_err.buf, "usage:")) { |
|
error(_("ssh-keygen -Y find-principals/verify is needed for ssh signature verification (available in openssh version 8.2p1+)")); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
if (ret || !ssh_principals_out.len) { |
|
/* |
|
* We did not find a matching principal in the allowedSigners |
|
* Check without validation |
|
*/ |
|
child_process_init(&ssh_keygen); |
|
strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program, |
|
"-Y", "check-novalidate", |
|
"-n", "git", |
|
"-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, |
|
verify_time.buf, |
|
NULL); |
|
pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, |
|
&ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Fail on unknown keys |
|
* we still call check-novalidate to display the signature info |
|
*/ |
|
ret = -1; |
|
} else { |
|
/* Check every principal we found (one per line) */ |
|
const char *next; |
|
for (line = ssh_principals_out.buf; |
|
*line; |
|
line = next) { |
|
const char *end_of_text; |
|
|
|
next = end_of_text = strchrnul(line, '\n'); |
|
|
|
/* Did we find a LF, and did we have CR before it? */ |
|
if (*end_of_text && |
|
line < end_of_text && |
|
end_of_text[-1] == '\r') |
|
end_of_text--; |
|
|
|
/* Unless we hit NUL, skip over the LF we found */ |
|
if (*next) |
|
next++; |
|
|
|
/* Not all lines are data. Skip empty ones */ |
|
if (line == end_of_text) |
|
continue; |
|
|
|
/* We now know we have an non-empty line. Process it */ |
|
principal = xmemdupz(line, end_of_text - line); |
|
|
|
child_process_init(&ssh_keygen); |
|
strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out); |
|
strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err); |
|
strvec_push(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program); |
|
/* |
|
* We found principals |
|
* Try with each until we find a match |
|
*/ |
|
strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-Y", "verify", |
|
"-n", "git", |
|
"-f", ssh_allowed_signers, |
|
"-I", principal, |
|
"-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, |
|
verify_time.buf, |
|
NULL); |
|
|
|
if (ssh_revocation_file) { |
|
if (file_exists(ssh_revocation_file)) { |
|
strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-r", |
|
ssh_revocation_file, NULL); |
|
} else { |
|
warning(_("ssh signing revocation file configured but not found: %s"), |
|
ssh_revocation_file); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, |
|
&ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0); |
|
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); |
|
|
|
FREE_AND_NULL(principal); |
|
|
|
if (!ret) |
|
ret = !starts_with(ssh_keygen_out.buf, "Good"); |
|
|
|
if (!ret) |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0); |
|
strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0); |
|
/* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */ |
|
strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_principals_err.buf, ssh_principals_err.len); |
|
strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_keygen_err.buf, ssh_keygen_err.len); |
|
sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&ssh_keygen_out, NULL); |
|
sigc->gpg_status = xstrdup(sigc->output); |
|
|
|
parse_ssh_output(sigc); |
|
|
|
out: |
|
if (buffer_file) |
|
delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); |
|
strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_out); |
|
strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err); |
|
strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out); |
|
strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err); |
|
strbuf_release(&verify_time); |
|
|
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc) |
|
{ |
|
const char *ident_line = NULL; |
|
size_t ident_len; |
|
struct ident_split ident; |
|
const char *signer_header; |
|
|
|
switch (sigc->payload_type) { |
|
case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT: |
|
signer_header = "committer"; |
|
break; |
|
case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG: |
|
signer_header = "tagger"; |
|
break; |
|
case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED: |
|
case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT: |
|
/* Ignore payloads we don't want to parse */ |
|
return 0; |
|
default: |
|
BUG("invalid value for sigc->payload_type"); |
|
} |
|
|
|
ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len); |
|
if (!ident_line || !ident_len) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
if (split_ident_line(&ident, ident_line, ident_len)) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
if (!sigc->payload_timestamp && ident.date_begin && ident.date_end) |
|
sigc->payload_timestamp = parse_timestamp(ident.date_begin, NULL, 10); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc, |
|
const char *signature, size_t slen) |
|
{ |
|
struct gpg_format *fmt; |
|
int status; |
|
|
|
gpg_interface_lazy_init(); |
|
|
|
sigc->result = 'N'; |
|
sigc->trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; |
|
|
|
fmt = get_format_by_sig(signature); |
|
if (!fmt) |
|
die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature); |
|
|
|
if (parse_payload_metadata(sigc)) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen); |
|
|
|
if (status && !sigc->output) |
|
return !!status; |
|
|
|
status |= sigc->result != 'G'; |
|
status |= sigc->trust_level < configured_min_trust_level; |
|
|
|
return !!status; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags) |
|
{ |
|
const char *output = flags & GPG_VERIFY_RAW ? sigc->gpg_status : |
|
sigc->output; |
|
|
|
if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload) |
|
fwrite(sigc->payload, 1, sigc->payload_len, stdout); |
|
|
|
if (output) |
|
fputs(output, stderr); |
|
} |
|
|
|
size_t parse_signed_buffer(const char *buf, size_t size) |
|
{ |
|
size_t len = 0; |
|
size_t match = size; |
|
while (len < size) { |
|
const char *eol; |
|
|
|
if (get_format_by_sig(buf + len)) |
|
match = len; |
|
|
|
eol = memchr(buf + len, '\n', size - len); |
|
len += eol ? eol - (buf + len) + 1 : size - len; |
|
} |
|
return match; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int parse_signature(const char *buf, size_t size, struct strbuf *payload, struct strbuf *signature) |
|
{ |
|
size_t match = parse_signed_buffer(buf, size); |
|
if (match != size) { |
|
strbuf_add(payload, buf, match); |
|
remove_signature(payload); |
|
strbuf_add(signature, buf + match, size - match); |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void set_signing_key(const char *key) |
|
{ |
|
gpg_interface_lazy_init(); |
|
|
|
free(configured_signing_key); |
|
configured_signing_key = xstrdup(key); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb UNUSED) |
|
{ |
|
struct gpg_format *fmt = NULL; |
|
char *fmtname = NULL; |
|
char *trust; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "user.signingkey")) { |
|
if (!value) |
|
return config_error_nonbool(var); |
|
set_signing_key(value); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.format")) { |
|
if (!value) |
|
return config_error_nonbool(var); |
|
fmt = get_format_by_name(value); |
|
if (!fmt) |
|
return error(_("invalid value for '%s': '%s'"), |
|
var, value); |
|
use_format = fmt; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.mintrustlevel")) { |
|
if (!value) |
|
return config_error_nonbool(var); |
|
|
|
trust = xstrdup_toupper(value); |
|
ret = parse_gpg_trust_level(trust, &configured_min_trust_level); |
|
free(trust); |
|
|
|
if (ret) |
|
return error(_("invalid value for '%s': '%s'"), |
|
var, value); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.defaultkeycommand")) { |
|
if (!value) |
|
return config_error_nonbool(var); |
|
return git_config_string(&ssh_default_key_command, var, value); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.allowedsignersfile")) { |
|
if (!value) |
|
return config_error_nonbool(var); |
|
return git_config_pathname(&ssh_allowed_signers, var, value); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.revocationfile")) { |
|
if (!value) |
|
return config_error_nonbool(var); |
|
return git_config_pathname(&ssh_revocation_file, var, value); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.program") || !strcmp(var, "gpg.openpgp.program")) |
|
fmtname = "openpgp"; |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.x509.program")) |
|
fmtname = "x509"; |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.program")) |
|
fmtname = "ssh"; |
|
|
|
if (fmtname) { |
|
fmt = get_format_by_name(fmtname); |
|
return git_config_string(&fmt->program, var, value); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Returns 1 if `string` contains a literal ssh key, 0 otherwise |
|
* `key` will be set to the start of the actual key if a prefix is present. |
|
*/ |
|
static int is_literal_ssh_key(const char *string, const char **key) |
|
{ |
|
if (skip_prefix(string, "key::", key)) |
|
return 1; |
|
if (starts_with(string, "ssh-")) { |
|
*key = string; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static char *get_ssh_key_fingerprint(const char *signing_key) |
|
{ |
|
struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; |
|
int ret = -1; |
|
struct strbuf fingerprint_stdout = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct strbuf **fingerprint; |
|
char *fingerprint_ret; |
|
const char *literal_key = NULL; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* With SSH Signing this can contain a filename or a public key |
|
* For textual representation we usually want a fingerprint |
|
*/ |
|
if (is_literal_ssh_key(signing_key, &literal_key)) { |
|
strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen", "-lf", "-", NULL); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, literal_key, |
|
strlen(literal_key), &fingerprint_stdout, 0, |
|
NULL, 0); |
|
} else { |
|
strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen", "-lf", |
|
configured_signing_key, NULL); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &fingerprint_stdout, 0, |
|
NULL, 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!!ret) |
|
die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"), |
|
signing_key); |
|
|
|
fingerprint = strbuf_split_max(&fingerprint_stdout, ' ', 3); |
|
if (!fingerprint[1]) |
|
die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"), |
|
signing_key); |
|
|
|
fingerprint_ret = strbuf_detach(fingerprint[1], NULL); |
|
strbuf_list_free(fingerprint); |
|
strbuf_release(&fingerprint_stdout); |
|
return fingerprint_ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Returns the first public key from an ssh-agent to use for signing */ |
|
static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void) |
|
{ |
|
struct child_process ssh_default_key = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; |
|
int ret = -1; |
|
struct strbuf key_stdout = STRBUF_INIT, key_stderr = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct strbuf **keys; |
|
char *key_command = NULL; |
|
const char **argv; |
|
int n; |
|
char *default_key = NULL; |
|
const char *literal_key = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (!ssh_default_key_command) |
|
die(_("either user.signingkey or gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand needs to be configured")); |
|
|
|
key_command = xstrdup(ssh_default_key_command); |
|
n = split_cmdline(key_command, &argv); |
|
|
|
if (n < 0) |
|
die("malformed build-time gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: %s", |
|
split_cmdline_strerror(n)); |
|
|
|
strvec_pushv(&ssh_default_key.args, argv); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&ssh_default_key, NULL, 0, &key_stdout, 0, |
|
&key_stderr, 0); |
|
|
|
if (!ret) { |
|
keys = strbuf_split_max(&key_stdout, '\n', 2); |
|
if (keys[0] && is_literal_ssh_key(keys[0]->buf, &literal_key)) { |
|
/* |
|
* We only use `is_literal_ssh_key` here to check validity |
|
* The prefix will be stripped when the key is used. |
|
*/ |
|
default_key = strbuf_detach(keys[0], NULL); |
|
} else { |
|
warning(_("gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand succeeded but returned no keys: %s %s"), |
|
key_stderr.buf, key_stdout.buf); |
|
} |
|
|
|
strbuf_list_free(keys); |
|
} else { |
|
warning(_("gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand failed: %s %s"), |
|
key_stderr.buf, key_stdout.buf); |
|
} |
|
|
|
free(key_command); |
|
free(argv); |
|
strbuf_release(&key_stdout); |
|
|
|
return default_key; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static const char *get_ssh_key_id(void) { |
|
return get_ssh_key_fingerprint(get_signing_key()); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Returns a textual but unique representation of the signing key */ |
|
const char *get_signing_key_id(void) |
|
{ |
|
gpg_interface_lazy_init(); |
|
|
|
if (use_format->get_key_id) { |
|
return use_format->get_key_id(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* GPG/GPGSM only store a key id on this variable */ |
|
return get_signing_key(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
const char *get_signing_key(void) |
|
{ |
|
gpg_interface_lazy_init(); |
|
|
|
if (configured_signing_key) |
|
return configured_signing_key; |
|
if (use_format->get_default_key) { |
|
return use_format->get_default_key(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return git_committer_info(IDENT_STRICT | IDENT_NO_DATE); |
|
} |
|
|
|
const char *gpg_trust_level_to_str(enum signature_trust_level level) |
|
{ |
|
struct sigcheck_gpg_trust_level *trust; |
|
|
|
if (level < 0 || level >= ARRAY_SIZE(sigcheck_gpg_trust_level)) |
|
BUG("invalid trust level requested %d", level); |
|
|
|
trust = &sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[level]; |
|
if (trust->value != level) |
|
BUG("sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[] unsorted"); |
|
|
|
return sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[level].display_key; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key) |
|
{ |
|
gpg_interface_lazy_init(); |
|
|
|
return use_format->sign_buffer(buffer, signature, signing_key); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. |
|
* NEEDSWORK: make it trim only CRs before LFs and rename |
|
*/ |
|
static void remove_cr_after(struct strbuf *buffer, size_t offset) |
|
{ |
|
size_t i, j; |
|
|
|
for (i = j = offset; i < buffer->len; i++) { |
|
if (buffer->buf[i] != '\r') { |
|
if (i != j) |
|
buffer->buf[j] = buffer->buf[i]; |
|
j++; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
strbuf_setlen(buffer, j); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, |
|
const char *signing_key) |
|
{ |
|
struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; |
|
int ret; |
|
size_t bottom; |
|
const char *cp; |
|
struct strbuf gpg_status = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
|
|
strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, |
|
use_format->program, |
|
"--status-fd=2", |
|
"-bsau", signing_key, |
|
NULL); |
|
|
|
bottom = signature->len; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* When the username signingkey is bad, program could be terminated |
|
* because gpg exits without reading and then write gets SIGPIPE. |
|
*/ |
|
sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&gpg, buffer->buf, buffer->len, |
|
signature, 1024, &gpg_status, 0); |
|
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); |
|
|
|
for (cp = gpg_status.buf; |
|
cp && (cp = strstr(cp, "[GNUPG:] SIG_CREATED ")); |
|
cp++) { |
|
if (cp == gpg_status.buf || cp[-1] == '\n') |
|
break; /* found */ |
|
} |
|
ret |= !cp; |
|
if (ret) { |
|
error(_("gpg failed to sign the data:\n%s"), |
|
gpg_status.len ? gpg_status.buf : "(no gpg output)"); |
|
strbuf_release(&gpg_status); |
|
return -1; |
|
} |
|
strbuf_release(&gpg_status); |
|
|
|
/* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. */ |
|
remove_cr_after(signature, bottom); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, |
|
const char *signing_key) |
|
{ |
|
struct child_process signer = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; |
|
int ret = -1; |
|
size_t bottom, keylen; |
|
struct strbuf signer_stderr = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
struct tempfile *key_file = NULL, *buffer_file = NULL; |
|
char *ssh_signing_key_file = NULL; |
|
struct strbuf ssh_signature_filename = STRBUF_INIT; |
|
const char *literal_key = NULL; |
|
int literal_ssh_key = 0; |
|
|
|
if (!signing_key || signing_key[0] == '\0') |
|
return error( |
|
_("user.signingKey needs to be set for ssh signing")); |
|
|
|
if (is_literal_ssh_key(signing_key, &literal_key)) { |
|
/* A literal ssh key */ |
|
literal_ssh_key = 1; |
|
key_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_signing_key_tmpXXXXXX"); |
|
if (!key_file) |
|
return error_errno( |
|
_("could not create temporary file")); |
|
keylen = strlen(literal_key); |
|
if (write_in_full(key_file->fd, literal_key, keylen) < 0 || |
|
close_tempfile_gently(key_file) < 0) { |
|
error_errno(_("failed writing ssh signing key to '%s'"), |
|
key_file->filename.buf); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
ssh_signing_key_file = strbuf_detach(&key_file->filename, NULL); |
|
} else { |
|
/* We assume a file */ |
|
ssh_signing_key_file = interpolate_path(signing_key, 1); |
|
} |
|
|
|
buffer_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_signing_buffer_tmpXXXXXX"); |
|
if (!buffer_file) { |
|
error_errno(_("could not create temporary file")); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (write_in_full(buffer_file->fd, buffer->buf, buffer->len) < 0 || |
|
close_tempfile_gently(buffer_file) < 0) { |
|
error_errno(_("failed writing ssh signing key buffer to '%s'"), |
|
buffer_file->filename.buf); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
strvec_pushl(&signer.args, use_format->program, |
|
"-Y", "sign", |
|
"-n", "git", |
|
"-f", ssh_signing_key_file, |
|
NULL); |
|
if (literal_ssh_key) |
|
strvec_push(&signer.args, "-U"); |
|
strvec_push(&signer.args, buffer_file->filename.buf); |
|
|
|
sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); |
|
ret = pipe_command(&signer, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &signer_stderr, 0); |
|
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); |
|
|
|
if (ret) { |
|
if (strstr(signer_stderr.buf, "usage:")) |
|
error(_("ssh-keygen -Y sign is needed for ssh signing (available in openssh version 8.2p1+)")); |
|
|
|
error("%s", signer_stderr.buf); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bottom = signature->len; |
|
|
|
strbuf_addbuf(&ssh_signature_filename, &buffer_file->filename); |
|
strbuf_addstr(&ssh_signature_filename, ".sig"); |
|
if (strbuf_read_file(signature, ssh_signature_filename.buf, 0) < 0) { |
|
ret = error_errno( |
|
_("failed reading ssh signing data buffer from '%s'"), |
|
ssh_signature_filename.buf); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
/* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. */ |
|
remove_cr_after(signature, bottom); |
|
|
|
out: |
|
if (key_file) |
|
delete_tempfile(&key_file); |
|
if (buffer_file) |
|
delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); |
|
if (ssh_signature_filename.len) |
|
unlink_or_warn(ssh_signature_filename.buf); |
|
strbuf_release(&signer_stderr); |
|
strbuf_release(&ssh_signature_filename); |
|
FREE_AND_NULL(ssh_signing_key_file); |
|
return ret; |
|
}
|
|
|