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#include "cache.h"
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#include "pkt-line.h"
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#include "exec_cmd.h"
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#include "interpolate.h"
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#include <syslog.h>
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#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
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#define HOST_NAME_MAX 256
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#endif
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static int log_syslog;
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static int verbose;
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static int reuseaddr;
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static const char daemon_usage[] =
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"git-daemon [--verbose] [--syslog] [--export-all]\n"
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" [--timeout=n] [--init-timeout=n] [--strict-paths]\n"
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" [--base-path=path] [--user-path | --user-path=path]\n"
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" [--interpolated-path=path]\n"
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" [--reuseaddr] [--detach] [--pid-file=file]\n"
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" [--[enable|disable|allow-override|forbid-override]=service]\n"
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" [--inetd | [--listen=host_or_ipaddr] [--port=n]\n"
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" [--user=user [--group=group]]\n"
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" [directory...]";
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/* List of acceptable pathname prefixes */
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static char **ok_paths;
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static int strict_paths;
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/* If this is set, git-daemon-export-ok is not required */
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static int export_all_trees;
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/* Take all paths relative to this one if non-NULL */
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static char *base_path;
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static char *interpolated_path;
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/* Flag indicating client sent extra args. */
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static int saw_extended_args;
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/* If defined, ~user notation is allowed and the string is inserted
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* after ~user/. E.g. a request to git://host/~alice/frotz would
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* go to /home/alice/pub_git/frotz with --user-path=pub_git.
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*/
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static const char *user_path;
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/* Timeout, and initial timeout */
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static unsigned int timeout;
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static unsigned int init_timeout;
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/*
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* Static table for now. Ugh.
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* Feel free to make dynamic as needed.
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*/
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#define INTERP_SLOT_HOST (0)
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#define INTERP_SLOT_CANON_HOST (1)
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#define INTERP_SLOT_IP (2)
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#define INTERP_SLOT_PORT (3)
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#define INTERP_SLOT_DIR (4)
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#define INTERP_SLOT_PERCENT (5)
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static struct interp interp_table[] = {
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{ "%H", 0},
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{ "%CH", 0},
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{ "%IP", 0},
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{ "%P", 0},
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{ "%D", 0},
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{ "%%", 0},
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};
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static void logreport(int priority, const char *err, va_list params)
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{
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/* We should do a single write so that it is atomic and output
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* of several processes do not get intermingled. */
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char buf[1024];
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int buflen;
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int maxlen, msglen;
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/* sizeof(buf) should be big enough for "[pid] \n" */
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buflen = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "[%ld] ", (long) getpid());
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maxlen = sizeof(buf) - buflen - 1; /* -1 for our own LF */
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msglen = vsnprintf(buf + buflen, maxlen, err, params);
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if (log_syslog) {
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syslog(priority, "%s", buf);
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return;
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}
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/* maxlen counted our own LF but also counts space given to
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* vsnprintf for the terminating NUL. We want to make sure that
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* we have space for our own LF and NUL after the "meat" of the
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* message, so truncate it at maxlen - 1.
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*/
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if (msglen > maxlen - 1)
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msglen = maxlen - 1;
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else if (msglen < 0)
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msglen = 0; /* Protect against weird return values. */
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buflen += msglen;
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buf[buflen++] = '\n';
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buf[buflen] = '\0';
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write_in_full(2, buf, buflen);
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}
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static void logerror(const char *err, ...)
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{
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va_list params;
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va_start(params, err);
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logreport(LOG_ERR, err, params);
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va_end(params);
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}
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static void loginfo(const char *err, ...)
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{
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va_list params;
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if (!verbose)
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return;
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va_start(params, err);
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logreport(LOG_INFO, err, params);
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va_end(params);
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}
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static void NORETURN daemon_die(const char *err, va_list params)
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{
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logreport(LOG_ERR, err, params);
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exit(1);
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}
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|
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|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
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static int avoid_alias(char *p)
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|
|
{
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|
int sl, ndot;
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/*
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|
* This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
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|
* done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
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* does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations.
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*
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* sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
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* be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
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* non-dot character.
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|
*/
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|
if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
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|
return -1;
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|
sl = 1; ndot = 0;
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p++;
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while (1) {
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char ch = *p++;
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if (sl) {
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if (ch == '.')
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ndot++;
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else if (ch == '/') {
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if (ndot < 3)
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/* reject //, /./ and /../ */
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|
return -1;
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|
|
ndot = 0;
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}
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|
else if (ch == 0) {
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|
|
if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
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|
|
/* reject /.$ and /..$ */
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|
|
return -1;
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|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
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|
|
sl = ndot = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
else if (ch == 0)
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|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
else if (ch == '/') {
|
|
|
|
sl = 1;
|
|
|
|
ndot = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char *path_ok(struct interp *itable)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static char rpath[PATH_MAX];
|
|
|
|
static char interp_path[PATH_MAX];
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *dir;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dir = itable[INTERP_SLOT_DIR].value;
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (avoid_alias(dir)) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': aliased", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*dir == '~') {
|
|
|
|
if (!user_path) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': User-path not allowed", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*user_path) {
|
|
|
|
/* Got either "~alice" or "~alice/foo";
|
|
|
|
* rewrite them to "~alice/%s" or
|
|
|
|
* "~alice/%s/foo".
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int namlen, restlen = strlen(dir);
|
|
|
|
char *slash = strchr(dir, '/');
|
|
|
|
if (!slash)
|
|
|
|
slash = dir + restlen;
|
|
|
|
namlen = slash - dir;
|
|
|
|
restlen -= namlen;
|
|
|
|
loginfo("userpath <%s>, request <%s>, namlen %d, restlen %d, slash <%s>", user_path, dir, namlen, restlen, slash);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(rpath, PATH_MAX, "%.*s/%s%.*s",
|
|
|
|
namlen, dir, user_path, restlen, slash);
|
|
|
|
dir = rpath;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (interpolated_path && saw_extended_args) {
|
|
|
|
if (*dir != '/') {
|
|
|
|
/* Allow only absolute */
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': Non-absolute path denied (interpolated-path active)", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
interpolate(interp_path, PATH_MAX, interpolated_path,
|
|
|
|
interp_table, ARRAY_SIZE(interp_table));
|
|
|
|
loginfo("Interpolated dir '%s'", interp_path);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dir = interp_path;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (base_path) {
|
|
|
|
if (*dir != '/') {
|
|
|
|
/* Allow only absolute */
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': Non-absolute path denied (base-path active)", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snprintf(rpath, PATH_MAX, "%s%s", base_path, dir);
|
|
|
|
dir = rpath;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
|
|
|
path = enter_repo(dir, strict_paths);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!path) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': unable to chdir or not a git archive", dir);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( ok_paths && *ok_paths ) {
|
|
|
|
char **pp;
|
|
|
|
int pathlen = strlen(path);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The validation is done on the paths after enter_repo
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
|
|
|
* appends optional {.git,.git/.git} and friends, but
|
|
|
|
* it does not use getcwd(). So if your /pub is
|
|
|
|
* a symlink to /mnt/pub, you can whitelist /pub and
|
|
|
|
* do not have to say /mnt/pub.
|
|
|
|
* Do not say /pub/.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
|
|
|
|
int len = strlen(*pp);
|
|
|
|
if (len <= pathlen &&
|
|
|
|
!memcmp(*pp, path, len) &&
|
|
|
|
(path[len] == '\0' ||
|
|
|
|
(!strict_paths && path[len] == '/')))
|
|
|
|
return path;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* be backwards compatible */
|
|
|
|
if (!strict_paths)
|
|
|
|
return path;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': not in whitelist", path);
|
|
|
|
return NULL; /* Fallthrough. Deny by default */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef int (*daemon_service_fn)(void);
|
|
|
|
struct daemon_service {
|
|
|
|
const char *name;
|
|
|
|
const char *config_name;
|
|
|
|
daemon_service_fn fn;
|
|
|
|
int enabled;
|
|
|
|
int overridable;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct daemon_service *service_looking_at;
|
|
|
|
static int service_enabled;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int git_daemon_config(const char *var, const char *value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(var, "daemon.", 7) &&
|
|
|
|
!strcmp(var + 7, service_looking_at->config_name)) {
|
|
|
|
service_enabled = git_config_bool(var, value);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we are not interested in parsing any other configuration here */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int run_service(struct interp *itable, struct daemon_service *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
|
|
|
int enabled = service->enabled;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
loginfo("Request %s for '%s'",
|
|
|
|
service->name,
|
|
|
|
itable[INTERP_SLOT_DIR].value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!enabled && !service->overridable) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': service not enabled.", service->name);
|
|
|
|
errno = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(path = path_ok(itable)))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Security on the cheap.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We want a readable HEAD, usable "objects" directory, and
|
|
|
|
* a "git-daemon-export-ok" flag that says that the other side
|
|
|
|
* is ok with us doing this.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* path_ok() uses enter_repo() and does whitelist checking.
|
|
|
|
* We only need to make sure the repository is exported.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': repository not exported.", path);
|
|
|
|
errno = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (service->overridable) {
|
|
|
|
service_looking_at = service;
|
|
|
|
service_enabled = -1;
|
|
|
|
git_config(git_daemon_config);
|
|
|
|
if (0 <= service_enabled)
|
|
|
|
enabled = service_enabled;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!enabled) {
|
|
|
|
logerror("'%s': service not enabled for '%s'",
|
|
|
|
service->name, path);
|
|
|
|
errno = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We'll ignore SIGTERM from now on, we have a
|
|
|
|
* good client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return service->fn();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int upload_pack(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Timeout as string */
|
|
|
|
char timeout_buf[64];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(timeout_buf, sizeof timeout_buf, "--timeout=%u", timeout);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* git-upload-pack only ever reads stuff, so this is safe */
|
|
|
|
execl_git_cmd("upload-pack", "--strict", timeout_buf, ".", NULL);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int upload_archive(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
execl_git_cmd("upload-archive", ".", NULL);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int receive_pack(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
execl_git_cmd("receive-pack", ".", NULL);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct daemon_service daemon_service[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ "upload-archive", "uploadarch", upload_archive, 0, 1 },
|
|
|
|
{ "upload-pack", "uploadpack", upload_pack, 1, 1 },
|
|
|
|
{ "receive-pack", "receivepack", receive_pack, 0, 1 },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void enable_service(const char *name, int ena) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(daemon_service); i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(daemon_service[i].name, name)) {
|
|
|
|
daemon_service[i].enabled = ena;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
die("No such service %s", name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void make_service_overridable(const char *name, int ena) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(daemon_service); i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(daemon_service[i].name, name)) {
|
|
|
|
daemon_service[i].overridable = ena;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
die("No such service %s", name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Separate the "extra args" information as supplied by the client connection.
|
|
|
|
* Any resulting data is squirreled away in the given interpolation table.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void parse_extra_args(struct interp *table, char *extra_args, int buflen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *val;
|
|
|
|
int vallen;
|
|
|
|
char *end = extra_args + buflen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (extra_args < end && *extra_args) {
|
|
|
|
saw_extended_args = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (strncasecmp("host=", extra_args, 5) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
val = extra_args + 5;
|
|
|
|
vallen = strlen(val) + 1;
|
|
|
|
if (*val) {
|
|
|
|
/* Split <host>:<port> at colon. */
|
|
|
|
char *host = val;
|
|
|
|
char *port = strrchr(host, ':');
|
|
|
|
if (port) {
|
|
|
|
*port = 0;
|
|
|
|
port++;
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(table, INTERP_SLOT_PORT, port);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(table, INTERP_SLOT_HOST, host);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* On to the next one */
|
|
|
|
extra_args = val + vallen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void fill_in_extra_table_entries(struct interp *itable)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *hp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Replace literal host with lowercase-ized hostname.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
hp = interp_table[INTERP_SLOT_HOST].value;
|
|
|
|
if (!hp)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for ( ; *hp; hp++)
|
|
|
|
*hp = tolower(*hp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Locate canonical hostname and its IP address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_IPV6
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo hints;
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo *ai, *ai0;
|
|
|
|
int gai;
|
|
|
|
static char addrbuf[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gai = getaddrinfo(interp_table[INTERP_SLOT_HOST].value, 0, &hints, &ai0);
|
|
|
|
if (!gai) {
|
|
|
|
for (ai = ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin_addr = (void *)ai->ai_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin_addr->sin_addr,
|
|
|
|
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(interp_table,
|
|
|
|
INTERP_SLOT_CANON_HOST, ai->ai_canonname);
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(interp_table,
|
|
|
|
INTERP_SLOT_IP, addrbuf);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
freeaddrinfo(ai0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hostent *hent;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sa;
|
|
|
|
char **ap;
|
|
|
|
static char addrbuf[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hent = gethostbyname(interp_table[INTERP_SLOT_HOST].value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ap = hent->h_addr_list;
|
|
|
|
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
|
|
|
|
sa.sin_family = hent->h_addrtype;
|
|
|
|
sa.sin_port = htons(0);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&sa.sin_addr, *ap, hent->h_length);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
inet_ntop(hent->h_addrtype, &sa.sin_addr,
|
|
|
|
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(interp_table, INTERP_SLOT_CANON_HOST, hent->h_name);
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(interp_table, INTERP_SLOT_IP, addrbuf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int execute(struct sockaddr *addr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static char line[1000];
|
|
|
|
int pktlen, len, i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (addr) {
|
|
|
|
char addrbuf[256] = "";
|
|
|
|
int port = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin_addr = (void *) addr;
|
|
|
|
inet_ntop(addr->sa_family, &sin_addr->sin_addr, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
|
|
|
|
port = sin_addr->sin_port;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_IPV6
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr && addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6_addr = (void *) addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *buf = addrbuf;
|
|
|
|
*buf++ = '['; *buf = '\0'; /* stpcpy() is cool */
|
|
|
|
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &sin6_addr->sin6_addr, buf, sizeof(addrbuf) - 1);
|
|
|
|
strcat(buf, "]");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
port = sin6_addr->sin6_port;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
loginfo("Connection from %s:%d", addrbuf, port);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alarm(init_timeout ? init_timeout : timeout);
|
|
|
|
pktlen = packet_read_line(0, line, sizeof(line));
|
|
|
|
alarm(0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(line);
|
|
|
|
if (pktlen != len)
|
|
|
|
loginfo("Extended attributes (%d bytes) exist <%.*s>",
|
|
|
|
(int) pktlen - len,
|
|
|
|
(int) pktlen - len, line + len + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (len && line[len-1] == '\n') {
|
|
|
|
line[--len] = 0;
|
|
|
|
pktlen--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialize the path interpolation table for this connection.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
interp_clear_table(interp_table, ARRAY_SIZE(interp_table));
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(interp_table, INTERP_SLOT_PERCENT, "%");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len != pktlen) {
|
|
|
|
parse_extra_args(interp_table, line + len + 1, pktlen - len - 1);
|
|
|
|
fill_in_extra_table_entries(interp_table);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(daemon_service); i++) {
|
|
|
|
struct daemon_service *s = &(daemon_service[i]);
|
|
|
|
int namelen = strlen(s->name);
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp("git-", line, 4) &&
|
|
|
|
!strncmp(s->name, line + 4, namelen) &&
|
|
|
|
line[namelen + 4] == ' ') {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note: The directory here is probably context sensitive,
|
|
|
|
* and might depend on the actual service being performed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
interp_set_entry(interp_table,
|
|
|
|
INTERP_SLOT_DIR, line + namelen + 5);
|
|
|
|
return run_service(interp_table, s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logerror("Protocol error: '%s'", line);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We count spawned/reaped separately, just to avoid any
|
|
|
|
* races when updating them from signals. The SIGCHLD handler
|
|
|
|
* will only update children_reaped, and the fork logic will
|
|
|
|
* only update children_spawned.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* MAX_CHILDREN should be a power-of-two to make the modulus
|
|
|
|
* operation cheap. It should also be at least twice
|
|
|
|
* the maximum number of connections we will ever allow.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_CHILDREN 128
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int max_connections = 25;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These are updated by the signal handler */
|
|
|
|
static volatile unsigned int children_reaped;
|
|
|
|
static pid_t dead_child[MAX_CHILDREN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These are updated by the main loop */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int children_spawned;
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int children_deleted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct child {
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid;
|
|
|
|
int addrlen;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage address;
|
|
|
|
} live_child[MAX_CHILDREN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void add_child(int idx, pid_t pid, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
live_child[idx].pid = pid;
|
|
|
|
live_child[idx].addrlen = addrlen;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&live_child[idx].address, addr, addrlen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Walk from "deleted" to "spawned", and remove child "pid".
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We move everything up by one, since the new "deleted" will
|
|
|
|
* be one higher.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void remove_child(pid_t pid, unsigned deleted, unsigned spawned)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct child n;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
deleted %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
spawned %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
if (live_child[deleted].pid == pid) {
|
|
|
|
live_child[deleted].pid = -1;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = live_child[deleted];
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
struct child m;
|
|
|
|
deleted = (deleted + 1) % MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
if (deleted == spawned)
|
|
|
|
die("could not find dead child %d\n", pid);
|
|
|
|
m = live_child[deleted];
|
|
|
|
live_child[deleted] = n;
|
|
|
|
if (m.pid == pid)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
n = m;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This gets called if the number of connections grows
|
|
|
|
* past "max_connections".
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We _should_ start off by searching for connections
|
|
|
|
* from the same IP, and if there is some address wth
|
|
|
|
* multiple connections, we should kill that first.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* As it is, we just "randomly" kill 25% of the connections,
|
|
|
|
* and our pseudo-random generator sucks too. I have no
|
|
|
|
* shame.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Really, this is just a place-holder for a _real_ algorithm.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void kill_some_children(int signo, unsigned start, unsigned stop)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
start %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
stop %= MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
while (start != stop) {
|
|
|
|
if (!(start & 3))
|
|
|
|
kill(live_child[start].pid, signo);
|
|
|
|
start = (start + 1) % MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void check_max_connections(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
int active;
|
|
|
|
unsigned spawned, reaped, deleted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spawned = children_spawned;
|
|
|
|
reaped = children_reaped;
|
|
|
|
deleted = children_deleted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (deleted < reaped) {
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = dead_child[deleted % MAX_CHILDREN];
|
|
|
|
remove_child(pid, deleted, spawned);
|
|
|
|
deleted++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
children_deleted = deleted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
active = spawned - deleted;
|
|
|
|
if (active <= max_connections)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Kill some unstarted connections with SIGTERM */
|
|
|
|
kill_some_children(SIGTERM, deleted, spawned);
|
|
|
|
if (active <= max_connections << 1)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the SIGTERM thing isn't helping use SIGKILL */
|
|
|
|
kill_some_children(SIGKILL, deleted, spawned);
|
|
|
|
sleep(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void handle(int incoming, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pid) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned idx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
close(incoming);
|
|
|
|
if (pid < 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
idx = children_spawned % MAX_CHILDREN;
|
|
|
|
children_spawned++;
|
|
|
|
add_child(idx, pid, addr, addrlen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
check_max_connections();
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dup2(incoming, 0);
|
|
|
|
dup2(incoming, 1);
|
|
|
|
close(incoming);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
exit(execute(addr));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void child_handler(int signo)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
int status;
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pid > 0) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned reaped = children_reaped;
|
|
|
|
dead_child[reaped % MAX_CHILDREN] = pid;
|
|
|
|
children_reaped = reaped + 1;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: Custom logging, since we don't wanna getpid() */
|
|
|
|
if (verbose) {
|
|
|
|
const char *dead = "";
|
|
|
|
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) > 0)
|
|
|
|
dead = " (with error)";
|
|
|
|
if (log_syslog)
|
|
|
|
syslog(LOG_INFO, "[%d] Disconnected%s", pid, dead);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[%d] Disconnected%s\n", pid, dead);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int set_reuse_addr(int sockfd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int on = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!reuseaddr)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
|
|
|
|
&on, sizeof(on));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_IPV6
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int socksetup(char *listen_addr, int listen_port, int **socklist_p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int socknum = 0, *socklist = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int maxfd = -1;
|
|
|
|
char pbuf[NI_MAXSERV];
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo hints, *ai0, *ai;
|
|
|
|
int gai;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sprintf(pbuf, "%d", listen_port);
|
|
|
|
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
|
|
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gai = getaddrinfo(listen_addr, pbuf, &hints, &ai0);
|
|
|
|
if (gai)
|
|
|
|
die("getaddrinfo() failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(gai));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (ai = ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
|
|
|
|
int sockfd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sockfd = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
|
|
|
|
if (sockfd < 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (sockfd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
|
|
|
|
error("too large socket descriptor.");
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
|
|
|
|
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
|
int on = 1;
|
|
|
|
setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY,
|
|
|
|
&on, sizeof(on));
|
|
|
|
/* Note: error is not fatal */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (set_reuse_addr(sockfd)) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (bind(sockfd, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
continue; /* not fatal */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (listen(sockfd, 5) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
continue; /* not fatal */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
socklist = xrealloc(socklist, sizeof(int) * (socknum + 1));
|
|
|
|
socklist[socknum++] = sockfd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (maxfd < sockfd)
|
|
|
|
maxfd = sockfd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
freeaddrinfo(ai0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*socklist_p = socklist;
|
|
|
|
return socknum;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else /* NO_IPV6 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int socksetup(char *listen_addr, int listen_port, int **socklist_p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
|
|
|
int sockfd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin);
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_port = htons(listen_port);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (listen_addr) {
|
|
|
|
/* Well, host better be an IP address here. */
|
|
|
|
if (inet_pton(AF_INET, listen_addr, &sin.sin_addr.s_addr) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (sockfd < 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (set_reuse_addr(sockfd)) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof sin) < 0 ) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (listen(sockfd, 5) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
close(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*socklist_p = xmalloc(sizeof(int));
|
|
|
|
**socklist_p = sockfd;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int service_loop(int socknum, int *socklist)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct pollfd *pfd;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pfd = xcalloc(socknum, sizeof(struct pollfd));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < socknum; i++) {
|
|
|
|
pfd[i].fd = socklist[i];
|
|
|
|
pfd[i].events = POLLIN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
signal(SIGCHLD, child_handler);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (poll(pfd, socknum, -1) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (errno != EINTR) {
|
|
|
|
error("poll failed, resuming: %s",
|
|
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
sleep(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < socknum; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (pfd[i].revents & POLLIN) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int sslen = sizeof(ss);
|
|
|
|
int incoming = accept(pfd[i].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, &sslen);
|
|
|
|
if (incoming < 0) {
|
|
|
|
switch (errno) {
|
|
|
|
case EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
case EINTR:
|
|
|
|
case ECONNABORTED:
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
die("accept returned %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
handle(incoming, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sslen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if any standard file descriptor is missing open it to /dev/null */
|
|
|
|
static void sanitize_stdfds(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0);
|
|
|
|
while (fd != -1 && fd < 2)
|
|
|
|
fd = dup(fd);
|
|
|
|
if (fd == -1)
|
|
|
|
die("open /dev/null or dup failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
if (fd > 2)
|
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void daemonize(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (fork()) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case -1:
|
|
|
|
die("fork failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (setsid() == -1)
|
|
|
|
die("setsid failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
close(0);
|
|
|
|
close(1);
|
|
|
|
close(2);
|
|
|
|
sanitize_stdfds();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void store_pid(const char *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FILE *f = fopen(path, "w");
|
|
|
|
if (!f)
|
|
|
|
die("cannot open pid file %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
fprintf(f, "%d\n", getpid());
|
|
|
|
fclose(f);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int serve(char *listen_addr, int listen_port, struct passwd *pass, gid_t gid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int socknum, *socklist;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
socknum = socksetup(listen_addr, listen_port, &socklist);
|
|
|
|
if (socknum == 0)
|
|
|
|
die("unable to allocate any listen sockets on host %s port %u",
|
|
|
|
listen_addr, listen_port);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pass && gid &&
|
|
|
|
(initgroups(pass->pw_name, gid) || setgid (gid) ||
|
|
|
|
setuid(pass->pw_uid)))
|
|
|
|
die("cannot drop privileges");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return service_loop(socknum, socklist);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int listen_port = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *listen_addr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int inetd_mode = 0;
|
|
|
|
const char *pid_file = NULL, *user_name = NULL, *group_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int detach = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct passwd *pass = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct group *group;
|
|
|
|
gid_t gid = 0;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Without this we cannot rely on waitpid() to tell
|
|
|
|
* what happened to our children.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
|
|
|
|
char *arg = argv[i];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--listen=", 9)) {
|
|
|
|
char *p = arg + 9;
|
|
|
|
char *ph = listen_addr = xmalloc(strlen(arg + 9) + 1);
|
|
|
|
while (*p)
|
|
|
|
*ph++ = tolower(*p++);
|
|
|
|
*ph = 0;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--port=", 7)) {
|
|
|
|
char *end;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
|
|
|
n = strtoul(arg+7, &end, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (arg[7] && !*end) {
|
|
|
|
listen_port = n;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--inetd")) {
|
|
|
|
inetd_mode = 1;
|
|
|
|
log_syslog = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--verbose")) {
|
|
|
|
verbose = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--syslog")) {
|
|
|
|
log_syslog = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--export-all")) {
|
|
|
|
export_all_trees = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--timeout=", 10)) {
|
|
|
|
timeout = atoi(arg+10);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--init-timeout=", 15)) {
|
|
|
|
init_timeout = atoi(arg+15);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--strict-paths")) {
|
|
|
|
strict_paths = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--base-path=", 12)) {
|
|
|
|
base_path = arg+12;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--interpolated-path=", 20)) {
|
|
|
|
interpolated_path = arg+20;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--reuseaddr")) {
|
|
|
|
reuseaddr = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--user-path")) {
|
|
|
|
user_path = "";
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--user-path=", 12)) {
|
|
|
|
user_path = arg + 12;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--pid-file=", 11)) {
|
|
|
|
pid_file = arg + 11;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--detach")) {
|
|
|
|
detach = 1;
|
|
|
|
log_syslog = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--user=", 7)) {
|
|
|
|
user_name = arg + 7;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--group=", 8)) {
|
|
|
|
group_name = arg + 8;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--enable=", 9)) {
|
|
|
|
enable_service(arg + 9, 1);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--disable=", 10)) {
|
|
|
|
enable_service(arg + 10, 0);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--allow-override=", 17)) {
|
|
|
|
make_service_overridable(arg + 17, 1);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(arg, "--forbid-override=", 18)) {
|
|
|
|
make_service_overridable(arg + 18, 0);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(arg, "--")) {
|
|
|
|
ok_paths = &argv[i+1];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else if (arg[0] != '-') {
|
|
|
|
ok_paths = &argv[i];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
usage(daemon_usage);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (inetd_mode && (group_name || user_name))
|
|
|
|
die("--user and --group are incompatible with --inetd");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (inetd_mode && (listen_port || listen_addr))
|
|
|
|
die("--listen= and --port= are incompatible with --inetd");
|
|
|
|
else if (listen_port == 0)
|
|
|
|
listen_port = DEFAULT_GIT_PORT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (group_name && !user_name)
|
|
|
|
die("--group supplied without --user");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (user_name) {
|
|
|
|
pass = getpwnam(user_name);
|
|
|
|
if (!pass)
|
|
|
|
die("user not found - %s", user_name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!group_name)
|
|
|
|
gid = pass->pw_gid;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
group = getgrnam(group_name);
|
|
|
|
if (!group)
|
|
|
|
die("group not found - %s", group_name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gid = group->gr_gid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (log_syslog) {
|
|
|
|
openlog("git-daemon", 0, LOG_DAEMON);
|
|
|
|
set_die_routine(daemon_die);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strict_paths && (!ok_paths || !*ok_paths))
|
|
|
|
die("option --strict-paths requires a whitelist");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (inetd_mode) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr *peer = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
|
|
|
|
socklen_t slen = sizeof(ss);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
freopen("/dev/null", "w", stderr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (getpeername(0, peer, &slen))
|
|
|
|
peer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return execute(peer);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (detach)
|
|
|
|
daemonize();
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sanitize_stdfds();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pid_file)
|
|
|
|
store_pid(pid_file);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return serve(listen_addr, listen_port, pass, gid);
|
|
|
|
}
|