Commit Graph

3 Commits (e44f15ba3ee873b5df5e8e5d8cc018df288472ef)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Patrick Steinhardt fba95dad6a t: mark a bunch of tests as leak-free
There are a bunch of tests which do not have any leaks:

  - t0411: Introduced via 5c5a4a1c05 (t0411: add tests for cloning from
    partial repo, 2024-01-28), passes since its inception.

  - t0610: Introduced via 57db2a094d (refs: introduce reftable backend,
    2024-02-07), passes since its inception.

  - t2405: Passes since 6741e917de (repository: avoid leaking
    `fsmonitor` data, 2024-04-12).

  - t7423: Introduced via b20c10fd9b (t7423: add tests for symlinked
    submodule directories, 2024-01-28), passes since e8d0608944
    (submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only,
    2024-03-26). The fix is not obviously related, but probably works
    because we now die early in many code paths.

  - t9xxx: All of these are exercising CVS-related tooling and pass
    since at least Git v2.40. It's likely that these pass for a long
    time already, but nobody ever noticed because Git developers do not
    tend to have CVS on their machines.

Mark all of these tests as passing.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2024-05-27 11:19:57 -07:00
Johannes Schindelin e8d0608944 submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
Submodules are stored in subdirectories of their superproject. When
these subdirectories have been replaced with symlinks by a malicious
actor, all kinds of mayhem can be caused.

This _should_ not be possible, but many CVEs in the past showed that
_when_ possible, it allows attackers to slip in code that gets executed
during, say, a `git clone --recursive` operation.

Let's add some defense-in-depth to disallow submodule paths to have
anything except directories in them.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2024-04-17 22:30:04 +02:00
Filip Hejsek b20c10fd9b t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
Submodule operations must not follow symlinks in working tree, because
otherwise files might be written to unintended places, leading to
vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2024-04-17 22:30:00 +02:00