To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use
`test_config_global`.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for changing the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to
"user", update the `prolog()` function in lib-submodule-update to allow
submodules to be cloned over the file protocol.
This is used by a handful of submodule-related test scripts, which
themselves will have to tweak the value of `protocol.file.allow` in
certain locations. Those will be done in subsequent commits.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
When cloning a repository with `--local`, Git relies on either making a
hardlink or copy to every file in the "objects" directory of the source
repository. This is done through the callpath `cmd_clone()` ->
`clone_local()` -> `copy_or_link_directory()`.
The way this optimization works is by enumerating every file and
directory recursively in the source repository's `$GIT_DIR/objects`
directory, and then either making a copy or hardlink of each file. The
only exception to this rule is when copying the "alternates" file, in
which case paths are rewritten to be absolute before writing a new
"alternates" file in the destination repo.
One quirk of this implementation is that it dereferences symlinks when
cloning. This behavior was most recently modified in 36596fd2df (clone:
better handle symlinked files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10), which
attempted to support `--local` clones of repositories with symlinks in
their objects directory in a platform-independent way.
Unfortunately, this behavior of dereferencing symlinks (that is,
creating a hardlink or copy of the source's link target in the
destination repository) can be used as a component in attacking a
victim by inadvertently exposing the contents of file stored outside of
the repository.
Take, for example, a repository that stores a Dockerfile and is used to
build Docker images. When building an image, Docker copies the directory
contents into the VM, and then instructs the VM to execute the
Dockerfile at the root of the copied directory. This protects against
directory traversal attacks by copying symbolic links as-is without
dereferencing them.
That is, if a user has a symlink pointing at their private key material
(where the symlink is present in the same directory as the Dockerfile,
but the key itself is present outside of that directory), the key is
unreadable to a Docker image, since the link will appear broken from the
container's point of view.
This behavior enables an attack whereby a victim is convinced to clone a
repository containing an embedded submodule (with a URL like
"file:///proc/self/cwd/path/to/submodule") which has a symlink pointing
at a path containing sensitive information on the victim's machine. If a
user is tricked into doing this, the contents at the destination of
those symbolic links are exposed to the Docker image at runtime.
One approach to preventing this behavior is to recreate symlinks in the
destination repository. But this is problematic, since symlinking the
objects directory are not well-supported. (One potential problem is that
when sharing, e.g. a "pack" directory via symlinks, different writers
performing garbage collection may consider different sets of objects to
be reachable, enabling a situation whereby garbage collecting one
repository may remove reachable objects in another repository).
Instead, prohibit the local clone optimization when any symlinks are
present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory of the source repository.
Users may clone the repository again by prepending the "file://" scheme
to their clone URL, or by adding the `--no-local` option to their `git
clone` invocation.
The directory iterator used by `copy_or_link_directory()` must no longer
dereference symlinks (i.e., it *must* call `lstat()` instead of `stat()`
in order to discover whether or not there are symlinks present). This has
no bearing on the overall behavior, since we will immediately `die()` on
encounter a symlink.
Note that t5604.33 suggests that we do support local clones with
symbolic links in the source repository's objects directory, but this
was likely unintentional, or at least did not take into consideration
the problem with sharing parts of the objects directory with symbolic
links at the time. Update this test to reflect which options are and
aren't supported.
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
* maint-2.35:
Git 2.35.4
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
8959555cee (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.
An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.
An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):
$ git -C /tmp init
To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.
This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.
Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.
While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
With a recent update to refuse access to repositories of other
people by default, "sudo make install" and "sudo git describe"
stopped working. This series intends to loosen it while keeping
the safety.
* cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo:
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git clone --origin X" leaked piece of memory that held value read
from the clone.defaultRemoteName configuration variable, which has
been plugged.
source: <xmqqlevl4ysk.fsf@gitster.g>
* jc/clone-remote-name-leak-fix:
clone: plug a miniscule leak
The path taken by "git multi-pack-index" command from the end user
was compared with path internally prepared by the tool withut first
normalizing, which lead to duplicated paths not being noticed,
which has been corrected.
source: <pull.1221.v2.git.1650911234.gitgitgadget@gmail.com>
* ds/midx-normalize-pathname-before-comparison:
cache: use const char * for get_object_directory()
multi-pack-index: use --object-dir real path
midx: use real paths in lookup_multi_pack_index()
"git rebase --keep-base <upstream> <branch-to-rebase>" computed the
commit to rebase onto incorrectly, which has been corrected.
source: <20220421044233.894255-1-alexhenrie24@gmail.com>
* ah/rebase-keep-base-fix:
rebase: use correct base for --keep-base when a branch is given
Avoid problems from interaction between malloc_check and address
sanitizer.
source: <pull.1210.git.1649507317350.gitgitgadget@gmail.com>
* pw/test-malloc-with-sanitize-address:
tests: make SANITIZE=address imply TEST_NO_MALLOC_CHECK
The commit summary shown after making a commit is matched to what
is given in "git status" not to use the break-rewrite heuristics.
source: <c35bd0aa-2e46-e710-2b39-89f18bad0097@web.de>
* rs/commit-summary-wo-break-rewrite:
commit, sequencer: turn off break_opt for commit summary
macOS CI jobs have been occasionally flaky due to tentative version
skew between perforce and the homebrew packager. Instead of
failing the whole CI job, just let it skip the p4 tests when this
happens.
source: <20220512223940.238367-1-gitster@pobox.com>
* cb/ci-make-p4-optional:
ci: use https, not http to download binaries from perforce.com
ci: reintroduce prevention from perforce being quarantined in macOS
ci: avoid brew for installing perforce
ci: make failure to find perforce more user friendly
A bit of test framework fixes with a few fixes to issues found by
valgrind.
source: <20220512223218.237544-1-gitster@pobox.com>
* ab/valgrind-fixes:
commit-graph.c: don't assume that stat() succeeds
object-file: fix a unpack_loose_header() regression in 3b6a8db3b0
log test: skip a failing mkstemp() test under valgrind
tests: using custom GIT_EXEC_PATH breaks --valgrind tests
"git archive --add-file=<path>" picked up the raw permission bits
from the path and propagated to zip output in some cases, without
normalization, which has been corrected (tar output did not have
this issue).
source: <xmqqmtfme8v6.fsf@gitster.g>
* jc/archive-add-file-normalize-mode:
archive: do not let on-disk mode leak to zip archives
The "--current" option of "git show-branch" should have been made
incompatible with the "--reflog" mode, but this was not enforced,
which has been corrected.
source: <xmqqh76mf7s4.fsf_-_@gitster.g>
* jc/show-branch-g-current:
show-branch: -g and --current are incompatible
Meant to go with js/ci-gcc-12-fixes.
source: <xmqq7d68ytj8.fsf_-_@gitster.g>
* jc/http-clear-finished-pointer:
http.c: clear the 'finished' member once we are done with it
Fixes real problems noticed by gcc 12 and works around false
positives.
source: <pull.1238.git.1653351786.gitgitgadget@gmail.com>
* js/ci-gcc-12-fixes:
dir.c: avoid "exceeds maximum object size" error with GCC v12.x
nedmalloc: avoid new compile error
compat/win32/syslog: fix use-after-realloc
In http.c, the run_active_slot() function allows the given "slot" to
make progress by calling step_active_slots() in a loop repeatedly,
and the loop is not left until the request held in the slot
completes.
Ages ago, we used to use the slot->in_use member to get out of the
loop, which misbehaved when the request in "slot" completes (at
which time, the result of the request is copied away from the slot,
and the in_use member is cleared, making the slot ready to be
reused), and the "slot" gets reused to service a different request
(at which time, the "slot" becomes in_use again, even though it is
for a different request). The loop terminating condition mistakenly
thought that the original request has yet to be completed.
Today's code, after baa7b67d (HTTP slot reuse fixes, 2006-03-10)
fixed this issue, uses a separate "slot->finished" member that is
set in run_active_slot() to point to an on-stack variable, and the
code that completes the request in finish_active_slot() clears the
on-stack variable via the pointer to signal that the particular
request held by the slot has completed. It also clears the in_use
member (as before that fix), so that the slot itself can safely be
reused for an unrelated request.
One thing that is not quite clean in this arrangement is that,
unless the slot gets reused, at which point the finished member is
reset to NULL, the member keeps the value of &finished, which
becomes a dangling pointer into the stack when run_active_slot()
returns. Clear the finished member before the control leaves the
function, which has a side effect of unconfusing compilers like
recent GCC 12 that is over-eager to warn against such an assignment.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Technically, the pointer difference `end - start` _could_ be negative,
and when cast to an (unsigned) `size_t` that would cause problems. In
this instance, the symptom is:
dir.c: In function 'git_url_basename':
dir.c:3087:13: error: 'memchr' specified bound [9223372036854775808, 0]
exceeds maximum object size 9223372036854775807
[-Werror=stringop-overread]
CC ewah/bitmap.o
3087 | if (memchr(start, '/', end - start) == NULL
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
While it is a bit far-fetched to think that `end` (which is defined as
`repo + strlen(repo)`) and `start` (which starts at `repo` and never
steps beyond the NUL terminator) could result in such a negative
difference, GCC has no way of knowing that.
See also https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla//show_bug.cgi?id=85783.
Let's just add a safety check, primarily for GCC's benefit.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
GCC v12.x complains thusly:
compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c: In function 'DestroyCaches':
compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c:326:12: error: the comparison will always
evaluate as 'true' for the address of 'caches'
will never be NULL [-Werror=address]
326 | if(p->caches)
| ^
compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c:196:22: note: 'caches' declared here
196 | threadcache *caches[THREADCACHEMAXCACHES];
| ^~~~~~
... and it is correct, of course.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Git for Windows' SDK recently upgraded to GCC v12.x which points out
that the `pos` variable might be used even after the corresponding
memory was `realloc()`ed and therefore potentially no longer valid.
Since a subset of this SDK is used in Git's CI/PR builds, we need to fix
this to continue to be able to benefit from the CI/PR runs.
Note: This bug has been with us since 2a6b149c64 (mingw: avoid using
strbuf in syslog, 2011-10-06), and while it looks tempting to replace
the hand-rolled string manipulation with a `strbuf`-based one, that
commit's message explains why we cannot do that: The `syslog()` function
is called as part of the function in `daemon.c` which is set as the
`die()` routine, and since `strbuf_grow()` can call that function if it
runs out of memory, this would cause a nasty infinite loop that we do
not want to re-introduce.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Add a support library that provides one function that can be used
to run a "scriplet" of commands through sudo and that helps invoking
sudo in the slightly awkward way that is required to ensure it doesn't
block the call (if shell was allowed as tested in the prerequisite)
and it doesn't run the command through a different shell than the one
we intended.
Add additional negative tests as suggested by Junio and that use a
new workspace that is owned by root.
Document a regression that was introduced by previous commits where
root won't be able anymore to access directories they own unless
SUDO_UID is removed from their environment.
The tests document additional ways that this new restriction could
be worked around and the documentation explains why it might be instead
considered a feature, but a "fix" is planned for a future change.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
bdc77d1d68 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de>
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Originally reported after release of v2.35.2 (and other maint branches)
for CVE-2022-24765 and blocking otherwise harmless commands that were
done using sudo in a repository that was owned by the user.
Add a new test script with very basic support to allow running git
commands through sudo, so a reproduction could be implemented and that
uses only `git status` as a proxy of the issue reported.
Note that because of the way sudo interacts with the system, a much
more complete integration with the test framework will require a lot
more work and that was therefore intentionally punted for now.
The current implementation requires the execution of a special cleanup
function which should always be kept as the last "test" or otherwise
the standard cleanup functions will fail because they can't remove
the root owned directories that are used. This also means that if
failures are found while running, the specifics of the failure might
not be kept for further debugging and if the test was interrupted, it
will be necessary to clean the working directory manually before
restarting by running:
$ sudo rm -rf trash\ directory.t0034-root-safe-directory/
The test file also uses at least one initial "setup" test that creates
a parallel execution directory under the "root" sub directory, which
should be used as top level directory for all repositories that are
used in this test file. Unlike all other tests the repository provided
by the test framework should go unused.
Special care should be taken when invoking commands through sudo, since
the environment is otherwise independent from what the test framework
setup and might have changed the values for HOME, SHELL and dropped
several relevant environment variables for your test. Indeed `git status`
was used as a proxy because it doesn't even require commits in the
repository to work and usually doesn't require much from the environment
to run, but a future patch will add calls to `git init` and that will
fail to honor the default branch name, unless that setting is NOT
provided through an environment variable (which means even a CI run
could fail that test if enabled incorrectly).
A new SUDO prerequisite is provided that does some sanity checking
to make sure the sudo command that will be used allows for passwordless
execution as root without restrictions and doesn't mess with git's
execution path. This matches what is provided by the macOS agents that
are used as part of GitHub actions and probably nowhere else.
Most of those characteristics make this test mostly only suitable for
CI, but it might be executed locally if special care is taken to provide
for all of them in the local configuration and maybe making use of the
sudo credential cache by first invoking sudo, entering your password if
needed, and then invoking the test with:
$ GIT_TEST_ALLOW_SUDO=YES ./t0034-root-safe-directory.sh
If it fails to run, then it means your local setup wouldn't work for the
test because of the configuration sudo has or other system settings, and
things that might help are to comment out sudo's secure_path config, and
make sure that the account you are using has no restrictions on the
commands it can run through sudo, just like is provided for the user in
the CI.
For example (assuming a username of marta for you) something probably
similar to the following entry in your /etc/sudoers (or equivalent) file:
marta ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since 522354d70f (Add Travis CI support, 2015-11-27) the CI has used
http://filehost.perforce.com/perforce/ to download binaries from
filehost.perforce.com, they were then moved to this script in
657343a602 (travis-ci: move Travis CI code into dedicated scripts,
2017-09-10).
Let's use https instead for good measure. I don't think we need to
worry about the DNS or network between the GitHub CI and perforce.com
being MitM'd, but using https gives us extra validation of the payload
at least, and is one less thing to worry about when checking where
else we rely on non-TLS'd http connections.
Also, use the same download site at perforce.com for Linux and macOS
tarballs for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
5ed9fc3fc8 (ci: prevent `perforce` from being quarantined, 2020-02-27)
introduces this prevention for brew, but brew has been removed in a
previous commit, so reintroduce an equivalent option to avoid a possible
regression.
This doesn't affect github actions (as configure now) and is therefore
done silently to avoid any possible scary irrelevant messages.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Perfoce's cask in brew is meant[1] to be used only by humans, so replace
its use from the CI with a scripted binary download which is less likely
to fail, as it is done in Linux.
Kept the logic together so it will be less likely to break when moved
around as on the fly code changes in this area are settled, at which
point it will also feasable to ammend it to avoid some of the hardcoded
values by using similar variables to the ones Linux does.
In that same line, a POSIX sh syntax is used instead of the similar one
used in Linux in preparation for an unrelated future change that might
change the shell currently configured for it.
This change reintroduces the risk that the installed binaries might not
work because of being quarantined that was fixed with 5ed9fc3fc8 (ci:
prevent `perforce` from being quarantined, 2020-02-27) but fixing that
now was also punted for simplicity and since the affected cloud provider
is scheduled to be retired with an on the fly change, but should be
addressed if that other change is not integrated further.
The discussion on the need to keep 2 radically different versions of
the binaries to be tested with Linux vs macOS or how to upgrade to
newer versions now that brew won't do that automatically for us has
been punted for now as well. On that line the now obsolete comment
about it in lib.sh was originally being updated by this change but
created conflicts as it is moved around by other on the fly changes,
so will be addressed independently as well.
[1] https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-cask/pull/122347#discussion_r856026584
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Taylor Blau