kernel/git - git - PowerEL Git System

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Brandon Williams	f1762d772e	transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	8 years ago
Brandon Williams	85e4205365	lib-proto-disable: variable name fix The test_proto function assigns the positional parameters to named variables, but then still refers to "$desc" as "$1". Using $desc is more readable and less error-prone. Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	8 years ago
Jeff King	a5adaced2e	transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	10 years ago

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Brandon Williams

f1762d772e

transport: add protocol policy config option

Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to
specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push
commands.  This patch introduces new configuration options for more
fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols.  This also has
the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol
whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is
non-trivial.

Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via
the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option.  A default policy for all
unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config
option.  If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe
protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous
protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other
protocols.

The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`.  The `user`
policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly
used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run
clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g.
recursive initialization of submodules).  Commands which can potentially
clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention
can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent
protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used.

Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext
protocol to be tested.

Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net>

Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

8 years ago

Brandon Williams

85e4205365

lib-proto-disable: variable name fix

The test_proto function assigns the positional parameters to named
variables, but then still refers to "$desc" as "$1". Using $desc is
more readable and less error-prone.

Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

8 years ago

Jeff King

a5adaced2e

transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable

If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).

Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).

We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).

A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

10 years ago

3 Commits (adac8115a6e7f9841c48e4fe48b74e0ce652ef58)