kernel/git - git - PowerEL Git System

Tree: ca132089d2

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Shawn O. Pearce	cabead982b	Use the empty tree for base diff in paranoid-update on new branches We have to load a tree difference for the purpose of testing file patterns. But if our branch is being created and there is no specific base to difference against in the rule our base will be '0'x40. This is (usually) not a valid tree-ish object in a Git repository, so there's nothing to difference against. Instead of creating the empty tree and running git-diff against that we just take the output of `ls-tree -r --name-only` and mark every returned pathname as an add. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	18 years ago
Shawn O. Pearce	d47eed3272	Teach the update-paranoid to look at file differences In some applications of the update hook a user may be allowed to modify a branch, but only if the file level difference is also an allowed change. This is the commonly requested feature of allowing users to modify only certain files. A new repository.*.allow syntax permits granting the three basic file level operations: A: file is added relative to the other tree M: file exists in both trees, but its SHA-1 or mode differs D: file is removed relative to the other tree on a per-branch and path-name basis. The user must also have a branch level allow line already granting them access to create, rewind or update (CRU) that branch before the hook will consult any file level rules. In order for a branch change to succeed _all_ files that differ relative to some base (by default the old value of this branch, but it can also be any valid tree-ish) must be allowed by file level allow rules. A push is rejected if any diff exists that is not covered by at least one allow rule. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	18 years ago
Shawn O. Pearce	b767c792fa	Teach update-paranoid how to store ACLs organized by groups In some applications of this paranoid update hook the set of ACL rules that need to be applied to a user can be large, and the number of users that those rules must also be applied to can be more than a handful of individuals. Rather than repeating the same rules multiple times (once for each user) we now allow users to be members of groups, where the group supplies the list of ACL rules. For various reasons we don't depend on the underlying OS groups and instead perform our own group handling. Users can be made a member of one or more groups by setting the user.memberOf property within the "users/$who.acl" file: [user] memberOf = developer memberOf = administrator This will cause the hook to also parse the "groups/$groupname.acl" file for each value of user.memberOf, and merge any allow rules that match the current repository with the user's own private rules (if they had any). Since some rules are basically the same but may have a component differ based on the individual user, any user.* key may be inserted into a rule using the "${user.foo}" syntax. The allow rule does not match if the user does not define one (and exactly one) value for the key "foo". Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	18 years ago
Shawn O. Pearce	9398e5aa16	Contribute a fairly paranoid update hook I'm using a variant of this update hook in a corporate environment where we perform some validations of the commits and tags that are being pushed. The model is a "central repository" type setup, where users are given access to push to specific branches within the shared central repository. In this particular installation we run a specially patched git-receive-pack in setuid mode via SSH, allowing all writes into the repository as the repository owner, but only if this hook blesses it. One of the major checks we perform with this hook is that the 'committer' line of a commit, or the 'tagger' line of a new annotated tag actually correlates to the UNIX user who is performing the push. Users can falsify these lines on their local repositories, but the central repository that management trusts will reject all such forgery attempts. Of course 'author' lines are still allowed to be any value, as sometimes changes do come from other individuals. Another nice feature of this hook is the access control lists for all repositories on the system can also be stored and tracked in a supporting Git repository, which can also be access controlled by itself. This allows full auditing of who-had-what-when-and-why, thanks to git-blame's data mining capabilities. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>	18 years ago