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/*
* I'm tired of doing "vsnprintf()" etc just to open a
* file, so here's a "return static buffer with printf"
* interface for paths.
*
* It's obviously not thread-safe. Sue me. But it's quite
* useful for doing things like
*
* f = open(mkpath("%s/%s.git", base, name), O_RDONLY);
*
* which is what it's designed for.
*/
#include "cache.h"
static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
static char *get_pathname(void)
{
static char pathname_array[4][PATH_MAX];
static int index;
return pathname_array[3 & ++index];
}
static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
{
/* Clean it up */
if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
path += 2;
while (*path == '/')
path++;
}
return path;
}
char *mkpath(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
unsigned len;
char *pathname = get_pathname();
va_start(args, fmt);
len = vsnprintf(pathname, PATH_MAX, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (len >= PATH_MAX)
return bad_path;
return cleanup_path(pathname);
}
char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
{
const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
char *pathname = get_pathname();
va_list args;
unsigned len;
len = strlen(git_dir);
if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
return bad_path;
memcpy(pathname, git_dir, len);
if (len && git_dir[len-1] != '/')
pathname[len++] = '/';
va_start(args, fmt);
len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (len >= PATH_MAX)
return bad_path;
return cleanup_path(pathname);
}
/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
{
char *env, *pch = path;
if ((env = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL) {
strcpy(pch, "/tmp/");
len -= 5;
pch += 5;
} else {
size_t n = snprintf(pch, len, "%s/", env);
len -= n;
pch += n;
}
strlcpy(pch, template, len);
return mkstemp(path);
}
int validate_symref(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
char *buf, buffer[256];
int len, fd;
if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
return -1;
/* Make sure it is a "refs/.." symlink */
if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buffer, 5))
return 0;
return -1;
}
/*
* Anything else, just open it and try to see if it is a symbolic ref.
*/
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
len = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
close(fd);
/*
* Is it a symbolic ref?
*/
if (len < 4 || memcmp("ref:", buffer, 4))
return -1;
buf = buffer + 4;
len -= 4;
while (len && isspace(*buf))
buf++, len--;
if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buf, 5))
return 0;
return -1;
}
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
{
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
struct passwd *pw;
char *slash;
int len, baselen;
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
if (!path || path[0] != '~')
return NULL;
path++;
slash = strchr(path, '/');
if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
}
else {
if (slash) {
*slash = 0;
pw = getpwnam(path);
*slash = '/';
}
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
else
pw = getpwnam(path);
}
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
return NULL;
baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
buf[baselen-1] = 0;
baselen--;
}
if (slash && slash[1]) {
len = strlen(slash);
if (sz <= baselen + len)
return NULL;
memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
}
return buf;
}
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
/*
* First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
*
* (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
* done. Otherwise:
* (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
* (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
* (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
* (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
*
* Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
* "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order. The first one that exists is
* what we try.
*
* Second, we try chdir() to that. Upon failure, we return NULL.
*
* Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
* Upon failure, we return NULL.
*
* If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
* before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
* links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
* except DWIM suffixing.
*/
char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
{
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
if (!path)
return NULL;
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
if (!strict) {
static const char *suffix[] = {
".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
};
int len = strlen(path);
int i;
while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
path[len-1] = 0;
len--;
}
if (PATH_MAX <= len)
return NULL;
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
if (path[0] == '~') {
if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
return NULL;
strcpy(validated_path, path);
path = used_path;
}
else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
return NULL;
else {
path = strcpy(used_path, path);
strcpy(validated_path, path);
}
len = strlen(path);
for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
break;
}
}
if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
return NULL;
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
path = validated_path;
}
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
else if (chdir(path))
return NULL;
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
validate_symref("HEAD") == 0) {
putenv("GIT_DIR=.");
check_repository_format();
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation. The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
19 years ago
return path;
}
return NULL;
}
int adjust_shared_perm(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
int mode;
if (!shared_repository)
return 0;
if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
return -1;
mode = st.st_mode;
if (mode & S_IRUSR)
mode |= (shared_repository == PERM_GROUP
? S_IRGRP
: (shared_repository == PERM_EVERYBODY
? (S_IRGRP|S_IROTH)
: 0));
if (mode & S_IWUSR)
mode |= S_IWGRP;
if (mode & S_IXUSR)
mode |= (shared_repository == PERM_GROUP
? S_IXGRP
: (shared_repository == PERM_EVERYBODY
? (S_IXGRP|S_IXOTH)
: 0));
if (S_ISDIR(mode))
mode |= S_ISGID;
if ((mode & st.st_mode) != mode && chmod(path, mode) < 0)
return -2;
return 0;
}