kernel/git - git - PowerEL Git System

Tree: 883b98efad

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Jeff King	30c586ff15	t/lib-proto-disable: restore protocol.allow after config tests The tests for protocol.allow actually set that variable in the on-disk config, run a series of tests, and then never clean up after themselves. This means that whatever tests we run after have protocol.allow=never, which may influence their results. In most cases we either exit after running these tests, or do another round of test_proto(). In the latter case, this happens to work because: 1. Tests of the GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL environment variable override the config. 2. Tests of the specific config "protocol.foo.allow" override the protocol.allow config. 3. The next round of protocol.allow tests start off by setting the config to a known value. However, it's a land-mine waiting to trap somebody adding new tests to one of the t581x test scripts. Let's make sure we clean up after ourselves. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	8 years ago
Brandon Williams	f1762d772e	transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	8 years ago
Brandon Williams	85e4205365	lib-proto-disable: variable name fix The test_proto function assigns the positional parameters to named variables, but then still refers to "$desc" as "$1". Using $desc is more readable and less error-prone. Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	8 years ago
Jeff King	a5adaced2e	transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>	10 years ago